

Manifesting The Many In The One

**On Knowing the Irreducible Complexities of Self, Other, and World through
Singular Reduction and Diversifying Plurality**

(An Archetypal Epistemology of Inclusive Understanding)

Leslie M. Emery

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Introduction

Composing an Archetypal Approach to Knowing as a Conjunction of Reductive and Non-Reductive Epistemic Methods

This writing presents an analysis of modes of knowing that distinguishes between reductive and non-reductive ways of differentiating status. This elemental contrast in how ‘things’ are known is also characterized as an exclusive or singular mode of identification versus an inclusive or plural one. From this perspective, status can be asserted as exclusively singular or as inclusively plural, the latter being composed of various component or overlapping statuses. In essence, an archetypal distinction is being made between two general epistemic logics or modes for representing the existent status of entities and phenomenon. The term epistemic is defined as “of, relating to, or involving knowledge: cognitive (Am. Heritage Dict. ’96, 619).” The term archetypal is used to indicate characteristic tendencies rather than absolutely different, utterly unrelated processes of cognition. Such an analytical approach is not concerned so much with ‘hard and fast’ categorical differences but more with general tendencies that are distinguishable even though they can be intrinsically related. Thus these archetypal modes of knowing are approached here as both antithetical epistemologies (or ways of knowing) and as aspects of a continuum of human understanding.

Human attitudes about ‘how things are’ that tend to identify objects and events as fixed, separate, and exclusively singular, are regarded as composing the archetypally reductive mode. Such assumption about the status of things, persons, and reality as essentially simple is posed here as the more reflexive or ordinary mode of conscious knowing, and thus the dominant mode of defining status. How such reductive understanding interacts with an evident and contrasting human mode of knowing the status of things as intrinsically complex and plural is a primary concern of this study. That interaction between reductive and non-reductive knowing is found to serve an intrinsic human need to know wholeness, completeness, or unity in some overtly inclusive or plural manner, particularly one that does not reduce diversity and individuality to simplistic, singular conditions or rigidly hierarchical relations. Again, it is because these epistemic modes of knowing and understanding are determined to be intimately interdependent they are termed archetypal rather than represented as two fixed archetypes of epistemological process.

Examining these archetypal modes of knowing involves presenting a broad perspective on how humans know diversity of self, others, and the world inclusively or non-reductively, as well as why such knowing is important to the ‘fullness’ of personal, social, and cultural life. The topic of this study thus becomes the interplay of knowing existence as particularized variety or diversity that also has commonality—or as having ‘many-ness in one-ness.’ From the perspectives of both ordinarily practical

assumptions and scientifically material reasoning, such a pluralistic status of knowing and understanding tends to be considered as un-realistic or ‘merely metaphorical.’ Categories of human expressions of ‘how things are’ that contrast with the reductive, habitually singular mode of knowing (such as art, myth, and even some abstractions of scientific theory) and their ‘valid status’ as modes of knowing thus become central topics in this study. Epistemology, as that “branch of philosophy that studies the nature of knowledge and its extent and validity (Am. Heritage Dictionary ’86, 619),” tends to be conducted in the more reductive mode of understanding. Yet this analysis, in so far as it is a study of the differences between *and* the interplay *of* reductive and non-reductive epistemics, must somehow convey more than a primarily reductive interpretation of that relationship.

The very attempt to distinguish these modes of knowing immediately presents one with a contradiction. Despite the claim made above that more ordinary knowing tends to compose identity and understanding in singularly reductive terms, knowing ‘an entity’ non-reductively (as variously composed of differing and non-identical aspects) can also be considered as an inherent commonplace of everyday experience. William James asserted this notion of the participation of ‘things’ in ‘other things’ in his attempts to relate the reductive philosophy of psychological theory to practical experience.

Take any concrete finite thing and try to hold it fast. You cannot, for so held, it proves not to be concrete at all, but an arbitrary extract or abstract which you have made from the remainder of empirical reality. The rest of things invades and overflows both it and you together, and defeats your rash attempt. Any partial view whatever of the world tears the part out of its relations, leaves out some truth concerning it, is untrue of it, falsifies it. The full truth about anything involves more than that thing. [. . .] There is a dialectic movement in things, if such it please you to call it, one that the whole constitution of concrete life establishes [. . .]. (James 670)

Such a notion of a “dialectic movement in things,” whereby they tend to over-lap and co-generate each other, establishes a conceptual basis for their participatory mutuality, or ‘co-participation’ in/as each other and thus the continuum of totality. A flower is ‘a thing’ yet it is also an association of petals, the light that reflects its colors, and even, so far as it is humanly known, a ‘thing’ of perception and cognition. The experience of particular things as both distinct and not distinct from each other gets expressed in the way language is used to distinguish categories of identity: humans are animals and yet not animals, are both genetically determined biological systems *and* radically diverse personalities of immaterial consciousness. Language is used to describe a given thing as itself and also as ‘of’ another thing, which is also ‘of yet other things.’ Thus there arises a paradox of separate yet overlapping identities. On one side of the paradox is a world of separate parts or fragments. On the other side a world of interconnected, inseparable continuities. This is the paradox of reductive and non-reductive, or exclusive and inclusive epistemic methods for knowing. It is inherent in the very definition of identity.

1. The collective aspect of the set of characteristics by which a thing is definitely recognizable or known.
2. The set of behavioral or personal characteristics by which an individual is

recognizable as a member of a group. 3. The quality or condition of being exactly the same as something else. 4. The quality or condition of being or remaining the same. 5. The personality of an individual regarded as a persisting entity (American Heritage Dictionary, '78, 654).

It appears evident here that the term or concept identity is utilized to refer to both inclusive sets of references and reductively singular states. The term's etymological source in the Latin *idem*, meaning "the same," indicates an inherent reductivity in the 'act' of 'identifying.' However, it is informative to note that if one 'thing' is 'the same' as another 'thing,' yet the two 'things' are not a single 'thing,' then the 'identified' 'sameness' is constituted by a 'plurality.' Identity might be singular and unique, yet derives from multiple components.

It is evident from cross-cultural anthropology that human's exhibit a persistent impulse or need to experience this paradox of separateness and connectedness *as a an inclusive unity*—to know it as 'a' whole or totality. That impulse is closely related here with the concepts of plurality and pluralism. The former is defined as "relating to or composed of more than one member, set or kind," and the latter as, "a condition of society in which numerous distinct ethnic, religious, or cultural groups coexist within one nation; the holding by one person of more than one position or office [. . .]; the doctrine that reality is composed of many ultimate substances; the belief that no single explanatory system or view of reality can account for all the phenomena of life (Am. Heritage Dict. '85, 955)."

However, providing a self-consistent rationale for how one knows a status of 'diversity in singularity' or 'irreducible plurality' requires an argument of great complexity because it must somehow 'mirror' the dynamics of this ordinarily paradoxical knowing. Thus such an argument cannot progress in a typically linear fashion, through a series of dependent assertions, to 'a single' conclusion. It requires an argument of arguments, or analysis of analyses that, taken together, provide a reasonable basis for a non-linear, non-reductive reasoning suitable to validating the reality of inclusive knowing. Thus this writing presents a sort of trans-disciplinary fugue of theoretical constructs and evidentiary presentations across a variety of intellectual disciplines of thought and analysis. In relation to the polyphonic structure of a musical fugue, these distinctive modes of analysis and interpretation are presented to elaborate a theme-- that of how humans approach knowing through both singularity and multiplicity. As such, each is engaged as a 'separate voice of reasoning' and also 'in concert,' as composing a contrapuntal chorus that articulates 'a rationale' of knowing inclusively (or non-reductively). The theme that both holds these associations together and apart can be described as the (non-reductive) mediation of reductive and non-reductive modes of knowing. Thus a third archetypal mode of knowing or epistemic method is considered that is inclusive of the singular and pluralistic ones. In the terms of ordinarily reductive reasoning, the result of constellating these differing analyses becomes a deliberately self-contradictory rationalization of how knowing diversity non-reductively can be, in some valid sense, an 'inconclusively conclusive way of

knowing.’ Thus much that ordinarily appears as irrational will be presented here as ‘quite reasonable’ given a certain set of references.

The How of Writing about the How of Pluralistic Knowing in Reductive Terms

There are two immediate practical difficulties encountered in this attempt to explain how humans know irreducible many-ness in/as one-ness. In one regard, seeking to explicate the essentially non-linear reasoning of such knowing in linear terms is problematic given the restrictions of discursive language usage and the rules of reductive logic. The commonly available intellectual discourse is not suitable to such conventionally ‘improper’ reasoning. This conflict is exemplified in the very difficulty of rationally analyzing language itself: how is one to make linearly logical sense of the actual complexities of language with all its contextual, conditional and cultural dependencies? Randy Allen Harris, in examining how the ‘science of language’ known as linguistics ‘breaks’ its subject into different parts, asserts such analysis must impose limitations upon itself and its subject.

Every science needs to rope off those phenomena for which it can reasonably generate explanatory theories. Nature, it has been clear since at least Heraclitus, is in dizzying flux, abuzz with colliding, chaotic, blurred events; it is a universe of infinitesimal detail and immeasurable vastness. Our senses have adapted to this by tuning to only a tiny range of those events, the ones most relevant to our survival and propagation. We see only a certain narrow band of light frequencies, hear only a small range of sound, smell and taste and feel only the grossest of data. Everything else we filter off, ignore. Sciences do exactly the same thing. Collectively they have overcome many corporeal limitations, augmenting our senses astonishingly well, but they also make even more exclusive choices than our senses. Even in the outlandishly general schemes of some physicists, currently working on a Theory of Everything, only the narrowest of phenomena would be covered; a Theory of Everything would not explain, for instance, a moth drawn to a flame, a wolf baying at the moon, a physicist writing a grant proposal. Nor should it. Science, like any other form of apprehending the world, would be impossible without its self-imposed limits (Harris, Linguistic Wars 7).

Commensurate with this thought, an analysis of inclusive understanding or non-reductive knowing must impose some limits upon itself also. Yet these limits stand in some contrast to those of scientifically exclusive investigation. The ‘narrowing down’ and ‘fragmenting of wholes into parts’ that typifies scientific analysis seeks understanding *in terms of* such categorically separated and mechanically related parts. Thus linguistic analysis does not tend to approach language ‘as a whole,’ but rather in the exclusive mode of scientific quantification and mechanism. Such epistemic method obscures understanding of the dynamical character of language as some totality. As the title of Harris’ book (The Linguistic Wars) indicates, study of differentiated ‘parts’ of language has resulted in often-virulent argument about whose description of what part most accurately and importantly defines language.

To unreflectively apply this exclusive method and the reductive terms of the ‘language of science’ to an analysis of inclusive knowing would limit capacity to understand its holistic dynamical character. The language of an analysis of inclusive knowing cannot rely upon simply self-consistent rationalization and ordinarily reductive language usage if its subject is to be accurately described. The dynamical character of that subject cannot be distinguished by such description so must rather, somehow, elucidate its subject in a non-reductive manner. If what linguists are describing is not Language but ‘parts of linguistic activity,’ then an analysis of inclusive epistemics must be wary of seeking to ‘break it down’ into separate parts with linear relations *as if it were* an exclusively reductive mode of knowing. And yet, in so far as this is ‘an analysis’ it must restrict itself also to representing the inclusive or non-reductive mode of knowing in a most reasonable manner. In short, this analysis must be both non-reductive and rationally valid.

In another regard, this writing about the ‘how’ of inclusive knowing is complicated by necessary reference to theories and assertions taken from diverse intellectual disciplines. Those concepts tend to be composed as reductively rational concepts expressed in specialized terminologies that derive their meanings in relation to intricately complex and diverse intellectual histories of development. In addition then to eluding the limitations of habitually reductive discourse, the topic at hand further demands deploying a language usage that maintains progressive reasoning while also manifesting a multi-factorial concurrency of diverse or non-identical theories and rationales. Such a discourse needs convey the complexity of metaphorical poetic diction yet still be reasonably discursive in correlating multiple academic disciplines. These requirements are approached here through various stylistic modes deployed to defer reflexively reductive or singular usage of words and concepts. Utilizing specialized disciplinary insights about knowing requires composing a trans-disciplinary representation correlating diverse contexts for rational analysis and theoretical interpretation. The challenge is to do so yet retain adequate sophistication without either relying on obscure terms or implying a simplistic reduction or ultimate hierarchy of truth and accuracy among those references. Performing that task in a systematically encyclopedic manner would require volumes. Here it is attempted through selections from diverse works concerned with the themes of singularity and plurality, simplicity and complexity that are correlated in multiple associations. To ‘speak about’ the ‘how’ of knowing specifically, variously and inclusively *all at once* is thus not a ‘straight forward’ task—rather, it is elliptical, ‘ambi-valent,’ and constellatory in its associations. One can imagine the difficulties implicit in encountering such concurrent reasoning as ‘thinking in four dimensions’ such that ones references are dispersed in both space and time. As an archetypal analysis, this study is more concerned with elucidating the varied ways the perspectives of one-ness and many-ness, singularity and plurality configure human experience, knowing, and expression than composing a neatly ordered epistemological theory.

Thereby, though this text purports to be both philosophically and psychologically sophisticated, it does not present its issues in a typically uniform and progressive manner. And further, for the sake of enabling trans-disciplinary engagement, specialized terminologies from the broad range of intellectual disciplines referenced are subsumed into a more generally accessible vocabulary. However, that vocabulary is deployed to manifest an expression of intricate interrelations between diverse disciplinary methodologies and interpretations. There are two aspects to this transdisciplinary presentation. The first is an extended introduction to the ‘fugue’ of this conceptual chorus that has been composed in the most accessible terms possible and with a minimum of references or citations. The second aspect is a series of exemplary explorations of notions about knowing complexly taken from a variety of disciplines of study. That second part involves an accumulative usage of terms derived from cited authors to compose a composite set of references for knowing how knowing is configured in singular and pluralistic, or exclusive and inclusive ways. In consort, these strategies aim to constellate a sort of palimpsest of ‘lines of reasoning’ and divergent expressions that can, when in essence ‘read all at once,’ enable a reasonable validation of a non-reductive status for knowing the multiplicity of singularity—or the irreducible diversity of self, other, and world.

The reading of this work is not likely to be less exasperating than was the writing of it. Frustration and confusion arise as inevitable responses to attempts at rationalizing what appears, to the reductively conditioned standards of conclusive conventional rationalization, as quite simply irrational, absurd, or unreal. There is an inherent impropriety to such thinking. It is marginal or liminal in relation to ordinary assumptions—indeed, it necessarily ‘must be so.’ The inconsistent character of language usage and descriptive phrasing employed here to represent the concurrently diverse status of being and conceptual understanding that constitute such knowing can be confusing and irritating. But the purpose of this style is to allow the varied concepts to be *encountered variously*—in diverse associations and combinations. Establishing this epistemological perspective necessarily requires presenting extremely complicated analyses and concepts in grossly brief descriptions to allow them to be ‘pushed up against each other.’ But an appropriate sense of their inherent complexities is preserved in the varied and recombinant associations of these concepts. Thus the reader is implored to persevere despite the convoluted structure of this presentation, its repetitions, and often seemingly unsophisticated terminology. Since ‘the argument’ being articulated is not inherently linear and progressive, its ‘parts’ could be, and are, presented in differing sequences and contexts of association. There is a sort of ‘zig-zagging’ or looping progression to its arrangement. Thus a reader does not necessarily have to fully comprehend every wording or context of illustration. The principle associations and notions of this ‘fugue of reasonings’ are repeated variously so that these can be accessible in different ways. Whether one reads this text start to finish or ‘jumps about’ in it according to an intuitive sequencing of its parts might just indicate how a given reader needs to ‘ingest’ such a complex of concepts about irreducibly complex knowing.

The methodology of this analysis is essentially archetypal rather than definitively reductive. It seeks to elucidate inherent characteristics or patterns of knowing and expressing rather than to establish absolute truths and singular standards for accuracy in defining what is known and how. Rather than seeking to be exact in terms of quantification and definition it attempts to be precise in determining the dynamical character of knowing through singularity and multiplicity. Conceiving and representing such precision tends to frustrate and even offend ordinarily composed expectations about identity, reality, and truth. Thus the reader is implored not only to persist despite encountering an irresolution to the conceptual and linguistic aspects of the presentation, but also to be aware of how his or her own resistance to it arises—for such resistance appears integral to acknowledging the reasoning articulated here. These insights and perspectives are not the sort that ordinary socialized attitudes are prone to accept or embrace—most particularly because of their non-ordinary philosophical and psychological implications about identity and reality. Frustration with reading this text and resistance to its assertions are expected, as these appear inherent in the very processes of consciousness here elaborated.

Part of the difficulty of this text derives from the essentially discursive analytical examination applied to its topic. That mode tends to construe this particular subject in terms that obscure its dynamical character—tending to ‘linear-ize’ what is radically complex and literalize what is inherently figurative and symbolically referential. The standard format of discourse required for a ‘logical discussion’ renders the ‘thingless things’ of thought and concept just as positivistically as do definitive representations of books and rivers. Words in rational argumentation tend to be taken as having singular meanings or literally representing what is described. Such definitive description tends to ‘materialize’ concepts and the ‘activity’ of phenomena in such a way that obscures how language is always figurative and referential. Thus various methods are deployed here to subvert such reductively literalizing inferences in the discourse engaged. To maintain awareness of the psycho-logical character of epistemic processes and the reflexively metaphysical dynamic of meaning-making within the inherently figurative, non-literalistic character of language, the text of this study makes frequent use of singular quotation marks to counterbalance the reductive mode of its deductive style of discourse. The single quotation marks are not meant to convey irony but rather to resist singular or literalistic interpretation of the words and phrases used. These quotation marks are employed as parenthetical reminders of the inherently figurative and polysemous quality of even the most denotational, literalistic, and equational language usage—and how meaning can be singularized or pluralized by contextual references. Double quotation marks are used to identify notions and terms specific to the theories and terminology of cited authors (to designate actual quotations), in an effort to maintain the contextual references for those terms throughout the text. In a related maneuver, words modified with prefixes such as non-, un-, and re- are often hyphenated to emphasize their ‘re-configuring’ dynamic of meaning making. Compound or composite words are also hyphenated at times to emphasize the transformative activity of their compounding. Compound words are

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also sometimes separated to re-context their component meanings (sensibility thus becomes sense ability). The manifestation of the many-ness in one-ness implied by this work's title is nowhere more present yet unacknowledged as in language and its usage.

The epistemic modes of exclusive reduction and inclusive pluralization are represented here by an unconventional usage of printed symbols. Reductive dyads or pairs are considered to be binary oppositions, such as 'black versus white,' whereas contrasting but related or interactive pairings are considered somehow complimentary. The difference in these associations is represented schematically by two arrangements of arrow brackets. Pairs of these brackets shown pointed toward each other thusly $> <$ are intended to designate oppositional association (black $>$ $<$ white), those shown pointed away from each other thusly $< >$ are employed to indicate a complimentary status of interactive co-participation (human $<$ $>$ nature). However, depending upon the perspective taken, many dyadic pairs can be approached in either way, as opposed or complimentary. Thus categorical statuses of real and un-real can be associated oppositionally as real $>$ $<$ un-real, or complementarily as real $<$ $>$ un-real. Again, these stylistic maneuvers might prove irritating and confusing to readers. But such representation seems inevitable in efforts to actually 'conceive' the logic of inclusive knowing by extending the reasoning of rational analysis beyond exclusive conclusions.

Chapter 1

The Quandary of the Many in the One:

An Orientation To Parsing Singularity and Plurality in Knowing

An Approach to some Boundaries of Knowings

Attempts to 'make sense' of the 'ways we make sense' of human experience as perception, cognition, and expression assert various epistemological, philosophical, and psychological distinctions about how we know what we know and even about what is knowable. Quite different sorts of distinctions between 'ways of knowing' can be posed. This analysis of reductive and non-reductive epistemic references for knowing derives from a boundary posed between knowing based upon identifying discreet, exclusive entities, and knowing by way of groups or constellations of elements and references. That boundary and the relations between the categories of knowing it poses, are developed here by examining their archetypal characteristics as expressed in such status-distinguishing dyads as one-ness and many-ness, singularity and plurality, exclusivity and inclusivity, reductivity and non-reductivity, linearity and constellation, the ordinary and non-ordinary, literalistic and non-positivistic, real and un-real. Examination of knowing by way of such contrasts elucidates the difficulty of knowing self, other, and world as both particular, discrete entities and also as irreducibly complex and radically diverse statuses of being. Such complexity of knowing is shown to involve a status composed through inclusive, pluralistic, and constellatory methods of association that intrinsically confound status asserted in reference to exclusive, singular, and positivistic criteria.

Exploration of these contrasting modes of knowing indicate that the boundaries of the 'ordinarily real' are associated with reductive one-ness and singularity. Knowing self, other, and world as irreducible complexity and radical diversity (associated with many-ness and plurality) is thus 'out of bounds' to such a context for ordinary status. It is marginal or 'at the edges of' the typical, proper references for asserting valid status. Transition from the singular status of ordinary knowing to a more pluralistic one thus requires some significant transgression of the boundaries for reflexively ordinary states of consciousness, identity, reality, and truth. A kind of inversion of central and peripheral references is required. That boundary is typified by distinctions between 'realistic' and unrealistic representation of 'how things are.' Myth, art, dream, fiction, poetry, and fantasy are associated with the un-real states of representations. In the following discussion such expression will be associated with more inclusive, non-reductive modes of knowing.

This book is thus in essence about the boundary between knowing self, other, and world as singular or ordinarily real statuses *and also* as some non-ordinarily real statuses that are more diverse or inclusive

than the ordinary ones. It explores how that divide is manifested in human expressions as well as how that gap is effectively transgressed in attaining some status of inclusive knowing of a totality that ‘incorporates’ the contrast of such seemingly contradictory statuses. In so doing, it must examine knowing by abstract, analytical methods of rational analysis that assert definitive states of being as well as experiential encounters with overwhelming complexity and diversity. Thus it presents a consideration of methods humans use to know self, other, and world in ways that can *include* radical diversities, irreducible complexities, logical contradictions, or ordinarily possible and impossible phenomena, all as somehow concurrently valid. That inclusivity involves transgression of many typical cultural and societal distinctions, like those posed by the good versus the bad, the tame and the wild, the true and the false—even the real and unreal. Such complex knowing is represented by the phrase ‘manifesting the many *in* the one’ with its suggestion of irreducible diversity. Thus this writing is concerned with how humans know the variousness of being and experience as some totality—without reducing it to mechanistic explanations or singular definitions of simple one-ness-es.

This investigation proceeds then from the assumption that there are ways of knowing which are more reductive or exclusive in representing aspects of totality in contrast to those which are more inclusive of inherent contrast and diversity. The thesis developed here is that the more inclusive modes require propositions and experience that contradict the more typical or ordinary assumptions people and societies employ to define identity and reality. Thus the more inclusive modalities of knowing will intrinsically appear as invalid or unreal to ordinary perspectives. Engaging this investigation of how the ordinarily un-real enables knowing inclusively commences with examining some elemental contrast in framing paradigms for knowing or establishing epistemic distinctions. Stated reductively, this contrast is between knowing by singular one-ness in contrast to knowing by plural many-ness: as ‘an entity’ or as ‘a complex of elements.’

However, stating that contrast inclusively or non-reductively cannot be done as an antithetical opposition. Rather, it requires posing an interdependent, complimentary dynamic of mutuality between reductive statuses of one-ness and non-reductive statuses of many-ness. The challenge faced here is to represent the complexity of that mutuality in linearly rational, thus reflexively reductive discourse. That challenge must be met convincingly if the ‘reality’ of inclusive knowing is to be validated by a social mentality reflexively identified with the reductive model of mechanistic materialism as its standard for evaluating valid existence. As it turns out, the distinctions between reductive and non-reductive knowing are more psychological and philosophical than physical or mathematical. Thus their elucidation requires not only a rigorously indefinite language usage (to avoid reduction) but also references to a broad array of intellectual disciplines. It requires a trans-disciplinary perspective in order to demonstrate that inclusive knowing is actually valid even in the terms of more reductively rationalist perspective. The themes of this discussion could be presented in the specialized terms of discourse in rational philosophy, post-

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structuralist critical theory, literary theory, semiotics, or depth psychology. But the effort to facilitate a meta-correlation of multiple discourses of knowledge appropriate to validating the ‘reality’ of unreality required for inclusive knowing imposes reliance upon a broadly accessible vocabulary rather than the specialized terms of any of disciplinary analyses here implied and invoked. This attempt to ‘translate’ many discourses into a sort of chorus or fugue of complimentary association also imposes a certain circularity or spiraling upon the ‘progress’ of this presentation. Topics are approached repeatedly from differing perspectives to provide a non-reductive correlation. The reader is implored to bear with the frustrating difficulties of presenting an adequate if brief overview of this topic by way of introduction to the actual study of ‘inclusive knowing.’ This introduction outlines concepts about exclusive and inclusive knowing in general terms that are amplified in relation to specific disciplinary discourses in subsequent chapters.

Differentiating Aspects of Totality and the Impulse to Assert a Unified Perspective on what is Real and How to Know It

There are many sets of criteria for differentiating and thusly knowing, identifying and assigning meaning to the particularity of the things, persons, and phenomena that constitute the totality of human experience and thought—as self, other, and world. Sets of such criteria are deployed as categories for differentiating status, as well as for distinguishing relations between those categories—such as the categories human and non-human, herbivore and carnivore. Such criteria and the other categories they are used to define can order cultural beliefs and become formulated as societal structures, scientific theories, philosophical principles, religious doctrines, and even personal identity structures. These criteria and the differentiations drawn from them about ‘how things are’ readily become habitual references. Such reflexive distinctions assert powerful influence over how one knows and identifies self, other, and world—as human or animal, organic or inorganic, male or female, Christian or Muslim, master or slave, for instance. These criteria sets often constitute paradigms for description, explanation, and understanding that permeate and even configure patterns of human consciousness. The resulting parameters for what can be known by whom and how are often used to assert an absolute claim to validity and thus to compete for the greater dominance of influence in society about what is right, true, and real. Thus even in a given cultural context there are often competing frames of reference for valid knowing. One set of criteria asserts that the earth orbits the sun, for instance. Yet people still reflexively assert another frame of reference for understanding the diurnal cycle by stating that the sun ‘rises’ and ‘sets’ over the earth. Two other sets of contemporary criteria support the contrasting propositions about the origins of biological life. According to one, life evolved from single cell organisms through natural selection. According to another it was created by supernatural intention. Each explanation represents a valid reality according to different

criteria for knowing causation—by way of faith in materialistic science or religious belief in divine intervention.

Contrasts between parameters for knowings of self, other and world (such as the scientific versus the religious), often threaten each other's validity when experienced as competitive. Such competition can prompt both collective cultural and personal attempts to order or relate differing modes of knowing in such a way that they at least seem to be complimentary or non-contradictory. There appears to be a particularly human anxiety about unresolved contrasts in how we know and define what is actual or real. Confronted with what will be termed here the radically complex character of inclusive totality, human consciousness reflexively asserts versions of unitary order and continuity among the astonishing diversity of perceived existence and cognitive responses to it. That ordering impulse can be regarded as taking two general forms. One tends to propose a more hierarchical structure composed of exactly distinct elements with exclusively specific definitions or identities. Elements of what is known and how are thusly ranked in order of causation or importance, creating an appearance of unitary order. Such a hierarchical unification is here regarded as intrinsically reductive and as expressing a 'reductive imperative' characteristic of most social mentalities. Societies thusly order both human life and the world, whether in reference to the criteria of religion or science. The other form of 'knowing totality' poses perspectives that accept its radically complex diversity without reducing it to a singular, thus reductive ordering. Scientific thinking is readily associated with reflexively reductive, ordering of existence, whereas mythological representations associate with the more non-reductive mode. However, distinguishing between reductive and non-reductive approaches to knowing and 'ordering' radically complex totality will be shown to be more complicated than that simple contrast suggests.

Distinguishing Reductive Method from Reductive Intent In Seeking to Know Totality

Among the varied cultural attempts to include the diversity of totality, and human criteria for knowing it, in some valid concurrent experience of reality, reductive tendencies can be noted not only in materialistic science but in religious doctrines, artistic expressions, and mythological representations. The impulse to 'nail it down' with exact specificity is a persistent characteristic of attempts to create socialized unity and continuity. Thus even the most overt intentions to validate knowing the diversity of totality *without* reducing it to a singular or hierarchical ordering can be frustrated by the reflexive operation of reductive methods. Persons seeking to validate the coexistence of the mortal body and an immaterial "soul" often proceed with the methods of reductive rational argument. Thereby, their efforts to validate a non-reductive status are typically frustrated by an unacknowledged reductive method. Conversely, reductive methods such as those of materialistic science can be shown to actually amplify knowing of complexity and diversity in a seemingly indefinite manner—frustrating an overt intention to

arrive at a singular truth. Research in sub-atomic physics and mathematical theories about fractals are examples in which rational reduction imply indefinite variation, diversity, or change. How such confusions of reductive and non-reductive knowing occur is explored below in terms of knowing by ones and by manys.

The further purpose of this book, in elucidating such a distinction, is to explore attempts at generating a concurrently diverse thus non-reductive knowing of radical complexity that is not prefigured by reductive method or intention. Whereas attempts to know totality by way of reductive methods or for reductive purposes necessarily seek to define its composition in singular and predictable ways, knowing it inclusively is taken to require some less static, concurrently diverse method. Thus the more inclusive mode is posed here as a participation in the dynamical character of irreducibly or radically complex totality—rather than a reductive definition of it. The overall distinction can be posed as that between attempts to establish a predictably consistent sense of unity as defined by collective social agreement in contrast to establishing a sense of unity of/in a totality that supercedes socialized concepts and structurings. This later unity would have to necessarily be ‘of radically diverse totality’ and thus be a unity of some ‘other order’ than that created by reductive method for the purpose of socialized unity.

Knowing and Knowledge as Dependent Upon Criteria for Classifying Difference that are Necessarily Incomplete and Contradictory, thus Arbitrarily Reductive

The term *knowing* is employed here to indicate awareness of difference that differentiates or identifies the status and characteristics of entities and phenomena yet does not necessarily explain those differentiations in ultimately definitive ways. In this regard one can ‘know difference’ (as in ‘books are not tables’) by sensorial distinction (seeing and feeling) as well as by cognitive differentiation (assigning conceptual categories of definition). Both distinction by sensation and by conception enable a ‘knowing of difference’ that is ‘abstracted from’ the total complexity of a given context (such as ‘a book on a table’). The actual awareness or knowing of difference ‘as a status’ is regarded here as depending upon reference to some established criteria. Knowing can thus be understood as a sort of ‘cognitive movement’ from perception, experience, or conceptual awareness of difference to its classification as some ‘known status’—from a status of *non-identity* awareness to *identity* assignment. Thereby the abstracted status of difference is given an identification relative to other such identifications of difference. The criteria for qualifying and identifying states of difference can be regarded as expressing some dynamical method-- such as reference to contrasts rather than likenesses, by grouping or by isolating entities. The categorical criteria used to discriminate difference—such as solid or gas, living or dead, soft or hard—all refer to yet other sets of contrast to establish their basis for differentiation. The category solid is distinguished in contrast to characteristics of the status liquid.

Knowing in this sense is experiential in that it is an ‘activity’ or phenomenon of perceiving and sorting; as in “I am perceiving that this object is a book and that it is red in color.” Such knowing represents differences that can then become knowledge *as* assigned or identified statuses ‘of the known,’ derived in relation to such categorical criteria. Knowledge, as a ‘product’ of knowing, is thus an established determination of differentiated statuses, as in “I know that particular book is red.” Knowing is thusly parsed as representative awareness and knowledge as re-presentation of such awareness as an identified status derived from previously categorized knowing. Knowing-as-knowledge is this thus re-presentation of previous knowings, such as about objects as books and color as red. As such, knowledge itself becomes ‘known’ or experientially engaged as ‘something perceived’ even in the cognitive process of knowing—as in, “I know that I know books are composed of pages and bindings and that there is a color red. I notice that this definition could fit the object I am perceiving.” Re-presentative knowledge thus becomes a phenomenon to be ‘known’ in the process of composing further re-presentations of knowing—as pre-existing or *a priori* knowledge is compared to present representative perception. This processing is indicated by the term apperception, defined as “perceiving in terms of past perception,” “conscious perception with full awareness,” and “the process of understanding by which newly observed qualities of an object are related to past experience,” (Am. Heritage Dict. ’85, 120). In apperception difference can be regarded as differentiated in respect to past differentiations. Yet, if the initial process of knowing as awareness of difference is dependent upon already known categories of contrasting status to enable its distinctions, then both representative knowing and knowledge as its re-presentation are dependent upon some pre-existing or *a priori* categories—they are in some way self-referential. In this sense, knowing makes connections between perceptions or thoughts that are made meaningful (become knowledge as conclusions about difference) in reference to the criteria of already known categories. One philosophical critique of such self-reference concludes that consciousness is “solipsistic”—referring only to ‘itself’ and not the ‘outside world’ that it cannot engage without ‘seeing’ by way of preconceived categories of difference.

But this model does not appear to allow either for knowing difference that is not readily classified in reference to existing knowledge about criteria for differentiating knowing of difference, nor for negotiating contradiction between such categories in how these differentiate the difference perceived in knowing. If knowing and knowledge were only self-referential then how would a person become aware of and learn about anything ‘new?’ If indeed there is a status of knowing that is valid but not readily made meaningful by reference to existing categories of knowledge about difference then two issues appear to arise. Firstly, such unclassifiable, or contradictorily classifiable knowing suggests that all *a priori* categories for distinguishing knowing are likely incomplete and thus in some sense arbitrarily reductive impositions upon not only perceptions and awareness but also whatever the status of actual reality prompting perception is. Such an arbitrary status for knowledge as representative definitions of actuality

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suggests that neither knowing as awareness nor ‘what is being known’ (actual phenomenon) can be conclusively represented. Secondly, a valid status of knowing difference that is not readily explained in the terms of ‘what is already known’ must prompt some re-composition of existing categories of distinction if it is to be ‘made meaningful’ in relation to existing criteria for categorizing what is known as knowledge. This contorted proposition suggests a distinction between notions of *intuition* and *explanation* as ways of knowing meaningfully.

Understanding the Knowing of Meaning: Explanation as Reductive Conclusion or Knowledge, Intuition as Unclassified Awareness or Irreducible Gnosis

These are recklessly brief and simple representations of consciousness and cognition. But when taken all together, a complex perspective will emerge. The question of what constitutes ‘understanding’ and ‘meaningfulness’ in the processes of knowing and knowledge creation has been explored from a myriad of philosophical, psychological, and neurobiological perspectives. The effort being made here is to distinguish between the terms being deployed about reductive and non-reductive knowings and knowledge, and by implication between how meaning is ‘made understandable’ through both a one-ness and many-ness of experience. That is to state, in so far as experience can be meaningfully understood through representative knowing and re-presentational knowledge, such meaning can be derived from criteria that sort difference in relation to a one-ness as well as to a many-ness of being or acting. This notion can also be stated in terms of ‘acts of interpretation.’ Both knowings and knowledge can be interpreted in relation to criteria of reductively singular states of being or acting, yet also in relation to pluralistic states of being and acting. Thus states of consciousness suggested by the terms understanding, meaning, and interpretation are all here regarded as dependent upon or deriving from differentiating difference in relation to criteria arranged around states of one-ness and many-ness. Knowing can be regarded as meaningful in relation to established statuses of knowledge or because it arouses some empathic feeling to the dynamic of its various, perhaps unfamiliar, associations. An encounter with a dead body might be meaningful because one already knows the significance of biological death, or because such ‘knowing of death’ arouses potent unfamiliar feelings that do not seem to have a pre-existing status of knowledge suitable to re-presenting that meaningfulness.

The term explanation is associated here most particularly with conclusive interpretations such as those of cause and effect that explain the how and why of phenomenon. Explanation thusly organizes the relations between knowings and the criteria that differentiate identifications of difference in such a way that supplies a very practical ‘way of knowing.’ Explanation of ‘how things work’ enables direct, effective, consistent manipulation of them. Explanations thereby also tend to assert the authority of what is already known as knowledge over how knowing is experienced and configured—awareness thereby

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tends to be directed by or reduced to the ‘authority’ of existing explanations. Intuition, in contrast, can be regarded as knowing or awareness that indicates some significant status of difference between aspects of self, other, or world that is ‘as yet not explainable’ in reference to existing habitual criteria for categorization. In this sense, one intuits differentiations that ‘feel meaningful’ but are not necessarily ‘explainable’ in terms of existing categories for assigning significance or identity. Such ‘un-classifiable knowing’ is inherently non-reductive—it has not, at least ‘not yet,’ been ‘reduced’ to a sense of phenomenon that can be described and explained in relation to ‘what is already known.’ Intuition, in this description, resembles Kant’s assertion of that which has not yet been “brought under adequate concepts.” Yet such an intensity of experience can be attached to intuited status that it is difficult to classify it as non-existent or invalid simply because it is not ‘ordinarily identifiable’ or explainable in terms of ‘what is already known.’ Curiously, the reflexive differentiation of identity status according to ordinary or already-known criteria actually assigns an identity status to intuitive knowing by classifying it as ‘non-identity’ or incoherent perception—thereby seeking to explain it in relation to the already known. Intuition thus can be posed as a knowing of what the inherently arbitrary criteria for what is knowable in relation to ‘the already known’ or knowledge *has not yet* or fundamentally *cannot* ‘make known’ as ‘an identity status’ or explanation. One thusly intuits what the reductions of habitual or ordinary knowledge obscures. The question then arises as to whether intuitive knowing so defined is a process of apperception, through which presently perceived difference is identified in terms of past experience, or rather through some present but not consciously identifiable ‘new’ awareness.

Explanations can be regarded as manifesting habituated cultural or personal beliefs—assumptions that act as filters or parameters influencing both ways of knowing and of configurations of knowing as knowledge. One can assert, in explanatory fashion, that “that book is red” *because* a person painted it red, or because it is about violence, or because it has been coated with chemical compounds whose composition reflect light radiation in such a way that stimulate receptors in the retina of the eye to register a particular wave length of the spectrum of visible light which is composed by photons that—etc., etc. Each explanation of ‘why the book is red’ derives from different criteria for interpreting the difference perceived or known—that the book is red. Thus the impulse to unify knowing as knowledge that is self-consistent in that it does not appear contradictory or arbitrary can be frustrated by explanatory invocation of such multiple sets of criteria for categorizing the knowing of difference. Such conflicting criteria can be disruptive of conclusive explanation not merely because they pose different references for knowing identity status; they can actually present different modalities for making knowing into meaningful knowledge. The latter explanation of the redness of the book as the reaction of the retina to light indicates a set of references for knowing phenomena concerned primarily with materialistic causation. It thus represents a particular methodological paradigm for valid knowledge and explanation. To explain the color as a symbolic choice that is meaningful because the color associates with the emotional status of

anger derives from a method of establishing meaning by reasoning through intuitive association rather than mechanistic causation. Both explanations can be true even as they establish different meanings for the redness of the book.

Knowing and explanatory knowledge that are habituated or standardized can be regarded as constituting ordinary awareness or status. Knowing that ‘seems’ valid yet does not readily conform to those ordinary categorizations suggests an intuition of some meaningful ‘understanding not knowable’ by reference to explanatory ordinary references. Yet human experiences, from mystics to physicists, indicate that there are potent states of knowing which are intensely meaningful even though resistant to expression in terms of *a priori* criteria for explanation or knowledge. Some status of non-ordinary or extra-ordinary knowledge is thereby implied. That status is here associated with the concept of gnosis—some “intuitive apprehension of spiritual truths,” or, “esoteric form of knowledge (Am. Heritage Dict. 85, 564).” Such non-ordinary awareness of what is ‘not obvious’ or ‘not commonly known’ will be shown to be intrinsic to the inclusive knowing of radically diverse complexity.

The complexity of an entity or experience thus can be so variously known that even if it is assigned an ‘ordinarily reasonable explanation’ it might not be ‘felt’ as ‘fully understood---that is to say, it might be ‘felt’ to ‘have’ further, unexplained or non-ordinary meaningfulness. Perhaps that is why understanding is defined in ways that suggest more than a conceptual explanation: “1. To perceive and understand the significance of: know. 2. To know thoroughly by close contact with or long experience of. 3.a. To grasp or comprehend the meaning intended or expressed by (another). (Am. Heritage Dict. ’85, p. 1318).” These definitions convey a considerable quality of sensation in the words “to perceive,” “by close contact,” “long experience of,” “to grasp.” Understanding can thus be considered a more tangible, felt status than simple explanation. A given status might then be regarded as ‘fully understood’ when one has a ‘feel’ for it, can ‘empathize’ with it somehow. This sensorial quality of understanding the meaning and significance of knowing, either as explanation or intuition, is essential to knowing radically diverse status that cannot be reduced to singularly conclusive explanation.

Exclusive and Inclusive Categorical Criteria for Identification

The proposed process of differentiating difference as identifiable statuses through reference to likeness and unlikeness, or in relation to categories of contrasting qualities, implies some relationship between those categories. One status requires others to establish its criteria for valid existence as ‘a status.’ But there is also perspective on categorization that asserts the ‘self-definition’ of status. In this sense the category solid is self-defining and thus exclusive of other categorical statuses—it is established by likeness among its members, which thereby define each other without reference to the qualities of other statuses, which it excludes. Solids then are simply all solid, liquids obviously all liquid, thus each

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group ‘belongs together’ or shares a singular identity. Such categorical status appears more definitive and fixed than one dependent upon some combination of difference and likeness to other categorical statuses for its differentiation. However, as indicated below, such an exclusive definitional status is logically difficult to maintain from a perspective that emphasizes the plurality or many-ness of references for identity composition. More inclusive categorization of statuses acknowledges the interdependency of such identifications—associating the ‘origin of identity’ more with the qualifications of difference *and* likeness than with ‘identical similarity.’ Thus the category solid is differentiated in that it is like the categories dense and thick but also different from these in that it is also like the categories hard and frozen. What is at issue here is not whether the more exclusive or more inclusive basis for establishing categorical criteria for identification actually changes the status of a category, but how such emphasis influences understanding of the character of identity, reality, and truth as statuses themselves generated by human consciousness.

The definition of identity as a status that is singular yet derived from both various references and a condition of ‘sameness’ to an exclusive category illustrates this inherent confusion of exclusive and inclusive modes of identification. Ultimately ‘exact’ identification would thus seem to have to specify an utterly unique entity, yet how can that be done without references to ‘other things’ that are yet are not ‘the same?’ Such an approach to identity-as-a-plurality echoes the pluralism of William James philosophical and psychological pragmatism.

For pluralism, all that we are required to admit as the constitution of reality is what we ourselves find empirically realized in every minimum of finite life. Briefly it is this, that nothing real is absolutely simple, that every smallest bit of experience is a *multum in parvo* plurally related, that each relation is one aspect, character, or function, way of its being taken, or way of its taking something else. (James, “A Pluralistic Universe” 777).

James’s articulate assertions that the universe and reality cannot be known in a singularly exclusive interpretation (monism), with consistent orders of causality and standards of description, closely model the perspectives on identity being presented in this study. Identity is regarded here as necessarily a matter of relational associations of various factors, and discriminated by complex criteria—thereby it never effectively isolates that ‘identified’ from all other entities as an exclusively separate existence. The emphasis upon this perspective in this writing is not meant to deny the existence or usefulness of exclusive categorization, however. The effects of such more and less pluralistic approaches to establishing categorical criteria for identity are amplified by considering knowing and knowledge as dependent upon the contrasting priorities of one-ness versus many-ness.

So Configured, So Confined: Conceiving a Rationale of Mediation between Reductive and Non-Reductive Knowing

Whether identity, reality, and totality are composed in exclusive or in inclusive identifications of status, the consequence appears to be that existence and experience are confined to the dynamics of such configuration: so configured, so confined. As such, self, other, and world can only be known one way or the other. If the boundaries of knowing by ones and by manys, as reductive singularity versus diversifying plurality, are to be understood as ‘reasonably permeable’ rather than mutually exclusive, then some logic of how these modes concurrently co-create knowing is required. It would seem, following James’ view, that many-ness is an inherent status of being. Yet one-ness is evidently a reflexive tendency of human knowing and identification. Many-ness could be said to characterize a broadness of awareness, as in peripheral vision or ‘soft focus.’ One-ness would then associate with the narrow focus of intense binocular vision or the aiming of a gun in which peripheral awareness is repressed. The succeeding parts of this chapter present attempts to variously elucidate how these two modes ‘configure and confine’ self, other, and world—as well as how they might be understood as concurrently valid modes of knowing.

On Being Singular and Multiple

The Concurrency of Singular and Plural Identifications of Difference

In relation to the concept that knowing involves awareness of differences, identity status relates to discerning how ‘an entity’ is different from others. Identity, whether of a person or a thing, is typically posed as a singular status: “I am a person,” “He is George,” “That is a book.” The implied specificity or singularity of such identification is emphasized by indicating one entity, or category of entities, in contrast to others. One might speak of “this book” in contrast to “those other books,” even though those ‘other’ books might be composed of the same text, printed in the same edition, and virtually indistinguishable from “this book.” However, things exactly identified as ‘an entity’ also can be regarded as having complex compositions. A book can have many chapters, many copies, and various printings. Even a single atom is determined to be composed of a (as yet indeterminate) number of sub-atomic particles and “forces.” Distinctly identified entities thus also can be regarded as composites, or collectives of other singularly identifiable entities. Similarly, any given entity, even something as simple as a hair, can be described or experienced in various ways that do not ‘equal’ each other. Its specific singularity can be known multiply—as soft or prickly, light or dark, reddish or brownish, long or short—depending in part upon what it is compared to or who is experiencing it. A hair can be regarded as ‘a strand’ or something composed of multiple strands or fibers.

Thus any given 'one' also can be considered as 'a many,' and 'a many' can be posed as 'a one.' The entirety of an evidently endless cosmos—composed of *innumerable* galaxies, stars, and planets—is identified singularly as “the universe.” Yet that singularity is admittedly without limit or indefinitely diverse. A particular person is identified as 'a woman' because she is 'a part' of the unity or 'one-ness' of the many that compose the singular status of 'the female gender.' It would then appear that there is no 'one' that is not 'many' and, conversely, no 'many' that could not be identified in some way as a 'one.' The same person identified as 'a woman' might also be identified as 'a mother,' 'a doctor,' and 'the president.'

Such identifications constitute the 'knowledge of knowing'—the assigned identities derived from knowing differences about things and phenomenon in reference to established criteria. A book is a book because it is discriminated as presenting certain characteristics of the criteria designating the category book-ness. A particular book is identified as “the red book” because it is identified as both book-ish in form and red-ish in color. Yet there are many 'shades of red,' just as there are many variations of book-ish-ness. Thus the knowledge that an object is “a red book” remains rather imprecise: What type of book? What shade of red? As more criteria for knowing the object-as-knowledge get applied in attempts to be more specific in knowing the particular differences of an object, the more complex and diverse the references for identification can become. Thus the knowledge generated in differentiated knowing of particular identity statuses is inherently referential to other identifications as criteria for knowing. There appears then a relation between increased specificity of identification and greater diversity of references for categorizing difference—each differentiated status supplies more potential criteria for making further differentiations of difference. The category book is composed in reference to all the varied objects known in relation to the category books (or book-ish), as well as to contrasting categories such as magazine, which in turn collectively compose the type of object identified as 'a book.' So too the category red is a composite one. Neither 'book' nor 'red' are definitively singular states of being but rather complexes of criteria, the boundaries of which are composed in references to other such complexes of criteria—books versus magazines and unbound manuscripts, red versus orange and yellow. Thusly the un-known becomes known and non-identity becomes identity as a categorical status or re-presentation of knowledge—yet that knowledge is variously configured through the structural associations of the referenced categories for identification.

Knowing-as-knowledge can be 'differentiated' or identified as patterning—a process of establishing 'identifiable' patterns of association among aspects of perception or awareness that in turn become the 'identities' or 'existent statuses' of particular 'entities'—a basis for subsequent apperception. The criteria for the category 'book' provides a 'patterning' of associations that provides a 'flexible' template or archetypal characterization of bookish-ness enabling one to grant the identity 'book' to a variety of forms. Identity status the one-ness of more exclusive categorization tends to collapse these

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patterns of associated or composite identity into a singular condition. Identity status as many-ness tends to more overtly acknowledge or foreground the extended pattern of associations comprising a specifically differentiated status of difference. This distinction is indicated in the contrast between descriptions of identity status presented as singular versus plural nouns. The complex pattern of associations singularly identified as ‘the nation’ can also be identified plurally as ‘these United States,’ or even ‘We the People.’ The dynamical ‘activity’ of composite identification is also more obvious in representing status with verbs. An entity identified as ‘a book’ can also be indicated as ‘this printing,’ ‘that writing’ or ‘a telling.’ Thus the patterning of differentiations composing identity status is more covert in status-as-one-ness, and more overt in status-as-many-ness.

Humans thus seem to know self, other, and world in both particularly singular and multiply complex ways—as one-nesses and as many-nesses. Difference is variously differentiated. Such a variety of identity statuses might be overwhelming if all were valid and necessary to knowing ‘a person’ or ‘a thing’ in all situations. In actual practice, however, such various and differing identities or ways of knowing someone (or thing) tend to be context-dependent. In one set of circumstances, a person might be primarily identified as ‘a mother.’ In another context she could be ‘a doctor’—a status within which being identified as female might have little significance in contemporary society. In this way the many-ness of a one-ness is subordinated into a set or series of singularities that associate with particular contexts. Thus one of these contextual definitions tends to be the dominant factor for identification in any given situation or set of references. The complex variousness or multiplicity of identity does not thereby reduce to a singular status so much as become re-arranged in a hierarchy of priority or dominance relative to particular sets of contextual references. Criteria for identification are intricately context-dependent. A woman who is also a doctor is most primarily ‘doctor’ when at the hospital treating patients but more primarily ‘woman’ when entering a public restroom.

The Complexities of Composing the One-ness of Many-nesses

Considering the various references used for composing ‘one-ness’ (or differentiating it from many-ness), further elaborates the complexities of knowing in both singular and multiple ways. One-ness can be posed as a status of indivisibility in which there are no parts to it. It also can be posed as wholeness, unity, completeness, or totality. An indivisible status of ‘one-ness’ appears to be un-differentiable as there are no parts to distinguish, no difference within the one-ness. Such one-ness exhibits only absolute, self-consistent singularity. Atoms were once identified thusly till subatomic physics re-identified them as composed of component parts—the largest element of which is ‘empty space.’ Quarks are not identified as indivisible one-nesses. One-ness also can be regarded as completeness or wholeness. That criterion for one-ness depends upon a presence or association of elements regarded as ‘fitting together.’ It tends to imply some orderly unity of what ‘belongs together.’ ‘A whole’ might then be taken to exhibit some

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inherent self-consistency or intrinsic order of whatever 'parts' or elements compose it. The unity or completeness of 'a family' asserts this type of one-ness. Such 'wholeness of identity' also can be regarded as manifesting a hierarchical structure of its parts and their 'functions,' such as 'a' machine does. Here some parts of the whole or one-ness become more central or primary to the identity of the one-ness and its characteristic actions or functions. Some parts of a motor can be regarded as more 'central' to its function than others. In this sense the one-ness (of a motor) is manifested more by a particular order or hierarchy of its parts rather than the parts as an 'un-organized' or unassembled group. The parts, properly assembled and functioning, present a multiple status in which no one thing is 'out of order.' The parts of a clock all present but not 'fitted properly together' do not compose the one-ness of 'a clock.' Similarly, 'a family' was once definitively identified by having 'a father' or male patriarch as its 'head.'

But wholeness can also be figured as a constellation of aspects that 'belong together' yet do not demonstrate a particular center or sequential order of interactions—such as the wholeness of an ecological environment having many interdependent, but not hierarchically ordered components. The term totality can suggest an ultimate inclusion of 'all aspects' but with perhaps less implication of 'orderly' relationship among the elements being included in 'the total.' A mathematical total is said to 'add up,' equaling the singularity of 'a' sum or number. But the totality of persons in a society does not 'add up' in this equational way. Nor do they constitute a sequentially ordered mechanical process, or a uniformly structured mass. 'A society' is thus not 'a thing' but the totality of persons and their interactions composing it at any given moment. Thus a society can be regarded as continuing to exist even when many of the persons composing it die or some of its processes change. Similarly, 'a person' exists by virtue of both 'a body' and 'a personality' but a body is composed of various organs, limbs, and functions—some of which are not essential to a person being 'that person' (as illustrated by amputation, surgical excision, and organ transplant). Similarly, a personality exhibits various divergent aspects that often appear incompatible and can change.

Thus the 'many in a one' or the 'one that is a many' can be regarded or identified by differing descriptions of 'parts' that can be posed as having various dynamical relationships among them—as in machine parts, sub-atomic particles, or all the thoughts, behaviors, and feelings that constitute 'a personality.' Such 'parts' can be seen as interacting in hierarchically ordered sequences (the parts of a machine), in variable but predictable patterns, or through seemingly random and discontinuous events. The 'relations' between 'parts' can be sequential, always moving in one direction along a set pattern, or constitute interactions in bi-valent or dialectical ways, manifesting a 'back and forth' dynamic that continually affects the position or role of each part within the given whole or totality that identifies their association as 'a one.' The citizens of a socio-political whole, such as a city or nation, compose such a discontinuously interactive, self-modifying, radically complex one-ness that has no simple or consistently

sequential ordering yet maintains some identifiable 'one-ness.' Thus the unity or relatedness of the many in a one ranges from the stunningly complex one-ness of a living organism in to the sequential simplicity of a mechanical device or the chemical compositions of H₂O—singularly 'pure' water.

Modalities of establishing identification could be considered as sets of criteria 'identifying' heuristic methods for specifying and then interpreting relations between particularized aspects of larger 'wholes.' Pepper's four "world hypotheses" (formalism, mechanism, contextualism, and organicism) can be utilized as such heuristic modalities of generating identification: (1) identity as established by association to formalist references or Platonic ideals (the 'ideal' tree to which all trees are compared); (2) by establishing mechanically causal relations of sequential interaction with 'other' entities (identity as mechanism); (3) by delimiting a contextual field of reference within which identifying characteristics are established (such as family or ethnic group, a 'work of literature'); or (4) by seeking to orient identification in the largest possible field of reference, that of a nonlinear and inclusive organic totality, ultimately utilizing all possible modes of identification in a sort of 'meta-ecological context,' (Pepper, World Hypotheses 141). The latter mode is obviously the more 'inclusive' and thus the most complex.

Thus the contrast between singular and multiple status of identity can also be examined in assertions of specific form, structure, and ways of ordering. A singular status or one-ness poses 'a' form, structure, or ordering. 'A person' can be identified by the form, structure, and order of his or her particular physical body and appearance—tall man, short woman, black boy. The same person's identity can be pluralized by associating it with other singular forms, structures, and orderings—such as those of personality traits, social position, educational training, genetic code, etcetera; the short, woman, doctor president. Water as H₂O has one form, that of a chemical compound. Water known as a liquid has another form or structure of identity. Yet water can also be identified as a solid, as ice, and all these statuses are different identities of the 'one thing' known as water. 'An identity' composed of various forms, structures, and orderings in various contextings becomes increasingly complex. The complex of identities or characteristic 'states of being' composing such a larger *field of identity* for water (an inclusive one-ness), becomes logically irreducible. It also generates many possible associations of the 'forms of water' with other things, phenomena, and behaviors as criteria for identification. Both the fluid 'structure' of water and its rigid 'form' as ice can be employed to establish a characteristic identity for a person: "He has a watery will," or a will of water. "She has an icy heart," or a heart of ice.


Despite the variable compositions of a one-ness, so long as such 'a' many-ness fits into some accepted or typical range of identity characteristics—some category of knowledge—knowing it as 'a unity' poses little difficulty. However, when the many-ness includes particular aspects of identity that are non-ordinary or somehow paradoxical to the perspective of the knower encountering them, a significant problem arises. The available categories for assigning identity status become inadequate. In the not so

distant past, a man introduced to a woman who was also ‘a doctor’ might have found the many-ness of such a person difficult to acknowledge or validate as ‘a unity.’ There once was a historical social context in which doctors were identified exclusively as male persons. The structuring of those categorical references did not allow such a one-ness as a female doctor. Within such a ‘reality frame’ the particular identities of ‘woman’ and ‘doctor’ would appear incompatible or contradictory—even if factually accurate. Thus there appear socially constructed thresholds for contexting identity beyond which the many-ness of a one-ness becomes so radical that it is likely to be ‘unknowable’ by ordinary standards of identity and reality.

One-ness as Singular Reduction, Many-ness as Diversifying Pluralization


From the above sketch of how one-ness and many-ness differentiate and also associate aspects of what is known, the two modes can be regarded as expressing contrasting tendencies. Posing identity or status as singular tends to narrow or reduce such status to a simple, essential, fixed, absolute, definitive, or even pure condition. Status is thusly discriminated as ‘a this or a that,’ as ‘one way or another.’ Things and phenomenon are identified thereby as having exclusive forms, implying a positive, explicit, original status as ‘a thing.’ The dynamical movement in this mode of identifying or distinguishing difference is thus reductive in that it reduces many-ness to one-ness. It ‘conceals’ the associations of many-ness into an objectified identity status—even an idea or an image thereby becomes positivized as ‘a thing.’ Thus it can be characterized as ‘moving along a line’ of succeeding statuses toward, or converging various statuses upon, a precise point in such a way as to suggest conclusion and finality in its re-presentation. (Fig. 1)

Linear and Convergent Progression to Singular Conclusion



This mode can be seen as a ‘repression’ of the complex associations or compositions of many-ness. This dynamic of differentiation ‘holds things apart’ or ‘in oppositional definition’ and in so doing tends to generate separate ‘ideal’ states of being having absolute boundaries. Yet such reduction appears essential to the functioning of consciousness in so far as knowing by one-nesses provides the basis for structuring or ordering knowledge. Without exclusive one-nesses there would be no basic categories for differentiation and thus no parts to compose a many-ness.

Posing identity as composite or status as multi-factorial expresses a more expansive condition in that its associations ‘move’ concurrently among a plurality of points, tending to pluralize all states of being as ‘fields of association.’ The dynamical movement in this mode is thus more poly-valent, posing ‘a particular status’ as constellated points of reference that do not converge upon ‘a point.’ (Fig. 2)



Identity status here becomes a ‘field of activity’ or an associative process having a particular pattern yet no singular ordering. Identity as many-ness can thereby be regarded as a ‘type of flow’ or process even, deriving concurrently from other ‘takings of shape’ or ‘form’ resulting from other ‘flows’ or processes. A status of many-ness is thus more implicit among a set of references, expressing a pattern of associations that do not necessarily have ‘a center’ nor any particular positive form or location. Such identity could be said to be ‘immaterial’ or ‘thing-less’ and lacking a specific origin. The identity status book is thusly regarded as the interaction of many aspects of book-ness or bookish-ness. (Fig. 3)

Constellated Field of Identification for Bed-ness

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	Soft Cover	Design	Art	Hard Cover	
	Color	Rectangular Shape		Pages	Margins
Format	Story	Binding		Table of Contents	Citations
	Publisher	Print	Illustrations	Chapters	Sections
	Page Numbers	Editor	Foot Notes	Paper	Type Face
	Judge by Cover	Title	Plot	Graphs	Author
		Promotion	Genre	Edition	

In comparison to such identity-as-interactivity, one-nesses can be regarded as more of an abstraction *from* the continuum of an inclusive field of totality, whereas many-nesses, representing status as a complex of associations, are more indicative *of* the complexity of that larger field within and from which they are being discriminated or identified

A One-ness of Being, A Many-ness of Becoming

Identifying a status of one-ness that is primary or singular asserts a definitive status, at least within the specified criteria of particular contexts. Such status can be regarded as ‘a state of being.’ What ever ‘one is’ at a given moment, in a given context, such is what one is ‘being,’ or the ‘form of one’s being.’ Identifying status as many-ness tends to suggest a more dynamical or dialectical mode of existing that, as a process or flow, can be regarded as ‘a becoming.’ ‘Being,’ thusly figured as singularity, appears to be unchanging, fixed, constant, whereas ‘becoming’ appears as more active, less centered, and thus inherently rather unbounded or indefinite. As ‘a’ person, “I” *am* ‘a’ thing. Yet as ‘something’ composed of both past and present experiences, of thoughts and characteristics that are radically different, “I” am some ‘thing’ that is indefinite, radically complex, and thus in some sense actively a ‘becoming’ of what this person is in some total, if ultimately uncertain, status. . In contrast to the structural fixity of being-as-one-ness, the inherent activity of becoming-as-many-ness can then be regarded as rather de-centering and, as such, anti-structural. Yet, if there were a status of totality, then it would seem to have to *include both* these more singular and more plural states of ‘being’ and ‘becoming’ concurrently.

One-ness and Many-ness as Overlapping and Conflicting Statuses Composing Totality

If a status of one-ness is regarded as always also inherently being composed as a many-ness, and vice versa, then the two modes of knowing can be posed as interdependent or over-lapping. From such a perspective the two ‘states of being’ need not be considered as inherently competitive but rather can be regarded as complimentary or co-creative. Thusly considered, a one-ness is a compressed many-ness and


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a many-ness a diversified one-ness. Each is the ‘subtext’ of the other—reduction (‘the book’) implies multiplicity and plurality (the people) poses ‘an entity.’ Asserting priority of one mode over the other then becomes a consequence of emphasis placed upon either a reductive unity or a diverse plurality. Yet such a distinction is not so simple as it might seem. One can assert the particularity of a one-ness among a many-ness, or a many-ness in relation to some particularities, yet still be identifying ‘an entity.’ One can indicate a particular book as being one among a group of copies of the same printing of the same text, or identify the whole group as ‘a book’ that has many copies.

Yet these statuses of being also can appear to conflict when the particularity of a one-ness is posed in such way that it is indivisible or utterly unlike any other one-ness. Many-ness and one-ness can then be taken as opposing modes of knowing when the criteria for one-ness becomes irreducible singularity or exclusive uniqueness that does not share any of its identity with other entities. ‘A family’ might regard a particular person to be ‘of its many-ness.’ But that person might regard his or her self as utterly unique and different from that family, thus having no mutuality or shared identity with it. A status of many-ness as multiple identity associates with notions of complexity, irreducibility, diversity, and even some sense of chaotic or indefinite identity. Many-ness thereby implies an intrinsic otherness of all one-nesses to them selves since it implies that all singularities are actually composed of contrasting elements. In this sense a one-ness cannot simply ‘be itself.’ Identity as singular one-ness, in contrast, associates with notions of simplicity, unity, reduction, and order in which one thing can either be absolutely singular or two entities can exactly ‘equal’ another—the two books that are of the same printing of the same text and thus are ‘one book.’ The interplay of opposition and overlap between one-nesses and many-nesses is difficult to actually illustrate. The evident opposition between these compositions of identity does not lend itself to a simple spectrum or gradient between polarities. The ‘in between’ of that opposition can be regarded as an incoherent non-status of being ‘neither one nor many.’

Taken together—that is, as somehow mutually valid—these modes can be said to constitute a complexity of knowing that is inclusive without reducing the status of being to either mode. Thus the term totality will be relied upon in this text to indicate the most inclusive and complex, thus least hierarchical or mechanistic, sense of ‘taking all together,’ or one-ness. Such totality thus must include *both* statuses of one-ness and of many-ness. In this sense of totality, no particular composition of one-ness and many-ness can be regarded as ultimately exclusive since the parts of any given ‘one’ has ‘parts’ that can be composed in the variousness of some other one-ness (or many-ness). A person is also part of society and hydrogen and oxygen are elements themselves in other compounds beside H₂O. So contexted, the boundaries or margins of identity-statuses become inherently over-lapping, if not indefinite—identification of any ‘specific identity’ thereby becoming ‘contextually distinct’ but not universally so. One-ness, then, how so ever useful in ordering or structuring the differentiations of knowing as statuses of knowledge, needs be ‘related back’ or *relativized* to its inherent many-ness if

knowing the radical complexity of inclusive totality is to be feasible. Yet similarly, status-as-many-ness is dependent upon the notion of one-nesses for its relation to inclusive totality. This inter-active relationship of elemental status-conception can be imaged in the Yin-Yang symbol of Chinese Taoist philosophy. The light and dark teardrop shapes that circle each other in this symbol often are shown with a dot of the other inside them. The light shape has a dark spot and the dark shape a light spot. Such figuration suggests that the contrasting aspects of the pair are not ‘purely dark versus light’ but rather are the ‘co-arising’ aspects of some continuum of difference and non-difference. (Fig. 4)




Compositions of Totality: Singular, Dualistic, and Pluralistic Approaches to Elemental One-ness

Referring back to the notion that one-ness can be variously conceived, approaches to characterizing totality exhibit at least three general tendencies. Attempts to order the many-ness of one-ness as a totality having an ultimately undifferentiated status of unity are often termed monistic. This term refers to a mono-valent or singular constitution of identity and being. The monistic mode asserts that all difference, all contrast and contradiction are essentially illusion because there is ultimately no genuine way to separate of aspects of ‘the all.’ The task of knowing totality from this perspective thus becomes gaining awareness of the sameness or reductive unity of all *seemingly* different or separate aspects of being and becoming—many-ness conceived and experienced as monolithic, un-differentiable one-ness. This perspective is often termed monism.

Compositions of totality that assert a fundamentally diversified one-ness serve to preserve some elemental diversity or many-ness. These diversified concepts of totality derive from two basic categories of dynamical association. Compositions that reduce all many-ness to two elemental states of one-ness pose a binary or dualistic totality. Compositions that maintain more than two such elemental statuses pose a plurality of elemental states (here meaning three or more), beyond or below which there can be no further reduction to a dualistic or monistic status. Such a pluralistic mode can be termed constellatory in reference to the triangulated character of its associations that compose a status of totality. Having more than two elemental states of being, it allows for a more complex set of dynamical relations between aspects of totality than do monistic and dualistic compositions.

Dualistic compositions assert either > < or categories that tend to position their two aspects of totality as opposites: ‘A or B,’ ‘this world’ versus ‘that world.’ Some dualistic oppositions tend to be utterly antithetical (black or white) in asserting the division in totality: things are *either* good *or* evil, spirit or matter, true or false, real or unreal. These examples indicate how readily the binary pairs of dualism are hierarchicalized. Yet even essentially dualist compositions can become pluralized by an attitude that allows for a both/and status in which the two aspects of totality somehow overlap or interpenetrate: Not ‘A or B’ but ‘A/B.’ In this view, there might be a realm of material manifestation in contrast to one of immaterial spirit. But there might also be some acknowledgement that these two seeming opposites co-exist—at least in some instances or contexts. In this way some third status appears to be identified, such as the incarnation of god or as a material human being that becomes neither simply divine nor only human but rather both spirit and matter. (Fig. 5)



Pluralistic compositions of totality (tripartite or more) begin with an acceptance of multiple states of overall one-ness and thus seem less prone to pose utterly opposed elemental states of being—since there is always a third position or status. Again, elemental status can thus be designated as ‘neither A nor B, but C,’ A/B, A/C, or A/B/C. Such compositions of diversified totality thus assert rather less emphasis on the significance of self-consistent linear reasoning in representing some ‘order of totality’ than do dualistic ones. The latter are, by necessity, compelled more to assert the exclusivity of their dualistic distinctions in order to affirm their validity.

Some Conundrums of Knowing by Ones and Manys

The preceding differentiations of distinct yet overlapping statuses of one-ness and many-ness pose conundrums for any conclusive knowing and understanding of the composition, character, and dynamical behaviors of self, other and world. In the singular regard, things are known (identified) as ‘apart from’

other things or as 'other than.' In the pluralistic mode, things are known more as 'part of' or 'in relation to' other things. Yet in both instances identity statuses are established by way of some composite references to both categories or methods of differentiating status. Whether entity A is identified 'in distinction from' entity B, or 'in relation to' B, the knowing occurs by way of reference to 'an other.' There appears then a sort of paradoxical dynamic to knowing if a particular entity cannot be identified without identifying other, differing identities since entity A cannot have an identity independent from other identities. In addition to that dependence of any identification upon others, there arises the factor that entity A might be identified in relation to a variety of other established identities. The color green can be known as the appearance of grass, frog skin, a combination of blue and yellow, or a measured wavelength of visible radiation. Each identifying reference presents differing qualities to the identity of green. Thus both the paradox of an identity that is not itself alone and is composable from various other identities frustrates attempts to organize knowledge in systematically, self-consistently logical ways. The ways in which knowing by ones and manys both facilitates yet frustrates systematic understanding are crucial to appreciating the conundrum of many-ness in one-ness. The term system is defined in relation to "functionally related elements," "interacting mechanical or electrical components," "a network of structures," "step by step procedure," and "purposeful regularity." To systematize to "reduce to a system." These terms are associated with the dominant mode of modern knowing, as in, "The aim of science is surely to amass and systematize knowledge. (V. Gordon Childs) (Am. Heritage Dict. '85 p. 1234)." Such reduction is inevitably at odds with a status of 'radically diverse totality.'

Composite Knowing and the Metaphoric Dynamic of Identity Mediation

Knowing identity can be described as mediating differentiations between things through representational descriptions, using images or words to pose some distinct status of one-ness in relation to other one-nesses. Knowing, thusly composed by way of reference to other identity statuses, asserts one-nesses as composites of other things that they are and are not. Such a dynamic of 'carrying over' from one identification to another, as the associative basis for identification, and thus knowledge, can be regarded as analogical or metaphorical. Metaphor is defined as "a figure of speech in which a term is transferred from the object it ordinarily designates to an object it may designate only by implicit comparison or analogy, as in the phrase evening of life (Am. Heritage Dict. '85, 790)." This word derives from the Greek *metapherein*, to transfer, composed of *meta*, change, and *pherein*, to bear. In the cited phrase, evening of life, the status life is identified in relation to the relation of the status evening to the statuses day, sunset, night. This example poses a 'carrying over' or transferring from one identification to another that overtly transgresses the typical or ordinary sets of references used to establish the identity status life. That overtly atypical or non-literal composition of identity is what is considered to be a 'literal metaphor.' But such a dynamic of associative meaning is discernable in the way all words 'make meaning.' In one


regard, specific words have particularized meanings. Yet most words have more than one meaning, depending upon context or usage. And further, the meaning of all words is derived from other words, the meaningfulness of which is derived from yet other words. Words, then, in their complex mutuality of identification, exemplify the concurrently singular and multiple references necessary for posing any specific identity or status. Language, in this sense, ever derives meaningfulness from the many-ness of associations that can be constellated around a given word used in a given grammatical and topical contexting. There is ever some metaphorical ‘carrying over’ from word to word. The knowing of entities and phenomenon through language can thus be characterized as inherently, if covertly, metaphorical—or as ‘of other things’ that are and are not alike, are and are not in some relation with each other. Identity is thusly known by ‘carrying over’ or ‘across’ from some aspect of one known status to another.

This process of identification by ‘carrying over’ from one composition of descriptive identity to another can also be regarded as a re-configuring derived from other figurations of identity. Overt metaphor is thusly referred to as a ‘figure of speech’ because it overtly suggests an image of status or action that is not an ordinary or literally real thing. However, even the most abstract or literalistic of identifications are composed in reference to imaginable actions or qualities—these two identify by reference to images and thus also ‘figure by way of language.’ The difference is that these identifications figure more covertly due to the ordinariness of their associations. Covertly figured, the end of life is death. Overtly figured, the end of life is its evening. In the first case the end of life is identified in association with the absence of breath, warmth, and consciousness in the ‘figuring’ of notion of biological death. In the second one, the end of life is figured as the fading light of evening. There is a sense, then, in which words as well as images enable identification by figuring compositions of qualities ‘carried over from’ the figuring of other composite identifications. It is worth noting that such ‘carrying over’ is not mono-valent—green identified in relation to the ‘figure’ of the appearance of grass not only composes a specific identity for green but one for grass as well: grass is green. Identifications are bivalent or ambivalent, manifesting an interplay much as do the mutually defining meanings of words. That interplay, being non-linear, requires careful management to enable more exact or specific figurations of identity and meaning among the many-ness of its associations.

Identity and meaning are thus not simply mediated by way of a metaphorical dynamic, but also by such restrictions as assert the status of metaphor as a non-standard or not literal ‘figure of speech.’ Another way of distinguishing such modes of mediating identity can be posed in the dyad of terms sign and symbol. Sign can be identified as a form of making references that are more literal, that ‘stand for’ some actual and more singular status. As such, a traffic signal that displays a red light is taken to mean quite simply and literally ‘to stop all motion.’ A national flag, in contrast, tends to be taken as having various meaningful aspects to its identity but not such a literally correlation between its appearance and any singular status or action. The term symbol is here associated with the more diffuse and complex

identifications of the flag. Yet, even so identified/defined, both sign and symbol ‘make meaning’ by way of deferred references to other configurations (re-presentations) of images, concepts, and experience.

A bed is a thing typically composed of rectangular shaped mattresses, covered in sheets and blankets, etcetera, constituting a complex of constellated factors or aspects. The bed is and is not those other things. It is also a place identified as a ‘place of lying down, sleeping, dreaming, engaging in sexual behavior, and recovery from illness.’ That thing and place are referenced by the word bed, which acts as a ‘sign’ indicating the thing and place of ‘bed-ness.’ (Fig. 6)



Yet the word bed is not the thing and place of bed-ness it ‘signs,’ and its ‘signing’ poses a meaningful identity only in reference to other word-signs that indicate other ‘statuses of being’ or acting (rectangle, soft, rest, sleep, etcetera). That referential mode seems to reiterate the way bed-ness is ‘identified’ as an experiential phenomenon in relation to the similar and contrasting characteristics of other experienced phenomenon, Thus identities are specified or mediated among the continuum of many-nesses in totality by a metaphorical dynamic of association, exemplified in the referential derivations of meanings (denotative and connotative, implicit and explicit, signed or symbolized), among word-signs.

The two basic formulations for mediating this metaphoric composition of identity and explanatory description (re-presentation), differentiated as the literalistic and the figurative, can be regarded as ordinary and non-ordinary forms of discourse. When a word, concept, image, or other sign is treated as literally being or representing the thing or phenomena it ‘indicates’ then the metaphoric dynamic is covert or concealed in ordinarily reductive identification—there is no foregrounding of the ‘carrying over’ or interplay of identifications. In this mode, a description of a thing is reflexively regarded as ‘literally being the thing.’ That is the typically unconscious attitude of discursive description. When the referential mode of knowing things by signs and symbols that reference other signs and symbols representing other things is expressly acknowledged the discourse becomes more overtly metaphorical and thus non-ordinary. In this mode, often associated with hyperbolae, ‘purple prose,’ and poetic diction, language usage manifests its references in more overtly figurative ways. The literalistic mode associates more with one-ness and the overtly metaphorical mode with many-ness in how identification is mediated.

The Contrasting Logics of One-ness and Many-ness


Though there is evident interdependency of one-ness and many-ness, in the practice of cognitive conception, statuses of one-ness and many-ness are readily deployed to pose ‘logics for identity’ that contradict each other. In its covert ‘submersion’ of the patterning of composite identification, the logic of one-ness can be regarded as ‘skipping over’ or attempting to transcend difference-as-many-ness by way of asserting reductive simplicity and singularity. Exact specificity of identity, in establishing its fixed references, thus denies, in essence, any inherently irreducible complexity to entities so defined—it presupposes a homeostatic status of consistent self-continuity. The logic of many-ness, in contrast, in its overt foregrounding of the patterning of composite identification, tends to defuse assignment of any singular precision to identification—resulting in rather ‘insecure’ or unstable identifications of difference. Many-ness exposes or foregrounds the dynamical complexity of composite identification that one-ness compresses, or represses. The logic of one-ness thus can be characterized as ‘identity thinking’ in contrast to the logic of many-ness as a sort of non-identity thinking—in so far as identity is regarded to be singular or exclusive.

This distinction might be expressed as identity thinking in contrast to identification thinking, or as ‘thing thinking’ versus ‘thinging-thinking.’ The logic of one-ness tends to assert objectified, conceptually positivized ‘things,’ whereas that of many-ness represents associations whose concurrently mutual qualifications compose the ‘thing-ing’ of ‘a’ status—a status that is, relative to the perspective of one-ness, a ‘thingless thing’ because it does not reduce to ‘a singular status’ but rather remains a constellated pattern of associations. The book-ish-ness of an object is not ‘the thing’ of ‘a book’ but rather the ‘way a thing books.’ Nouns are more suitable to expressing the logic of one-ness and verbs, adverbs, or

adjectives more so to the logic of many-ness. To use language in ways that foreground the logic of many-ness thus requires expression more like, ‘that entity is a book-ing.’ One-ness is more deterministic in its conclusiveness about ‘what a thing is’ than many-ness. The logic of many-ness thus poses identity as some variation of a general patterning, the one-ness of which is overtly contingent upon a many-ness. Book-ish-ness is a general patterning of characteristics—a sort of original reference for constellating the category book-ish-ness that serves as an archetypal reference. However, any given entity identified as ‘a book’ is, by the logic of many-ness, not only diversely composed but so composed in some distinctive manner. An archetypal reference for book-ish-ness does not determine its color, shape, number of pages, dents and underlinings.


This contrast between the logic of one-ness and that of many-ness can also be illustrated in terms of directional association. One-ness can be regarded as arranging discriminations of difference, of likeness and unlikeness, in reference to established categories or criteria, in oppositional contrasts: ‘A is the antithesis of B,’ suggesting a ‘line of association’ that orders identities along a horizontal axis. Such ‘lining up’ of differences is extended in priorities of origin or causation: ‘A precedes or produces B.’ Identities derived in this manner form chains of sequence that appear to indicate exact sources origin or causation. The origins of meaning in words or concepts can be viewed this way, the meaning of one driving from another derived from another, yet in language this reference tends to pose an indefinite sequence. A logic of one-ness can also be configured in ‘lines of preference’ or dominance: ‘A is more important or powerful than B.’ This latter mode is particularly hierarchical, the mode of privileging A over B, as in being ‘better than’ or superior to, and suggests a ‘vertical’ ordering of reduction as the ‘above and below’ rather than a horizontal one of priority and progression. (Fig. 7)

Hierarchical Order as in Social Class Structure



Thus the ‘singularly separate entities’ asserted by the logic of one-ness are readily arranged in *linear associations*, either as dyads that define each other by binary opposition (good versus evil), or in sequential progressions of cause and effect (the status ‘rain’ results from condensation of the status ‘water vapor’), and predicative statements (X always results in Y).

This form of ‘unconditional’ reasoning relies on exclusive categorical distinctions of status that definitively sort things according to whether they precede or succeed each other in some progressive ordering, given specific contexts or conditions, or whether there is priority of origin or importance. Its singular assertions tend to depend for validity upon a sequential ordering and hierarchical prioritizing derived from preceding assertions of singular status or meaning. It thus generates the production of self-consistent rationales, or hierarchical chains of postulates and conclusions constituting a singular or mono-valent ‘line of reasoning’ (‘a’ rationale). In such manner it tends to make any many-ness *converge* on a one-ness. (Fig. 8)




Thus the complex factors in a chemical reaction or historical period are typically explained as having a primary cause and successive effects that ‘arrive’ at a specific concluding status. The logic of one-ness thus inclines toward centered, static, conclusive knowing. The most extreme form of such identification is expressed in the formulaic logic of mathematics and mechanical physics. This form of association can also be termed equational in that it reduces difference to equivalence in a mathematical manner. In the sense of simplistic, singular identification, $A = A$. In the sense of reduction, $A + B = C$.

The logic of one-ness thereby is reflexively dogmatic and idealistic in the assumptions it posits about status. It can even be characterized as idolatrous in its positivistic constitution of status or identity—to sustain the validity of its singular assertions it in essence prompts idealization of them as ‘idols of identity.’ Such a perspective in essence takes its re-presentations of status to be the status that it represents. Words or descriptions, for instance, are often treated as ‘being what they represent’ rather than as representations. Thus when the logic of one-ness is applied to composing an ‘order of totality’ then that totality tends to be configured as a hierarchically systematic or mechanistic unity (monotheism, the “great chain of being,” or the “big bang”). The logic of one-ness is resistant to uncertainty and

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variability. This form of reasoning is particularly effective in explaining how things are composed and function. It is useful for practical purposes, such as measurement, or in the distinctions of law. Here again, many-ness may be acknowledged but gets sorted by reductive logic into preferred hierarchical orders, sequences of cause and effect, or dominant/subordinate relations that can be readily summarized as a progressive unity or one-ness. Many-ness thus becomes a 'sub-set' of hierarchically composed one-nesses. Scientific theories can order vast many-nesses of data and phenomenon to pose such reductive summaries of varied phenomenal occurrences, as re-presented in the formula " $E = MC^2$." Again, this mode is extremely effective in analyzing and manipulating material phenomena. It can, however, be characterized as 'single minded' in terms of how such method conceives identity and totality.

Knowing which identifies difference in terms of many-ness tends to be less oppositional or sequential in determining status and associations. Rather than associating through binary opposition, linear progression, or vertical hierarchy, it configures patterns of interactivity more by triangulation among diverse references. In this manner three or more elements constellate associations that do not reduce to elemental opposites or sequential progressions. Such a mode is more likely to posit multiply concurrent factors of causation, composing understanding through combinations of likeness and unlikeness, and reasoning by analogy. It is more suited to constituting a logic of *concurrent causality* in which multiple factors co-participate or co-create status and phenomena. A status can be regarded as an expression of various factors whose causal contributions are understood by differing logical rationales. Contradiction of elements and associations 'with in' the constellated contexts of 'an identity' is thus not disruptive of identification posed through the logic of many-ness. Thus the logic of many-ness is polyvalent, triangulatory, and complexly dynamic in that it is not singularly centered, binarily opposing, linearly progressive, or conclusive. Its meaningful associations tend to both converge and diverge among aspects of its constellated references 'all at once.' (Fig. 9)



It can be figured as ‘expanding laterally’ rather than ‘proceeding linearly,’ or even as radiating from and between particular aspects of its references. This mode of thinking can be termed constellative and contextual knowing—in which identifications are complexes of continually modifying aspects that resist reduction to ‘a’ center or line. Identity thus becomes a contexting subject to re-contexting by inclusion or exclusion of various elements constellated in the ‘context of identification.’ The woman/doctor/mother/president entity ‘as an identity’ shifts around according to the context in which it is constellated; yet it is understandable as a ‘field of identification.’

Thus, in contrast to the rather idolatrous attitude the logic of one-ness prompts about its identifications, that of many-ness is less prone to literalizing its re-presentations of status as that actual status itself—or even as defining identity in any absolute manner. It is a contingent status of identification. Such a way of thinking can be characterized as ‘multi-mindedness’ or ‘fugue consciousness’ that enables a sort of ‘mental chorus’ of contrapuntal elements suggesting some relational unity. One might compare it to the logic of one-ness as a minor chord to a major one in music. The relatively unresolved contrasts of the logic of many-ness tends to appear paradoxical, inconsistent, and self-contradictory to the perspective of the more reductive, sequential logic of one-ness. Yet the logic of many-ness does appear even in scientific contexts, such as in the notion that the singular status light behaves as both particles and waves.

The logic of one-ness is thus associated with fixed status or a linearly progressive dynamism. That of many-ness is associated with defused status and multi-directional or poly-valent dynamism. As such, one-ness enables a more conclusive explanation of phenomenon as concrete entities whereas many-ness generates understanding through a more intuitive impression or experience of phenomena as nexes of activity or patterning. This distinction can also be characterized as a semantic versus a syntactic mode of

positing identity or meaning. One asserts the certain fixity of semantic status and the other the relational contexting of syntax as in language where words have defined meanings, but those are in syntactic relation to other words in dictionaries and the grammatical contexting of sentences.

The logic of one-ness can also be characterized as reflexive in that it ‘proceeds’ in a sort of automatic reference to past reductions of status or causation. Its validity is so dependent upon those previously asserted assumptions that to doubt them would risk reflection upon and possible reconstruction of the *a priori* basis for making further reductive identifications—thereby destabilizing or invalidating whole chains of identifications. The logic of many-ness is more readily associated with reflection, both in the sense that its constellatory mode of composing identity status tends to ‘reflect’ between the triangulated components of such status and in how it tends to prompt consideration for inherent diversity or complexity in all states of being. Reflexive attitudes in consciousness are thus more associated with the reductive mode of one-ness and reflective attitudes with the diversifying mode of many-ness.

Parsing Re-presentation as Reduction to and Diversification of Essence

If all knowledge is re-presentation of awareness/knowing of some phenomenon (be it physical, dynamical, or imaginal in its ‘actuality’), then one can assert, along with Owen Barfield, that it is a “representation of the un-represented.” In his “Saving the Appearances” Barfield elaborated the perspective that knowing and knowledge cannot be ‘what they represent’ and thus that what they re-present always remains un-represented in its full actuality. A piece of paper known by re-presentations of how a thing is known as a piece of paper remains, in its totality, un-re-presented. From that perspective, what is being discussed here is not whether reductive or non-reductive modes of representation are more or less ‘accurate’ in representing what is ‘out there.’ Rather, the issue being grappled with in this discourse is how to best understand the effects on the understanding of phenomenon, or ‘what is being known’ by way of re-presentation, resulting from reductive versus diversifying representational style.

All representation, like the criteria for differentiating statuses of difference used to compose re-presentations of ‘what is being perceived,’ are readily regarded as abstract, and thus reductive impositions upon the phenomenon they re-present. To ‘take the thing’ as its re-presentation as a ‘thingless thing of thought’ or imagination (as the image or definition of a piece of paper) is to miss-take the re-presentation for the thing. But such re-presentation can tend to be configured more in accord with the logic of one-ness or with that of many-ness. Both modes can be deployed to represent an abstracted identification of the characteristic essence of the phenomenon being re-presented as knowing and knowledge. Both are reductive in so far as the actual phenomenon is being re-presented by way of an abstract imposition upon its ultimately incompletely represented totality (be that more or less reductive). A rabbit can be identified in reference to an exactly specific genetic code or more variously as ‘a furry creature that hops, signifies fertility, and is famous for being depicted in the book Alice In Wonderland’—neither of which presents

the actuality of rabbit-ness. But one-ness as a mode of re-presentation is *dynamically* reductive as well as abstractly reductive, moving as it does toward exclusive singularity.

Dynamically reductive representation can be parsed further as having two forms. One is idiosyncratic in that it reduces to a singular status of composition, origin, or dynamical character. The other is systematic in that it reduces to a singular status that is dependent upon linear causation or rationalization within a self-consistent system of associations. In the former category the reduction of essential identity is not dependent upon concurrence with other reductions. Thus the context or rationale for such reductive representations need not be logically or practically consistent. In such perspective the origin of biological life can be reduced to the process of natural selection and its creation to an act of divine will without having to 'justify' the reasoning of such divergent reductions. Instead, these readily contradictory reductions are 'located' in different contexts of reference, i.e. the science lab and the church. Systematic reduction, in contrast, is intolerant of contradictions and paradoxes. It tends to assert a unifying context or rationale for all reductive identifications. In this mode, all scientific postulates about biological life are configured to conform to the reduction of the origin of such life to the process of natural selection. The validity of representations in this systematic mode is dependent upon coherence with some unifying rationale of causation or purpose. This is the more mechanistic and instrumental form of reductive thought and re-presentation.

Non-reductive or diversifying representation also can be parsed as having two forms. One is contextual in that a status is represented as plural but subservient to a larger one-ness or unity. In this sense a book has many copies but all are the same book. The second form of diversifying status is radical or de-centering. This form of representation indicates some irreducible condition to a diversified status of essence. Metaphorical expressions present this quality of identification in how they re-present phenomenon. To state that "the fog came in on cat's feet" is to re-present fog in a way that is obviously not a literal representation. Cat's feet and fog are most difficult to logically reconcile as aspects of any single, self-consistent identity status. In so far as such representation conveys some essential identity of fog then, it does so in an irreducible complex manner.

This parsing of diversifying representation suggests a similar distinction about inclusive knowing, or knowing by way of many-ness. In one sense it is contextual—one can know an entity or context in a diversified way. In a more radical form, inclusive knowing is 'of totality,' or of the many-ness in one-ness expressed as the dynamical diversity of totality. The relationship between diversifying representation and inclusive knowing becomes evident in this association. Dynamically reductive re-presentation is not suitable to conveying the dynamically diverse activity or poly-valent logic of radical complexity.

Parsing Knowings as Exclusive Reduction and Inclusive Diversification

Though all representation of that which is being known (the ultimately “unrepresented”) is portrayed above as reductive in its reference to the necessarily arbitrary criteria of the ‘already known,’ significant differences in how re-presentations enable knowing are being proposed in this analysis. In the broadest sense, then, knowing as re-presentation of ‘that being known’ is distinguishable for its emphasis upon the more reductive the logic of one-ness, versus that of many-ness. Such an *a priori* bias in formulating re-presentations of ‘that being known’ implies the possibility, if not necessity, of identifying the very essence of what is being known. Knowing and its re-presentations configured more by the logic of one-ness is thus taken to suggest ‘reduction to essence.’ Knowing configured more by the logic of many-ness, in contrast, asserts an ‘inclusive diversity’ that allows more multiple ‘states of being’ or ‘becoming’—thereby posing an ‘diversification of essence.’ The reductive category can be further parsed as idiosyncratic and systematic. Though all re-presentations are in some essential way reductive representations of what is being known/referred to in so far as these are arbitrary abstractions of the ‘ultimately un-represented,’ some are more predetermined by a particular ‘line of reasoning’ or systematic set of references for establishing reductive identity status. Materialistic science provides such a systematic set of references for determining how to re-present the status of an object within its ‘rules’ for material composition and physical mechanics. But many reductive identifications, though derived from various cultural and societal beliefs, are less dependent upon a set of self-consistent rules. Such logically inconsistent reductions are referred to here as idiosyncratic in character rather than systematic.

Knowing and re-presentation by way of inclusive diversification is dynamically resistant to both forms of this reductivity to essence—idiosyncratic or systematic. Representation that is non-reductive has two categories also: contextual and radical. An identity status can be known and represented as irreducibly complex within a specific context. Femininity might be regarded as intrinsically complex as an expression of behavioral and cognitive traits—that is, it could be known as a many-ness that is ultimately ‘un-definable.’ Yet it can also be assigned a rather more specific and limited status in a larger one-ness of life as ordered by biological processes which ‘contain’ that complexity. The seemingly irreducible complexity of femininity is thus limited by the reductive status of life-as-biological-process. A larger field of knowing by inclusive diversification is more ultimately radical. In this framing, the largest context, that of inclusive totality, is posed as irreducible complex—not amenable to any logical linearization or mechanistic interpretation of cause and effect. Inclusive knowing thus has two categories as well as does its more reductive counterpart. One can know the many-ness of an object or phenomenon as subject to or part of the one-ness of a reductively identified context, or many-ness in one-ness, suggesting that the one-ness is irreducible diverse and thus indefinite.

A One-ness and Many-ness of Heuristic Method: Conservative, Moderate, and Radical Standards of Reduction and Pluralization in Speculative Models of Interpretation

When knowing is construed as ‘the act of interpretation’ it is often described as being guided by some “speculative model” or heuristic method, “a procedure for searching out an unknown goal by incremental exploration, according to some guiding principle which reduces the amount of searching required (Dictionary of Modern Thought, p.382).” One heuristic method is to establish status and interpret meaning in relation to a standard of ‘ideal types’ against which one can compare all forms and phenomenon. Another method would be to proceed to identify what is unknown in reference to the standard that all statuses are complex. Obviously these two examples relate to a standard of one-ness and many-ness respectively. As elaborated by Gallagher in his “Hermeneutics and Education,” compositions of hermeneutic methods or procedures can be parsed as conservative, moderate, and radical. The conservative mode is the more absolutely reductive in requiring interpretations of identity status and logical relations between explanations to maintain self-consistent continuity with existing or traditional standards. It is exemplified in the traditions of logical positivism. The more radical formulations are opposed in that these methods do not insist upon such fixed or reductive models for truth and reality. Indeed, these insist rather upon interpretations that do not reduce identity to fixed, singular status literalistically represented by signs or symbols.

This radical version of hermeneutic method is exemplified in poststructuralist and deconstructive approaches to interpretation. But even this latter sort of mode that overtly states its intention to avoid or reject all reductive status can become a dogmatic orthodoxy that is reductive in so far as it predetermines to interpret all status as indefinite and pluralistic. In such a manner, even the logic of many-ness can be subordinated to a reflexive reduction to a singular type of status—i.e. that of *only* many-ness. This present study is guided by a heuristic that assumes a radically complex, ultimately irreducible character to the composition of totality. But that heuristic basis for making meaning of how humans make meaning is being deployed in conjunction with one that asserts an inherently valid role for posing reductively singular status in attempts to ‘know’ that diverse totality.

One-ness as a Status of the Ordinary, the Valid, and the Real that Delimits Many-ness

Asserting a status of one-ness inherently poses some rather fixed distinction between one entity and another. ‘A thing’ is thusly seen as having some definitive identity that ‘includes’ whatever many-ness is ordered by its unity and thus identifies it—color, shape, location, history, etc. In establishing some commonly agreed upon reality in ordinary experience, people by practical necessity must agree upon certain singularities of ‘how things are.’ It appears essential to decide upon some singularly identified states of being, or of cause and effect, which are to be ‘the ones that are real.’ Similarly, there is a need to

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agree upon which ‘ways of doing’ are the proper ways for people to behave in their societies. There can be no culture or society with out such structuring collective parameters. Practically, limits must be placed upon the many-nesses of identity, social behaviors, and possible definitions of valid reality. A certain commonality of re-presentations of things and phenomenon is essential to communication between persons.

Thus ordinary life becomes composed by ‘right’ and ‘correct’ ways to think, perform work, and act in relation to others. Similarly, valid, and true ways to understand and express events or phenomena are collectively agreed upon—rules for ‘how to structure the world’ and re-presentations of it. While the proper ways of behaving or the valid ways for describing real events can be complex and numerous, taken together these tend to constitute dominant one-nesses. In contemporary egalitarian-oriented individualistic societies, social behavior is organized under the dominant singular concept that one should be able to pursue one’s individual interests so long as he or she does not interfere with the liberty of others to do likewise. In scientific cultures description of the realm of reality is delimited by the one-ness of the concept of quantifiable cause and effect—that which cannot be measured and explained in terms of sequential, mechanistic causality tends to be granted less, if any, valid status as being real. These inherently hierarchical assertions of one-ness necessarily delimit the possibilities of what is granted ordinary validity and reality. Enforced fascism and communism are thusly regarded as invalid unifying bases for society as these contradict the privileged concept of personal liberty. Magic is similarly regarded as an invalid explanation of phenomenon under the hierarchical purview of the one-nesses of scientific materialism.

Such primary concepts that provide hierarchical unitary one-ness to ordinary socialized reality generate categories of identity status and phenomenal explanation (knowing as knowledge) that compose the terms and concepts of an ordinary *discourse*—a shared way of speaking about the validly real. Yet the dominant one-nesses configuring that socialized discourse can, on close analysis, be found to be in competition or contradiction with each other. Yet societies tend to be capable of ignoring such contradictions and acting as if they were logically self-consistent. The reductive basis for social unity and its definitions for valid reality are typically idiosyncratically reductive—even when claiming systematic consistency, as technologically scientific societies tend to do. Since such contradiction is found in and between different societies, and ‘the same’ society in different historical moments, can pose overtly different one-nesses of the ordinarily right, true, and valid, it can be supposed that there is always some arbitrary aspect to these socially structured limitations placed upon the acceptability or validity of the many-ness of actuality. Consequently, there are not only various socio-cultural versions of verisimilitude, but also some inherent discrepancy between the standards for the ordinarily real or proper and the actual in any given societal context. Thus the ordinary rules for structuring understanding and explanation will

be inherently inadequate in generating a discourse appropriate for expressing the character of totality not structurable within the limits of those ordinarily dominant rules—in all socialized contexts.

Verisimilitudes of Verisimilitude: Re-presenting the Valid Versus the Literal and the Actual

Social conventions and structures not only decide what criteria for structuring reality are valid but also when or where these are applicable. One set of rules might be dominant when attempting to devise a mechanical procedure, such as building a bridge, but another might be allowed validity when attempting to engage the powers behind emotional feelings, as in counseling a person about the significance of death. Which cultural one-ness of the real or true is dominant is contextual. Cultures posing dualistic or pluralistic versions of diversified totality can thusly 'go so far' as to assert such an alternate context as 'an other world' beside, behind, above, or below the ordinary one—a non-ordinary context that has different rules for what is possible or true. In this sense there can be both a realm of matter and one of spirit—a scientific and a religious context for valid re-presentations of the truth of phenomenal existence. Instances when the rules of both ordinary and non-ordinary 'worlds' are regarded as somehow concurrently valid are also conceived—thereby identifying yet another context for the validly real.

Thus verisimilitude, that appearance of being real, not only depends upon the socially and personally validated criteria for 'the ordinarily real,' it can have multiple, context dependent versions. When one set of criteria for valid reality appears inadequate to include certain experiences or phenomena, other sets might be required to 'make sense' of experience. In contemporary scientific societies the requirements of self-consistent explanations of reality in materialistic terms impose a strict continuity and hierarchy within a singular context for the real and true. Thus contrasting criteria for reality and truth must compete for priority in an on-going process of scientific research and critical rational analysis. But in non-scientific contexts, such as aesthetic and artistic expression, or non-Western cultures, various, even contradictory criteria can be regarded as concurrently valid. Such co-operative sets of criteria of the real or true can be regarded as compensating for each other's inadequacy at representing some totalistic reality of experience and phenomena. One set of criteria in essence re-relates what another has divided repressed, or opposed according to some structurally determined unitary theory or social convention. 'The rules' for how non-realistic painting re-presents the realities of a landscape or human emotion are thusly complex.

It appears then that what is determined to be valid—and thus granted some phenomenal reality—is not necessarily either literally existent or descriptively accurate phenomenal actuality. Cultures and societies as well as individuals obviously exist and survive despite asserting all manner of differing criteria for valid truth and phenomenal reality—criteria often demonstrated by the principles of materialistic science to be either literally incorrect or descriptively inaccurate (most obviously mythic and religious re-presentations). Knowledge, as the structuring of knowing of things in relation to other things,

known in relation to other things, etcetera, is thus ever subject to re-visioning or re-con-figuring. Thereby one can expect to encounter various verisimilitudes of verisimilitude—re-presentations of the true and valid are never likely to be ‘literally accurate’ in any definitively complete way.

It is worth noting that though contemporary usage of the term hierarchy most commonly indicates a “body of persons organized or classified according to rank,” or “a body of entities arranged in a graded series,” its origins reflect a rather supernatural or sacred ordering. The word derives from the Greek *hierarkhes* for high priest or sacred leader. Thus every hierarchy of values asserting a verisimilitude of the real and true can be regarded as implying some ‘sacred ordering’ that privileges a given ‘ordering of reality.’

How Habitual Reductions in the Orthodoxies of Ordinary One-nesses of Cultural Belief, Societal Structures, and Personal Identity Reflexively Restrict Knowing of Self, Other, and World

In constituting a general set of references demarking ordinary reality, culturally and socially constructed parameters for identifying self, other, and world distinguish normal from deviant modes of understanding, communicating, and behaving. Those distinctions result in social orthodoxies of selfhood that con-figure sense of self rather unconsciously. In so doing a basis for societal continuity or homeostasis of collective identity is established. Associations between or experiences of aspects of self, others, and world that do not conform to these normative parameters are thus repressed or filtered through the habitual reductions of ordinary discourse in a rather automatic manner. Thought, speech, and action become reflexive expressions of the standards of collectively assumed one-nesses. Much of such orthodoxical identity is inculcated during early childhood conditioning—‘with mother’s milk,’ as it were. Consequently, the ways in which the identity of specific persons is configured as ‘sense of self’ is reflexively or unconsciously structured, delimiting awareness of the composition of selfhood to the standardized perspectives. In both cases, the composition of collective reality and of personal identity, a criteria for knowing and identifying self, other, and world develop that assert a reflexive ‘authority’ over awareness, the validity of experience or thought, and the discourse available for describing these. The assumptions and relatively automatic operation of those dominant orthodoxies of one-ness delimiting the many-ness of self, other, and world constitute *habitual identity* and ordinary reality. In every cultural and social context, then, those habituated ways of knowing and structuring knowledge necessarily constrain or restrict knowing of self, other, and world.

Mediation Between Habitually Structured Identity/Reality and an Unstructured or Un-structurable Status by way of Relativization

Inevitably, the dominant orthodoxies of ordinary identity and valid reality are challenged by some experience or thought that are difficult to express in the one-nesses of ordinary discourse. Thereby some means of mediating between conflicts of normative criteria or structuring and experiences of actual identity and phenomenon become important. Contradictions between elements of normative criteria for valid identity, reality, and truth, as well as incompatible experiences, are in essence ‘transgressions of the unitary order.’ As noted, in the context of scientific materialism such conflict can be mediated by experimental testing and rational analysis of theoretical explanations that accommodate the unfamiliarly structured to normative definitions. Thusly, emerging data on as-yet-unstructured statuses of phenomenon is assimilated to the previously structured authority of a materialistic reality. This activity can be termed mediation by assimilation. But there are occasions when normative standards must be changed in order to accommodate new data about materialistic phenomenon. Scientific theories are frequently ‘amended’ in this manner without destabilizing the dominant unifying one-ness of their methodological reality. But when the conflict between ordinary and non-ordinary status concerns radically incommensurable sets of criteria for structuring valid reality, such mediation becomes more problematic. When mechanistic scientific causality is confronted phenomenon incompatible with its existing orthodoxies of reality a schizoid status develops that can only be ‘bridged’ by some concept that allows a mutual if causally inconsistent context for validity. Scientific materialism confronts such conflict in attempting to explain the appearance of simultaneous ‘communication’ between particles across space that seems to be ‘magical action at a distance.’ Such conflict can be encountered in the extreme context of having to mediate between ordinarily established reality and experience of radically diverse totality that renders those normative structurings utterly incoherent or inadequate. The capacity to effectively mediate that sort of conflict requires a shift that can incorporate the seemingly incommensurable statuses into some non-reductive relationship that does not privilege one over the other—a many-ness in a one-ness.

An effective mediation of the opposed positions on defining the meaning of abortion present a conflict of ‘right and proper’ reductive one-ness that would require some radically other perspective to pose a criteria of validity capable of including such antimony in a non-reductive yet relational totality. Such a relational context is unthinkable from either of the conflicting positions. Thus a third, inclusive perspective on abortion could be said to ‘relativize’ the reductive ‘pro’ and ‘con’ arguments to a more complex association of issues and concerns. Mediation by relativization brings antimonies into some field of inclusive commonality that does not depend on assimilating to a hierarchy of dominant priority—diversity thus tends to be preserved rather than repressed. Categories generating such conflicts that are suitable to mediation by relativization include the ordinarily real versus un-real, the literally

actual versus the conceptual, and the materially versus the psychologically real. But statuses and experience that cannot be structured under normal or ordinary hierarchies of social convention and scientific paradigms can prompt relativization of those dominant standards or criteria to non-ordinary ones of ‘that which is not yet structured’ or else so radically complex and irreducibly diverse as to be reductively ‘un-structurable.’ Encounters with such un-structurable characteristics of identity and phenomenon can only be existentially ‘classed’ as non-ordinarily, mythically, or supernaturally real and valid. These non-ordinarily valid categories mediate between what is structurable under ordinarily reductive criteria (idiosyncratic or systematic) and what can be identified only by relativizing that modality of ordinary context for reference to some larger field that has a more totalistic or inclusive ‘ordering’ or logos.

Maintaining Continuity of Unifying One-nesses that Assert Ordinary Identity and Reality by Denial, Subordination, Compartmentalization, and Repression

Continuity of ordinary reality and collective identity are obviously maintained despite discrepancies between dominant ones that manifest conflicting criteria for valid identity status (such as manifesting between religious belief and scientific theory). Whereas a primary ideal (or dominant one-ness) of Westernized society might well be characterized as the belief in and pursuit of a singular, self-consistently rational explanation of all existence, contemporary socio-cultural life is readily regarded as structured by dominant one-nesses that do fit into such a non-contradictory rationale. Dominant one-nesses do not exhibit identical criteria for the real, true, and valid. Nonetheless, a pervasive attitude that there is general agreement about ‘how things really are’ appears to persist. One can assert then that some potent and effective denial about the actual many-ness of identity, phenomenal causation, and experience (even as expressed through the dominant one-nesses) is effectively maintaining the collective sense of unitary continuity. If that view is accepted, then it can be further posited that in general the radically complex dynamical relations of totality are being deliberately, if perhaps unconsciously, ignored despite contradictions between and inadequacies of social convention for consistently defining valid identity and reality. However, such an attitude as contributes to this denial of contradictory criteria or orders can also be regarded as necessary to the practical organization of societies. Thusly the diverse and often divisive “we” of the society are assimilated to the one-ness of “the nation” with little resistance due to some shared sense that a reflexive basis for collective cooperation is a necessity.

Maintenance of the supremacy of dominant one-nesses in spite of inherent divergences between how dominant they order many-ness, or fail to adequately represent certain new experiences, concepts, and phenomenal events, can also be asserted by contextual subordination. An overall socialized attitude can develop that reflexively assumes that certain one-nesses or sets of criteria for identity and reality are

primary only under particular circumstances. In this way conflicts and contradictions can be ignored out of habit. The shift from an earth centered to a solar centered universe appears to be scientifically confirmed. But practically, most people still act in accord with the attitude that the sun ‘rises’ and ‘sets’ as if it orbited the earth. That reductive one-ness or concept of celestial reality might well be devoid of scientific truth. But rather than its being dismissed as utterly insignificant, it appears to have been subordinated to a contextual validity. Such ‘holding apart’ of reductive criteria that conflict can also be termed compartmentalizing that isolates different sets of criteria for dominant one-nesses and thereby preventing them from ‘coming into open conflict.’

When open conflict between dominant one-ness cannot be avoided by denial, subordination, or compartmentalization, the pressure for reconfiguring such collective identifications can become socially ‘explosive.’ The historical era of social and religious conflict termed the Reformation is a most violent example of how conflict between world and society ordering one-nesses can be expressed. The disintegration of national unity in and eruption of civil war presents an example of how the rupture of effectively unifying one-ness, such as of national identity, can result in disorder that provokes violent attempts to restore the preceding, now dismembered, one-ness by repressing challenges to it, or else to impose a new one. Reactive or reflexive attempts to restore previously dominant one-nesses is typical in such instances of spontaneous eruptions of disorderly or unstructured many-ness. Old orders ‘die hard’ but new ones tend to be equally repressive of ‘disorderly diversity.’ Both leads to new ordering one-nesses and regressions to old ones can be viewed as attempts to repress eruptions of many-ness under a sense of unitary identity or explanation. The strident reductive character of social and political propaganda illustrates this tendency to impose a unitary, self-consistent collective orientation. In some cases a ‘new identity of identity’ will be more inclusive than one it replaces, as in the American revolution’s adding of more social classes and political factions to the arena of power—expressed as a shift from monarchical government to democratic society. But the impulse to impose a unitary mentality over the inevitable conflicts between dominant one-nesses appears inevitable. Again, two characteristic dynamics can be noted in these types of re-orientation of bases for collective one-ness.

Analytical Differentiation’s Fragmenting Effects and the Indefinite Proliferation of Competitive One-nesses

The very mode of knowing expressed by rational analysis derives from differentiating *definitive* one-nesses that can be associated in progressively reasoned explanations of predictably determinative or causal relations. The word analyze derives from a Greek root meaning, “to loosen throughout” and appearing in words such as dissolve. Thus analysis enables us to loosen the interconnectedness of many-ness, and so to ‘take things apart’ into more separate components. Such loosening as a ‘method for

knowing' seems to facilitate the development of consistent reasoning about the relations or interactions of the components of composite status. An immediate effect of such 'dissolving' of con-fusing bonds or connectedness is an essential fragmenting of inter-related contexts. Such definitive differentiation is central to scientific method. Analyzing water into H₂O fragments its unity into the separate statuses of hydrogen and oxygen. Curiously, this method of 'taking things apart' can be applied not only with an intention to elaborate diversity, but also deployed for the purpose of 'arriving at singular finality.' Thus one can analyze with the intention of rather endlessly differentiating aspects of being and further developing understanding of the complexity of discernable patterns in causation and manifestation. Yet one can also one can analyze for the purpose of establishing the 'complete truth' that has identified all the parts with finality. Under either intention, however, analysis tends to promote increased, fragmentary differentiations.

Rational analysis applied in service to establishing a singularly self-consistent explanation of valid reality tends to reduce many-ness to a hierarchically ordered one-ness. Yet in so doing it manifests a seemingly contradictory effect. The effort of applying rational analysis for the purpose of reducing states of being and causation to ever more definitively singular states (such as water to a chemical compound, gravity to mathematical formulae, or human behavior to a genetic code), tends to generate ever more numerous singular states and 'units of causation.' Such seeking of an ultimately differentiated unitary one-ness serves to fragment seeming 'wholes' into ever more numerous pieces. That proliferation of statuses ultimately compounds the many-ness of being even as it applied to 'arriving at the smallest common denominator.' Subsequently, ever greater efforts appear required to order these increased differentiation in some singularly self-consistent one-ness or hierarchical unity—some 'final theory.' Reductive analysis, in this sense, can be regarded as creating more complexity even as it is employed to establish elemental simplicity. In other words, analytical rational analysis of things and phenomenon actually tends to create *more* differentiations rather than fewer ones. Even as scientific study seeks to establish some final, rationally consistent description of valid reality, it produces ever more data that must some how be explained without contradicting existing rationalizations of structure and causality.

Science, like Western philosophy in general, thus is engaged in a constant revision of its rationally self-consistent explanations of valid reality—seeking to progressively incorporate new differentiations into existing rationales. That process of research, *new* discovery, and revision of accepted explanations manifests an on-going competition between newly proposed differentiations and explanations. As mentioned, this process of reasoning out definitive identities and order serves to assimilate the as-yet unstructured phenomenon of existence to unitary hierarchies of one-ness. Yet it can be observed, then, that the attempt to reduce many-ness to some singularly self-consistent order of valid reality actually proliferates one-nesses into a seemingly infinite or irreducible variety.

Knowing Rightly from Wrongly: Social Consecration of Ways of Knowing

In a summary sense, every society presents primary one-nesses asserting complex and inevitably contradictory criteria sets for how to know and what is considered a valid status of existence or knowledge. Yet every society inevitably asserts some unifying perspective of one-ness that ameliorates or obscures those conflicts between its primary and foundational one-nesses. Some ways of knowing and formulations of knowledge are granted superior status, at least in specified contexts. It is not an exaggeration to describe such primacy as a 'consecration.' How reality and valid identity status are defined has an ultimate significance that confers a relatively sacred significance. Such a status is thereby granted only to certain ways of knowing and formulations of knowledge, but to aspects of knowledge and meaning thusly derived that are, relatively, superior, right, and good. In the most general sense, then, one-ness might be consecrated as the most 'right' way to know, so that knowing by way of many-ness can only be a valid way of knowing if it is subordinated to one-ness.

Knowing Right from Wrong: Ones and Manys of Morality and Ethics

Just as there are socialized rules that determine how to categorize the ordinarily real in distinction from than un-real, or validly true versus invalid or un-true status, there are rules guiding how to know what is right and wrong in moralistic terms of good versus bad. The oppositional character of good versus bad or fair versus unfair automatically prompt a reductive hierarchy in which the good and fair are superior statuses. Moral criteria for sorting status into these categories are thus reflexively reductive. Morals and ethics define states of being and acting that are necessarily opposed to status that is immoral or unethical. Thus inclusive knowing by way of non-reductive identification and many-nesses tends to be either amoral or immoral in how it asserts a valid status for knowledge and behavior. By the standard of ethical morality, a 'good person' is one who 'does ethical acts.' But a person who does both ethical and un-ethical acts is not readily classed as 'moral' by such reductive standards. A less reductive standard of identifying status is more able to distinguish between the ethical qualities of such a person in relation to another one who acts mostly in an un-ethical ways and commits few ethical acts. There appears then an intrinsic tension between knowing morally or ethically and knowing inclusively. That tension is evident when persons of a more reductive moral judgment accuse those inclined toward more pluralistic perspectives of 'relativism' in how the latter establish rules for ethical behavior. Rules for ethical morality derived from a more pluralistic approach are more likely to be contextually dependent, identifying some behavior as ethical in certain contexts but not others.

Knowing by Way of Inclusive Multiplicity and Exclusive Singularity in Western Intellectual Tradition

The influences upon knowing and knowledge of configuring identification in reference to one-ness and many-ness is significance for understanding any socialized definitions of real, true, and valid status. In the contemporary moment of this writing it is of particular importance to consider how these orientations are expressed in the perspectives of Westernized intellectual method and socialized reality. The following sketch of ways reductive and non-reductive, or exclusive and inclusive approaches to knowing tend to be deployed in Westernized thought is meant to enable a more specific discussion of how the contrast is actually experienced in contemporary society.

Western Preference for Reductive Logic and Its Idealistically Positivizing Consequences for Method and Purpose

In Western cultures, the intellectual tradition since the ancient Greeks can be characterized as having privileged ‘the logic of one-ness’ in ordering its criteria for knowing self, other, and world to a relatively extreme degree.

The philosopher desires to apprehend the world as an absolute unity; he hopes ultimately to break down all diversity, and particularly the diversity of symbols: to discern the ultimate reality, the reality of “being” itself. The metaphysics of all times has faced this fundamental problem. It postulated a unitary and single being, because and insofar as truth could be thought of only as unitary and simple. In this sense the *ἐν τὸ σοφόν* of Heraclitus became the watchword of philosophy: it was an admonition to seek the one, unbroken light of pure knowledge behind the variegated colors of sensory experience, behind the multiplicity and diversity of the forms of thought. As Spinoza said, it is in the essence of light to illumine itself and the darkness—thus it was held that at some point there must be an immediate self-revelation of truth and reality. For thought and reality ought not merely to correspond to each other in some sense but must permeate each other. The function of thought should not be merely to “express” being, i.e. to apprehend and classify it under one of its own categories of meaning. Rather, thought held itself able to deal with reality on an equal footing, and was fully convinced that it could exhaust its meaning. There could be no final, unsurpassable barrier: for thought and the object toward which it is directed were one. Parmenides was first to state this proposition with classical succinctness and sharpness, and so became the founder of all philosophical rationalism. (Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* 1-2).

Thereby, understanding of being and explanations of phenomenal becoming in Western philosophy are not simply approached through the typically idiosyncratic reductive criteria of ordinarily socialized knowledge suggested by Cassirer’s reference to “the metaphysics of all times.” Rather, these concerns of knowing are examined through a reflexively dominant reductive methodology of rational analysis for the goal of defining exact, final identity, reality, and truth. Thereby, reductive method and reductive intention become conjoined as

both method of and purpose for analysis—constituting a sort of ‘double reductive imperative.’ Consequently great emphasis is placed upon ‘reasoning toward conclusive singularity’ with self-consistent or systematic continuity when asserting any status of truth and reality. Rational analysis thus reflexively comes to be ‘practiced’ *for the purpose of* determining the exclusive status of being and becoming, of identity and phenomena, as definitively singular states or sequences of cause and effect. The intentionality of knowing thereby tends to be delimited by the logic of one-ness, with its idealistic positivizing of identity and representations. Plato’s foundational assertion of the ‘realm of ideal forms’ from which all manifestations derive is the exemplary formulation of this perspective on an absolute truth, represented as a literalized metaphorical abstraction.

Consequently logic in Western philosophy, as represented in the term “logos,” is generally taken to refer explicitly to a reductively definitive, linearly or self-consistently rational explanation of ‘how things are.’ It provides the criteria for reducing all diversity and variation to singular statuses of idealized categories. As such it appears modeled upon mathematical precision. Yet the dictionary definition of this term suggests it has more complex derivations. The etymological sources of this term include the Greek *logos* that can be translated as speech, word, reason, but also as “the point” or “final purpose.” The latter sense is amplified as “cosmic reason, affirmed in ancient Greek philosophy as the source of world order and intelligibility” and also as “the self-revealing thought and will of God as set forth in the Gospel of John ” ([American Heritage Dictionary](#) 767). Such a sense of logic suggests it must be utterly inclusive to be “the source of world order and intelligibility,” to be genuinely the ‘logic of the cosmos,’ or ‘the Creator’ that can make ‘intelligible’ or ‘know’ all its manifestations—including its (apparently) indefinitely indeterminate diversity. As such, it would seem to necessarily have to include both the logics of one-ness and many-ness. It is just such an inclusive logos that will be shown here to be the logic of inclusive knowing and exemplified in both psychological complexity and its ‘mythical expressions.’

Logic reflexively posed and engaged as the logic of one-ness indicates that there can be only one, self-consistent logos—a one-ness that subsumes all divergent diversity. Thus any and all contradiction tends to be interpreted as resolvable either to a true or false, the real or the un-real status—a dualism that has only one valid status to its two opposites. In contrast, a more pluralistic, co-participatory mode of ‘being logical’ might be termed ‘logo constellative,’ as it is less likely to pose a dominant ‘central line’ of sequential causality or explanation. The terms mono-logical and mono-valent will be used here in association with more exclusively reductive method and impulse. Poly-valence and concurrency will be associated with the pluralistic or constellative mode of composing a more inclusive logos—the constellative logic of many-ness. And it will be shown that this latter mode of knowing, or practicing analysis and composing understanding, are not so absent from Western intellectual practice as its conclusions might suggest,

The Polemical Opposition of One-ness and Many-ness in Analytical Rationalism

Within the social contexting of Western cultures, with their emphasis on analytical rationalism as the dominant ‘one way’ for validating the real, the statuses of one-ness and many-ness appear more fundamentally, more intrinsically competitive and oppositional than in less rationalistic cultures. The method of validating reality by means of mechanistic analysis, positivistic experiment, and self-consistent rationalization (with its reliance on exclusive categories of identity status), tends to be intolerant of ambiguity, rational inconsistency, and non-hierarchically ordered many-ness.

Such a method for posing valid states of being and statuses of identity is thereby dependent upon a polemical opposition between one-nesses and many-nesses—opposition that assumes a superiority of one-ness in knowing accurately. By analyzing the relations between the many-ness of things and phenomenon, this intellectual method creates a reasonable understanding by way of a process of ordering those parts into self-consistent one-nesses or unities. Given such a reductive mode of validation in which ‘the one’ must dominate the many possibilities of posing understanding, it is not ‘reasonable’ to validate competing or plural explanations of the real or true.

Reality and Un-Reality in the Western Distinction between Mythos and Logos

The intellectual methods of Western rational philosophy and science can be said to derive in part from a distinction made by ancient Greek thinkers between “mythos” and “logos.” A perspective developed that regarded mythos as ‘story’ that might be emotionally compelling and aesthetically pleasing, but did not provide a description or explanation of the actual status of existence. In contrast, logos came to be posed as the mode of knowing that could provide accurate explanations of actual cause and effect, of being and becoming. The basis for the greater accuracy of logos derived, in considerable part, from analysis of physical phenomenon and formulaic mathematical precision, prompting the development of rigorously self-consistent reasoning. The truthfulness of logos explanations of reality became antithetical or opposite to the overtly metaphorical and fantastic expressions of mythos. Where mythos or myth as story was understood to defy practical reality or the ‘laws of nature’ in its representation of self, other, and world, logos as rationalism came to be regarded as capable of realistic or literal representation. And thus its conclusions could conceivably be evaluated for accuracy in relation to the positivistic status of ‘what actually happens.’

This distinction between metaphorical mythos and supposedly literalistic logos arises in conjunction with a particularly intense emphasis on analytical applications of reasoning. As certain ancient Greek thinkers developed theoretical explanations of physical or material phenomenon the notion of “natural philosophy” emerged—a way of explaining nature as governed by ‘laws’ of material causation rather than by divine gods. Their mode of reasoning, derived from observations of cause and effect in

physical phenomenon and an affinity for the precision of mathematical principles, favored the value of rational self-consistency. In the absence of resort to mythical or religious contextings of causation, the validity of theories became dependent more on how convincing the consistency of their logic appeared to be, how non-contradictory the reasoning was. To assert a 'logic' of 'how things are' thus meant posing a self-consistent rationale. Such rationales rely upon exclusive categorical distinctions of the either > <or categories of true and false, accurate or inaccurate, real and un-real. Truth thus came to be associated more closely with ordinarily literal causation and rationally self-consistent reasoning or theory. This distinction positioned categorically self-consistent reasoning as not only superior to mythos but to any rhetorical argument judged rationally inconsistent—regardless of how convincing, eloquent, emotionally compelling or *seemingly* reasonable it appeared to be.

This opposition of literalistically real logos and 'merely fantastic' mythos implies a most significant shift in cultural references to a diversified totality. From within the perspective that allowed a valid, if non-ordinary, realm of mythic reality, an ultimate distinction came to be posited between 'this world' of normal consciousness and experience, and 'the other world' of mythical dynamism and divine intentional powers. When a materialistically and mathematically derived basis for self-consistently rational logos is posed, there is no longer any valid status for mythical reality—there is no reality to any 'other world' besides the ordinarily real one. The gods or 'divine agencies' inherently tend to become concepts of "natural laws" or 'mere metaphors' for physical phenomenon or rationalized explanations. Any plurality of references for valid reality thus becomes narrowed to a single context—that of equationally and materialistically reductive logos. Though a dualistic version of totality still remains, it is not one composed of the realms of material reality and divine or mythic reality, but rather more hierarchically and oppositionally as the real versus the un-real, the true versus the false. If, for example, human consciousness is causally determined to depend upon the biological functions of the brain then, by the standards of reality being materialistic valid explanation requiring self-consistent reasoning, there can be no human consciousness in the absence of functioning biological physiology. The concept of ghosts is thereby rendered an utter impossibility since it would contradict the exclusive identity association of human consciousness with biological brain function—unless one could posit a literalistic rationale for how ghosts are generated by material phenomenon. This example is not meant to assert that belief in ghosts ceased with the emergence of reductively mechanistic logos, but that a basis for invalidating the concept of ghosts—as well as gods—thereby emerged in the 'naturalistic philosophy' and intellectual methodology of Western culture.

To reason inconsistently, to assert an explanation that contradicts the sequence of reasoning in an earlier explanation, thus cannot present a valid unitary *logos*. When two explanations of a particular event contradict each other rationally, only one can be true according to the 'rule of self-consistency,' which excludes the possibility of validating such 'dis-agreement.' Paradoxical propositions, in this view,

become inherently false and meaningless. The linkage of self-consistent reasoning with reality as having only a materialistic basis further diminishes capacity to grant any accuracy or truthfulness to mythos—with its fantastical stories and implausible associations. Though mythos was acknowledged in some Greek analysis as emotionally more satisfying than rationalistic logos, the latter was deemed more reliable as it appealed to reason, not emotion. This perspective is epitomized by Aristotle's 'law of non-contradiction' holding that 'things can only be one way or another—not both at once.'

The difference in ways of knowing posed by this logos > < mythos split can be considered in another way than simply as logically consistent versus self-contradictory, or as literally 'true' versus 'false.' Mythos, with its overtly metaphorical and metamorphic imagery, portrays a world of intricate interrelations that are not singularly defined or exclusively described. Mythos, one might say, regards the world more from the perspective of many-ness than that of privileging one-ness. Its representations are thus not mechanistic or reductively self-consistent. Its perspective does not depend upon asserting a status of absolute truth in rationally defensible terms. Logos, in contrast, asserts the possibility of ultimate analytical differentiation of all entities and phenomenon into their definitively identified parts and functions in causation. The associative logic of mythos can portray a world that is variously ordered, is both 'this way and that,' both literally real and metaphorically actual or valid. Reductively analytical logos depends upon asserting a singular hierarchical order for its explanations to be valid or 'true.' It is important to note here that the ancient Greeks did not appear (anymore than other peoples who derived meaning and truth from mythical realities) to be deluded about the practical necessities of living a material existence. The emergence of the mythos > < logos split was not essential to their ability to survive in nature or produce a technology of metallurgy. Yet the advent of that split does appear central to the development of Westernized scientific materialism and industrial society.

The implied quest of logos oriented consciousness toward a complete and definitively ordered knowing of existence (a "final theory of the universe"), can be seen as coming to dominate cultural attitudes in modernity. However, the contemporary proliferation of differing rationales competing to present 'the' most logical explanation of existence appears more overwhelming than conclusive. Intricately self-consistent logics of the nature of phenomenon exist that appear scientifically accurate, yet having limited contexts of application—such as Newton's physical theories in contrast to Einstein's and quantum mechanics. Thus the all-inclusive self-consistent rational explanation of totality comes to resemble a composite of context dependent rationales. Some cultural analysts assert that modernity gives way to post-modernity when an acceptance arises that the quest for absolute, universal, self-consistently rational explanations or truths might, quite reasonably, be deemed impossible—an irrational delusion or even an unconsciously mythical metaphor. Rational analysis enables a meticulous particularizing of the many-ness of one-ness. But, after such extensive 'taking the world apart'—how to 'put it back together again?' As noted, what is rather ironic about the differentiating mode of analysis is that while it seeks to

define accurate specificity or singularity, the effect of this activity is to create ever more differentiation or singularity, and thus to emphasize multiplicity rather than achieve ‘ultimate unitary consistency of explanation.’

From a perspective that allows mutually valid but logically inconsistent assertions of logos—a constellative rather than reductively linear version—one can begin to reconsider the validity of mythos. The possibility of a logical attitude that can validate the radically associative logic of mythical expression *as well as* the linear rationalism of reductively self-consistent logos is explored in this writing. It will be proposed that it is not impossible after all to regard mythos and logos as mutually valid aspects of inclusive knowing.

The Mathematization of Reasoning and Conflict between Ideal and Real, Simple and Complex

The relentlessly progressive and conclusive logic of mathematics that so influenced the Greek emphasis upon self-consistency in reasoning is considered to epitomize “formal” logic or reasoning. It is an extremely abstract form of reasoning that derives from mathematical enumeration and forms the basis of scientific evaluation of empirical phenomena. It can be absolutely accurate in a sense because it assumes absolute statuses such as those of numbers: $2 + 2 = 4$ and cannot be otherwise. Its conclusions follow necessarily from its premises and assert the most absolutely reductive form of reasoning. Its definitional terms tend to reduce things and phenomena to indivisible, universal essences. Thus there is an aura of exactness and simplicity about this mode of knowing. In contrast, so-called “informal” logic and reasoning are more speculative, relying on comparative judgment and involving reasoning by way of interpretive probability relative to specific contextualization: ‘if this, then probably that.’ The more informal mode overtly posits an analytical extension from its premises rather than a necessarily true conclusion. It tends to require convoluted conditional premises that are relatively complicated in comparison to the mathematical model. The more formal mode is appropriate to quantification but less so to analytical interpretation of what cannot be ‘enumerated.’ Informal reasoning, being inherently speculative or hypothetical, is thus less absolute in its reductive tendencies than is formal. Yet in Western intellectual tradition the formal mode has exerted an extraordinary influence over application of the informal. One might call this influence the ‘mathematization of reasoning.’ It has the effect of idealizing the conclusions of self-consistent rationalization. Under such emphasis, if the reasoning of an argument were held to be ‘true’ then its conclusions appear not simply ‘reasonably valid’ but tend to attain the ‘ultimate truth’ of a mathematical equation. Argument and explanation not asserting such ‘idealized self-consistent truth’ could thereby be discredited as mere imprecision, rhetorical manipulation, or irrational paradox.

Inevitably, the idealizations of such ‘ultimate truth’ comes into inherent conflict with attempts to depict the messy complexity of actual phenomenal manifestation or ‘the real.’ Conflict between the ideal

and the real characterize many of Western philosophy's concerns, expressed in impulses to impose definitive simplicity upon divergent complexity. Nonetheless, emphasis upon formal reasoning as the proper mode for logical epistemic accuracy is regarded as becoming virtually dominant in Western thought from Descartes on into the 20th century. It is only more recently that the validity of informal reasoning has regained prominence and enabled a less oppositional relationship between an idealized rationalism and the reality of radically complex totality, between notions of simplicity and radically complex totality. It is that shift that enables a complexly reasonable reconsideration of the relations between *mythos* and *logos*, between inclusive and exclusive epistemic methods.

Analytical Logos, Oppositional Dualism, and Philosophical Resistance to Inclusive Knowing

The antithetical opposition that developed in Western philosophy and science between *mythos* and *logos* deserves close examination if one is to understand the cultural conflict between exclusive and inclusive states of knowing and understanding in Western societies. The method of reasoning through self-consistent rationales favors making distinctions by asserting exclusive categories of difference and likeness—categories whose validity depends upon maintaining the consistency of their excluding or including criteria. All dogs are thusly classed as mammals. According to the rule of self-consistent reasoning, no dog can be regarded as other than a mammal without invalidating the category used to identify dogs. Definitions of identity, states of being, and meaning thus all come to be posed in dualistically oppositional terms. The simplest and most powerful forms of such dualistic opposition are the absolutely opposite categories of good versus bad, right versus wrong, true versus false, correct versus incorrect, like versus unlike. That type of 'knowing by opposition' is philosophically primary in the logic of analytical logos, or 'knowing by differentiation in relation to self-consistent reasoning.' Such distinction by exclusively dualistic opposition can also be found in the tenets of religious attitudes and doctrines. But the dualistic opposition of good and evil has a somewhat different effect upon knowing than that of true versus false. The latter opposition, when used as a basis for analytical rationalizing, divides the real from the un-real. A religious or moral category of evil might be negative and 'bad,' but its existence is still validated—evil is real. The categories of false, incorrect, and wrong tend much more to assert invalidity, non-existence, and unreality. As will be explored below, such a tendency in asserting and validating knowing *intrinsically* resists the dynamics of inclusive knowing.

Resistance to inclusive knowing can then be said to arise from a philosophical emphasis placed upon singularity or exclusivity of identification in which one-ness is favored (most overtly by analytical rationalism), over many-ness as the 'more real' or even the *only* real status of identity. From this perspective the contrast between singular and multiple states of identity or being is intolerable and must be resolved in the assertion of some hierarchically dominant status of unity or singular identity. When a given entity or phenomenon cannot be identified with a particular, dominant status of form, structure, or

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ordering, this philosophical attitude is likely to encounter a state of multiplicity that is essentially meaningless due to its irresolution or self-contradiction. If states of reality are posed that cannot be explained by a self-consistent 'line of reasoning' or rationale, then the very possibility of reality becomes logically unfeasible within this philosophical criteria. When a singularly exclusive ordering cannot be asserted then this perspective is likely to experience existence as simply disorderly or chaotic—*un-structurable*. It is asserted here, then, that Westernized cultural attitudes generate an inherent and exceptional resistance to both the experience and validity of inclusive knowing of radically complex totality.

Western Positivism and Its Basis for Valid Status in Systematic Instrumentalism

The mechanistic mode of logic derived from the subordination of rational analysis to idealistically reductive purpose—'arriving at' absolute truth—results in a positivizing or literalizing of all entities as the exact statuses of their definitions or descriptions. Even concepts become objectified in this manner. (Even an absolute invalid or unreal status is 'positivized' in that it is 'positively negative.')

A concordant impulse toward self-consistent reasoning in establishing all identity statuses along with a singular contexting for reality tends to privilege hierarchical and systematic orderings of statuses. A 'need' thereby develops to fit all identity statuses into a singular 'order of singular things' if these are to be considered 'logically valid' under the purpose of asserting a self-consistent totality. The mathematical and mechanistic basis for such ordering, with its dependence upon quantification, calculation, and linearly sequential causation, also express a potent techno-logical emphasis, or what can be called *instrumentalism*. This term is meant to suggest that meaningful or valid status is assigned to things, concepts, and activities that are 'productive' of desired effects in a rather mechanical manner of causation. Thereby tools and formulas, as "instruments" of measurement, manipulation, and calculation, become the very standards of assessing and validating consciousness. All 'things' then readily come to be regarded as 'instrumental components of mechanical processes'—processes that, under the imperative of reductive purpose of self-consistent one-ness, 'must' aggregate into larger and larger logically self-consistent systems. Thus the 'contextual field' referred to by the word nature can be conceived as 'an organic system' with the implication that it is an instrumentally mechanical and hierarchical system. Subsequently to such identification, aspects of that context are granted valid reality only in so far as they are explained as functional components, or instruments of, that singularly hierarchical system. The more central or primary a status of instrumental function is given, the greater hierarchical importance it is granted in the overall systematic context. Thereby the positivizing effects of an exclusively reductive application of rational analysis generate a dependency of valid identity or reality status upon instrumental reasoning and systematic coherence. Aspects of experience and even rationally consistent analysis that

are not 'coherent' with the systematized hierarchy of normative order are reflexively denigrated, devalued, marginalized, dismissed, or repressed.

The One-ness and Many-ness of Experience

Preceding references in this text to knowing and knowledge as the basis for understanding 'how things really are' do not differentiate what *experience* is or how it constitutes knowing. If experience were associated with sensory perception as awareness then it would seem more akin to intuition than explanation. If one's past experiences constitute knowledge that provide criteria for interpreting subsequent knowing (apperception) then experience is also a 'thing of thought' that one 'becomes aware of' during cognitive processes of analysis of immediate awareness or knowing. Thus a dictionary definition for experience: "the apprehension of an object, thought, or emotion through the senses of the mind," and, "active participation in events or activities, leading to the accumulation of knowledge or skill," and even, "an event or series of events participated in or lived through; to participate in personally; undergo" (*Am. Heritage Dict.* 2nd E, 1985, p.477). Thereby, to experience is to "apprehend," "live through," "participate in," or "under go" objects, events, and even thoughts. The derivation of this word traces the notion back to the Latin *experiri* for 'to try.' Perhaps it is appropriate then to characterize the archetypality of experiencing as a *trying out, of or on* objects, events, and even thoughts. Knowing-as-experience, as apprehending through 'participation' and 'under-going,' can also be parsed as generating more singular versus more pluralistic statuses.

The Presence of One-ness, the Diffusion of Many-ness

Experience is obviously a rather uncertain phenomenon. One can be said to experience objects, events, and thoughts or concepts—thus both objectified things and the immaterial or 'thing-less things' of mental images, ideas, patterns. In one regard, what is experienced can appear to change. A landscape looks different in morning light than in moonlight. A person can appear and act radically different from one day, even one moment, to the next. An image or concept can prompt different emotions or thoughts on different occasions. In another regard, what is experienced can be experienced variously in the same place and time. One might see, touch, and turn a doorknob, thereby 'participating in' and experiencing its presence as 'that particular object.' It's status as a singular entity is thereby composed in 'undergoing' its particularity of appearance and function. Yet at the same time, one might note that it has many characteristics of other doorknobs, that it is composed of various parts, that experiencing it activates experiences of opening other doorways in other places at other times, that it is also a mirror in which one sees one's self curiously reflected, that it is the 'agency' by which one 'passes through' to another

context, and so on. Thereby the experience of 'this door knob' can become an experience of other objects, events, and concepts in other places and times that are, experientially, present in the 'now' of touching 'this door knob.' Encountering its presence as a many-ness could thereby be understood as diversifying and diffusing one's experience. The 'now' of its presence can become the 'then' and 'there' of other presences so that the contexts for experiencing multiply. When one experiences 'a city' as 'a place' its presence appears more 'continuously ordered.' But when one experiences it as an overwhelming complexity of actions, events, persons, ideas, and the interaction of these, then it becomes more a diffusing many-ness. When one stands in 'the thing' that is 'a river,' one feels that this 'it' changes and moves continually. It is never 'the same river' two moments 'running.' Such an encounter can become an experience of flow, or form that is flow—'a thing' whose 'thing-ing' is, relatively speaking, 'thing-less.' And yet it is 'that particular river' that one can return to and experience similarly years later.

Thus there is 'something' about experience that ever evades adequate reductive definition or explanation. The experience of a particular presence tends to engender radiating associations—experience of experiences that defuse the singularity of 'the moment' or 'the thing' towards or into the particularity of yet other aspects of 'this moment' or other moments that become part of or co-terminus with 'this moment.' In so far as one's conscious attitude 'clings' to an impression of one-ness about 'moment' and 'thing,' experience can be made to seem relatively static. But in so far as attention is turned toward the complex context and composition of the experience of 'a thing' there arises a dynamical inter-activity among aspects of experiencing and thing-ness experienced. A basic example is when one becomes aware of not only seeing but hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling some object or event in ways that seem to contrast each other. Even sensory experience can become divergent. Perhaps the most compelling example is when one experiences two, or more, distinctly different emotional responses to some particular presence or event—such as the death of a parent that brings both terror and relief.

Yet experience-as-knowing which might then be considered knowledge, in so far as non-conceptualized experience (image, sensation, emotion, intuition) can become criteria for configuring associations in further knowings, can become another reductive pre-determining set of references for experience. If one's last swim in 'that river' was associated with warm water, one might assume it is ever that way. If on a subsequent occasion the water is colder than remembered, one might be shocked and refrain from swimming. Yet if one dives in anyway, one might come to know 'that river' as 'an other' river, one that is a source of diverse but mutually valuable and valid experiences. This example suggests that experiential knowing 'as knowledge' (or re-presentation of 'knowing-by-experience'), readily becomes 'meaning as given' according to predetermined references. Yet there also appears a status of experiential knowing that is incongruous with or not dependent upon pre-determined references. One can know, from experience, that one dislikes cold water. Yet one can discover, through experience, that a dash into cold water has remarkable invigorating effects that are desirable. Thereafter one can experience,

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or know, like and dislike of cold water concurrently. This contrast might be represented as meaning-as-given versus meaning-as-found. There is an association here with the previously posed dominance of ordinary identity or modes of identification that tend to control how one knows and configures knowledge. Both persons and societies compose such reflexive templates for understanding and categorizing experience. It follows, in linearly logical fashion, that there then must be considerable 'actual experiencing' that tends to 'go unnoticed' because it does not conform to the expectations of the ordinary or socialized standards for 'knowing the experience of experience.' Experience can be repressed or ignored by habitual attitudes.

In so far as experience of 'being present' or the 'presence of some thing' are 'experienced' as singular statuses, their one-ness can more readily be termed 'literal' or absolute. In so far as experience of presence is more plural and not hierarchically ordered, I can be regarded as more a 'presencing' that is constituted by some 'activity' of association between 'aspects of manifest phenomenon of being and becoming.' Thus the singular presence of a singular thing or action becomes more a trans-forming or concurring that is neither 'this nor that.' Experience of a doorknob can become that of other doorknobs in other places or of becoming the person of childhood in the room beyond the doorway. Experience of standing in the river can include becoming its ever-changing fluidity. Such experience, or experiencing, is readily described as the 'carrying over' of significance or meaning in the term metaphor, or the becoming-other of metamorphosis. The singular presencing of one-ness thus becomes a 'this-and-that-ness' of pluralistic presencing. One can also re-present such experiencing as 'being-here-and -here,' this-and-that, or an oscillating there-and-back-again.

Of Real and Un-Real Experience

If sensation, perception, and thought tend to be 'experienced' in accordance with the reflexive categories and criteria of knowledge-as-previously-categorized-knowing, then some experience will be classified as un-real or invalid. The dominant one-ness of socialized identification and reality will automatically confirm some and dismiss or ignore other aspects of experiential phenomena. Thereby some aspects of experience will become rather 'un-experientable' in so far as these are difficult to acknowledge or validate. Presumptions of validity or actuality, or one's 'state of mind' at a given moment, can either obscure experience or create it in the absence of 'actual phenomenon.' Hypnotized persons touched with a cool object represented to them as a red-hot piece of metal have been observed to respond by producing a literal burn-blister on the skin. Eyewitnesses to a particular event often give radically differing representations of that event. Specific individuals will describe a particular past event differently at one point in time than at another. The phenomenology of experience does not appear to be comparable to the mechanistic laws of physical mechanism. Yet all experience, in all its psychic and

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somatic complexities, can be said to be quite 'real' in so far as it is 'real to psyche.' Conversely, if experience is all re-presented as intrinsically reductive description then, in so far as we know it *as knowledge*, it can be regarded as un-real in so far as its re-presentation is not the phenomenon being represented. One's experience of the doorknob or the river as one's re-presentation of that experience is not that experience—yet it might become 'an experience' of response to there-presentation. Yet such uncertainty and diversity in the character of experience and its re-presentations need not be taken as indicating some inability to 'know reality' if the real, as the actual, is composed of many-ness and one-ness. It does suggest, however, that the reductive method is not likely to prove conclusive in establishing definitive identity status of either things or thing-less thing, being or becoming.

Experience that appears 'un-real' or invalid to ordinary attitudes might just be 'experience of what has not yet been experienced or conceived.' Even in the historical development of concepts in physical science, researchers and theorists often 'experience' phenomenon in ways that their ordinarily validated references cannot 'identify' as real, yet such experience leads to a reconfiguring of those ordinarily validating references. Experience that is either obscured by or invalidated by predetermined criteria thusly proves to be an encounter with what is 'real' but 'as yet' or 'as such' unknown—even unknowable. In a cultural context that tends to sort all statuses and events into exclusive categories of real versus un-real, true versus false, the 'reality' or validity of experience becomes particularly subject to reductive definition. Thereby, much of what one 'feels' or somehow 'senses' to be actual is simply classified as un-real or false.

Of Conscious and Un-Conscious Experience: The Actually Felt, Expressed, Perceived or Re-presented but Unacknowledged

In relation to the preceding notion that socialized standards rather automatically sort or 'edit' acceptably valid or real experience from the invalid, a status of actual but not consciously acknowledged experience can be posed. In response to privileged one-nesses that establish valid status for experience, both individuals and collective groups appear capable of essentially not noticing or not consciously acknowledging a variety of forms of experience. (This distinction assumes a distinction between the total activity of mind as cognitive consciousness and an aspect that is 'self aware.') Dreaming during sleep can be a vivid experiential phenomenon, but people typically make little effort to 'remember' it while in a waking state of consciousness. When dreams are 'brought to conscious awareness' they are seldom granted a status of valid reality relative to waking phenomenon. Memory of past events can often be shown to be highly selective in what it recalls and even suspect in respect to what has been 'added on' to the actual occurrences being remembered.

Brain research indicates an increasingly larger percentage of cognitive activity as being ‘below’ or ‘prior to’ overt conscious waking awareness. The complex functioning of the autonomic nervous system typically regulates body and most brain functions without one consciously ‘thinking’ or even ‘thinking about’ them. One is seldom aware of one’s heart beating. Thus when one becomes consciously aware of it one suddenly has access to a different experience of one’s self—one’s sense of self becomes more attuned to being a mortal biological being. When individuals develop capacities of awareness that they did not previously demonstrate they appear to gain access to ‘new experience.’ When person becomes aware of perceiving shades of color not previously evident to their conscious awareness it could be asked whether they have gained access to new experience or become aware of experience that was simply unconscious before. Similarly, when one remembers an event or experience that had been ‘forgotten,’ or some way ‘repressed’ from conscious awareness, one’s sense of self, others, and world can be significantly altered. When repressed memories of being tormented as a child ‘return’ to conscious awareness one’s entire identity can be reconfigured. In so far as conscious awareness and its assumptions about identity, reality, and truth are composed around privileged one-nesses, experience that fails to be assimilated to those standards is likely to be repressed or simply never be granted conscious acknowledgement because it might pose a many-ness of self, other, or world that would be too threatening to the dominant assumptions of habitual identity. Even philosophical shifts of awareness can provoke repressive reaction, just as when the perspective of scientific materialism threatened a sanctified god-centered one-ness of ‘creation.’ That scientific philosophy can be said to have not so much ‘invented new experience’ as to have brought much of common experience ‘out from under’ the repression of a dominant one-ness of socialized belief.

In relation to the theme of one-ness and many-ness, the notion of actual experience that is inaccessible or repressed from self-consciousness suggests that there is some considerable range or diversity of sense of self, other, and world that ‘goes unacknowledged’ by whatever aspect of cognition constitutes the ‘waking awareness’ of identity, reality, and truth.

Reduction as Transcendent Abstraction from, Inclusion as Immanent Participation in Complex Totality of Experience

A dominant emphasis upon singularity can subsume even the contrapuntal characteristics of the one-ness and many-ness of experience and presence—as noted above. Such reduction ‘abstracts’ a singular status from the complexity of experience. In contrast, a primary emphasis upon the complexity and diversity of experience of presence can be viewed as a ‘plunge’ into plurality of status in a given event or object. The reductive re-presentation of experiencing could thus be described as a transcending of the many-ness of experience, whereas its pluralization can be considered as an ‘incending’ into its

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immanent inter-activities. The reductive move seems to fashion ‘a status’ from the complex totality of a presence through by way of its abstraction. An emersion into complexity of experience seems to express an inclusion of its concurrent aspects. Clearly the latter condition would be much more difficult to re-present in any definitive manner since any description of it is likely to be a reduction of its actual complexity. From this perspective, though some version of an experience of the dynamical activity of radically complex totality might be possible, re-presentation of such experience appears daunting—being that it is intrinsically rather ‘beyond’ the ordinary ordering or structuring of reality. As is said about the Tao, that all-inclusive ‘way of nature,’ ‘the Tao that can be spoken is not the Tao.’ This phrase indicates that the ‘ordering of totality’ is not ‘an order’ but some ‘order of mutual orderings’ that is not representable in any reductive manner of re-presentation. Reductive knowing thus appears as a ‘rising above’ or ‘passing over’ aspects of the complexity of a radically totalistic status of experience, whereas the inclusive approach appears to engage a participation with such status.

Inclusive Knowing as Experiential Participation in the Dynamical Relations of Complex Totality

Despite an intrinsic impulse to assert sets of criteria for unitary one-ness of valid identity and reality (however contradictory), a persistent impulse toward more inclusive modes of knowing is evident cross-culturally. Human consciousness seems to express a need, at least occasionally, to re-relate ordinary reductive sense of identity and reality to personal experience of the irreducible many-ness of totality—without necessarily rupturing or reconfiguring habitual social reality. This study indicates that such impulses can be described as attempts to encounter and experience the radical complexity of dynamical totality typically repressed and denied by collective conventions. Another way of stating the impulse is as a seeking to *participate in* concurrent manifestation of many-ness and one-ness—a ‘knowing the many *in* the one.’ Such inclusive knowing stands in contrast to *assimilation* of the un-usual to the usual, the abnormal to the normal—whether by reassertion of existing one-nesses or configuration of new ones. Rather than thusly ‘domesticate’ the context of irreducible many-ness, the participatory move seeks to submit consciousness to a status that is, in essence, ‘un-civil’ or *un-assimilatable* to conventional reality and identity. It thus requires some ‘*extra-ordinary*’ modes of perceiving and understanding—as well as some non-ordinary discourse to represent these. It necessarily must generate expressions of identity which include typically unrelated, even seemingly ‘un-relatable’ characteristics or ‘parts.’ How human consciousness negotiates such conflict between ordinary and non-ordinary compositions of the many-ness of one-nesses is the principle concern of this writing.

Different cultures present different standards or societal norms for what can be plausibly included in the many-ness of a particular type of ‘ordinary’ one-ness. In one cultural context human and animal consciousness are plausibly included in a singular continuum, while in another these require definitively distinct categories of identity ranked in hierarchical dominance. What various cultures share appears not

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to be their specific standards of unitary one-ness but a need to mediate disparities between those ordinarily valid knowings of self, other, and world and incompatibly divergent experience of identity and reality. In the ways that mediation is facilitated various cultures appear to share a stylistic modality of enabling the non-ordinary knowing of seemingly incompatible, non-ordinary seeming, self-contradictory traits of identity and reality. That modality will be explored as conceptual and experiential *participation in the dynamical character of totality*.

This book's consideration of how knowing through singular and multiple modes, as 'ones' and 'manys,' that appear ordinarily incompatible indicates that to know or understand the *coherence* of non-ordinary many-ness cannot be dependent upon definitively singular identification, nor assertions of indivisible states of being. Standardized hierarchies of categories of identity and reality obscure concurrent knowing of one-ness as many-ness and many-ness as one-ness as well as frustrate inclusive validation of the ordinarily and non-ordinarily 'real' in some larger field of reference. Inclusive knowing of radical complexity allows for one to know one's self, others, and the world as a 'many in the one' *without reducing the many to a one*—to know these identities and their realities as *a radical complexity*. This way of knowing can accommodate the identity of an entity that is concurrently both singular and multiple, both 'this' and 'that,' both 'here' and 'there.'


The concept of knowing in radically complexity inclusively as 'knowing by participating in both singularity and multiplicity concurrently' is difficult to pose as a 'knowing of specifics' or 'facts.' A more appropriate way of stating such knowing is as *of the dynamical relations of complex totality*, or *of the interplay of one-ness and many-ness*. But such complex concurrency resists conceptual grasp—and reasonably so, since the radical complexity of totality is, by definition, *un-structurable* in the reductive terms of self-consistent rationalism. Thus, a person can be said to best 'know' that interplay of these two modes of composing identities by *experiencing* it—an experience derived from participating in the dynamical quality of the *co-creative concurrency* of one-ness and many-ness. Knowing in a radically inclusive manner would thus prompt experience of knowing in both singular and multiple modes without *either* status gaining dominance. In this way one can be said to actually participate in the many-ness of one-ness, or the irreducible diversity of singularity.

Attaining to such a knowing in human consciousness will be shown to involve some psychosomatic manifestation, or 'experiential gnosis,' of 'the many in the one.' These terms are meant to convey how radically inclusive knowing is 'of relational dynamics' between evidently singular states of being rather than 'of fixed states' or definitive status. As such, it is not a knowing 'of the actual as the material,' or of the validly real within ordinary definitions. To best represent this hybrid status it is characterized here as *metamorphic dynamism*, a status having the complimentary diversity of one-ness *and* many-ness. Such co-existent status is re-presented by the particle/wave interpretation of light, which poses a non-reductive plurality of concurrently operant manifestation—a status in which 'an entity' can be both one

way and an other. Notions represented by the terms dialogic and dialectical are also useful in characterizing the non-reductive dynamical relations of such a status. The dynamical interaction of dialogue, requiring the participation of two or more ‘discussants’ or participants, provides one way of conveying this many-ness of one-ness. The meaning of the word dialectic expressed as “the contradiction between two conflicting forces viewed as the determining factor in their continuing interaction,” is also pertinent the notion of inclusive knowing being presented here (American Heritage 2nd College, 1985, p.392). In this sense it is not resolution of the contrast that is dialectical but its continuing interaction.

The evident incompatibility of such inclusive or dialectically active knowing with the logic of one-ness indicates it can only be engaged through an experience of irreducible phenomenological status. A conceptual approach to it by ways of the logic of many-ness is feasible, but remains reductively represented ‘as concept’ —as abstraction. The dynamism of pluralistic status seems accessible only through ‘direct experience’ that necessarily confounds the reductive identifications of ordinarily defined reality—experience of dynamical diversity that is some how validated yet not reductively defined. Such experience appears to involve a ‘participatory consciousness of concurrency,’ of being both ‘here’ and ‘there,’ ‘this’ and ‘that,’ self and other. (Such a status that is not ‘a status,’ according to ordinary attitudes and criteria, appears to be accessible only by way of some valid experience of what is not real yet is real. Such a status of un-real reality is readily associated with what will be termed here mythic consciousness, in which ordinary reality and standards are subordinated to a mode of representation and experience that express a ‘more than socially constructed’ reality.)

Some appropriately dynamic figural re-presentation of this experience of radically complex totality would seem to have a triangular character rather than a dualistic one. As noted previously, the interactivity of one-ness and many-ness can be ‘seen’ in the Taoist Yin/Yang symbol of light and dark tear-drop forms circling/flowing into each other and having a dot of each in the other. This duality suggests an interaction that is not of complete opposites. In terms of the known and the un-known, or the represented and the un-represented, this dyad could be interpreted as showing two states knowable as opposites. The experience of radically complex dynamism, however, suggests that there is an experience that is not ever ‘explainable’ in either the logic of one-ness or that of many-ness. Rather, such experience would be ‘of the unknowable’ in terms of positivized knowledge or any conclusive explanation by way of conceptual re-presentation. A more three-fold status of being, the known/not-yet known/ un-knowable, or socially structured/unstructured/unstructurable, suggests the figuration termed a triskelion. In this figure three forms, such as the teardrop shapes that circle/flow into each other in the Yin/Yang symbol, associate to form a circle. (Fig. 10)



This image seems to pose some intuitive knowing-by-experience of the radically complex dynamism of inclusive totality that is not simply a ‘this and that’ or ‘here and there,’ but of being ‘here, there, and in/between.’ Such a status can also be represented as being both/and *and* neither/nor. As an experiential identity it can be conceptualized or abstracted as ‘the identity of identity and non-identity’ in which the positivized status of one-ness is experienced concurrently with the ‘thingless thinging’ of the dynamical inter-activity of many-ness. A status of consciousness that can ‘inhabit’ both one-ness and many-ness of identity or reality concurrently can also be regarded as ‘standing between’ or ‘beside’ those statuses in a manner that can be characterized as constituting a triangulatory status of consciousness.

Reality and Un-Reality in Knowing Inclusively: Overtly Metaphorical and Metamorphic Modes of Knowing the Un-real Reality of Inclusive or Mythic Consciousness

When the complexity of multiple identifications or rational explanations poses a one-ness of person, object, or world that is not ordinarily plausible, then the forms, structures, and orderings composing its unity can be regarded as chaotic—the proposed or seeming one tends to ‘dissolves’ into a many because it ‘violates’ habitual references. There is no reductive re-presentation capable of ‘containing’ it. Phenomenal forms and psychical associations that cannot be subordinated to a typical hierarchy of unitary reality present a knower with potential crises of understanding. When forms and phenomena are encountered that cannot be reconciled to some unifying standard the very basis for one’s own identity and understanding of reality can be threatened. If the ordinary set of reality references cannot accommodate some particularity of experience or manifestation of identity then either those references must be reconfigured, or a non-ordinary means of understanding might be required to enable an acceptance of incommensurable diversity. Such an inclusive embrace of radically divergent particularities can be characterized as a validation of a non-reductive status of totality. Such a totality does not exhibit a singular logic of validity and yet it can, in an experience of inclusive knowing, be understood as ‘reasonably valid.’

Inclusive knowing of the radical complexity of totality is thus characterized as requiring non-ordinary modes of perception and expression, or discourse. It thereby must manifest some mediation between categories of ordinarily valid reality, on the one side, and experience or existence appearing

somehow incommensurate with those habitual categories of identification on another. Such mediation of an ‘other than ordinary’ mode of knowing thereby requires an extra-ordinary presentation of that knowing as knowledge—relative to dominant socio-cultural as well as personal standards for valid reality and identity.

If ‘the real’ is designated as that which is measurable, materialistically feasible, and rationally self-consistent in the terms of discursive analysis, then it becomes that which has a definitively singular identity. The validly true or real thereby become the materialistically literal and logically self-consistent. Literal facts and truths thus tend to be presented as exclusively singular states. Many-nesses that do not reduce to singular or hierarchically ordered states, that do not have a materialistic or ordinarily rationalized unity, can be regarded as somehow not real, actual, or valid states of being. These biases about reality and identity status necessarily come to reflexively configure communicative discourse in language, both in technical analysis and in daily speech. Such characteristic assumptions in ordinary discourse become subject to some ‘subversion’ in expression that attempts to represent the identifications and knowledge of inclusive knowing. It can reasonably be asserted, then, that since the knowing of radical complexity (of many-ness in one-ness) transgresses the bounds of ordinarily valid reality and identity, it entails knowing and expressing an *un-real reality*. Concepts, phenomenon, and experience associated with ordinary reality are not simply negated in this shift but rather are encountered as metamorphically ‘becoming other.’ That encounter with ordinary identity status in non-ordinary ways is what appears to activate a relativization of ordinary consciousness to a larger, more inclusive field of reference than is normatively accessible to knowing.

The many-ness of a human body, with all its parts, has an ordinarily identified one-ness of unity. But a body that is part human, part horse (a centaur) presents an ordinarily illogical and impossible association of parts into a one-ness. It cannot, according to ordinary consciousness and scientific reason, be validly real because it is a literal impossibility and thus a logical self-contradiction. Such a status of many-ness that does not reduce to a valid singularity or unity can be regarded as overtly metaphorical—it combines or ‘carries over’ ordinarily un-like elements into a particular status. Thus ordinarily or literally separated elements enter into some form of dialogically interactive relationship represented as ‘an entity.’ Metaphor thusly constitutes a one-ness manifesting—or re-presenting—a non-reductive dialectical association in which ordinarily unlike statuses ‘inter-penetrate.’ It follows that metaphoric one-ness-as-many-ness presents a sort of metamorphic activity in which normally unlike elements are shown ‘in process,’ as it were, of becoming ‘some thing else.’ The notion of ‘being in process,’ of ‘being as a becoming,’ represents the active and non-ordinary tension of inclusive identification. Such association of ordinarily real identities or statuses into un-real ones allows for communicating some meaning that might not be possible otherwise. It makes possible a way of knowing that includes ordinarily unrelated or even opposing one-nesses as somehow ‘belonging together’ in a non-reductive many-ness.

Though the thing centaur is not an ordinarily real or actual thing, it can become ‘a thing of thought’ if it is experienced as meaningful, as communicating some truthfully accurate expression of experience, emotion, intuition, or concept. For ancient Greeks, centaurs are said to have expressed the struggle between rational human consciousness and emotional, or irrational impulses. The metaphoric association of human and horse, with its metamorphic dynamism, rendered the rational and irrational antitheses of human consciousness as a tangible many-ness-in-one-ness to ancient Greek sensibilities, thereby becoming an appropriately real and valid status. This ‘more-than-ordinary’ reality typifies what is considered here to be the mythical mode of knowing and knowledge. A language usage that overtly foregrounds this non-literal, non-ordinary yet meaningful mode of re-presentation can be termed poetic diction—a manner of associating words that amplifies the pluralities of their meanings in non-ordinary ways. The style of that mode is intrinsic to accessing mythical consciousness of the dialogic dynamics of totality. The presentation of such ‘states of consciousness,’ or identification and understanding, that ‘defy’ ordinary criteria necessarily involve exaggeration, distortion, discontinuity, incongruity, and disorientation that are strange and disturbing to ordinary assumptions about experience, identity, and reality. Encounters with many-ness *in* one-ness is intrinsically associated with such re-presentation which is able to grant some appropriate expression of experience that is, according to ordinary standards, incomprehensible. Such re-presentation is referred to here as expression of the reality of the ordinarily un-real, or the ‘un-real real.’

In contrast, much metaphorical usage in daily ordinary expression appears to be understood as a sort of code for literal events and identities. As such it is not intended to assert ‘actual truth’ to its metaphorical associations or ‘carrying over’ of un-like statuses. The term ‘raging storm’ in a weather report is not actually meant to impute consciousness and intention to the weather but only to qualify its intensity by association. Such usage provides dramatic emphasis and a sort of shorthand reference to ordinarily real status and rationally self-consistent expressions of ‘how things actually are.’ Metaphor thusly deployed functions more as simile, as expression of likeness, rather than as the metamorphosis of the ‘un-real real.’ But when metaphorical states and metamorphic processes are presented as true and valid representations of ‘how things are,’ then reality is being expressed in terms of some un-reality that is appropriate to re-presenting the radically complex dynamism of inclusive totality.

What is at issue here is a distinction between ‘symbolic signification,’ understood as code for ordinary reality and as re-presentation of experience of non-ordinary metaphorical reality. To ‘identify’ natural biological processes as “Mother Nature” symbolizes those processes as if they were maternal in the way of mammal mothering. But to actually experience those processes as an intentional entity having maternal characteristics is a ‘knowing of an other order of reality.’ The basis for the validity of that more-than-material or other-than-ordinary reality could be termed psychical. A shift in the status of consciousness that constitutes an experience of many-ness in one-ness is regarded here as a sort of

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dialectical ‘metaphoresis’ of identity status. Thereby, two or more statuses of identified experience become metaphorically one—but a one which remains co-terminally derived or concurrently arising.

The Psychology of Being One and Many

The following psychological orientation concerns the re-presentation of mind and consciousness in terms of a radically complex thus ultimately irreducible phenomenal field of cognitive activity. Thus representational theories of identity and reality composition are considered in relation to such a psychical contexting for sensing self, other, and world.

Interminably Complex Selfhood and a Psychology of the Hidden

The notion of identity obviously plays a large part in these considerations of knowing by way of singularity and multiplicity. The concept of identity has been posed as a consequence of knowing by differentiating status in reference to established criteria. One such status to be so known is that of ‘a particular person.’ Status as ‘a person’ or ‘a selfhood’ can be defined ‘from the outside’ by other persons or by social standards. It can also be asserted ‘from the inside’ by the personal consciousness of ‘that person’ as ‘a self-determining entity.’ The phrasing ‘sense of self’ is used here for how both individuals and social collectives or groups compose or experience their selves as ‘an identity’ That context for self-knowing is obviously intimately influenced by societal or group criteria for ‘identifying selves.’ Such ‘external’ references for identity and identification that configure self-knowing are ‘internalized’ and then extended or projected ‘back out there’ upon what is other or external to persons or groups (things, phenomenon, other persons) in the process of identification. That dynamic of ‘taking in’ then projecting out external standards for normative identity and reality indicates how complicated the constitution or composition of a sense of ‘the world’ is. The complex of such knowing is indicated in the phrasing ‘sense of self, other, and world.’ These identifications of self-status—whether of one’s own, a group’s, an other’s, or the world’s—can be said to ‘take place’ ‘within’ the cognitive activities of ‘the mind.’ Given that identities are both collective and personal, are composed within the ‘in here’ of individual consciousness as well as the ‘out there’ of groups, some activity of ‘collective consciousness’ is also posited as a ‘place’ where identifications are composed. The interplay between nexes of consciousness as personal and collective realms for composing identification suggests a context of references for selfhood that is vastly complex and in a sense interminable or without any singular origin.

Investigations of and theories about how identifications of ‘selfhood’ are derived can be designated as the study of an inclusive field of consciousness referred to as psyche. The term psyche is here deployed to represent the most inclusive field of cognitive activity encompassing sentient experience and

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intentional thought. Given the references of the logics of one-ness and many-ness, and the notion of image, language, and thought as re-presentation of the un-represented, such psychology necessarily involves a 'study of the hidden' within a totality of selfhood that is interminably complex. Identity and selfhood for such a psychological perspective become some interplay of one-ness and many-ness, a mercurial composition of ones and manys that are not amenable to any simplistic hierarchical ordering or reductive dynamic of relations—thus any one aspect of or perspective upon such selfhood inevitably obscures some other. Different criteria for specifying consciousness, such as neurological brain function, self-aware or ego-identity, or symbolic representation, each reveal and hide differing aspects of the one-ness and many-ness of the inclusive field of psyche. In keeping with this notion, psychological study of consciousness, as both personal and collective 'fields' of psyche, is represented here by hyphenating the standard term thusly: psyche-ology. This con-figuration of the term is meant to emphasize an attempt to study psyche from the perspective of its radical complexity that has an indeterminable and thus 'non-linear' diversity—a study of the intrinsic 'logic of psyche' that resists imposing a more singular, hierarchical ordering upon its complexity.

Such a perspective renders knowing selfhood radically complicated, whether 'form the outside' or 'from the inside,' of 'a' person or group. As an aspect of radically complex totality, selfhood and consciousness can be regarded as similarly irreducible and thus never being 'entirely visible' or available to complete examination and identification. Any given specificity of identity thereby inherently obscures or hides some divergent aspects of selfhood. Thus no matter how extensively one analyses identity and its 'sources' its totality remains at least partly 'hidden' from observation or explanation. The dividedness and hiddenness of psychical aspects and dynamics in consciousness-as-psyche is indicated in such psychological terms as repression, depression, cognitive dissonance, introjection, projection, transference, schizoid, passive aggressive, personality disorder, and multiple personality syndrome. The notions suggested by such terms indicate that 'parts' of psyche separate, rearrange, and 'act' without 'self-conscious personal awareness.' Psyche, as such, manifests pluralistic or poly-centric intentionality. This perspective is also exemplified in the ways consciousness is 'divided' into categories such as autonomic nervous system, pre-consciousness, un-consciousness, sub-consciousness, and even higher consciousness. Such categorical identifications are not regarded here as necessarily accurate or inaccurate, in conflict or concordance, but rather as both indicative of psychic complexity and useful in study of it.

If to know inclusively is necessarily to 'know variously,' it follows that self-knowing requires knowing one's self in diverse ways, as well as knowing others and the world thusly. Such complex identification implies a self-knowing that is 'of one's singular being' and also 'of one's complex, pluralistic becoming.' It is essential to this study then to specify a psychological perspective appropriate to differentiating the psycho-dynamics of such complex identity as suggested by a status of many-ness in one-ness and one-ness in many-ness. A related conception about the 'psychical nature of all knowing' as

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a psychology of epistemic process or epistemological psychology is also integral to this perspective on the knowing the ‘irreducible identity of identity.’ It will be shown that such a psychological perspective, as can embrace the manifestation of the many in the one and the epistemological dynamics of knowing by ones and manys concurrently, exhibits correlations with the dynamical representations of consciousness expressed in archaic myth and ritual.

The “I” that is not Itself Alone: Self Duplicity as Person, Persona, and Psyche

Personal identity is typically re-presented by the singular pronouns I, you, he, and she. But a commensurate singularity of selfhood or consciousness is rendered dubious by the simple phenomenon of ‘internal conversations.’ A self that ‘talks to itself’ does not appear particularly singular in the composition of its consciousness. Similarly, outward behavior often indicates self-contradiction or opposed intentions and perspectives ‘within a person.’ Persons are said to be ‘not his self today,’ or ‘out of her mind.’ Given such evidence of inherent many-ness of one-ness even in personal consciousness, along with the previously mentioned distinction between literalistic and psycho-dynamic realities, a commensurate psychological perspective on personal identity must re-present its diversity as poly-centric. But when a person contemplates their ‘singular self’ as also an ‘irreducibly complex multiplicity’ there arises a tendency to experience an ‘identity crisis.’ How is ‘a’ person to know who he or she is if the self is regarded as actually multiple, as being so various that it is essentially ‘other to its self?’ Though most persons might admit to having ‘internal conversations’ and often ‘being of more than one mind’ about certain concerns or feelings, they tend to assume a homeostasis of ‘singular selfhood’—just as society regards them as ‘a’ person. Yet psychological concepts of mental or psychical pathology pose that ‘at some point’ the ‘order’ of ordinary or normally unitary consciousness dissociates so dramatically that persons experience and express split or schizoid identity.

Assuming that there is some continuum between these states of evidently unified or normal and overtly dissociated or pathological self-experience that presents a polarized spectrum, even the normal status for sense of self can be regarded as duplicitous—in so far as it presents a unity that is actually a diverse many-ness whose inter-activity is subject to change. Such ‘self duplicity’ can thereby be understood not only as a ‘deceit’ directed toward the ‘outer world’ but also one imposed upon one’s pluralistic selfhood—the assumption of singular selfhood is self-deceiving about the duplicity of selfhood. Put another way, the diversity of selfhood compels personal duplicity in presenting any semblance of ordinarily singular identity.

The concept of pluralistic or poly-valent selfhood is most thoroughly investigated in the perspectives of depth psychology or the psychologies of the interplay between conscious (as self-awareness) and un/sub-conscious statuses of mind or psyche. In one regard there appears a split between consciousness and material embodiment. ‘My’ mind’ is ‘in my body’ though somehow separate from ‘my

body,' yet 'I' tend to regard 'my' 'egoic thinking self' as an agency separate from both body and mind as mechanisms 'I' manipulate to think and act. What then is this 'I' that is and is not 'of this mind/body?' Such contrast in psychical complexity is explored by depth psychological perspectives that do not equate the 'I' or 'conscious sense of self' with the totality of a person's consciousness or psyche. Instead, in this 'logic of psyche' the 'I' or conscious sense of self which typically comprises a person's self-conscious identity is considered to represent only some aspects of total self—the 'I' is not alone 'in there.' Thus there arises a dynamical relationship between the 'I' and the 'rest of the self'—between its one-ness and its many-ness. That distinction between 'I' and 'me' or 'mine' presents an internal or intra-psychic version of interactions between a one and a many that are also a 'many in the one.' 'A shorthand way used to express this complexity is that there is not only an 'I' of psyche, but a 'Not-I' and thereby a 'Not-not-I' status of the 'I' that is and is not itself. The 'I < >Not-I < >Not-Not-I' constellation for identity relates to that of real < >un-real < >un-real-real in the sense that the binary opposition of 'I versus Not-I' seems to generate a third reality status required to validate what 'fits' in neither oppositional category by virtue of belonging to both, and thus being somehow inclusive. 'I am a responsible member of society, yet now and then I commit small crimes to assist others, ergo: I am and am not a criminal, or, criminality is Not-Not-I.' This psychological notion of the complexity of internal or intra-psychic being that is also a poly-centric 'becoming' is integral to understanding ways humans seek to know inclusively.

Depth psychological notions provide a logic of psyche that posits ways in which psychical plurality can cohere in the *apparent* one-ness or continuity of what is termed personality. In this version of psychodynamics the 'I' of conscious personality is generated by an 'egoic function' that serves to compose a socially viable singularity of identity. This 'I-ness' derives from constellations of certain aspects of psyche in what are termed "psychological complexes." These complexes are conceived as nexes of particular concerns, emotions, memories, and impulses that have a certain autonomy within 'a psyche.' These nexes are conceived as exerting a specific focus of 'agency' or influence on personality that is typically not recognized for its autonomy from one's habitual sense of self. Thus one can speak of a 'father complex' constituted historically by how a person experienced relation with 'father figures' and subsequently developed attitudes that influence feelings and behavior in relation to any context prompting concerns about 'fathering' or even men in general. Thus a woman's relations with men might be disrupted by impulses from her 'father complex' if it causes her to react to all men 'as potential father figures'—be they dominant or submissive types. Psychological complexes can also constellate around concerns about money, creating reflexive behaviors such as feeling that there is 'never enough money' not matter how much one has. Anxiety about valid versus invalid ways for knowing reality can readily be associated with a complex constellated around preoccupation with reductive method.

A personal consciousness or psyche is thus in a sense comprised of such psychological complexes or nexes of consciousness each having a particular pattern of emphasis and impulse. Personal sense of

self and the habitual patterns of personal behavior referred to in the term personality are then posed as arising from the intentional and emotional qualities of those (typically contrasting and contending) complexes. Yet personality is regarded as an incomplete expression of personal psyche since it tends to be a selective expression of some aspects of the more dominant complexes composing the poly-centric elements of consciousness. The very existence of psychological complexes as aspects of selfhood is typically not ‘admitted into’ the conscious self-awareness that constitutes the ‘I’ of self-identity—these are essentially ‘hidden’ from the ‘I’ and, partly in consequence, the ‘I’ resists becoming aware of them and how their existence challenges the ways the ‘I’ re-presents the totality of selfhood. However, in this writing no acceptance is posited of a necessarily singular psychic complex or constellation that delineates an individual’s identity (or ‘an’ ego) as some positivized status. Rather, the term ego is associated with an ‘agency of knowing’ in psyche that generates an ‘activity of identification’ capable of employing various dynamical modes for differentiating difference and configuring identity statuses, thereby orienting one’s sense of self, other, and world. The unity of personality as a set of traits and behaviors is thus ever an incomplete re-presentation of psychic totality—and one constantly shifting in emphasis among an array of psychological complexes.

The more dominant complexes, or one-nesses of selfhood within the many-ness of an individual psyche, tend to assert the habitual or ordinary pattern of ‘sense of self’ and behavior. Thus there is often as much repression of self-aspects as there is expression of them in such ordinary presentation of selfhood—as dictated by reflexively dominant complexes. The overall pattern of personality that results was termed by Carl Jung to be a person’s “persona.” For Jung, “persona,” or what is referred to in this writing as ‘habitual identity,’ is both a necessity of belonging to collective social life and an obstacle to conscious development of awareness of individualizing psychic complexity and its ‘enlivening’ expression. Yet its aspects of self-denial or ‘duplicity’ can also be a self-protection in response to the restrictive judgment of others and society.

The persona is a complicated system of relations between the individual consciousness and society, fittingly enough a kind of mask, designed on the one hand to make a definite impression upon others, and, on the other, to conceal the true nature of the individual. That the latter function is superfluous could be maintained only by one who is so identified with his persona that he no longer knows himself; and that the former is unnecessary could only occur to one who is quite unconscious of the true nature of his fellows (Jung, Two Essays on Analytical Psychology 192)

However, Jung does not characterize this habitual ‘presentation of one’s self’ as entirely consciously composed nor as ultimately structured by external social conformity. Rather, he understands it as a conglomeration of both conscious and unconscious personal psyche along with aspects of the collective psyche in the social context. His conception of this seemingly conscious sense of self being composed in part by an “arbitrary segment of collective psyche” exemplifies the

dependence of identification upon external or other-defined references. One often ‘takes on’ or ‘assumes’ a public posture approved by society ‘onto’ which one ‘grafts’ some aspects of individual personality and the resulting persona readily becomes one’s reflexive ‘identity.’ That is to say, one’s sense-of-self becomes ‘identified with’ or ‘identical to’ that ‘posture.’ The word persona derives from the Latin for the mask worn by an actor ‘playing a part’ on stage. In this psychological contexting, persons typically ‘take the mask to be the self’—becoming in a sense deceived by their own ‘performance of personality.’

The typically resulting discrepancy between persona and ‘the rest of’ individual character, or totality of self, necessitates dis-identification with persona if a more complex and accurate sense-of-self is to be experienced (Jung’s concept of the process of “individuation”). But, such a ‘move’ poses an ‘invalidating’ of the established ‘I’s’ ‘precious sense-of-self’ as presented in persona. In this perspective, persona can be seen as an ‘un-real’ status, insofar as incomplete, reality of self-identity, despite its being held ‘valid’ according to established criteria. Yet it can be assumed to be ‘quite real’ even though psychologically it is a ‘mask/ing’ of ‘the whole self’ since it has demonstrably real consequences for behavior. Such a partial identity can only be relativized to a more inclusive ‘totality-of-self’ by a contrasting and seemingly ‘un-real’ (even if more complex and ‘accurate’) image or set of references for identification—a sort of alternate persona. If an existing sense-of-self or persona is held to be valid, or ‘real,’ then any significantly contrasting image of self will seem ‘un-real’ even if it presents an ‘actually’ more accurate version of psychic totality of the individual. When such a shift of identifications involves a distinctly different modality-of-identification, or ‘way-of-knowing,’ one’s entire basis for ‘knowing’ reality can be radically challenged—since one knows one’s self *as* persona and others or world *through* its perspectives. Jung associated persona perspective with inclination toward particular modes of knowing that constrict ability to know and express a more differentiated identity.

The persona is always identical with a typical attitude dominated by a single psychological function, for example, by thinking, feeling, or intuition. This one-sidedness necessarily results in the relative repression of the other functions. In consequence, the persona is an obstacle to the individual’s development. The dissolution of the persona is therefore an indispensable condition for individuation. It is, however, impossible to achieve individuation by conscious intention, because conscious intention invariably leads to a typical attitude that excludes whatever does not fit with it. The assimilation of unconscious contents, on the contrary, leads to a condition in which conscious intention is excluded and is supplanted by a process of development that seems to us irrational. [. . .] So long as the persona persists, individuality is repressed [. . .]. (Jung, Two Essays on Analytical Psychology 297)

The definitive grip of persona on identity thus extends not only to expressions of self-complexity but capacity to ‘will’ one’s self to know self, other, or world differently than the persona attitude allows or validates. This description of the inherent resistance toward more complex knowing of

self/other/world presented by habitual identity establishes a core basis for the role of the 'un-real' and 'un-real real' in pluralistic knowing. This dilemma of the individual being virtually unable to disentangle conscious sense-of-self from the reflexively controlling unconscious contents of persona by way of personal intention and effort makes a more totalistic knowing 'fantastically' difficult. Thus, typically some radical disruption of ordinary status or reality is required to enable engagement in such knowing by conscious awareness. Jung posits persona-as-identity as opposed to a self-knowing of one's selves as polycentric psyche. Yet some 'posture of self' or persona is inevitable in manifesting a 'practical' and social identity. This study utilizes Jung's notion as he expressed it but perhaps also in a more general sense whereby a persona can be manifested 'variously,' by one particular methodology of knowing as well as by another, or by a collective of individuals composing a 'group persona.' Thus it is not the elimination of persona but its deconstruction and reflective, non-literalistic re-identification and diversification that is explored here as enabling pluralistic knowing. A distinction between the notion of persona as a fixed or reductive posture of sense-of-self and one of more fluid or pluralistic identification of self is represented in this text by using the plural personas for more than one Jungian persona and the term personae for a 'self-pluralizing persona.'

Similar to 'identification with' persona, Jungian notions of "inflation" of the 'I' or 'egoic function' by its 'identification with' one or another 'internal' aspect of or perspective upon self illustrates the consequences of singular identification, or 'mono-identity.' Whether one 'identifies' with a 'positive' or a 'negative' image of self, an exclusive identification tends to 'inflate' the importance of 'itself' as the very 'imago-of-self,' casting other aspects or images of self or world into relative insignificance. Such effectively repressed aspects Jung termed "the shadow" aspects of self. These character traits and functions of consciousness, being blocked from overt acknowledgment by the 'I,' can only generate behavior 'unconsciously' by a process of 'acting out' in spite of persona identity. A 'habitually singular identity' might be 'accurate' as one particular sense-of-self, but is dangerously incomplete, and thus intrinsically insecure. Its repression of shadow aspects renders it susceptible to their subversive disruptions. In a sense then, there are personal impulses in an individual psyche arising from conscious intention but also 'impersonal' or 'other-derived' impulses arising from shadow aspects of the person. Such unintentional or unconscious behavior also derives from the collective unconsciousness of society in which the personal psyche is imbued and that has a similarly repressed or denied area of psychic concerns capable of provoking unconscious behavior.

Thus the reflexive unity of the 'I that is not itself' is not only a partial representation of the self but is composed in reference to both 'internal' and 'external,' or personal, impersonal, and social criteria. It is a necessity for social participation as well as protection against social judgment, but an impediment to development of a more complexly self-re-presentative ego-function or conscious sense of self. Habituated persona-based identity tends to resist incorporation of the many-ness of selfhood into a consciously

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diversified one-ness of I-ness. The contrast and conflict between the 'I' of egoic persona and the me of complex selfhood can be expressed as mirroring that between socially conventional reality and radically complex totality. The relativization of reductive I-ness to the irreducibly complex field of inclusive personal psyche or self is thus integral to radically inclusive knowing. Such a shift entails a reconfiguration of what can be termed *identity consciousness*, or the reflexive assumptions from which identity is composed and validated. The reflexive primacy of singular identity thereby becomes *subject to* a valid experience of multiple identity by way of encountering radical diversity.

This psychology of being one and many, of 'the I that is not itself alone,' of the self or consciousness that is always partly hidden, and identity that is multi-dimensional, is not considered here to be a modern invention. It will be shown that this perspective on identity and psychological reality are, rather, a rationalistic formulation of the insights of archaic cultural mythologies expressed through metaphorical actualities and metamorphic dynamism. This logic of psyche assists in distinguishing the mediation between ordinary and non-ordinary reality, between socialized conventions and the radical complexity of totality by *relativization* rather than by assimilation. But that activity is associated with more than rational understanding.

Just as there appears to be no way of 'knowing all there is to know' about material reality and causation (the more that is differentiated, the more data there is to know and more possibilities for knowing implied), there seems no plausible way to finally 'know' the complexity of self or psyche. Thus knowing in either modalities of reduction or non-reduction appears to be inevitably limited. Yet knowing whose finality of knowing is limited is also, at least psychologically, unlimited—there is always more to know and yet further varied experiences of knowing. And it seems possible to know knowing, of onenesses and many-nesses as mutually valid, even if that knowing entails something of an oscillation, a going back and forth, between them—seeking some moments of holding both states of knowing in conscious experience concurrently. The psychological insights of archaic cultures, manifested in mythic expressions and ritual enactments, indicate the inevitability of this activity in which humans experience a 'there and back again' of transit or mediation between ordinary and non-ordinary consciousness, between the socially structured sense of self, other, and world, and a status of these that is, relatively, unstructurable. Thereby both the 'I' and society that are and are not their self-complexity can be made aware of its self-imposed limitations—can become radically self reflective by becoming conscious of their typically self-reflexive and reductive assertions of identity and reality.

Archetypal Psyche-logical Perspective as Tracking the Dynamical Patterning of Psychic Identification

Just as the general method of analysis in this study is archetypal, so is its more specifically psychological perspective. The term archetypal and its usage in depth psychological theory relates to a non-reductive perspective on the many-ness of one-ness in/as psyche. As noted above, the logic of many-ness tends to compose identity in reference to archetypal or generalized patterns of association. The archetypality of book-ish-ness has various constituting aspects: cover, pages, print, binding, format, material, title, etcetera. Yet a seemingly endless diversity of books can be derived from variations on that archetypal theme or motif of book-ish-ness. Archetypal identification is thus relatively non-reductive in that it seeks to trace the particularities of a given status or entity 'toward' or in relation to some archetypal patterning that is given expression in the specific constellation of that entity (horseness, humanness, sex-ness, etc.). Such tracking of correlations between archetypal generality and individual specificity illustrates identifies the many-ness of an identity status in relation to the conceptual one-nesses of various archetypal patterns. The identification is thus composed in 'both directions,' as the archetypal patternings are themselves derived from associating similarities among the particularities of diverse entities to note certain commonalities.

The archetypal imago or general motif of book-ish-ness is derived from associating many diverse expressions of it as different books, thereby being composed itself as a constellated many-ness that expresses 'range and breadth.' Thus the 'father figure' is regarded as an archetypal patterning in psyche that derives in general from many different particular expressions of the role father. However, any particular father (or 'fathering' } needs be identified in relation to the variety of those archetype-composing examples. The archetypal status is a 'tendency' rather than an ideal or exact form that is reproduced in manifest entities. As such, archetypal figurings discernable of/in expressions of psyche provide references for interpreting the meaningful dynamics of a given personal or collective context of consciousness without reductively defining them. Psychological complexes manifest particular archetypal qualities of 'structure' or dynamical impulse.

Of Reductive and Non-Reductive Psychological Mentalities: Reflexive and Reflective Tendencies in Knowing Self, Other, World

Just as the egoic-I attitude can subsume expressions of the variousness of consciousness and selfhood under its reflexive proposition of a singular or unified selfhood, it also can be seen to readily project that reductive tendency onto the composition of all 'other' identities 'out there' in the world. It would seem then that a reductive perspective upon identity, personal and otherwise, is relatively reflexive and thus an ordinary condition of one's mentality—defined as a "cast or turn of mind, ([Am. Heritage](#)

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Dict, 1985, p.786).” Knowing self, other, and world is thus typically engaged through the logic of oneness. Thereby, knowing through the less reductive logic of many-ness as an overt psychological mentality would require some conscious attempt to shift away from the habitually reflexive attitude. This latter “turn of mind” or mentality against habit can then be expected to require a sort of deliberate dissociation of consciousness from one’s reflexive egoic perspective, in order to enable reflection upon the ways identity status is reflexively composed. In short, only then can the self ‘see’ how it has reductively represented itself and the world. The intellectual method of rational analysis can be understood as just such a methodology for evading reflexively reductive assumptions about identity status. It does so by analyzing or loosening the composition of those assumptions. However, when this method of more reflective examination of ‘how things really are’ is deployed ‘in service to’ a reductive purpose—such as to determine the absolute or ultimate true state of identity—then its non-reductive reflective differential analysis is subject to a reductive criteria about what its examination can mean. As noted, such a conflict between differential analysis and reflexively reductive mentality characterizes a dominant aspect of modernist Western society—one expressed in a reflexively mentality that can be regarded as posing a ‘psychological complex’ restricting the validity of epistemological method to a reductive model. However, a non-reductive psychological mentality will be shown to be difficult to generate even in non-Western cultural contexts.

Knowing Knowing Psyche-Logically: The Psychical Basis for Epistemic Processes and Hermeneutic Method

Though rational analysis and scientific methods can assist in determining just which impressions and conclusions persons have about ‘the real world’ are more literalistically accurate, these are not necessarily the most socially valid or psychologically significant methods for knowing. The actuality of psychical reality does not appear to be determined in such simplistically quantitative and literal terms. Indeed, even those very methods of materialistic analysis and mechanistic interpretation can be said not to take place ‘out there’ in the positivized objectivity of the ‘real world’ but rather ‘in here’ in the subjective ‘realm of psychical realities.’ If the reality of the external world is known by way of the ‘internal’ sense abilities and cognitive processes of the self doing the knowing—and re-presenting that knowing as knowledge—then mind/psyche is the ‘ultimate authority’ about the real and true. Thus to know knowing psyche-logically is not to know it materialistically.

Epistemological analysis, as the study of how human consciousness knows, is necessarily a form of ‘self examination.’ It is not an examination of ‘an object’ but of cognitive processes ‘in here,’ making it a subjective reflection on subjectivity. Study of the ‘structure and function’ of psyche, of the total field of consciousness, with its supposed personal and impersonal intentionality (ego-consciousness and un- or

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sub-consciousness), is thus frustrated in attempts to examine its 'subject' as 'an object' not only because it must 'study itself' but because that 'object of study' is actually a 'subjectivity'—an activity of consciousness that is 'thing-less.' Such self-analysis can readily become reflexive, in that it sees 'itself' as it habitually assumes itself to be. It can also, though more unusually, be self-reflective, in that it reflects upon its habitual assumptions about its behavior or activity and radically questions those assumptions. In the self-reflexive mode, analysis of knowing and psyche are likely to reiterate what conventional assumptions about reality and identity already assert. In the self-reflective mode, standardized one-nesses of identity and reality are likely to be destabilized when consciousness is considered as essentially strange to ordinary sense of self, other, and world. Consciousness considered as more genuinely 'other to' the analytical examination of egoic persona identity, as the inclusive totality or 'larger self' of ego-consciousness *and* un/sub-consciousness, as personal and impersonal psyche, conscious readily becomes an incommensurable many-nesses of 'other factors' than those habitually acknowledged through habitual identifications of identity and reality. The 'logic of psyche,' in this more radically inclusive regard, would seem to necessarily 'exceed' the reductive abstractions of egoic-analysis and its socialized criteria for representing reality.

If psyche, or psychical life and how it know, are to be regarded as (in some inclusively totality), an expression of ultimately irreducible many-nesses, then reductively configured psychologies need be ever regarded as contextually accurate at best—in so far as these elaborate only a particular aspect or dynamic of psyche and its epistemic processes. From the perspective of the logic of many-ness psyche/psychic life is not amenable to representation in universal one-nesses of hierarchical structure, self-consistent dynamical function, or linearly determinable behavior because its formations, activities, and dynamism are, quite 'simply,' too diverse and concurrently operant. Given such a poly-centric form and poly-valet dynamism, the 'logic of psyche' and its ways of knowing are necessarily radically complex and non-linear. That is not to say that there are no self-consistent or linear sequences of activity in psychical manifestations, but that these are so multiple and interactive that none are likely to be primary by themselves—at least not all the time, in all circumstances. Identity, or continuity of selfhood and knowing, can thereby be regarded as a status of homeostasis imposed upon the vast diversity of psychical aspects generating consciousness. Yet the continuity of that homeostasis is neither likely to be maintained by any singularly dominant hierarchy of functions or aspects, nor to be 'identical' in all circumstances for composing 'an identity.' It is not a simple one-ness, but an on going, context dependent 'performance' of as-if self-consistency indicated by contextual personas. As such psycho-dynamism is better understood in analogy to the complexity of an ecological environment than the characteristic ordering of a mechanical device. The shear volume of concurrently occurring brain activities detected in neurological examinations suggest a radically complex multiplicity of cognitive processes that, in their 'fugue-like' interactivity, defy reductive conception as some linear hierarchy of dynamical order.

Given such an assessment of psychical ‘structure and function,’ attempts to ‘know knowing’ become concerned with perceptual and cognitive processes that are not linearly organized or necessarily ‘in agreement.’ Sensorial ‘data’ relayed to the brain presumably provides some ‘impression’ of ‘external’ phenomena. Yet whether aspects of that data are in some way inherently compatible with each other as ‘sensings’ of what is ‘out there’ appears beyond analytical determination since it only becomes available to examination as the re-presentations of consciousness. Studies of brain function indicate vastly complex pre-cognitive activity just involving perception. And further, how that ‘input’ to cognitive processing is associated with existing references of conceptual criteria or experience is not necessarily going to be consistent or predictable if identification is a context dependent activity of mind. Knowing then becomes both ‘subject to’ the particular perceptual and cognitive activities of an individual person’s brain activity in a given moment, to that person’s habitual assumptions about identity and reality (conscious as well as un/sub-conscious), and also to assertions of atypical or less habituated psychical aspects that might assert influence at any given, if unforeseen and even consciously un-perceived moments. Knowing thusly becomes constituted by both conscious and unconscious aspects of the ‘subjectivity’ of the knower, just as epistemological study tends to be constrained by the epistemic habits and analytical methods of the analyst.

Yet, again, such an assertion about the reflexive subjectivity involved in analyzing psyche and knowing need not lead inevitably to a conclusion of consciousness as inherently solipsistic—to a view that reality is merely a subjective impression existing only within the psyche of persons and having no relation to external or objective phenomenon. Nor does this view of the psyche-logic of knowing necessarily impute an inevitable relativism to all truth and reality claims. One might reply to such conclusions that ‘mere common sense’ indicates there is significant correspondence between knowing and objective reality to enable humans not only to ‘cope’ in an objective environment but to practice reality-testing to the degree of developing sophisticated technological manipulations of such environments.

However, this psyche-logical view of knowing or epistemic practice does impute a certain unreality to perception, cognition, and expression in that these activities are all symbolic re-presentations of what is encountered by way of perceived, thought about, and portrayed in symbolic forms. The ‘products’ of these activities are not ‘in themselves’ the things to which each refers. Neither knowing, nor its identity status as knowledge, are the ‘things’ known. Referential signification by way of gesture, image, and language provide the medium of human epistemic expression, constituting what might be termed the ‘speech of psyche.’ But such signs and symbols are not ‘the things represented’ but rather a form of abstraction from the ‘presence of the perceived.’ These are, however, as thingless things of psyche, inherent ‘structurings of consciousness’ that ever pre-configure to some degree what they re-present. Some analysts thereby assert that there is no reality ‘outside’ the descriptions of language-as-psyche. That notion could be phrased as: the only objective reality is the reality of objective psyche—of the ‘reality of

subjectivity’ and its thingless things of consciousness. Words then are real things with real meaning—but not, as re-presentational abstractions, the things they are ‘taken to be/represent.’

Again, however, such a conclusion appears reductive. Thus this interpretation of the nature of knowing need not necessarily discredit some potential accuracy in correspondence between knowing, knowledge, and objective phenomenon. The distinction at issue here is that accuracy is not a consequence of perception, thought, and expression being ‘identical with’ that which they re-present. A conundrum of consciousness thus arises in that objective phenomenon are known by subjectively generated symbolic references which can, but do not necessarily, enable an accurate cognitive understanding of those phenomenon. This paradoxical dynamic of consciousness is further compounded by the implication that any or all such psychically generated perceptions, thoughts, feelings, and expressions are ostensibly ‘real’ to psyche—regardless of the accuracy of their correspondence to objective phenomenon. The ‘things of knowing’ can be experienced as objectively real whether or not they assert ‘accurate’ correspondence to the things and events they purport to re-present. Such a ‘reality of the inaccurate representations of reality’ might be regarded as the boundary of madness. A person granting validity to un-real representations of the real thus tends to be considered either deranged, socio-culturally ‘other,’ or perhaps as one merely presenting an entertaining ‘as if’ performance that does not actually challenge the real (at least as configured in dominant social convention). Just to add a further twist to this convoluted interactivity of objective and subjective knowing of objective phenomenon, one can note that subjectivity is itself one of those objective phenomenon—a thingless thinging that has ‘actual consequences in the world.

Yet, as indicated above, there appears to be more to the assertion of an overtly un-real reality than delusion or diversion. The accurate knowing of reality appears to require not only a degree of literalistic correspondence between the things of knowing and the things of objective phenomenal occurrence but also an appropriate correspondence between knowing and the radically complex dynamism of totality. In both categories knowing appears to derive from psychical symbolism—whether of objective, subjective, thing, or thingless status. . But in the first case it might be said that the symbolism depicts more reductive one-nesses of status and dynamical activity, while the latter category concerns re-presentation of more irreducible many-nesses and thus does not attempt to portray self-consistent identities or linear, causal processes. The accuracies of exclusive and inclusive knowings are thusly, if not conclusively, differentiated.

These notions about the psychical basis for epistemic processes are echoed in neurologist Antonio Damasio’s concept of the ‘origins of consciousness.’ Damasio associates the capacity to generate psychical or mental images with the capacity to more radically adapt actions ‘in the environment’ for effective survival.

If actions are at the root of survival and if their power is tied to the availability of guiding

images, it follows that a device capable of maximizing the effective manipulating of images in the service of the interests of a particular organism would have given enormous advantage to the organisms that possessed the device and would probably have prevailed in evolution. Consciousness is precisely such a device. . . .

Consciousness generates the knowledge that images exist within the individual who forms them, it places images in the organism's perspective by referring those images to an integrated representation of the organism, and, in so doing, allows the manipulation of the images to the organism's advantage. Consciousness, when it appears in evolution, announces the dawn of individual forethought (Damasio, Feeling of What Happens .24).

There appears a radical shift in this concept of the evolution of consciousness from a more simplistic correlation of mental images with literal external phenomenon to a capacity to abstract images from the presently perceived or experienced immediate environment. The capacity to know images as imaginal or non-literal re-presentations enables an exponentially greater range of speculative association between cause and effect, feeling and thought, or past, present, and future. "Images allow us to invent new actions to be applied to novel situations and to construct plans for future actions—the ability to transform and combine images of actions and scenarios is the wellspring of creativity (Damasio 24)." Thus a capacity to abstract images from present perception, to engage psychical experience and thought in a non-literal or imaginal phenomenal status constitutes the un-real reality of a 'mental laboratory' where a specular/speculative reality enables radically creative re-presentations and interpretations of existence. Just where one might 'draw the line' or establish some exact boundary between perception of reality that is and reality that is not configured by that abstracted 'creative psychical reality of consciousness' appears as a radically difficult task, since to do so is to 'imagine' such a boundary through the very epistemic processes of that abstracting consciousness. Contemplating this dilemma of ultimate distinction one might conclude that self, other, and world are and are not those images of creative consciousness, images that enable humans to so effectively adapt to environments and even radically adapt environments to human need, impulse, and fantasy. This 'un-real real' epistemic character of human consciousness seems to 'give us the power of gods.'

The Metaphysics of Making Meaning through both Reductive and Non-Reductive Epistemology and Heuristics

If self, other, and world are understood as known only through the re-presentations of them in consciousness and its expression in language, art, or science (as signs signifying some existence that the sign itself is not), then the 'place of making meaning' becomes 'internal' to the subjectivity of psychic processes, regardless of how quantitatively accurate its references to 'external objectivity' happens to be. That being the context for knowing or the epistemic processes of consciousness, its re-presentations of the cognitively represented reality 'out there' are intrinsically metaphysical in character. That is to say, those

re-presentations are inherently constituted in reference to *a priori* concepts, experiential criteria, and psychological complexes that configure the sensed or measured world ‘within’ pre-existing and abstract identification of valid reality.’ Those pre-configuring references are comparable to the definition of metaphysics as “first principles about ultimate reality.” From this perspective, all meaning is a metaphysical projection of psyche upon what it perceives and re-presents—even when those representations are materialistically accurate, because the notion of materialistic accuracy is a psychological construct or *a priori* first principle favored by certain psychological complexes—be those personally intra-psychic or socially inter-psychic.

Reality is thus always already predetermined to some degree by psychic patterns and the epistemological methods used to ‘access’ it. Even the materialistic order or one-ness of phenomenon posed by mechanistic science ‘originates’ as a psychical production—a ‘thingless thing’ of metaphysical imagination. This notion can be stated as the maxim that ‘self, other, and world are never simply as these appear or as re-presented in consciousness since such representations are necessarily psychical abstractions *from* and projections *upon* what remains incompletely re-presented and thus essentially un-represented.’ Thereby, even categories such as true and false, correct and incorrect, and even real and unreal to some degree impose metaphysical concepts upon totality. The criteria for such categories can differ between cultures as well as intellectual disciplines that pose differing frames of reference for evaluating phenomenon and consciousness.

However, attributing an intrinsic metaphysical character to all knowing and knowledge does not contradict the concept that there are more and less accurate re-presentations of the phenomenal existences of self, other, and world—be those of material things or the ‘thingless things’ of consciousness or psyche. There exist differing contexts and criteria for accuracy. But neither does this perspective contradict the concept that all psychic representations are ‘actually real’ to the psyche—regardless of how accurately these represent material objectivity. An image of a book is not a material thing, yet it can have absolutely valid reality to psychic processes of knowing—even if it is not an image of any materially existent book. But then, no *thing of knowing* is ‘real’ according to this logic of psychical epistemology, in so far as it is always a re-presentation of some ‘actual thing,’ and thereby a ‘thingless thing’ of consciousness composed in some part as a metaphysical criteria for valid existence—be it a ‘vision’ of a literal train wreck, an ‘image’ derived from the materiality of a Picasso painting, or a concept accessed by way of a mathematical formula asserting the causal relations of matter and energy. Conversely, according to the logic of one-ness asserted by notions of materialistic and mechanistic reality, even the ‘thingless things’ of psychical processes must be granted a valid status as ‘real’ in so far as these can be ‘proven’ to have material effect upon measurable substances and linear causation. After all, someone had to ‘imagine’ geometry for it to become a ‘valid re-presentation’ of material phenomena, and the first steamboat had its initial existence in the psychical imaginings of a certain patterning of personal psychic complexes. These

notions of psyche as a ‘substance of thought’ or imagination that effects, even creates, the world through consciousness is exemplified in Jung’s term, “the objective psyche” which he used to assert the reality of subjective, immaterial consciousness.

The metaphysical character of psychical making of meaningful re-presentation of experience and phenomenon can be posed as heuristic method. The term heuristic derives from the Greek *heuriskein* for to find. It gets defined as “a usually speculative formulation serving as a guide in the investigation or solution of a problem (Am. Heritage. Dict. ’85 p.610).” Methodologies employed for establishing the status and interpreting the meaning of what is known as knowledge are thus referred to as heuristics. The scientific method of quantifying phenomenon in terms of materialistic analysis and mechanistic causation is a particular heuristic method. Another such guide for meaningfully categorizing data as knowledge is the reference to a set of ‘ideal types’ or predetermined standards. Such methods derive from metaphysical first principles that direct heuristics, or interpretive methods. Just as there are distinctions between materialistic and psychical epistemic process of knowing, there are different modalities of heuristic interpretation. Gallagher sorts these as conservative, moderate, and radical in association with the degree of their emphasis upon reductive categorization in making meaning. The conservative mode assumes a literalistic, objective status of meaningful representation whereas the radical one assumes no absolute status for reductive meaning. The metaphysical principles behind meaning making thus include distinctions between emphasizing one-ness or many-ness—between more or less reductive first principles. Re-presentation for the purpose of meaning as definitive explanation is metaphysically reductive. Re-presentation for the purpose of meaning as pluralistic association expresses a first principle of non-reduction or inclusive diversity.

A first principle for making meaning that is non-metaphysical—the philosophical posture of materialistic science—thus appears as ‘metaphysically non-metaphysical.’ Its heuristic modality is pre-configured by a first principle of ‘no first principle.’ It claims to proceed in its investigations without metaphysical prejudice about ‘what it will find.’ However, such a position is impossible according to the concept that all epistemological processes are significantly pre-configured by *a priori* assumptions and expectations about reality. Thus all heuristic methods for analyses of status and meaning must proceed from some first principle that delimits the possible re-presentations of actuality.

These remarks upon the psychical nature of epistemological processes and metaphysical construction of all re-presentation are not meant to conclusively ‘solve’ arguments about what is real and how humans know. The intention is rather to emphasize the staggering complexity of such processes, their seeming irreducibility to any singular method or self-consistent explanation or universal criteria of accuracy. Evidently epistemology can be approached in a materialistic manner or in a phenomenological one that foregrounds psyche as the ‘place of knowing’ rather than positioning it ‘out there’ in materialistic objectivity. It is this latter perspective that allows for the investigation of knowing as a dynamical

episteme which allows for understanding the experiences of inclusive knowing of radically complex totality—an epistemic process that appears to derive from granting valid status of being ‘real’ to that which objectifying literalism cannot validate, and thus, a ‘mythical mentality.’ From such a perspective, the metaphysical imposition of materialistic epistemology upon the ultimately un-represented complexity of phenomenal existence appears just as mythical, as ‘fantastic’ in its psychical creation of self, other, and world, as that of more overtly metaphorical re-presentations of ‘the way it really is.’

Representation that is a metaphysically configured re-presentation of some phenomenal entity or status that ever remains incompletely represented can be regarded as a ‘map.’ The phrase, ‘the map is not the territory’ suggests this relation of re-presentation to “the unrepresented.” The ‘territory’ represented in the map-as-re-presentation is thus alluded to but not present. In so far as the map is taken to *actually be* the territory it re-presents (whether that ‘terrain’ be a literal or psychical geography), the map can be classed an illusion since it is not what it is assumed to be. Yet the map is not only allusion and/or illusion but also ‘a real thing’ as a ‘thing of thinking,’ which can have ‘real effects’ in the material sense by influencing a persons actions. And the map (or a theory) is not only the paper with lines, numbers, and words but perhaps even more so the pattern of its associations among its re-presentations of places, concepts, experiences that constitute its being knowable as ‘a map’ representing ‘a territory.’ The map itself is both a thing and a thingless thing of re-presentation. The marvel here is that human consciousness can somehow engage the symbolic presentation of the map-as-territory in relation to the ‘territory not present’ in/as the map in meaningful ways. The heuristic of map reading as a method of discovery and meaningful understanding about a ‘place not present’ that facilitates knowing that ‘territory that is and is not the map’ can produce effective practical navigation. It can also, when taken too literally, produce great frustration and confusion. The map, like a theory or epistemological methodology for knowing, ‘projects’ a complex set of essential metaphysical assumptions upon what it re-presents and *thereby enables knowing those meaningfully*. Thus, one can assume, no particular metaphysical heuristic method results in no particularly meaningful identification.

Epistemologies of One-ness and Many-ness as Mind Independent or Objective and Mind Dependent or Subjective Knowings

The proposed psychological basis for epistemic process or knowing, characterized above as a psychical phenomenology, can be associated with notions of a subjective or mind dependent basis for knowing reality. Such status definition stands in contrast to a more materialistic epistemology and its objective or mind independent basis for reality status. Knowing by way of the logic of one-ness readily associates with this latter epistemological method that seeks to establish a definitively materialistic or at least objective status of identity and reality that is ‘external to’ psychical processes. It is an epistemology

of objects or positivized validity or thingness. An epistemology derived from the logic of many-ness tends to rely more on positing a dynamical association of references for identity status rather than static objectified singularity. Such identity status is ‘subjective’ in that it is ‘thought’ and thus ‘mind-dependent’—a ‘symbolic phenomenon’ of a ‘psychical subject’ or the ‘subjectivity of consciousness.’

However, again in keeping with the conundrum of the interdependency of knowing by ones and manys, these two epistemological modes or aspects of knowing are not readily disengaged. Instead, they can quite easily be regarded as complimentary or even intrinsically concurrent. It appears most illogical to doubt either the existence of objects or the practical effectiveness of objective manipulation of mind independent entities. Yet to deny the mind dependent context of subjective consciousness necessary to discriminating and manipulating such positivized existence appears equally illogical. To attempt to ultimately privilege one context for knowing over the other thus appears rather irrational. Subjective and objective statuses are co-terminus—subjectivity is ‘an object’ that has ‘tangible’ consequences, and objectivity is subjectively derived.

Metaphor, Metamorphosis, Myth, and Magic in Knowing Knowing Psyche-logically

The proposed interplays of psychical and material, subjective and objective, mind dependent and mind independent statuses for valid identity and reality (for knowing self, other, and world), provide another context for understanding how inclusive knowing requires some extraordinary modes of re-presentation. Conscious awareness of the interplays between such contrasting categorizations of identity status in knowing demands some mode of re-presentation that overtly foregrounds the complexity of the logics of psycho-material epistemic processes actually. Similarly, knowing the complexity of the inclusive character of radically diverse reality requires some ordinarily un-real re-presentation that can evade habitual assumptions of reductive one-ness. The non-reductive dynamical association of status as many-ness requires some subversion of ordinarily singular identifications. Thus the ‘carrying over’ movement of metaphorical identification and the ‘trans-form-ing’ dynamic of metamorphic status appear as psyche-logically appropriate ways of knowing both the complex character of subjective < > objective knowing and as well as some inclusive status of radically complex totality. This relationship will be explored further in regard to magical ritual practices and mythical narratives of ‘how things really really are.’

Psycho-Somatic Enactment and Psychical Participation in the Radical Complexity of Dynamic Totality

In so far as the processes of psychical perception and cognition appear to derive from some engagement with stimulus then activities of consciousness are responses to some experience, even if such

stimulus is 'internal' or psychical. As noted above, the concept of understanding is closely associated with some experiential 'grasp,' 'contact,' or sensing. Initially, the human infant appears to embark upon psychic life in response primarily to somatic phenomenon or experience. Perception, stimulated by such experience, appears to precede development of complex cognitive formulation of symbolic images and thought. Yet, presumably, very soon the developing psyche begins to *generate* psychical phenomenon (i.e., emotional and conceptual content), 'in response to other psychic phenomenon,' rather than just to external somatic stimulus. That 'self-stimulating' character of consciousness is termed intersubjectivity—by way of which mind begins to create its 'versions' of self, other, and world.' A somatically stimulated perception of hunger might become associated with a psychical production of anxiety that gets associated with the 'external absence of mother' that then in turn might stimulate other somatic and psychical phenomenon in an exponentially complex dialectic of stimulus and response, thought and feeling, imagination and behavior.

From such origins, it can be supposed, the specific configurations of psychological complexes aggregate. Such a proposed causal relation between somatic and psychical phenomenon is presented here to indicate the intrinsically 'tangible' reference for psychical reality. Whatever a person asserts to be validly real thus tends to derive from some 'sensible experience'—even if that experience is 'stimulated' by psychical productions of thought. The actual material occurrence of such experiential phenomenon is not essential to its psychical reality. Yet the 'original' or archetypal reference for a basis of thought in actuality (a feeling of feeling), might be assumed as 'of sensate or somatic experience.' The relativization of ordinarily reductive identity to a more inclusive non-ordinary or novel sense of valid reality thus can be regarded as requiring not only an adaptation of abstract criteria for the validly real but also some 'tangible experience' that overtly challenges existing 'sense abilities.' Shifts in modes of identification might be expected to be facilitated by some 'taking action' or enactment in a way that stimulates non-ordinary sensing—physical and/or psychical.

Given that the materially actual is always known in some way as the psychical, yet that psychical cognition appears to originate in reference to some sensible or tangible perception (be it of a material object or another psychical phenomenon such as an image or thought), it follows that any fully valid experience of the non-ordinary dynamism of complex totality will require both a psychical *and* a somatic component. Thus a full validation of the many-ness of one-ness in radical complexity is regarded as requiring not only a conceptual grasp (typically mythical but potentially rational in its logic), but some actual experiential encounter with and enactment of such an irreducible status of self, other, and world. The concept of gnosis as intuitive apprehension and esoteric knowing relates to this concurrency of psychical and somatic awareness as a 'felt knowing.' Such psycho-somatic phenomenal engagement will be shown to derive potentially from both archaic ritual practices and psychological crises of identity. Consideration of such practices suggests that some psycho-somatic enactment, a gesturing that includes

both cognitive and physical aspects, is typically involved in shifts of identity consciousness toward validation of pluralistic identity and non-ordinary reality. In such a way there can be an experience of radical complexity by way of its manifestation in/as the personal sensing of self as a pluralistic entity—a manifesting of the many-ness in the one-ness of the self that constitutes a metaphorical reality and metamorphic status of being as becoming. (Enactments such as yogas, song, dance, and sexuality will be considered in relation to this notion.)

This concept of the role of ‘felt experience’ in any significant re-orientation of identity is developed below in reference to Jung’s observation that persona-identity is an obstacle to more complex and inclusive self-knowing: “The dissolution of the persona is therefore an indispensable condition for individuation. It is, however, impossible to achieve individuation by conscious intention, because conscious intention invariably leads to a typical attitude that excludes whatever does not fit with it (Jung, Two Essays on Analytical Psychology 297).” The repressed complexity of psyche typically does not gain conscious acknowledgment in ordinary egoic consciousness without some experience that ‘overwhelms’ dominant assumptions about self, other, and world. Intentional self-reflection, though essential to reconfiguring persona identity, does not appear sufficient to the task. Virtual, if not literal trauma tends to provide the experiential basis for a felt or somaticized re-representation of selfhood and reality.

Identity Consciousness and Its Configurations in Archaic, Modernist, and Post-Modernist Contexts

The general orientation or one-ness of cultural attitude toward the ‘metaphysics of knowing’ or heuristics of epistemological method characterizes its *a priori* psychological *mentality* (turn of mind) about identity, reality, and truth. Such a generally shared mentality about identification can be termed identity consciousness in so far as it represents the habituated activity of consciousness that configures dominant assumptions about identity statuses. Such a general attitude is not posed here as uniformly dominant but more as a reflexive ‘filter’ or editorial function that favors certain characteristics of identity criteria, such as, in emphasizing singularity over multiplicity. Identity consciousness can thus be more or less reductive and mechanistic in its ‘turn of mind.’ The notion of identity consciousness as the dominant perspective on how the identity of persons and things is to be composed, and thus known, is important to distinguishing how some cultures are more resistant to radically inclusive knowing than others. It is important to this study to differentiate such emphasis in relation to more recent Western cultural attitudes and those of more archaic, non-Western ones.

The historical context referenced to by the terms modernity and modernism is not easily determined. In the broadest appraisal it begins perhaps with aspects of the Renaissance, the emergence of the scientific revolution, technological society, and capitalist economy. It is characterized by rapid change in social, political, technological, and economic ‘orders.’ The status of the possible, the legal, even the real, have been undergoing nearly constant ‘re-vision’ over a sequence of centuries. As a consequence,

traditional uniformity and continuity to methods of knowing and constitutions of knowledge have been repeatedly invalidated. This very general and diverse 'era' of global cultural transformation has been both 'inspired' and dominated primarily by the influences of Western cultural mentality and its quantitative, objectivist or positivistic criteria for reality and identity. While philosophical and scientific assertions of the real and the unreal have changed radically and repeatedly over the last few hundred years, the dominance of a mechanistic notion of causality and a reductivist, oppositionally binary character of identity consciousness can be said to have remained relatively consistent. Despite the vast complexities of natural phenomena revealed by scientific investigation, Western mentality persists in privileging essentialist and mechanistic interpretations.

Such characteristic reductivity of modernist mentality, in contrast to the 'revealed' 'chaotic complexity' of phenomena, is a principle reference in this study. While modernity is credited with producing some of the most pluralistic and egalitarian social orders of historical record, these societies tend to reduce individuals undifferentiated 'equals.' The era has also begotten some of the most hierarchically repressive and fascistic socio-political structures. While being the historical context for institutionalized democracy, it has also been that for mass participation in homicidal as well as suicidal obedience to authoritarian hierarchy. It is a context of legally enhanced individual liberty while also that of mechanized work and the mass production of indistinguishable products. A reductive, binary tendency in Western mentality remains a primary aspect of 'modernist identity' yet clearly does not 'define' the 'activity' of 'modernist psyche.' Contemporary 'identity consciousness' does seem to be struggling more 'consciously' with the conflicts of reductive and pluralizing impulses that appear so central to events in recent history.

When comparing this more modernist attitude to more archaic cultural versions of identity consciousness, a characteristic difference about knowing reality is discernable in terms of knowing by way of multiplicity and the co-participation of identity statuses. In the broadest sense, the distinction made here is that the 'turn of mind' regarding identity consciousness associated with archaic culture allowed for more 'overlapping' of identities and states of plausible reality between the ordinary and non-ordinary, the singular and plural. Its categories of identity were distinctly inclusive and concurrent. It was, for example, less likely to categorize the intentionality and rationality of consciousness as exclusively human. Aspects of the non-human world were often regarded as having similar intentionality. Psyche, as it were, was experienced as more 'of the world' than associated only with human identity. Thereby, humanness could readily be regarded as participating in the non-human world. In such a worldview there is great latitude for ordinarily un-like aspects to be known and experienced in an inclusive state accepting both difference and relation—human and non-human over-lapping or interacting as co-participants.

The 'turn of mind' about identity consciousness in the context of modernist scientific rationalism inherently resists validating such relations between what it regards as exclusive and oppositional states of being. From its perspective, intentional consciousness tends to be limited to human cognition, and that is typically associated only with the conscious egoic sense of self—as if there were 'no more to the intentional self' than the 'I.' This expresses a much more reductive mentality about identity status than does 'archaic mentality.' In relying upon mechanistic, materialistically positivized criteria and a primacy of reductively final truth for constituting the metaphysics of its heuristic methodology, the modern attitude 'cannot help' but pose identity status in exclusive, oppositional contrasts.

Among the many periods of disruption in the vaguely identified era of modernity, the contentious attempts to differentiate a context of post-modernity suggest the most significant historical struggle over orientations to modes of identification 'within' modernist attitudes. The modernist > <postmodernist debates might be radically re-identifying the identity of the contemporary status of culture and even of 'reality.' Whether or not there are fundamental differences of modes of identification that validate distinctions between modernism and so-called postmodernist thought will be considered in chapter 4. But the very prevalence of attempts to assert or refute such distinctions, and the virulence often attendant upon that 'discourse' suggests the significance of 'identity' in a positivistic culture. In regard for the oppositional character of modernist > <postmodernist debates, the notion of an 'after-modern' era will be represented with the term 'post'-modern, to indicate it more as a 'psychical status' than a distinct era of historical fact.

Notions about identity that will be characterized here as post-modernist tend to be configured in critical reaction against the reductive methods and purposes of modernist attitudes. In so doing, the post-modernist thought often poses a radically relativistic heuristic over and against the conservative one of modernist positivism. It thus suggests, by way of its negation of reductive certainty, a basis for co-existence, if not co-participation, of states of being that are seemingly contradictory and paradoxical. That reversal derives from a logical reflection that analyses the reductive identity construction of modernist rationalism for its illogical denial of many-ness.

In the inclusive or co-participatory status of identity consciousness, associated here with archaic cultures, the many-ness-es and one-ness of an entity or phenomenon are allowed not only a valid co-existence but also a meaningful though non-reductive unity or coherence with/in diversity. The many forms of 'a form' can thusly be regarded as constituting a 'flow' that manifests a concurrency of 'related formulations.' Yet accepting such a status remains antithetical to contemporary modernist social conventions about reality and identity consciousness. Yet the radical relativism of more post-modernist logical analyses of valid identity status do not provide a basis for non-reductive inclusion either, as these tend to antithetically de-legitimize any given singular status of representable identity. The available

criteria for persona configuration thereby remain either absolutely singular or absolutely relativistic and indefinite. Both a basis for complex concurrent co-participation of status and

Archaic cultural attitudes constituting identity consciousness do not omit reductive identification by constitute it more idiosyncratically than systematically. That mode of reductive status allows logical contradiction between singularly composed identifications. Thus ‘an entity’ can be assigned valid singular identities that are not logically congruent. As in Hindu culture, all cows can be regarded as sacred, yet some cows can be killed and eaten while others cannot. That approach to one-ness allows overlapping and paradoxical identities that, if held valid, inherently imply interpenetrating and thus pluralistic status by virtue of their very inconsistencies. The reductive style of modernist identity consciousness, with its hierarchical logic, positivistic causality, and self-consistent taxonomy, is more intolerant of such inconsistent identification, and thus is better characterized as systematic.

The postmodernist attitude being suggested here might best be characterized as *systematically idiosyncratic*. It tends to ‘absolutely invalidate any absolute validity’ of status—singular or plural. In its more extreme expressions it is intolerant of any reduction. Such a ‘turn of mind’ about identification obviously makes for an utterly uncertain and insecure sense of self, other, and world. It should not be surprising then that the 20th century has been associated with a pervasive ‘identity crisis’ and the advent of existential philosophy. In an effort to better understand this contemporary status of identity status, it is the focus of the succeeding chapters to consider how identity and identification are affected by the experience and practice of metaphoric sensibility and metamorphic enactment.

The remainder of this work can be approached as investigating the epistemic of radically inclusive knowing in two contexts. In one respect, it is an engagement with an ‘other than ordinary world’ of concurrently active ‘dynamical reality.’ In another respect it is an encounter with ordinary identity and reality as concealing extra-ordinary phenomenal aspects of ‘every day existence’ in which the typically real can appear un-real and the typically un-real real. Yet these explorations are not about ‘proving’ which context is the more ‘true’ or ‘accurate.’ The intention is, rather, to demonstrate how reductive and non-reductive epistemics and heuristics can be engaged so as to relativize the reflexive reductions of either when allowed dominance. Most particularly, given the pragmatic emphasis upon reductive method in ordinarily materialistic perspectives, this work focuses more upon how that attitude gets relativized to larger, more complexly inclusive ones that psychologically humble the positivizing, literalizing impulses of egoic-function in both persons and societies. That investigation involves examining socio-cultural generations of inclusive identification through symbolic enactments as well as the roles inclusive epistemics play in specific intellectual disciplines of knowing and knowledge creation. The overall contrast between singular and pluralistic modes of knowing can be stated as an examination of how simplicity and complexity are ‘known’ in both overtly symbolic or metaphorical creativity and also through the methodologies of more rationally abstract conception (intellectual disciplines).

Chapter 2

Archaic Culture's Inclusive Epistemic: Initiations of Individual Identity into Psychic Plurality, Concurrent Realities, and Participation of Totality

The academic disciplines of anthropology and ethnography provide the first context for citing examples of inclusive knowing in this investigation. A focus is placed upon what these fields of study reveal about socio-cultural approaches to knowing inclusively in pre-modern and non-Western contexts. Those references provide a basis for establishing a general differentiation between such 'archaic' attitudes about identity consciousness and more modernist Westernized ones. This distinction demonstrates that there are, or were, cultural attitudes and social structures that overtly promoted the relativization of reductive epistemic modes of knowing to more non-reductive, even radically inclusive ones. These epistemic modalities are characterized here as constituting 'participation in' radically complex status (the so-called archaic mode) in contrast to resisting such participation of sense of self, other, and world in such concurrently diverse status (the so-called modernist mode).

Distinguishing between Inclusive Archaic Participatory and Exclusive Modernist Non-Participatory Identifications

In order to discuss traits of 'archaic culture' some identification of it must be attempted. Distinguishing categories of culture involves numerous and varied lists of criteria. In this study, an attempt is made to differentiate between cultural mentalities that tend to conceive of human consciousness and activity as 'horizontally imbedded' in, or participatory with, the entirety of nature, and those that imagine human activity as in opposition to or transcendent over 'nature.' A definitive distinction is not posited here but rather a general historical one, associated with a tendency in hierarchically ordered, increasingly urban-centered societies. That tendency is towards increasing opposition in human identifications of self and society over against the non-human other. An illustrative indicator of this tendency is taken to be the degree to which divine creational powers are imagined anthropomorphically and to which the 'concern' of such god-figures is regarded as focused on human social ethics or morality. The more anthropomorphic and ethically focused 'the gods,' the more human societies seem to identify themselves in opposition to 'nature.' Another indicator of such a sense of separation from or opposition with nature is a cultural anxiety over mortality and imaginations of transcending or escaping the earthly context of suffering and death. In general, this trend is toward human affairs being a 'world of their own' rather than 'of the world of totality.'

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A second shift here referred to is that the cultural mentality of such 'civilized' societies tends to pose 'ordinary' and 'non-ordinary' 'realities' as more distinct or conflicting. In more modernist cultures, the extremity of this move is seen in a decisive denial of the existence of a 'non-ordinary' reality of equal or greater importance than the ordinary, and decline of enactment of 'relations' with forces and entities conceived to manifest such a 'world' of 'non-human' intention and action. Such 'ordinary' and 'non-ordinary' realities as identified in more archaic cultures can be termed a creationally divine< >ordinarily mortal conjunction. But archaic mentality does not typically appear to pose these realms as 'in opposition' but rather 'in relation.' Thus the cultural divide assumed and referenced here is discerned as the relative presence or absence of a personal and collective experience of participation within a continuum of 'ordinary' physical reality *and* 'non-ordinary' spiritual or psychical 'reality,' of existence in 'habitual identity' *and* 'validated' experience of *being* 'outside' those 'ordinary' identifications.

Cultures that conceive and enact relations with such a "sacred" realm of existence are thus viewed here as being more 'original,' as in aboriginal, or archaic. Those that tend to conceive reality as a relatively singular, consistently mechanistic field of non-intentional matter and energy, devoid of divine< >ordinary complimentary pairings, and in which human consciousness is essentially an alien phenomenon, are here considered the most 'modernist.' In the latter, the primary distinction seems to be not between 'this world' and 'an other' but between 'this only real one' and 'all other false or imaginal ones.' In between perhaps would be cultures that maintain an 'other worldly' context but primarily as realms of 'good' and 'evil' distinguished by an ethical divide. These can be seen as a transition stage between the divine< >ordinary context and a real< >not real one. The ethical division of good< >evil or sacred< >profane is one in which 'the other world' becomes a concern of 'heaven' or 'hell,' of 'salvation' or 'damnation,' of 'enlightenment' or 'endless rebirth into earthly suffering.' Both the good< >evil and real< >not real premises favor either/or oppositional choices for identification considered to be reductive modes for discrimination. These traits are used here as criteria for distinguishing cultural mentality of the 'modernist' type.

Archaic culture is viewed as generating a collective context of participatory experience of being that involves various levels of identification of 'self' with both human and non-human, personal and impersonal, material and immaterial 'Others.' The term primitive culture is pointedly not used in this study due to its pejorative connotation, which suggests a simpler and thus less significant or intelligent mode of being. Indeed, the archaic is here assumed to manifest a more complex conscious experience of psychic and physical phenomenon than the modernist, though absent the developed capacity for sophisticated intellectual abstraction and reflection manifested in some modernist contexts. This notion of archaic complexity in contrast to modernist reductivity is echoed in postmodernist thought about the totalizing effect of modernist meta-narratives that attempt to explain all human experience and nature in conclusive, universal, linear and literalistic terms. (The postmodernist use of the term totalizing

indicates reductive singular identification while this study's use of the terms totality and totalistic indicate inclusive, non-reductive 'completeness.')

These distinctions between archaic and modernist culture are taken here as posing a 'divide,' as constituting a gap, a dichotomy between what configure two fundamentally differing 'mentalities' toward identifying self/other/world. Thus, this gap is not posed so much as a 'literal' contrast in social structures (in the outward appearances and activities of such cultures) but as internal or psychological. The greater divergence is thought to occur in the personal sense and experience of self, other, and world: between a sense of being *of* while participating *in* world and other, versus being primarily in competition with and defined 'in opposition to' other and world. And yet, this distinction is not just about 'how' the world is experienced but 'how' it thus 'actually is.' The 'archaic world, as 'so-inhabited,' or 'lived-as,' actually must *be* different from one not so-experienced, according to the logic of the inseparability of psyche and matter in 'reality that is inherently psychical.' For in the context of the archaic type of mentality, person and culture are *of* the world while in the modernist, humans live 'on' and even 'off of' the land, which is 'managed' as a 'resource.' The world in some ways experienced *as* self is a genuinely different world from one experienced as *not of* self. A person conditioned and identified in one status would likely not be able to 'experience' the world of the other status because it would simply 'not exist' as such.

Another expression of this contrast of participation between archaic and modernist is the relatively greater emphasis on individual identity and competition among persons in modernist societies than in archaic. The archaic emphasis on collective participation in both culture and nature seem to generate less individualistic or personalistic identity in opposition to other individuals, much as there appears less isolation and antagonism with nature. The contexting for individual identity within a human < > nature collectivity in archaic culture seems to differ dramatically from a status of individual-in-conflict-with society and nature common in modernist contexts.

Thus, a consideration of how senses of identity, how identifications, are formed or reformed by the archaic mentality can suggest approaches to re-orienting identity consciousness in a 'post'-modern collapse of modernist categories.

Identification by Clan and Moiety Associations with 'Persons' of Nature

In addition to typical establishment of personal identity by family and social roles and functions (such as son, father, hunter, midwife, headman) archaic cultures typically identify individuals and groups with aspects of the natural world, particularly animals. Elaborate 'taxonomies' of relations are identified among plants and animals by archaic mentality that do not resemble scientifically 'biological' categories for discriminating species. Individual persons or groupings that anthropologists term clans and moieties are identified with and by both specific 'biological' characteristics of certain animals as

well as the cultural mythology associated with them. Thus the ‘entities’ that such personal and group ‘identities’ are characterized by have a basis both in perceptions of the literally ‘natural world’ and the ‘imaginal’ or psychical field of experience. Humans thereby become ‘related’ to Coyote, Kangaroo, or Monkey, and such ‘animals’ also take on some human traits. The ‘human self’ is seen or figured in/as the non-human, and vice versa. Thus both ‘the human’ and the personal self are seen as ‘participating in’ and ‘participated by’ nature.

What is critical about such association to the concern of this study is the metaphorical and metamorphic dynamic of such ‘identifications.’ By composing ‘identities’ that ‘cross’ the ‘boundaries’ of literal biological distinctions of species, these become more distinctly ‘psychical’ creations. Yet, however fantastic, these overtly metamorphic identities are generated from a human consciousness possessed of intricate knowledgeable about the ‘literal world’ by absolute necessity of survival—far more so, indeed, than the typical modern persons of industrial culture. For the archaic human, failure to distinguish between real and unreal would seem fatal, having so little technological insulation between body and nature. Delusion about reality would be catastrophic for them.

Thus this metamorphic ‘imagination’ derived in a context of intricately pragmatic literality suggests that archaic mentality is somehow capable of intimate, even interdependent, identification with the real *and* the unreal *without* losing a capacity to ‘act pragmatically’ in the context of mechanistic causality. There is even here a suggestion that the latter is somehow dependent upon the former, that ‘literal pragmatism’ and ‘metamorphic representation’ are co-dependent and some way integral to practical survival.

Another characteristic of such archaic modalities of identification of human and non-human is their basis in physical embodiment. The overt, tangibly sensible forms of the material world provide the basis for initial discriminations of identity, for ‘knowing’ self/other/world. These tangible qualities also provide the elements for the often ‘extra-ordinary’ permutations of representation classifiable as ‘fantastic,’ ‘metaphorical,’ ‘mythical,’ ‘metamorphic’ and ‘un-real.’ The forms and sensations of ‘bodies’—human and non-human—appear as the basis for both literalistic and metamorphic ‘knowing.’

To provide a concise sense of how the metamorphic is utilized in archaic culture to form, re-form and orient identifications, this study will focus on initiatory ritualizing as it functions to alter identity in adolescents.

Ritualistic Deconstruction of Identity Orientations and Initiatory Re-orderings of Self/Other/World: Experiencing “Structure” and “Anti-Structure”

Anthropological and ethnographic study provide the basis for an analysis of archaic cultural practices that ‘pluralize’ identity. The prototypical context for examining a culturally induced

confrontation between 'habitual identity' and 'other psychic agencies' is found in initiation practices. Such rites as contextualized by archaic culture tend to appear far more subtle and complex than modernist mentality can readily appreciate, however. Joseph Henderson devoted much of his psychological study to relating archaic initiatory practices to modern psychological experience.

Initiation, more than any other body of knowledge, has suffered throughout history from the fate of continually being forgotten and having to be rediscovered. [. . .] The first decisive event in this [modern] rediscovery was the publication in 1909 of Arnold Van Gennep's book, *Les Rites de Passage*. Until then, the study of initiation had been a mere recording of the brutal devices invented, supposedly, to frighten boys into becoming men. Van Gennep recognized them as educational processes for accelerating growth, the various rites in each series making possible a passage from one stage to the next. (Henderson, Thresholds of Initiation 9)

Such a heteromorphic sequence of identities in life stages requires potent psycho-active stimuli to effect identity re-orientation. The anthropological work of Victor Turner amplifying Arnold Van Gennep's original insights is particularly attentive to transformative dynamics of archaic ritual.

Van Gennep made a striking discovery when he demonstrated, in his comparative work on rites of passage, that human culture had become cognizant of a tripartite movement in space-time. His focus was restricted to ritual, but his paradigm covers many extra-ritual processes. He insisted that in all ritualized movement there was at least a moment when those being moved in accordance with a cultural script were liberated from normative demands, when they were, indeed, betwixt and between successive lodgements in jural political systems. In this gap between ordered worlds almost anything can happen. (Turner, Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors 13)

The notion of such a 'placeless place,' a human existence that is "betwixt and between," by virtue of being 'outside' of "normative demands" of ordinary and habitual identifications, is crucial to the thesis of this present work. It is essential to note in Turner's description that the 'dislocation' from "normative demands" and "successive lodgements in jural political systems" involve a movement in 'space-time.' Turner's analysis, and that of many others, explicitly illustrates the central role of archaic ritual in invoking what he terms a "liminal" status appropriate for reorienting both social and psycho-spiritual identifications. Among anthropologists, however, Turner challenged the once-standard assumption that culture and society were fixed patterns with predictable dynamics.

The social world is a world in becoming, not a world in being (except insofar as "being" is a description of the static, atemporal models men have in their heads), and for this reason studies of social structure as such are irrelevant. They are erroneous in basic premise because there is no such thing as "static action." That is why I am a little chary of the terms "community" or "society," too, though I do use them, for they are often thought of as static concepts. (Turner, Dramas, Fields and Metaphors 24)

This distinction, or the refutation of a distinction, indicates that ritualized transitions into "liminal" space or status as "betwixt and between" are not actually transitions between fixed states or even from fixed, definitive status of identity and function to one of simple non-identity, but rather from familiarly structured fields of complex, if shifting identity orientation to distinctly unfamiliar but equally

elaborate and complex ones. The status of familiar, habitual, or ordinary identity and reality are distinguished by assumptions of constancy and maintenance of certain parameters of belief ('structures' of social and personal identity) which are what become disrupted by ritualistic induction into Turner's "liminality," a state of exposure to what he terms "anti-structure." Anthropologists most frequently discuss this 'de-structuring' of the individual's sense of self/other/world as a means for repositioning the individual in a new socio-political role, such as in conferring adulthood or married status. However, when viewed psychologically, there is another potent aspect of such 'experience' suggested by being in a "liminal" state.

In a sense, when man ceases to be the master [as in liminality] and becomes the equal or fellow of man, he also ceases to be the master and becomes the equal or fellow of nonhuman beings. It is culture that fabricates structural distinctions; it is culture too that eradicates these distinctions in liminality, but in so doing culture is forced to use the idiom of nature, to replace its fictions by natural facts—even if these facts themselves only possess what reality they may have in a framework of cultural concepts. Thus it is in liminality, and also in those phases of ritual that abut on liminality that one finds profuse symbolic reference to beasts, birds, and vegetation. Animal masks, bird plumage, grass fibers, garments of leaves wreath and enshroud the human neophytes and priests. Thus, symbolically, their structural life is snuffed out by animality and nature, even as it is being regenerated by these very same forces. One dies into nature to be reborn from it. Structural custom, once broken, reveals two human traits. One is philosophical speculation; the other is bodily energy, represented by animal disguises and gestures. The two may then be recombined in various ways.

One classical prototype for this revealed duality is the centaur Chiron, half wise old man, half stallion, who in his mountain cavern—epitomizing outsiderhood and liminality—instructed, even initiated, the adolescent sons of Achaean kings and princes, who would later occupy leading positions in the social and political structure of Hellas. Human wisdom and animal force meet in this liminal figure, who is both horse and man. As is well known, theranthropic figures combining animal with human characteristics abound in liminal situations. (Turner, Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors 152-53)

Here one can get the sense of liminality as an experience of some 'wilder' context of being that can occur only 'outside' the ordinary status of social structure and its habitual identifications. One is thus 'stripped' of social context and personally human identity by immersion in a symbolic context of 'non-socialized' psyche. A 'transition' that evidently 'requires' metamorphic identifications among ordinary categories of distinction such as human and animal. Initiatory rituals for young boys being "made" into adult men are among the most vivid in the use of psycho-somatic ordeal and symbolic enactment to constitute liminality that can effectively deconstruct habitual identity.

The neophyte may be buried, forced to lie motionless in the posture and direction of customary burial, may be stained black, or may be forced to live for a while in the company of masked and monstrous mummers representing, inter alia, the dead or worse still, the un-dead. The metaphor of dissolution is often applied to neophytes; they are allowed to go filthy and identified with the earth—the generalized matter into which every specific individual is rendered down. [. . .]

The other aspect, that they are not yet classified, is often expressed in symbols modeled on processes of gestation and parturition. The neophytes are likened to or treated as embryos,

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newborn infants, or sucklings by symbolic means which vary from culture to culture.[. . .]

The essential feature of these symbolizations is that the neophytes are neither living nor dead from one aspect, and both living and dead from another. (Turner, "Liminal Period in Rites" 6-7)

Those 'undergoing' such re-identification are "neither . . . nor" *as well as* "both . . . and" living and dead. The experience of being in time and space would appear to be altered by such pluralistic status as the 'undead.' The truly radical nature of these states as generated in archaic ritual is summarized in Turner's observation that, "Ritual is transformative, ceremony is confirmatory." (Turner, "Liminal Period in Rites" 6) Ceremonial confirmation of status, in sharp contrast to ritualized liminality, is not produced by a psycho-somatic ordeal of dis-identification, but merely by enacting 'coded' gestures (within ordinarily structured space and time) by "normative" identities for the purpose of socio-political acknowledgment of role transitions. Liminality requires an existence 'outside' the familiar, the known, the safe. Again:

The attributes of liminality or of liminal personae ("threshold people") are necessarily ambiguous, since this condition and these persons elude or slip through the network of classifications that normally locate states and positions in cultural space. Liminal entities are neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremonial. (Turner, Ritual Process 95)

Sense-of-self, as well as of culture and world, are thusly not 'simply amended' but deliberately disordered. Clearly, such a state would render one open to powerful symbolic suggestion of new values and beliefs. However, it may also function to stimulate individual experience of one's own totality, or plurality of psyche, previously obscured by the "partial persona" of "normative" personal and societal habits of identification.

Here [in liminal ritual] we have a fruitful alienation from the partial persona which must result in the development at least in principle or potentiality if not always in practice of a total rather than a partial perspective on the life of society. (Turner, Dramas 259)

The term initiation in the most general sense denotes a body of rites and oral teachings whose purpose is to produce a decisive alteration in the religious and social status of the person to be initiated. In philosophical terms, initiation is equivalent to a basic change in existential condition; the novice emerges from his ordeal endowed with a totally different being from that which he possessed before his initiation; he has become another. (Eliade, Rites and Symbols x)

Such an 'initiation into otherness' takes place in a 'betwixt and betweenness' of "anti-structure." Note that Turner's chosen terminology here is not structure versus non-structure, but "anti-structure"—as in something that is not simply the oppositional 'absence' of structure. Thusly he is indicating a context of existence that is incomprehensible to ordinary human structural mentality. The association of these terms can be compared to pairings of 'reality' < > 'anti-reality,' or 'positivism' < > 'anti-positivism.' It appears that the initiatory field of 'becoming other' is experienced as a vivid contrast to the structural character of ordinary identity and 'reality,' but not simply as 'un-structured

chaos.’ Perhaps such a ‘shift’ can be imagined as a ‘re-defining’ of self/other/world by means of a ‘non-defining’ —a non-reductive, non-linear contexting of reality: an ‘other reality.’ Ritual liminality does thus constitute a ‘place’ but one that cannot be placed in ordinary consciousness and reality. Yet these ‘placings’ are not inherently oppositionally defined, for one is still ‘oneself’ while ‘not oneself’ —the world continues to exist, though experienced differently.

Once ‘dis-identified’ with the habitual associations of one’s “social persona,” reflection on what and who a person actually is in the (momentarily non-defining) social context becomes feasible because one is outside of it. (Such status then also makes feasible the re-identification of a person when ‘moved’ back into social structure from “liminality.”) Both shifts seem to depend on the presentation of a radically different experience of the ‘larger’ or more ‘totalistic’ world beyond ordinary social roles and hierarchies in the context of ritual liminality. The initiate’s “secular powerlessness may, however, be compensated for by a sacred power, the power of the weak derived on the one hand from resurgent nature and on the other from the reception of ‘sacred knowledge’” (Turner, Dramas 258). It is in that non-ordinary state that initiates are induced to envision and know the ultimate creative forces of the cosmos, which are taken to generate the ‘actual’ context for the ordinary reality of social life. It is there, in a ‘non-where’ of liminal status relative to ordinary reality, that the realm of what we might term ‘psychic powers’ is directly engaged or participated with/in.

Describing the theatrical performance of Aboriginal circumcision ritual, Lawlor notes:

What we consider deception is not simply that in the Aboriginal mind. Their attitudes toward myth are in keeping with their doctrine of two kinds of existence: the existence of extraordinary powers and the ordinary existence of humans and other creatures. For the Aborigines the existence of a perceivable reality in no way excludes or eliminates the existence of the extraordinary reality of the powers. The physical enactment of initiation occurs simultaneously with a mythic form on the unseen level, just as the conscious and unconscious minds are always functioning concurrently. On an inner level the boys actually die to themselves and are reborn.

The ritual circumcision must precipitate deep changes on three levels of being: psychophysical, social awareness, and psychic or spiritual understanding. (Lawlor, Voices of the First Day 186)

Initiations draw together the physical and psychic realms in a reciprocal way. The ordeals and crises of initiation, such as body scarring, bring to a physical level the emotions of fear, sorrow, and loneliness. Inversely, the physical body and its potent substances of blood and sperm are acknowledged for their spiritual and psychic power. Through initiation, as in life, the Aboriginal vision weaves together the psychic and physical realms into one body of life. (Lawlor 208)

For the archaic mentality, psyche and soma are concurrent, interactive dimensions. Perhaps the single most consistent theme of inducing the liminal status for experiencing this concurrence is that of death, dismemberment or being devoured, and eventual rebirth. To undergo a genuine reorientation to

self/other/world, to human and non-human, seems to require 'dying' to all former personal and social identity.

The initiated are already “dead” to the world in which the novice has been living. Symbolically, the novice is being led by the “dead” through death; it is only death that can bestow rebirth. The threat and constant presence of death, which the living must endure, is compensated by a gift from death of a succession of new lives. (Lawlor 187)

Those that have had this "liminal" experience and act as the initiators are already “dead” to the singular identity of social persona. It is only through suffering the loss of one’s previous sense of self and world, its death, that one can experience or sense a more complex and various one. That ‘reborn’ sense-of-self ‘incorporates’ (makes ‘literally’ manifest by metamorphic embodiment and thus ‘valid’) what would previously have seemed paradoxical or contradictory—such as death and rebirth, a bisexual self, a human embodying divine beings or powers, etc.

The means of portraying and enacting this realm beyond paradox is usually termed symbolic and metaphoric by modernist observers. But the use of such terms in this context is deceptive, if they imply an ‘illogic’ or ‘non-reality.’ One must bear in mind that in the liminal status of archaic ritual, ‘reality’ is much more inclusive than modernist mentality can logically conceive.

Religion means re-linking. The totemism that is central to Aboriginal religion is guided by the linking of humanity, nature, and the gods. The natural world is guided by the same principles and patterns that guide the formation of human culture and society. Aboriginal social order, ritual, and myth are inspired by and celebrate the bonds of mutual life-giving between nature, humankind, and the Ancestral Dreamtime powers. Nature gives life to humanity, and through culture humanity gives meaning to nature—together, they give body to the invisible life of their Dreamtime Creators. This entire reciprocal process is totemism. Totemism can be seen as animating the lines of identification flowing from the origin through all things, forming an invisible web on which the species and societies of the earth grow, nourish, and reflect each other. (Lawlor 279)

The ‘legitimacy’ of such notions rests upon a view of existence itself as metaphoric and metamorphic in nature. The metaphors of culture actually “animate” for human intelligence the metamorphic dynamism of the world—because, it appears, they *are* it. The transformative experiences in ritual liminality ‘embody’ the metamorphic activity of creation. It is not possible to *do* this within the linear causality of reductive logic. Such a ‘cognition’ requires a dialectical movement of consciousness: one that, in modernist terms, utilizes the ‘un-real’ to convey ‘the real.’ But for the archaic, conscious experience of that movement is no mere ‘entertaining of ideas’ but often a brutal dis-identification with the ordinarily real, opening one to engagement of some ‘un-real real.’

The often terrifying descent by the shaman initiate into the underworld of suffering and death may be represented by figurative dismemberment, disposal of all bodily fluids, scraping of the flesh from the bones, and removal of the eyes. (Halifax, Shamanic Voices 12)

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Thus, all of the foregoing also indicate that even in the context of archaic culture, there is a sense of distinction between the ordinary and non-ordinary, of a more singular personal social identity in contrast to a "liminally" induced pluralization of identifications with some super-ordinary totality. The 'ordinary reality' of existence in "normative social structures" and 'an other' context of existence are distinguished, but not necessarily as an oppositional or binary duality of existence. Thus the terrible, fantastic, violent imagery of death and dismemberment appear as a 'tearing apart' of the habitual sense of self and world necessary to an entry into a realm of reversals and inversions that reveals the 'true nature' of the larger 'creational field.' It is a descent into an 'uncivil realm' of "wild" forces that will dismember what one thinks one is and how one sees. And yet it is those very forces that are imagined as creational and thus inherently positive.

As such an 'other-worldly' dimension, visited in liminal status, typified by 'impossibly' transformative 'intentional powers,' suggests another 'space' and 'time' from the ordinary, 'real' ones.

The Aboriginal notion of space and identity is interwoven in a way utterly strange to the Western mentality, as is their concept of movement in relation to space and time.[. . .]

The outstanding difference is that the Aborigines move through space, and we move through time. Aboriginal stories, be they about life or the Dreamtime, focus on place descriptions and spatial directions rather than time designations such as when, before, or after. For example, in the course of a journey of a few miles along an approximate 180-degree arc the names of 38 separate spatial directions are marked as sites in a ritual walk at the base of Uluru (Ayers Rock) in central Australia. (Lawlor 238-39)

Lawlor's contrast between sensings of time-and-space suggests a fundamental distinction in how experience and identity are oriented in archaic and modernist mentality. An identity oriented primarily in space would have great 'latitude' or width and 'depth of field.' One oriented primarily in time would be more inherently sequential, accumulative, singularized in successive, discreet 'nows.' A 'spatial identity' could encompass more concurrency or simultaneity of existence while a 'temporal identity' could generate more intense, specific, directional focus and intention. A spatial orientation seems more 'multi-dimensional' and thus inclusive while a temporal one seems more linear and exclusive or oppositional.

Aboriginal and western thought share an interdependency of time and space, but our deep yearning and spiritual search for the elusive "present moment" and "eternal life" seems of no consequence to the Aborigine. For the Aborigines, the present moment and eternity have been physicalized as space. One is alive in the moment by being utterly grounded and centered in space. (Lawlor 240)

This contrast of identity of/in space/time seems relevant to that between archaic and modernist engagements with alienation. Alienation implies a 'here' and a 'there,' a near and a far, and some means of transition.

For Western man, the destruction of wilderness and the extension of fixed or structured space is the foundation of our time-measured civilization and personal identity. Both wilderness

and the unconscious threaten the bases of our sense of self and our culture . [. . .] The Aborigines move across an almost imperceptible boundary between campsite and wilderness in the same way they move between the conscious and the unconscious—between the physical world and the eternal Dreaming. They accomplish these transits with the ease and joy of a walk in a wild country seething with life and meaning, or a dance in shadowed firelight vivified with mythology. (Lawlor 241)

From a modernist perspective, one might ask how can a “wild” be conceived that is intimately ‘related’ to the familiar and yet an intensity of contrast be maintained?

Knowing Self as Otherness: the “Tame” and the “Wild”

Whereas the Romantic Western fantasy of the ‘noble savage’ may imagine a human being totally ‘at one’ with nature, the preceding brief summary of anthropological insight into the dynamics and functions of archaic ritual suggests otherwise. To be in awareness *of*, to feel and to manifest participation *in* a totality of self/other/world, archaic culture appears to maintain a 'duality' of existences that can be co-inhabited. But the capacity to do so requires deliberately induced psycho-somatic trauma and radical distortions of ‘ordinary reality’ to enable an experience of both 'realities' or of them as totality. Why humans pose such a duality and efforts to maintain ‘contact’ across it with a field of being ‘wider’ than the habitual human is thought by some to be a consequence of human development of ‘control’ over nature by the techniques of domestication and agriculture.

Domestication means, by definition, that the Wild is made Tame; that the Other becomes more like yourself. Or rather, a distinction is made between the Other that is now regarded as “me” and the Other that is identified as “not-me.” The first part of this equation generates a certain kind of safety, but it makes boredom inevitable. Once animals got subsumed under human categories, they could not, by definition, be as sacred or mysterious as they once had been. Domestication altered the polarity between Self and Other, it created a kind of flattening effect in one direction and an effect of heightened opposition in the other. (Berman, Coming to Our Senses 70)

The suggestion here is that humans-as-animals dwelt in an intense field of interactive participatory relation with ‘other animals.’ But, on becoming ‘humans-as-not-animals,’ humans that control animals lives, and later the manipulators of the life-cycle of plants, the human perspective was ‘alienated’ from ‘the rest of the world.’

Why domestication arose at all has never really been clarified, but what is clear is that it entrenched a binary form of reasoning that was probably not present, or only mildly present, in Paleolithic times.[. . .] [H]unter-gatherer society was not “religious” in the way agricultural society was. If there was no sharp divide between Wild and Tame, or Self and Other, there was also no such divide between sacred and profane, or heaven and earth. Again, it was not (I do not think) a question of everything getting melted down into the “One,” and the “All,” as in Great Mother societies—which bespoke a need to *transcend* a gap—but rather that fault lines and distinctions were lived with without very much difficulty, and were not, in any case, constructed or perceived in a binary fashion. Paleolithic society was characterized by *polymorphic* thought, which moved in a slow, kaleidoscopic way [. . .]. Domestication changed all this. The

fundamental categories that presented themselves now were two—Wild and Tame—and eventually all forms of thought, down to the present day, came to be based on this model (the raw and the cooked, in Levi-Strauss' terminology). (Berman 71)

For Berman, it seems, the cultural divide between archaic and modernist begins with domestication and culminates in a modernity that ceases to even attempt to 'bridge the gap' with the non-human. Domestication's shift in orientation of human identity emphasizes an opposition between that which seems more under human control and that 'beyond' human control, eventually positioning them as 'divided' by a 'fence'—a barrier that was to become the literal garden fence to keep out the marauding forces of "wild" nature. "The major psychic fallout for human beings is that Self and Other now constitute an antagonism rather than a polarity. Self is tame, "good"; Other is wild, "bad," (Berman 71)."

"Tame" self and "wild" other are then identified *by* their perceived opposition rather than some mutuality of participation in totality. Berman's equation of the effects of domestication with consciousness of an antagonism between self and other is perhaps a bit too simplistic, however, when observations of non-human animal behavior are considered. Competition is pervasive among animal species. Furthermore, anthropological data on cultures that practiced neither domestication or agriculture, such as that cited above from Lawlor on the Aborigines of Australia, indicates an intense sense of the necessity of imagining and enacting relations between the ordinarily 'real' and 'un-real' while invoking "liminality" and "anti-structural" contexts. To be 'human,' it would appear, is to experience an enhanced sense of 'otherness' in the presence of 'the rest of nature.' The cultural distinction indicated by Berman might better be characterized as a shift from an intense but non-oppositional duality of human < > non-human and ordinary < > non-ordinary to a more antagonistic and binary duality.

Regardless of cultural context the 'human' is who and what it is, after all, largely by not being what and how the 'others' are *with each other and in the world*. But then the core of Berman's assertion is perhaps that domestication and agriculture imposed a different sense of valuation upon the contrasts of human < > non-human as self > < other—specifically, the binary value of 'good' and 'bad'. That sort of emphasis surely exacerbates any existing sense of human 'alienness' in the wider context of nature—or the 'totality' of psyche.

Hans Peter Duerr, in his historical exposition of the decline of archaic pagan culture in Western Europe under the influences of Christianity, also investigates the divisions of "wild" and "tame."

What philosophers love nowadays, and what they call 'critical self-reflection' is a technique which supposedly makes it possible to render our own horizon intelligible from inside-out, within itself. Archaic humans, by contrast, still possessed the insight that one had to leave the world, that one could become 'tame' only if before one had been 'wild', that one could only live

in the true sense of the word if one had proved one's willingness to die.

In order to be able to live within the order, in other words, in order to be consciously tame or domesticated, one had to have lived in the wilderness. One could know what inside meant only if one had once been outside. (Duerr, Dreamtime 43-42)

Duerr gives the 'cultural divide' a compelling characterization with the notion of relation to the "wild" and the "tame." Duerr's analysis posits the metaphoric and metamorphic enactments of archaic mentality as visitations to 'the wild,' to a "liminal" place that is not *of* the "tame"—upon 'return' from which one might regard the "tame" from 'outside' and thereby know it better. He describes how the concern of the Christian critique of pagan 'practices' focused on 'discrediting' or 'invalidating' them as 'un-real' or 'imaginal.' Yet if such 'ventures into the wild' were 'merely' attempts to reconnect with the literal 'animal-other' and compensate for some alienation from mutuality as an effect of human consciousness or domestication, then the 'fantastic,' non-literalistic imagery and performances would seem unnecessary. Ritual enactment could simply involve an enactment of animal behavior. There is definitely more significance to archaic culture's metamorphic manifestations of the 'un-real real' than such compensation by 'delusion' or 'imitation.'

For modernist mentality, 'the wild' tends to be threatening, lawless, chaotic. It is the 'uncivil' absence of "structural" humanness and its "normative" proportionality—savage, bestly, cruel, lacking in 'order,' 'morality' and 'justice.' It exists to be subjugated, or perhaps turned into a 'nature theme park' that can be safely 'fenced' and visited without abandoning one's safe identification with the "tame."

It is probably misleading, therefore, to say that archaic humans experienced chaos 'between the times'. It would be better to maintain that they went through the dissolution of order and thus they experienced order.

In this elementary sense we moderns are much more ignorant about ourselves and our limitations than humans were earlier. The reason is that we tend to think that we can live consciously, without paying the price of the 'little death'. (Duerr 75)

The "little death," the dying to one's singularly-defined, "tame" sense-of-self, would seem a small price to pay for a sense of participation *with/in* the larger world, an experience of the "wild" and its metamorphic power that might enhance a sense of 'who' and 'what' being human is by way of contrast. But with the modernist emphasis on the 'sanctity' of personalistic individualism in a culture of ethical humanism, and its primarily oppositional distinctions, 'dis-identification' becomes a *far* more dangerous venture than for an (archaic) identity imbued with social collectivity. Such a move risks 'madness' for the individualistically defined "I" of late modernity.

Archaic mentality, as we noted, is characterized by a belief that humans can gain a clear consciousness of themselves by confronting what a person is and simultaneously is not. Much more clearly than can we moderns, archaic humans recognized themselves in what they were not. 'Being yourself and simultaneously not being yourself' can only mean expunging the boundary separating humans from kangaroos, human nature from kangaroo nature, a boundary, that is,

about which the Fang say, “It is overcome and it disappears after death’, even if that death is only the ‘small death’, the death of initiation.

To know what it is like, what it means for us to be ourselves, that is, to be oneself and also not to be oneself, that means, using a popular term, to be alienated. (Duerr 74)

And yet, we moderns live in a social status and historical context often characterized by the term “alienation.” Are these alienations of archaic and modern mentality alike or fundamentally different? Referring to Turner’s observation that ordinary “social structure” and reality are only posed as static and constant by standard anthropological perspective, while actually being in flux, one could conclude that life is ever “liminal.” If the ground on which society, and thus the individual, attempt to erect the ‘housing’ of their identity is so thusly ‘insecure,’ then human consciousness of self and world would be *inherently* ‘alienated’: never quite where, what, or when it thinks it is. Alienation thus appears as the basis for generating human culture and identity. Feeling inherently ‘alien’ in the world, humans generate their own ‘world’ as culture. Yet the maintenance of a human-centered reality in the “structures” of society and culture has the effect of further ‘alienating’ humanness from the wider field of nature. Thus the more human-centered the cultural “structure” the more alienating the effect.

What Duerr seems to be suggesting is that the inherent alienation is deliberately participated in by being ‘precipitated,’ deliberately induced, manifested, and identified with as a ‘knowing-of-self’ by knowing not-self and thus dis-locating (or dis-identifying with) one’s habitual conscious perspective. It could be termed a ‘move into alienation’ from assumed or habitual identity to better know one’s ‘alienness’ from nature or the “wild.”

Such a dynamic of dialectical identification fits with Turner’s model of “structural< >anti-structural” dynamism in ritual “liminality.” Returning to the archaic> <modernist comparison, an assumption of continuity of identity-as-alienation appears logical. The contrast between the two cultural mentalities would then be found in *how* that inherent alienation is encountered, experienced, identified—rather than that one mentality is alienated and the other not so. Clearly, Turner and Duerr suggest that archaic mentality valued alienation from “normative” reality, even though it could be frightening. But again, the prospect of confronting such inherent alienness of being human can easily be seen as more intimidating to a late/post-modernist bereft of even any secure socio-cultural collective identity, much less an intimacy with nature.

An observation by Turner about the function of images and notions in archaic ritual liminality as both serving and critiquing ordinary cultural “structure” prefigures the succeeding chapters of this study.

The same formulation would apply to such other expressions of liminality as Western literature and art. Sometimes art expresses or replicates institutionalized structure to legitimate or criticize; but often it combines the factors of culture—as in cubism and abstract art—in novel and unprecedented ways. The unusual, the paradoxical, the illogical, even the perverse, stimulate thought and pose problems, “cleanse the Doors of Perception,” as Blake put it. This is especially

likely to be the case when art is presented in preliterate societies in an instructional situation like initiation. Thus the portrayal of monsters and of unnatural situations in terms of cultural definitions, like the incestuous ties connecting the gods in the myths of some religions, may have a pedagogical function in forcing those who have taken their culture for granted to rethink what they have hitherto taken to be its axioms and “givens.” For each society requires of its mature members not only adherence to rules and patterns, but at least a certain level of skepticism and initiative. Initiation is to rouse initiative at least as much as to produce conformity to custom. (Turner, Dramas 255-56)

How individuals come to know their selves, others, and world is deeply ‘structured’ by socio-cultural indoctrination. Conformity to established “collective representations” of the ultimately “unrepresented” world is a necessity of social order. But such conformity is inevitably stifling for both individual and collective psyche. Thus, any cultural “structure” or identity as a set of identifications, which will not completely stifle ‘adaptive flexibility,’ must ‘incorporate’ in the ‘body’ of the individual, elements of experience that are “anti-structural,” relatively speaking. It must ‘moderate’ its insistence on obedient conformity. The applicable ‘depth’ psychological maxim here is; ‘the repressed will return compulsively if not expressed consciously.’ As Turner notes, in this regard there is some symmetry of expression on either side of the cultural divide between archaic and modernist mentality. Both cultural mentalities invoke “anti-structural” re-figuring of cultural identifications of ordinary reality, though it will be seen that they context the non-normative expressions quite differently.

Where there is the greatest difference between archaic and modernist, perhaps, is in the tenor of the response to the inherent alienations and the ‘relieving of conformist repression.’ In the archaic mentality there arises an effort to tend and maintain ‘relations’ with ‘the alienating otherness’ of self/other/world, as in ritual induction of “liminality” and engagement with non-human creational forces. For the modernist, there appears to be an, historically speaking, increasing intention toward attempting to either transcend the ‘gap’ between self and other, human and non-human or else to obliterate it in universalism and homogenizing globalism. Anxiety about ‘otherness’ and that which the ‘human’ or personal cannot control seem to both torment and invigorate modernist cultures.

[. . .] industrial civilization is continuous with agricultural civilization, but with one important exception: archaic societies made their fears [of the “wild”] explicit, whereas we repress them. This is why, strictly speaking, archaic societies did not know what we call “the unconscious.” Fear was as phenomenologically real as a spider; the latter did not “represent” the former in the sense that we now mean by this term. Thus, if the shift from hunter-gatherer society was a mistake in the sense of creating an enemy and a system of binary logic, agricultural civilization had—at least in comparison with industrial society—one saving grace, that the attendant tension and anxiety were publicly discharged, not forced down into nightmares and psychosomatic illness. (Berman 71)

Although an impulse to ‘transcend’ the antagonism of human > <non-human manifested in agricultural societies, most acutely in Christian imagination, the context of industrial cultural increase the ‘literal’ removal of the human from the ‘natural.’ Centuries of seeking to transcend or escape the

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anxiety of these 'alienations' by way of a 'spiritual' transcendence of this embodied world seem to have culminated in modernity's virtual 'triumph' over the "wild" forces of nature. But one might suggest that this violent domination of the "wild" and its 'egoic' refusal to acknowledge the trauma of being human (that 'being-alien-from-yet-subject-to' otherness and the non-human) required an even more intense and 'internal' figuring of human alienation. Thus the notion of the 'unconscious' aspect of self as a new expression of the 'un-real real'—an 'un-real' that 'reveals' a field of 'hidden' otherness in which there might be a psycho-physical co-participation, yet from which the egoic "I" feels hopelessly estranged, alienated.

[. . .] the last remnants of participating consciousness, or complete merger with the environment, got routed with the rise of Renaissance humanism and the Scientific Revolution. It became "irrational" to have irrational fears. Hybrid monsters and fabulous beasts seemed to vanish under the glaring light of the new science. In reality, they only scurried away, found a place to hide in the recesses of the mind. The language of psychoanalysis and depth psychology, which may partially apply to the period from Homer to Hieronymus Bosch, now starts to make much more sense. Fear expressed is very different from fear repressed. (Berman 76)

The evidently 'appropriate' anxiety about being human and non-human, "tame" *and* "wild," would seem to both have motivated Western culture's transcendent 'flight' into 'elitist' humanism and technological dominance over Nature, as well as intensifying the 'dis/ease' of non-participation in It.

Observations of the persistent disturbance of "normative" social structure (and the 'ordinary' identities and realities that such structure both generates and validates), by "wild" or 'unconscious forces,' have been made in both archaic and modernist cultural contexts. But in the archaic mode of 'identifying,' a tendency to periodically ritualize some submissive relationship to such 'powers' demonstrates a sense of respect, co-participation, value and sacredness—as well as awe and fear. In contrast the modernist approach is seen rather to repress, manage, or oppose such experience. Before concluding this brief consideration of the 'real' and the 'un-real' in archaic representations, some explication of the 'potency' of non-ordinary sense-of-self/other/world are important.

The Powers of Otherness: "Structural" Inferiority and Ritual Potency

Another characteristic of archaic ritual culture that Turner describes is the significance typically attributed to the role of social 'inferiors' and normally taboo or negatively regarded subjects and actions in ritual or liminal contexts. Persons or groups, as well as conduct, which are 'ordinarily' regarded as of low social status in social structure, or as impure or unethical, are often given prominent significance in ritualizing the 'relation with divine powers and other worlds.' Similarly, marginal social groups are often associated with "anti-structural" qualities.

It is often believed that the lowest castes and classes in stratified societies exhibit the greatest immediacy and involuntariness of behavior. This may or may not be empirically true, but it is at any rate a persistent belief held perhaps most firmly by the occupants of positions in the middle rungs of structure on whom structural pressures to conformity are greatest, and who

secretly envy even while they reprobate the behavior of those groups and classes normatively less inhibited, whether highest or lowest on the status ladder. (Turner, Dramas 243)

Thus the greater the pressures to conform to “normative social structures” the more of a simultaneous attraction *and* repulsion to the non-normative and inferior or ‘non-ordinary.’ Turner goes on to describe how those seeking “liminal” experience in more hierarchically structured societies tend to imitate ‘the poor,’ the lower classes, in simplicity of demeanor and appearance (citing Gandhi and others). He attributes such ‘moves’ to a desire to seek community ‘outside’ the confining identifications of “normative structure,” a community that is ‘relational’ rather than “structural.” He terms the form of co-participation or non-hierarchical relationship that can be constituted in “liminal anti-structure” as “communitas.” “In literature, we find the values of communitas represented by such types as Tolstoy’s peasants and by such characters as Dostoevsky’s prostitute Sonia, [. . .] Mark Twain’s Negro slave Jim and youthful vagrant Huckleberry Finn [. . .]” (Turner, Dramas 265).

In general, the perspective of ‘social order’ fears and devalues ‘outsiderhood,’ an attitude regarded here as indicating the potency and attraction of such positioning. But the ritualistic mode of archaic mentality deliberately ‘moves into relation with’ that ‘elemental otherness.’ Again: the initiate’s “secular powerlessness may, however, be compensated for by a sacred power, the power of the weak derived on the one hand from resurgent nature and on the other from the reception of sacred knowledge” (Turner, Dramas 258).

The ‘repressed’ and ‘oppressed,’ the marginalized and threatening, are thusly re-recognized as aspects of psyche and world (those most overtly classed as ‘other’) and thereby ‘of self,’ whose ‘rejection’ by “social structure” tends to ‘remove’ certain potencies from habitual ‘identity of self/other/world.’ Re-orientation to and re-cognition of that ‘otherness,’ often as a deliberate ‘inversion’ of “social structure” or status, is thus ritualized to establish some overt ‘identification’ of and with that normally denied sense-of-self/other/world. Turner characterizes such ‘opening’ to the non-human by way of ‘un-real’ figurations and actions as “reception of sacred knowledge.” Thus confronting, ‘facing,’ the non-human realm of agency, the “wild,” in or *as* its evidently appropriate ‘un-real’ figurations, is both threatening to personalistic identity *and* creates ‘access’ to a more potent field of being worthy of being classed as “sacred.” This notion is an important reference for the following chapter’s consideration of the ‘un-real’ in modernist culture as ‘art.’

Communitas breaks in through the interstices of structure, in liminality; at the edges of structure, in marginality; and from beneath structure, in inferiority. It is almost everywhere held to be sacred or “holy,” possibly because it transgresses or dissolves the norms that govern structured and institutionalized relationships and is accompanied by experiences of unprecedented potency (Turner, Ritual Process 128).

There is dialectic here, for the immediacy of communitas gives way to the mediacy of structure, while, in *rites de passage*, men are released from structure into communitas only to

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return to structure revitalized by their experience of *communitas*. What is certain is that no society can function adequately without this dialectic. Exaggeration of structure may well lead to pathological manifestations of *communitas* outside or against “the law.” Exaggeration of *communitas*, in certain religious or political movements of the leveling type, may be speedily followed by despotism, over bureaucratization, or other modes of structural rigidification (Turner, Ritual Process 129)

In the absence of ritualized “liminality,” then, it is to be assumed that there will *have to be* some formulation of “anti-structural” context for “normative society” and its ‘ordinarily structured identifications’ to perdure at all. Some ‘encounter’ with a more totalistic experience of ‘being’ is inevitable and likely to be ‘catastrophic’ if avoided too assiduously. Excesses of “normative structure” are seen to induce convulsive eruptions of reactive “anti-structural” chaos or violence. Western imperialism’s catastrophic implosion in World War I and even the antagonistic relation of reductive modernist mentality to ‘indeterminant’ postmodernist thought are apt examples. There is a powerful suggestion here that “*communitas*” as experience of vitality, mutuality and co-participatory identity is repressed by “normative structure” and requires inductions, or if necessary eruptions, of “anti-structural” ‘chaos’ to ‘revitalize’ “structural normality.” Otherwise, psychologically speaking, ‘the repressed returns as unconscious obsession,’ or is ‘acted-out protectively.’

In conclusion of these considerations of identity orientation in archaic cultural context it is noted that the focus here on initiatory rituals is only one example of how sense-of-self is brought into a more participatory set of identifications. The cross-cultural expression of hunting rituals that involve a metamorphic becoming of the ‘hunted’ by the ‘hunter’ provides another readily accessible example. Correlations between such enactments and the performances of more modernist culture reveal much about the relationship between definitions of ‘reality’ and the capacity for such ‘inclusive knowing.’ Such is the subject of the succeeding chapter.

Chapter 3

Artistic Creativity as Inclusive Knowing: Un-Reality in Modernist Re-presentation of Concurrent and Non-Ordinary Status

This chapter considers the concern with inclusive modes of expression, begun in the preceding one with some examination of inclusive archaic epistemics, in relation to modernist modes of ‘creative’ re-presentation or art. The disciplinary mode of knowing knowing utilized here is difficult to title as it includes a variety of academic methodologies that address the dynamics and interpretations of ‘artistic creativity’ or ‘aesthetic expression.’ Thus the term aesthetic theory is used to indicate aspects of such disciplines as literary criticism, linguistics, art history, semiotics, cultural anthropology, psychology, and mythology that seek to analyze non-literalistic re-presentation as a non-ordinary yet secularized mode of knowing. In the modernist context such expression is considered here as not explicitly a mythical, spiritual, religious, or cosmological mode of knowing. Yet it is viewed as expressive representation capable of engaging more-than-ordinary and non-reductive states of experience and understanding. Thus the focus in this chapter remains upon a categorical style of expression (non-ordinary, typically non-literalistic) rather than those disciplinary methods of intellectual knowing utilized to archetypally examine the epistemic character of such expressive style.

A Continuity of Non-reductive Identification from Archaic to Modernist Culture

In shifting focus from archaic to more modernist cultural contexts, the term artistic creativity is being used to indicate expressions that represent or enact ‘non-ordinary’ status of being and thus function as some ‘un-real real’ figuring. But in order to make this association convincingly some historical perspective is required. The overtly non-literalistic mode of re-presentation and enactment associated in the preceding chapter with archaic initiations of identity into pluralistic status and a more than ordinary reality of radically complex totality has been posed as a form of inclusive epistemic method. Its function in ritual induction is thusly conceived as acting to re-orient individual experience of self, other, and world into a more inclusive or less reductive sensibility. As such it can be regarded as somehow ‘bringing into being’ or presence the actuality of some more than ordinary, “anti-structural,” “wild” status. Such images could thus be said to ‘participate in’ radically complex totality, or put another way, actually manifest the presence and potency of divine energies or gods. The history of imagistic representation in Western cultures demonstrates a rupture with the continuity of this archaic

sensibility. The split among authorities of the Christian church over the issue of whether images of God could be considered to actually manifest his presence, rather than only indicate it symbolically, some would say indicates the beginning 'art as we know it.' The immanence of the divine in Christian icons (still maintained in the Eastern Orthodox Church) presents a participation of re-presentation in the more than ordinary status of radically complex totality. Thereby the image is regarded and experienced as actually manifesting the energies of "anti-structural liminality" capable of relativizing ordinarily reductive, "structural" assumptions about reality to a 'larger' contexting. In contrast, the notion of art in Western cultures became "mimetic," 'merely' a reference to or symbolic imitation (likeness) of reality. Han Belting examines this shift in his book, Likeness and Presence: A History of the Image Before the Era of Art.

Arthur Danto also elaborates a view that this attitude about imagistic re-presentation commenced the 'history of art' as a narrative of successive preferred or dominant styles governed by aesthetic standards and theories for 'proper mimesis.' (After the End of Art: Contemporary Art and the Pale of History). He understands that 'era of Art' to have lasted roughly a thousand years, culminating in the competitive art -isms and manifestos of 20th century modernism (perhaps 'late' or even 'post'-modernism). In that more recent historical context he locates "the end of art" in the sense that art was no longer defined by a singular status of style, purpose, or meaning. Thereby ended the narrative history of 'art' as a sequential development 'aimed at' achieving a 'pure' or 'true' status. That notion is pertinent to this study in so far as it suggests a radical shift in emphasis of the production of and responses to late modern artistic expression. In one regard, artistic expression was no longer subjected to a reductive notion of what art is or is supposed to mean (real art versus non-real or valid art). The more than ordinary expressive impulses of such expression were thus allowed to flourish in a valid diversity of styles, interpreted through a variety of perspectives about meaningfulness. In another regard, much of that expression became overtly concerned with re-presenting perceptual and epistemic process as the 'object of representation' rather than mimetically indicating 'actual phenomenon' through 'likeness' for the sake of generating aesthetic experience or portraying symbolic concepts imagistically. (This shift is typified by increasingly abstract re-presentational styles and the notion of conceptual and performance art.)

Thus, though artistic expression during the 'era of the history of art' still associates with the notion of manifesting some un-real real status such as produced by archaic re-presentation, an even greater continuity is proposed here between the latter and artistic expression 'after the end of the era of art.' Danto does not specify any exact historical moment for the termination of the 'history of art' but counts it as most overtly manifesting in the Pop art movement of the 1960s, which established the attitude that anything could be considered art. 'Art,' it is offered here, then became defined in significant ways as that which altered someone's habituated sense of identity and reality (self, other, and

world)—be its form that of Warhol's repetition of the image of a Campbell's soup can label or Michelangelo's David. 'Art' became in a sense a dynamical experience—one that to some degree depended upon 'how one looked at' the expressive 'object' being perceived or engaged. Such an experience derives as much from the context of that engagement as the object itself (a soup can label on a gallery wall rather than grocery store shelf). So regarded, it is a 'shift in consciousness' effect that makes some thing 'art,' not its reiteration of specified aesthetic styles, idealized forms, 'art market appeal,' or cultural standards. (This observation is not meant to assert 'an end of reductive responses to artistic expression.')

These are sweeping notions abstracted from meticulous studies of the intricately complicated sociological, aesthetic, and psychological aspects of 'the history of art.' The intention here is not to summarize those analyses in any conclusive manner but rather to indicate them as contexting for the following considerations. Relating them back to the notion of a cultural divide between archaic and more modernist compositions of identity consciousness (as participatory versus non-participatory, inclusive versus exclusive), there arises an indication that artistic expression in contemporary contexts might in some ways be manifesting an 'after modernist' (after the 'history of art') metamorphic sensibility. Thusly, 'artistic expression' in the more contemporary context is associated here with that typically other than ordinary style of re-presentation regarded as manifesting a "presence" or 'presencing' of "anti-structural liminality" in archaic contexts. Further, the former's tendencies to re-present 'the ordinary' and portray perceptual processes in ways that prompt conscious reflection on the part of the 'viewer' about what is real (and even 'what is art?') is regarded as potentially facilitating re-orientations of habituated identity consciousness of self, other and world toward a more "anti-structural" status. The term artistic expression can also be useful in maintaining a perspective on modalities of identification as 'ways of knowing.' Artistic expressions, particularly those that are more overtly 'un-realistic,' can be taken as epistemological efforts to 'know' self/other/world differently by giving these identifications non-ordinary, perhaps overtly "anti-structural" image and action. By so re-configuring 'the ordinary' (so that it is both recognizable yet un-recognizable) the re-configured is thus 'alienated' from habitual perception—both 'dis-identified' and 're-identified.' Yet 'as' that 'newly figured' identity, the re-configured is and is not what it 'is'—one could say it has become an "anti-structural" version of its "normative structure." This contexting of the 'artistic' is not configured by typical notions of 'aesthetics' but does have some aspects in common with semiotic theory. The primary concern here is not to define "art" but indicate how the more generally 'artistic' mode of expression in visual images and forms, as well as literary imaginations, relates to archaic expressions of the 'non-ordinary' and 'other worldly' as an epistemic method.

That said, one is still left with the question of how to make comparisons between orientations of identification and identity in archaic versus modernist cultural contexts. The contrast between ritualistic

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culture's deliberate induction of "liminality" by overt use of 'fantastic' images and acts to deconstruct and reorder identity and the virtual absence of such 'identity initiation' in modernist contexts is dramatic. Is habitual identity actually confronted with overt awareness of an "anti-structural" field of the "wild" in cultures that do not ritualistically induce such relativizing of ordinary identity consciousness or "I"-ness to a more plural field of identifications? If such 'confrontation' occurs, how is that experience valued? And is the traumatic aspect of the 'dis-identification' with habitual identity constituted by a move into inherent "alienation" incorporated in personal life and social context of non-archaic or modernist culture?

Here a reference to Turner's own terms for differentiating how otherness is treated across the cultural divide is helpful. He characterizes encounters with "anti-structural" context in ritualistic culture as acknowledged "liminality" which is given primary importance. But in more "complex" societies, such as the modern industrial ones, the "anti-structural" is overtly regarded as of minor significance. In the latter context he substitutes the term "liminoid" for "liminal."

Liminal phenomena are centrally integrated into the total social process [of archaic ritual culture], forming with all its other aspects a complete whole.[. . .] Liminoid phenomena develop apart from the central economic and political processes, along the margins, in the interfaces and interstices of central and servicing institutions—they are plural, fragmentary and experimental in character. (Turner, From Ritual to Theater 54)

Turner views the liminal experience of 'anti-structure' engaged in archaic ritual as an otherness that society allows to become 'central,' actually allowing 'social order' to become, at least briefly, 'assimilated' to, rather than ignoring it or attempting to accommodate the nature of that "wild" field to its domesticated or "tame" reality. Similar experience and expression of it in modernist culture remains peripheral, or "liminoid." In the latter context, the liminal becomes increasingly 'ordinary' or 'profane,' becoming accommodated to social values and ordinary reality or simply left 'to the side.' Thus that expression which in archaic culture is an engagement with "anti-structural" forces or the "wild" in some "liminal" status becomes in modernist contexts the relatively unimportant category of "art" that thus exists in a "liminoid" status. The creation of such "liminal" engagement as 'art' occurs 'on the fringe,' as an activity of individuals who are often 'at odds with' society. The "liminoid" is thus a region of unusual liberty or freedom of expression from social requirements while at the same time granted little, if any, primary importance or 'sacrality.' Archaic "liminality" thus becomes confined to collective symbols generated in the peripheral "liminoid" context where the individual artists is both unconfined by the sacred traditions of archaic culture but also unsanctified and 'profanely' commodified.

In the so-called "high culture" of complex societies, liminoid is not only removed from *rite de passage* context, it is also "individualized." The solitary artists creates the liminoid phenomena, the collectivity experiences collective liminal symbols. This does not mean that the maker of liminoid symbols, ideas, images, etc., does so *ex nihilo*; it only means that he is privileged to make free with his social heritage in a way impossible to members of cultures in

which the liminal is to a large extent the sacrosanct. (Turner, From Ritual to Theater 51)

Consequently, in the non-archaic or modernist cultural context, the collective acknowledgment of “liminality” as an opening to non-human creational powers is dispelled. Artistic expression then becomes a personalistic activity readily ‘identified’ with habitual or ‘egoic’ identity—an activity of conscious will, a ‘personal’ endeavor. Further, such activity is given a ‘professional’ context, as something done ‘for hire,’ as ‘work’ whose collective value is economic. Thus the “liminal-become-liminoid” occurs in a context of ‘entertainment’ and commodity economy that has no overt sacrality. It is thus extremely ‘ordinary’ as a part of commercial culture. Yet this context of ‘egoic personal creativity’ also allows for unconstrained individual expression.

“Entertainment is liminoid rather than liminal, it is suffused with freedom. It involves profoundly the power of play, and play democratizes” (Turner, From Ritual to Theater 120). In the modernist mentality, the individual is increasingly ‘on his/her own’ in expressing and engaging the non-ordinary, the “wild,” while society decreases attempts to arrange collective engagement with that “anti-structural” otherness. The individual is granted more latitude to ‘play on the periphery’ but the consequences of what is encountered ‘out there’ is no longer collectively ‘sanctified.’ Its significance becomes a more ‘personal matter’ for artist and ‘viewer’ alike.

Thus, in making associations between expression of the ‘un-real’ or ‘un-real real’ in archaic and non-archaic contexts, the first concern is whether they actually function similarly on either side of the divide of cultural mentality. Is there a complete rupture between non-ordinary “sacred liminality” and ordinary or profane “liminoid” expression?

One must ask about ‘artistic expressions’: “What are these images, tales, and enactments meant to depict?” Are they ‘imitations’ of ‘how the world is’ even though they are, both in their ‘figurative form’ and frequently overt distortions of ordinarily perceived reality, *not it?* Certainly most artistic images, like the ‘un-real’ ones of archaic culture, ‘refer’ to elements of actual or ordinary reality. But are they thus ‘mere’ semiotic signs and metaphors, a ‘code’ for ‘literal’ things and events, societal rules and cultural beliefs, or do they convey in another manner? Are these expressions of an ‘other world?’ Are moderns, for all their ‘objective’ analysis of art, psyche, history, religion, some how removed from and even incapable of in-corporating “liminal” status in their overt experience? Or are they also ‘swept up and over into it,’ all the while maintaining a collective social attitude that refuses or is unable to *acknowledge* the metamorphoses that dis-locate habitual identifications? Is there genuinely metamorphic experience that goes unacknowledged by means of acculturated denial, or does the modernist mentality exist in ‘another world’ from that of archaic ‘reality’—a world *actually* made more singular and simplistic by the limitations imposed on experience and logic by oppositional dualism?

Approaching Expressions of the Non-ordinary as Object versus Dynamic

In the proceeding chapter, attempts are made to characterize the contexting and re-contexting of identity of self/other/world in the orientations and practices of archaic culture, primarily in ritual induction of “liminality.” A contrast between ordinary and non-ordinary appears thereby but *not* one that is inherently oppositional or contradictory. In the archaic context the realm of creational, transformative powers is experienced as permeating that of daily, habitual life as well as being accessible more directly, if non-ordinarily, ‘on its own terms’ in “liminal” status. ‘It’ ‘participates’ in “structural normalcy” as the ‘creational’ source that ‘precipitates’ culture. Yet, though ‘it’ is ever-present, to enter into it’s field more fully, the context of ordinary personal and social reality or identity must be suspended, even ruptured. That move generally requires some traumatic ‘experience,’ particularly if one is to thereby undergo a metamorphosis of identity and thus of “structural” role in social and cultural contexts (as in puberty rites, marriage, etc.).

The medium for inducing and ‘figuring’ the presence of that other-worldly dimension is characteristically ‘fantastic’ to a modernist perspective. Yet, while ‘art’ in modernist perspective tends to be a ‘metaphoric’ or ‘symbolic’ and thus ‘un-real’ expression of ‘how things are,’ the fantastic imaginings of archaic culture are understood by its perspective to actually *be* ‘how things are’—without invalidating ordinary reality. The latter notion is difficult for a mentality basing validity on oppositional identifications of real <un-real, true> <false, material> <immaterial, literal> <imaginal. Thus access to the notion is best sought through a *dynamical* sense of the archaic distinctions and representations: ‘How things are’ can be approached not only as a matter of ‘what they are made of’ (either as literal objects or images with cultural references) but as ‘dynamics of manifestation,’ *as manifestations of creational processes*. Here an isomorphism can be experienced between the way an image (‘immaterial’) is created in human consciousness and a rock (material) manifests in ‘psychical space’ (perhaps even with how material objects manifest in *physical* space). As different as these two ‘entities’ are in their ‘thingness,’ could they be experienced as ‘coming into being’ by way of similar ‘dynamics’ or ‘activity?’

The cultural heroes or great Ancestors, through their acts of marvelous transformation, created the species, varieties, and order of the world. Transformation in sacred art recalls the potency of the Dreamtime. Aboriginal sacred art designates transformation in a number of ways; for example, a kangaroo in a painting may wear a hairbelt or other item of apparel strictly associated with humans. Such attributes indicate consciousness transformed into a spirit of another species. In Egypt these transformations were represented in exactly the same manner: the gods were pictured as humans with animal heads or animals with human attributes or accessories. The Aborigines depict another level of transformation by painting cross-hatched patterns inside or surrounding the bodies of animals and humans. These represent the subtle energy fields that underlie, surround, and interconnect all things in creation.

Transformation or metamorphosis is the basis of the entire sacred symbolism. (Lawlor 289)

Here again, human consciousness is posed as participating with/in nature by precipitating it, creating reality by way of the same dynamic of manifestation that nature is experienced as being/doing—the metamorphic. The images of gods *are* the divine powers that generate the ordinary world. And yet, again, in the same ‘concurrent’ ‘time,’ they are not.

The ambiguity and the transformative properties of both life and symbols are fundamental to the Aboriginal sense of reality. In sacred art, the Dreamtime Ancestors actually live within the transformative images. The image is the vehicle, indeed the body and presence, of the fertilizing power of the Ancestors on earth. The positive ambiguity of the image allows it to capture the spirit of invisible transformative powers. Sacred images exercise the power by inciting transformations in the thought and awareness of viewers. (Lawlor 291)

Here one seems to encounter a non-oppositional dualism, an identification that involves contrast but not mutual exclusivity. The non-ordinary creational powers exist in the things of the ordinary world and are activated or made manifest in the human-created images yet are not the ‘thingness’ of those images. Reflecting here on previously referenced notions of initiatory death and dismemberment may be helpful. To experience, to cognize such a ‘materialization of the immaterial,’ a ‘presence of immortal powers in/as mortal matter,’ is to ‘die’ to one’s ordinary status of self and world, yet to live in a ‘different manner.’ Indeed, one might say ‘the world’ comes to an end—as it is normally known. Any ‘accurate’ representation of such a ‘reality’ must both ‘be’ and ‘not-be.’

Symbolizing or naming retains the connection to death and devouring that it has had since the Dreaming. The experience dies to itself as soon as it becomes word or image. The naming mummifies the experienced, converting the mushrooming confluence of the actual into a reflection suspended in the veiled mirror of language. Reality and meaning escape the entombment of experience—they fly through the grid trap of sign and symbol. Their fearful desertion permits the inner vision to catch only a glimpse of them fleeing. The death of experience in words can be like any other death—an initiation. Words and symbols, if understood as death and initiation, allow experience to be reborn in human consciousness as fresh awareness in each generation. (Lawlor 294-95)

The manifestation of ‘creational forces’ lives *and* dies in both image and object. Language and ‘art’ are thus inherently both meaningful and meaningless, living and dead. In this ‘other-worldly’ context image and narrative, and even object, ‘manifest the medium of manifestation.’ The ‘non-ordinary’ being ‘expressed’ is dynamical rather than objectively ‘material.’

Before European contact, all sacred art in Aboriginal culture, except for some cave drawings, was purely geometric. The figures of crocodiles and emu birds and kangaroos were added only after European contact because, as the Aborigines say, “The Europeans have no power to visualize.” In the subtle variations of crosshatched energy fields, the Aborigines read knowledge of animals, maps, clan affiliations, and entire mythic stories. (Lawlor 295)

Here, one might say, the criticism of the modernist mentality usually directed against the archaic, that it cannot see the scientific reality inherent in the appearances of nature, is reflected ‘back’ upon the modernist by the archaic. The suggestion here is that the modernist can only ‘see’ in terms of

the 'objective' image not by 'dynamical modality.' Much commentary on archaic 'artistic expression' has, similar to the scientific critiques of myth, posited the archaic as 'primitive' or inept in its attempts to portray reality. But some have observed that such may not be its 'objective' or intention.

Primitive art differs from art of the Western academic tradition chiefly in that the tribal artist does not seek to "match" reality so much as to "make" it. This distinction, as elaborated by Ernst Gombrich, proposes that primitive artists create works that conform to internal visions more than they do to external appearances. By doing so, primitive artists directly contradict both Plato and Aristotle, who believed that mimesis, mimicking nature, was an innate impulse of the human personality. (Shlain, Art and Physics 150)

Here may be located one of the indicators of the 'cultural divide.' What if "mimicking nature" can be identified variously. What if personal and cultural experiences of 'nature' can differ radically? The preceding discussion can be taken to indicate that the archaic knowing or 'identifying' (and thus of experiencing) of the world does not locate "nature" or 'reality' in appearance—as literalistic or 'positive' manifestation alone—any more, say, than does biological science. Thus the images of archaic 'art' are perhaps not primarily generated to re-present the appearances of things but the 'dynamism' of their 'appearing' and interrelating. From this perspective, the geometric figurations of the Aborigines and the abstract concepts of modern science seem more closely related. Neither set of "representations" consists of the *things* or the activities overtly referenced. But do they 'manifest' them nonetheless?

Whatever the similarities, 'telling' differences remain.

Like the worldview of the child, the worldview of the primitive differs radically from Newton's. For instance, primitivism does not separate the proper time and "real" space of the objective world from the artist's inner mythopoetic vision. [. . .]
Because the primitives' ideas about space, time, and light were quite different from those of the Newtonian, tribal art contains distortions that were unacceptable by the standards of academic art.[. . .]

For the primitive, who had not learned that there was a "correct" way to see things, this behavior [of white men struggling to look at pictures hung 'upside down' in Eskimo homes] was inexplicable. This multidirectional spatial orientation encourages an Eskimo who may start a drawing or carving on one side of a board to continue right over the edge to the other side. Without an acknowledgement of the idea of a privileged place for a viewer stand, the tribal artist would never invent perspective. [. . .]

There remains in art and psychology circles a lively debate as to whether the world is actually in perspective or whether we learn to see it in this particular way. But, the very acknowledgement that not everyone can "see" perspective casts doubt upon the "truth" of our belief in Euclidean space as the only imaginable one. (Shlain 151-52)

It would appear that 'nature' variously 'viewed' or 'identified' results in nature variously expressed. Yet the 'fantastic' characteristic of archaic and some modernist 'art' suggests a continuity of representation of psycho-dynamic 'nature.'

Archaic and Modernist Sense Abilities

In contemplating the experience and expression of identifications of self and world in archaic versus modernist contexts, one is frequently confronted by these questions about ‘reality’ versus ‘perception.’ While the Western tendency has been to classify the archaic as “primitive” and thus inferior, an assessment that attempts to ‘dis-identify’ with the canon of Western identifications may well come to see the contrast between archaic and modernist experience as a consequence of ‘experiential and cognitive capacity.’

Nothing amuses the Eskimo more than for the white man to crane his neck to see the magazine pictures stuck on the igloo walls. For the Eskimo no more needs to look a picture right side up than does a child before he has learned his letters on a line. Just why Westerners should be disturbed to find that natives have to learn to read pictures, as we learn to read letters, is worth consideration. The extreme bias and distortion of our sense-lives by our technology would seem to be a fact that we prefer to ignore in our daily lives. Evidence that natives do not perceive in perspective or sense the third dimension seems to threaten the Western ego-image and structure. [. . .]

That we have accepted such bias and obliquity in a subliminal way through most of human history is clear enough. Just why we are no longer content to leave our experience in this subliminal state, and why many people have begun to get very conscious about the unconscious, is a question well worth investigation. (McLuhan, Understanding Media 172)

Perception and conceptualization are intensely conditioned by ‘environment,’ while environment is formed by human activity, both physical and mental. Thus different social and cultural contexts are bound to enhance different capacities of experience, perception, and expression, and thereby ‘generate differing worlds.’

To develop and live in an archaic cultural mentality, with its interpenetrating “structure” and “anti-structure,” would appear to enhance and enable an empathic, metaphoric sensibility. Such ‘sense ability’ would ‘enable’ submission to identity-transforming metamorphic “liminality.” Thus one would be more ‘capable’ of ‘participating’ in ‘otherness’ and the world variously. In contrast, development in modernist culture emphasizes capacity to experience forces, objects and entities—and thus self and other—in the primary contra-distinctions of mechanism, opposition, and competition. Thus the modernist ‘senses’ a particularly mechanical experience of self and world.

‘Artistic expressions’ might seem to manifest either contra-distinction or likeness of ‘ordinary reality’ in their representational style, but one’s response, one’s feeling and notions toward such ‘expression,’ might be more indicative of how one has been culturally enabled to experience rather than be a conclusive valuation of the intent of the ‘artist’ or the ‘meaning’ of the manifest image-object or image-narrative. One’s ‘encounter’ with an artistic image is firstly a ‘test’ of one’s habitual modality of ‘identification.’ This thought seems to suggest that ‘identity’ is not so much identification *with* and *between* static things, facts, or even ideas, but rather with dynamical modes of experiencing and of characterizing experience. Such ‘modalities’ of creating reality are those that constitute “social

structure” in Turner’s sense—with/in which one ‘feels at home’ because such modes are accessible to one’s developed sensibilities. One’s ‘senses’ and thinks as one is ‘accustomed’ to do—and it is that habit that is challenged by “liminality,” or even the “liminoid.”

In cultural contexts where “social structure” does not include deliberate violations of ‘itself,’ of its “normative” perspectives, by exposing individuals to “anti-structural liminality” for the sake of sensitizing them to the raw forces or dynamics out of which “structure” is selectively ‘solidified,’ individuals will likely be less sensitive to the ‘other worldly.’ Even when confronted by such they will be less enabled to ‘give it an image,’ to value and validate their experience of its ‘dynamical reality.’ Such a cultural tendency could be expected to favor an ‘art’ that reinforces the habitual identifications of self/other/world on the “tame” side of the ‘fence’. And when ‘artistic expression’ does disrupt those “structural” assumptions, it will not only be difficult for individuals to experience and ‘incorporate’ either an “anti-structural” perspective or experience, there will also be a tendency to ‘assimilate’ all such experience to ordinary status. Turner notes that such a condition in modernist societies seems to result in a proliferation of “liminoid” activity characterized by the ‘marginalizing’ fragmentation of collectivity into ‘individualistic’ or ‘personalized’ pursuits and creativity. In postmodernist terms this tendency would climax in a culture of the “simulacra” and artistic expression as commercialized parody of itself.

The history of art in the increasingly modernist Western mentality provides numerous examples of conflict between ‘artistic expression’ that tends to sustain established cultural identifications (of ‘this world’ and a ‘tamed other’) and that which disrupts the established, “structured” perspectives on identity and reality. The latter ‘re-visionings’ of orientations of self/other/world have tended to emerge as styles of expression that are at first radical then subsequently standardized and accommodated to the accepted “tame” or “structured” identity (i.e. Renaissance perspective and science). That pattern of disruption and accommodation seemed to sustain the modernist mentality and its triumphant civilization of ‘nature’ up until the era of what is generally referred to as modern art.

Curiously, what is thought of as the most modern era seems to be the historical period in which one may begin to ‘identify’ a shift in mentality that suggests a post-modernism in emerging “collective representations.” The ‘re-visioning’ that erupted in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries manifests such a radical shift in the dynamic modality of how self/other/world are made manifest, experienced, and expressed that a cross-cultural ‘identity crisis’ is suggested. The modernist > postmodernist conflict indicates an ‘old order’ has evidently failed to ‘accommodate’ an “anti-structural” ‘vision’ to established identifications. Perhaps, in the status quo’s evident failure at such ‘accommodation’ of the “liminality” of such a polyvalent manifestation of the “wild,” a ‘new order’ is emerging constituting ‘discourse’ rather than antagonism. Much of the ‘wildness’ of these ‘new’ expressions in “modern/postmodern art” is in their focus on the ‘how’ of manifestation and perception

rather than the ‘what,’ on the dynamical character of reality rather than its versions of distinct, objective, seemingly fixed materiality.

Re-Presentational Re-Visioning and The Reality of the Un-Real: The Art of Science, the Science of Art in/after Modernity

There are various approaches to take to illustrate how the ‘un-reality’ of artistic expression may actually be a portrayal of a more complex reality than that of more ordinary assumptions. In archaic culture that ‘other world’ considered as the source or ‘maker this world’ is associated with intentionally creative powers, often presented as anthropomorphic or theriomorphic figures (having human or ‘beast-like’ features). But in more modernist context, the ‘creative powers’ (once gods) that generate ordinary reality are figured as either phenomenon of mental perception and cognition configuring consciousness, or as abstract physical laws of the universe that ‘dictate’ the ‘behavior’ of matter and energy. Yet in both archaic and modernist contexts one is presented with a ‘meta-version’ of the world that reveals its hidden dynamics, in relation to ordinary identifications of ‘the real,’ presenting a tale of the ‘supernatural’—a view into nature beyond what ordinary perspective experiences of/as ‘natural.’

Radical stylistic shifts in artistic re-presentation are associated with such modernist notions about the character or ‘origins of reality,’ becoming particularly prominent in the latter 19th century. It can be said that the very process of re-presentation as perception and cognition began to become the ‘subject of artistic expression’ rather than the seemingly ordinary or socialized ‘appearance of things.’ In Danto’s analysis, that shift manifests an “end of art” in so far as artistic expression is no longer ‘about’ mimetic representation of ‘how the world is supposed to be,’ no longer primarily an aesthetic experience but an exploration re-presenting processes of perception and conceptualization of phenomenon and experience.

Yet in what can be termed the ‘religiously scientific’ modernist era, it well might be said that the most profound re-presentational re-visioning of ‘how the world is’ has manifested in such scientific theories as general relativity, quantum mechanics, and super string theory—presenting a sort of ‘super nature’ ‘beyond,’ ‘above,’ or ‘within’ ordinary status. Those theoretical notions fit this study’s category of ‘artistic creativity’ in the sense that they are (relative to ordinarily identified reality and the mechanistic Newtonian physics that seem consistent with same) ‘fantastic,’ ‘impossible,’ disorienting figurations. There appear to be irreconcilable logical contradictions between these ‘Newtonian’ and ‘Einsteinian’ scientific versions or ‘expressions’ of reality.

In addition, what the ‘new’ physics has to say about time and space are reminiscent of the transformative and metamorphic notions in archaic expression of non-ordinary reality: Turner’s “liminality” and Duerr’s “the wild.” (Recall here the essential role Turner assigns to shifts in experience

of space-time in inducing ritual liminality.) If a convincing association between the references of the ordinarily ‘un-real’ in ‘art’ and physics can be established, one need not rely then only upon artistic, literary, semiotic, and psychological theory (which tend to accommodate to the modernist ‘literalistic’ mentality to ‘validate’ their identifications) to make the case that the ‘un-real’ may be an expression of the ‘real.’ If the ‘ordinarily un-real’ expressions of ‘art’ and physics are epistemically related modalities of knowing that reveal more complex fields for identification and participation of human consciousness within and between self/other/world than the reductive impulse in modernist mentality typically ‘allows,’ then the latter’s limitations on ‘knowing reality’ can be substantiated even from a scientific perspective.

Leonard Shlain provides a thorough analysis of the roughly coinciding historical eruptions in art and physics of ‘non-ordinary’ perspective on ‘how the world is’ and the extensive but evidently unintentional correlations between them. Around the beginning of the 20th Century some artists began to manifest creatively radical figurations of things as objects of perception (phenomenon of light and consciousness) through such styles as Impressionism and Cubism (often associated with the ‘primitive’ art of archaic culture), Roughly concurrently, physics after Einstein professed limitations on applications of empirically positivistic Newtonian models of phenomenal reality. The pertinent issue in these categories of expression (artistic and scientific) for this study is their re-visioning of relations of time and space, their radical re-orientation of the perspective of viewer and observer to the other and the world, and thus, to one’s sense of self in relation to other and world, and thus again to self. In both these artistic and scientific ‘re-orientations’ the viewer/observer is repositioned as a inherent co-creator of the phenomena which are effected by the very act of viewing or measuring: in these ‘perspectives’ one cannot help but be a participant in the manifestation of ‘world.’ These shifts seem particularly worthy, among historical shifts in artistic and scientific visions, of comparison to Turner’s “liminality” and “anti-structure.”

All previous scientific discoveries had been generally apprehended, appreciated, and applauded by the sophisticated public—Einstein’s theory about the interrelationship of space, time, and light eluded an educated audience. Around the same time, intelligent readers felt rebuffed by the other, equally abstruse theories in the field of quantum mechanics. People knew that something momentous had happened concerning the nature of reality; but for the first time in history, no one except the discoverer and a select number of cognoscenti were able to understand it.

In the early years of the twentieth century, successive movements of art, too, like the corresponding discoveries in physics, presented to the discomfited public an ever-increasing array of unrecognizable forms. Beginning with Fauvism, Cubism, and futurism, and continuing through Expressionism, suprematism, Dadaism, and surrealism, new art styles assaulted the collective aesthetic sensibility of the West until the general public recoiled in confusion and gradually retreated from the challenge of trying to understand any meaning at all that might lurk behind these tumultuous displays of apparent graphic chaos.

Art has existed for at least thirty-five thousand years. During this long procession of time, not one of the many shifting styles was ever entirely incomprehensible to its audience. People

felt repelled by some, indifferent to others, and even outraged by a few; but never before had the general public felt the art of its own civilization to be incomprehensible.
. . . . Never in the history of art spanning millennia and varied cultures had one group of artists so systemically and deliberately developed an art that could not be understood. In concerted and fantastic coincidence, the branch of science primarily responsible for explaining the nature of physical reality became unimaginable at the very moment that art became unintelligible. (Shlain 222)

The challenges to both what 'reality' is and how it is experienced posed by the theories of relativity and quantum physics are so extreme (placing limitations on the 'laws of sequential causality' and habitual separation of time and space) that they remain basically unassimilated even in scientific, much less social and psychological, philosophy. Similarly, the distorting configurations of space and time in the cascade of bewilderingly abstractive artistic styles remain 'unassimilated' by the standard sense of ordinary reality and aesthetics. After a few decades of 'un-realistic' stylistic fervor a trend toward naturalism and realism in art appears to be reasserting dominance. Shlain notes a similar phenomenon of disorientation in perspective and subjectivity in both music (atonality and jazz) and literature (typified by James Joyce's non-linear narrativity).

It appears that, for the most part, these 'eruptions' of "liminal" expression of "anti-structural" forces generated by 'marginalized' individual artists and scientific theorists have remained "liminoid" relative to the habitually reflexive assumptions about reality in Western society and culture. Certainly encounters with these expressions can prove genuinely "liminal" in some individual's experiences or in a symbolic sense for 'collective consciousness,' but do not seem to have effected a potent collective engagement with 'reality-relativizing' "anti-structure" on a conscious level.

Whether or not the 'liminalistic' expressions of 'art' and science have significantly altered cultural identifications, the historical moment of their radical turns involves the 'distortions' modernist culture effected in its own experience of time and space.

Around 1910 a certain space was shattered. It was the space of common sense, of knowledge, of social practice, of political power, a space hitherto enshrined in everyday discourse, just as in abstract thought, as the environment of and channel for communication.[. . .] Euclidean and perspectivist space have disappeared as systems of reference, along with other former 'common places' such as town, history, paternity, the tonal system in music, traditional morality, and so forth. This was a truly crucial moment. (H. Lefebvre, qtd. in Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity 266)

One may conclude three provocative insights from these twin eruptions in 'art' and science expressing "liminal anti-structure" more-or-less contemporaneous with an overtly catastrophic 'moment' in modern history commencing roughly with World War I. The co-incidence of these 'eruptions in epistemic re-presentation' with the political, social, technological upheaval of nineteenth and twentieth century history suggest a traumatically metamorphic beginning-of-the-end to Western culture's 'ordinary reality.' Firstly, there appears a scientifically derived assertion that the objectively

evident relations of space and time are actually relative not constant or absolute, and thus that the seemingly 'un-real' can be actual even in scientific terms. Secondly, perspective emerges that considers directly conscious experience of 'reality' as requiring the 'literal' un-reality of creatively distortional 'art' or "re-presentation." And thirdly, that both these modalities (and by extension all experiences of "liminal anti-structure") are focused not on the 'nature of things' as empirically positive, but on the dynamic nature of manifestation and perception—in the terms of this study: on the metaphoric status of being and the metamorphic process of becoming.

Yet again, the import of these developments did not, and has not yet radically re-oriented habitually socialized sense abilities and assumptions about reality. As to the first insight, Einstein eventually commented that he felt he had failed to communicate the essence of the 'new' physics. His associate Neils Bohr noted:

It is one of the basic presuppositions of science that we speak of measurements in a language that has basically the same structure as the one in which we speak of everyday experience. We have learned that this language is an inadequate means of communication and orientation, but it is nevertheless the presupposition of all science. [. . .] For if we want to say anything at all about nature—and what else does science try to do?—we must somehow pass from mathematical to everyday language. (Niels Bohr qtd. in Shlain 22)

But that 'everyday language' is the language of 'everyday' reality and identity and thus dedicated to preserving same. To 'say' what is 'impossible' to the 'reality orientation' of that language one must express oneself 'un-realistically.' The mathematical abstractions of post-Newtonian physics are re-presentations of an utterly non-ordinary status of reality—despite their quantificational implications. Such re-presentation requires a language some how related to that of 'distortional' art to convey even exquisitely mathematical theories of 'literal reality' when these express "liminal anti-structure." But again, that reality-of-the-wild is not the one people 'bump into,' as it were, on a daily basis. It is a 'background' or 'interior' reality *in/of* the world of matter: a force invisible yet 'sensible'—even if to some degree 'calculable.'

The metamorphic neither/nor-ness of being as both 'particle-and-wave' and that seeming-paradox appearing as a "complementary pair" rather than an opposition is evident even in the conscious theory of such 'post'-modernist painters as Georges Braque.

No object can be tied down to any one sort of reality; a stone may be part of a wall, a piece of sculpture, a lethal weapon, a pebble on a beach, or anything else you like, just as this file in my hand can be metamorphosed into a shoe-horn or a spoon, according to the way I use it. [. . .] Everything is subject to metamorphosis; everything changes according to circumstance [. . .] this "metamorphic" confusion is fundamental to what I am out to express. It is all the same to me whether a form represents a different thing to different people or many things at the same time. And then I occasionally introduce forms which have no literal meaning whatsoever. (Georges Braque qtd. in Tucker, Dreaming with Open Eyes 38)

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These notions about 'irreducible presences' and the emergence of representational techniques and theories to express them bring one to consider the aspects of modernism indicated by the term postmodernist.

There is perhaps, a degree of consensus that the typical postmodernist artifact is playful, self-ironizing and even schizoid; and that it reacts to the austere autonomy of high modernism by impudently embracing the language of commerce and the commodity. Its stance towards cultural tradition is one of irreverent pastiche, and its contrived depthlessness undermines all metaphysical solemnities, sometimes by a brutal aesthetics of squalor and shock. (Terry Eagleton, qtd. in Harvey 7)

Although the conscious intentions of 'modern' and 'postmodern' artists may have some distinctive differences, such as the Futurists' idealization of speed and mechanism versus some postmodernists' parody of mechanistic mentality, there is continuity of disruptive and confrontational technique. Gertrude Stein's remark seems to hold as true for Picasso as many of his 'anti-modernist' 'postmodernist' successors.

As everything destroys itself in the twentieth century and nothing continues, so then the twentieth century has a splendor which is its own and Picasso is of this century, he has that strange quality of an earth that one has never seen and of things destroyed as they have never been destroyed. So then Picasso has his splendor. (Stein qtd. in Harvey 17)

Despite the profusion of often competing artistic styles of the early twentieth century and the more overly anti-modernist socio-political theories of artists identified with postmodernist thought, it would seem that modernist and postmodernist impulses toward expression must share both similar origins and effects.

It is no accident that the first great modernist cultural thrust occurred in Paris after 1848. The brush strokes of Manet that began to decompose the traditional space of painting and to alter its frame, to explore the fragmentations of light and colour; the poems and reflections of Baudelaire that sought to transcend ephemerality and the narrow politics of place in the search for eternal meanings; and the novels of Flaubert with their peculiar narrative structures in space and time coupled with a language of icy aloofness; all of these were signals of a radical break of cultural sentiment that reflected a profound questioning of the meaning of space and place, of present, past and future, in a world of insecurity and rapidly expanding spatial horizons. Flaubert, for example, explores the question of representation of heterogeneity and difference, of simultaneity and synchrony, in a world where both time and space are being absorbed under the homogenizing powers of money and commodity exchange. 'Everything should sound simultaneously,' he wrote; 'one should hear the bellowing of cattle, the whispering of the lovers, and the rhetoric of the officials all at the same time.' (Harvey, Condition of Postmodernity 263)

The very experiences of daily life were so radically altered that efforts to give that experience appropriate dynamical expression were increasingly inclined to a less 'naturalistic' or realistic style. Though the 'mainstream' of cultural consciousness may have continued to 'believe' in the orderly rule of rational scientific intelligence and the appropriateness of capitalistic progress, those 'attuned' to the "wild" saw 'things' differently. One could say that, faced with a collective cultural denial of the

dynamical disruptions of ordinary sensibilities by the forces of modern economies, making some 'sense' of 'how things are' became a task of 'every person for themselves.' And the very "liminoid" context of individual freedom from cultural 'constancy' enabled unrestricted 'creative expression,' whether in art or science. The 'artist' was forced to 'deconstruct' his or her own 'sacralization' of ordinary reality and assault that of the 'viewer' in the process if any experience of some "anti-structural" forces appropriate to the contemporary 'reality' was to be engaged. The techniques thus required were 'dis-orienting.'

Derrida considers, therefore, collage/montage as the primary form of modern discourse. The inherent heterogeneity of that (be it in painting, writing, architecture) stimulates us, the receivers of the text or image, 'to produce a signification which could be neither univocal nor stable.' Both producers and consumers of 'texts' (cultural artefacts) participate in the production of significations and meanings (hence Hassan's emphasis upon 'process,' 'performance,' 'happening,' and 'participation' in the postmodernist style). Minimizing the authority of the cultural producer creates the opportunity for popular participation and democratic determinations of cultural values, but at the price of a certain incoherence. [. . .] The effect is to break (deconstruct) the power of the author to impose meanings or offer a continuous narrative. Each cited element says Derrida, 'breaks the continuity or the linearity of the discourse and leads necessarily to a double reading: that of the fragment perceived in relation to its text of origin; that of the fragment as incorporated into a new whole, a different totality.' The effect is to call into question all the illusions of fixed systems of representation. (Foster, The Anti-aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture 142)

An essential consequence of such techniques in expression is a necessary co-participation of the 'receiver' of image or text in 'making meaning' of it, and thus 'the world,' since the 'representations' are neither 'naturalistic' nor 'literalistic' in established cultural terms. These figurations required the participation of the 'receiver's' experience and imaginal mentation to 'validate' any meaningful 're-presentation' of dynamical reality as an 'un-real real.'

Art and the Mystical Dilemma in Religion and Science.

It may be helpful to consider this dilemma of adequate expression of 'reality' in science (brought to the forefront of contemporary consciousness by the seeming contradictions of physical theories) as analogous to an ancient conundrum encountered in formulation of religious dogma from the experiential sources of mystical experience: How to convey a unitary yet seemingly transcendent experience of self/other/world to the ordinary, pragmatically linear mentality? More archaic cultures tend to rely on 'magical' explanations or descriptions of such experience, or on 're-enactments' such as in ritualizing, to convey such 'totalistic being.' They evidently accept that "liminal anti-structure" simply cannot be conveyed in the terms of time and space experienced in 'ordinary' physical reality. More modernist religious explanations tend to apply the linearly reasoned logic of cause and effect in a context of historical literality to the mystical or non-ordinary experience (such as the 'literally true' history of Jesus' resurrection). Consequently they literalize in Newtonian terms of causality and matter what is perhaps rather an insight into dynamical activity more akin to quantum mechanic's notion of light as

both particle and wave. One might say this is an attempt to ‘accommodate’ the mystical experience to the logic of the daily reality rather than allowing the ‘ordinary’ to submit or be assimilated to (if only briefly) the mystical. The mystic’s ‘flying’ and Christ’s miracles must be literalized to be valid in modernist mentality.

In the archaic context, ‘engagement’ of “liminal anti-structure” or the “wild” evidently was regarded as requiring an ‘experience’ (as in ritualistic inductions such as puberty rites that included themes of death and rebirth), before such could become ‘notion’ or ‘thought.’ An individual had to be ‘adequately alienated’ from ‘ordinary reality’ to ‘assimilate’ to the “liminal.” In the cases of the ‘new physics’ and modern art, the public was mostly alienated *from* these expressions by the difficulty of accommodating them to ordinary reality and its identifications, rather than being alienated *by way of them* into an experience of “liminal anti-structure” that might relativize their egoic identities to a ‘linearly non-structural multi-dimensionality’ of existence—some more total, concurrently plural identification.

Enacting Self and Not-Self: Themes of Dis-Identification and Metamorphosis in Artistic Expression

The expression of “modern/postmodern art,” as engagement of a non-ordinary field of “anti-structure,” emphasizes the ‘actions’ of an individual as creative agent. A ‘some thing’ is brought into being as image/object/description in a process involving egoic effort or will by ‘the artist.’ That effort is portrayed by some analysts as a personal intention to create a pre-determined result and by others as a submission of personal egoic intention to some ‘other’ source of creative impulse. In either context, a ‘creative act’ is enabled and the resulting ‘creation’ subsequently ‘acts’ as some form or expression of self that often provokes/produces more ‘content’ or ‘meaning’ than was consciously pre-determined or intended by the artist. Thus, such ‘creations’ often tend to ‘question,’ if viewed variously, established identifications—even when the ‘art work’ was intended to affirm ordinary or habitual ones.

The much commented-upon ‘turn back’ toward styles and content associated with ‘primitive’ cultures by “modern artists” suggests a ‘submission’ to a less ‘humanistic sensibility.’ Such so-called primitivism also suggests a re-emergent sense of the ‘potency of the inferior’ or ‘repressed’ that Turner notes as operative in archaic culture. ‘Something’ not so obviously human and personal is ‘figured’ in the abstracting styles of such expression. The ‘other’ and the ‘world’ are given expression that disrupts any sensing which facilitates a mechanical management *of* it. ‘Enacting’ that disruption seems an acknowledgement of art as essential act or performance of participation in existence rather than as an exclusively human expression that sets humans apart from the ‘rest of existence.’

Primitive song takes its singers out of themselves by making them act a part, even if this is themselves as they have recently been or hope to be. It gives the distance from the immediate scene which is the foundation of all the arts, and the detachment which enables a man to look at himself or his circumstances from other motives than the need or impulse to perform some action. (Bowra, Primitive Song 30)

Primitive imagination [. . .]. It is resolutely and rigorously concerned not with what is absent in time or place but with what is believed to be present but invisible. So far from creating its subjects out of nothing and making them live in their own authority, it assumes that they exist already and that the singer's task is simply to show what in fact they are, how they work, what is their appearance or character or behavior. Its sphere is confined to the supernatural, and to this it gives its attention and its insight. (Bowra 206-07)

Bowra suggests that the “detachment” of the primitive singer makes possible a more accurate reflection upon his self and circumstances to express what is “present but invisible.” The singer ‘alienates’ from himself and context to better ‘express’ their underlying reality, to in essence be ‘more present’ with totality. Such a ‘move’ is a ‘going away’ to ‘be more here.’ Such an ‘abstracting’ perspective seems to resemble that of the methods of “modern artists” and scientific theorists alike.

[. . .] the prehistoric shaman remains the archetype of all artists. Image maker, dancer and drummer, actor and singer, healer and holy one, the shaman epitomizes the human need to bridge worlds—to fly beyond the everyday realm of the visual in order to conjure worlds of visionary presence and power. (Tucker, Dreaming with Open Eyes xxii)

Thus one can configure artist-as-shaman: an individual who enacts ‘world-bridging’ metamorphoses to engender access to some healing effect of ‘totality.’ One whose attention and insight is given to the present but invisible, to the ‘dimension of the super natural.’

Modern art is often spoken of as having effected a ‘revolution’ in both form and content: the root of the word ‘revolution’ implies a return to the beginning, to the alpha point. [. . .] the search for a primal language in modern art, for new beginnings, has been an ‘archaic’ search for participation mystique. In undertaking that search, the modern artist has inherited and developed (whether consciously so or not) the ancient role of the shaman. (Tucker 19-20)

But if the ‘other world’ is not taken to be a literality like that of ordinary experience, then just *what* is being enacted, either in archaic shamanic transformations or artistic creations? Tucker suggests that the core intention is to somehow ‘participate’ in a wider/deeper field of existence. A participation in what is essentially a ‘mystery’—a field of the “wild” which encompasses and permeates a “tame” structural reality, and is thus “anti-structural.” Such ‘participation’ evidently collapses ordinary time and space distinctions (most clearly represented in pictorial and causal perspectives), those differentiations on which people base their habitual identifications and reality. Thus shamans and artists are enacting a ‘leap,’ a metamorphosis of states of being that constitutes a plurality of presence since it is not ordinarily ‘time-bound.’ Humans may not ‘actually’ be able to depart the context of their “structural normalcy” (since it is ‘internalized’), but neither does their sense-of-self/other/world have to be utterly confined by same. It is evidently possible to ‘inhabit’ more than a singular ‘perspective.’

[. . .] Cubism's poetic reshaping of perceptions can be seen as very much part of the primitivistic thrust of twentieth-century art, of its longing to recapture something of the so called primitive's experience of participation mystique. Building upon the achievements of Paul Cézanne [. . .] Cubism broke with centuries of 'masterful' one-point Western perspective. Instead, it conjured a world of pictorial space where the relations of objects to both each other and the viewer acquires something of a magical aura. Floating free of the laziness of everyday habits of perception, the objects of Cubism suggest a world where one can be a true 'centre of participation' —be 'one and many' at the same time. (Tucker 38-40)

Some way, then, a plurality of presence is given expression, enacted by artist and viewer/receiver who participates in that expression's variousness of space-time. Tucker's unusual perspective on art history is organized by both a familiarity with archaic ritual and with 'depth' psychological perspectives. He notes that such 'experience' is not necessarily 'reassuring.'

The modern artist helps to break up incusted and restrictive ideas of both self and reality, preparing the way for a healing rebirth of the feeling of being one and many in the world, able to participate in life with enlarged psychic resources.[. . .] Like the call of the shaman, then, the realms of the modern artist have nothing to do with helping us to sleep. Instead of offering us sublimated images of personal compromise and social adjustment, the modern artist attempts to wake us up to our place in the chain of being. And this may well be a place which we can only approach through experiencing the terror as well as the beauty of the depths that lie within us. (Tucker 98)

Again, the notion of participatory experience is linked with being prodded out of ordinary 'consciousness of identity.' The "beauty of the depths that lie within us" also prompt experience of "terror." Thus to enact "participation" is to be traumatized as the ordinary person/self as which 'one' is habitually and socially identified. The essence of this movement, this 'leaping,' may indeed induce more terror for the modern mentality than for the archaic, since contemporary psychological attachment to its version of ordinary material reality is less relativized by engagement with "liminal anti-structure." The 'courageous activity' of the "modern/'post'-modernist artists who most overtly challenged the ordinary reality is thus often characterized as, and even literally resulted in, 'madness.' Erich Neumann explores the appropriateness of such trauma.

The modern painters of the last sixty years have been captured by a power which threatens to destroy them. These painters are not masters in the old sense, but victims, even when they dominate this situation. Because the form of the outside world has been shattered, an identifiable and learnable artistic technique has almost ceased to exist. All these artists suffer the demonic violence of the inward powers. (Neumann, Art and the Creative Unconscious 117)

Vassily Kandinsky strove to express his perspective as a painter in more theoretical terms than most of his contemporaries. He idealized "abstraction" as the antidote to "the nightmare of materialism."

In his latest works (1911) he [Picasso] has achieved the logical destruction of matter, not, however, by dissolution but rather by a kind of parceling out of its various divisions and constructive scattering of these divisions about the canvas.[. . .]

In each manifestation is the seed of a striving towards the abstract, the non-material.

Consciously or unconsciously they are obeying Socrates' command—Know thyself.
(Kandinsky, Concerning the Spiritual in Art 18, 19)

“They,” the “manifestations” themselves, as “seed[s] of striving towards the abstract,” (and presumably thereby the painter), are here portrayed as seeking each to ‘know thy self’ by a “constructive dematerialization of matter.” Kandinsky seems to position the painter as an agent of the self-knowing of some ‘other’ by *its* own manifestation. Thus the self, the perception of the “I,” *and* the objects it perceives, known or identified in the context of ‘ordinary reality’ (with contemporary ‘religious’ emphasis on material existence and its linear causalities), must have its “divisions” “parceled out” on the canvas in enacting a more complete self-knowing. Here is an ‘alienation’ of the ‘personal identity’ of the ‘expressive agent’ as painter from the activity of non-ordinary knowing of self/other/world *and* of the object from its ordinary perceptual figuration for the sake of *its* ‘self knowing.’

Such an abstracting that is not experienced as a reductive delimitation to a ‘new’ version of singular identification, but rather as an expansive act, is bound to be some way alienating to the habitual sense of self and reality. The artist must thereby become an agency of a perspective alien to his or here habitual identity in the process of expressing a ‘further’ field of personal, or the world’s, existence—while at the same time ‘liberating’ the ‘perceived’ from habitual identification and yet still existing in relation to that familiar identity: no difference in expression of habitual or material being results in no new relationship as a basis for more inclusive ‘knowing.’ In such a manner concurrent, dynamically plural identifications are created/enacted that are both familiar and alien.

Perhaps it is such an ‘alien agency’ that is implied when many refer to the ‘faculty of imagination.’

[. . .] imagination is always considered to be the faculty of forming images. But it is rather the faculty of deforming the images offered by perception, of freeing ourselves from the immediate images. If there is not a changing of images, an unexpected union of images, there is no imagination, no imaginative action. (Bachelard, On Poetic Imagination and Reverie 19)

When one ‘imagines,’ in this sense, one creatively enacts an ‘altered reality.’ The ‘ordinary’ is evidently ‘alienated’ by such enactment unless its perspective can be made to somehow encompass the aberration, to ‘stand in judgment’ on its ‘validity’ by classifying such enactment with notions of harmless play or entertainment. But being ‘comfortably’ entertained is evidently not ‘participation’ in plurality. “Poetry is not born from within a unity; oneness has no poetic property. If we cannot immediately attain ordered

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multiplicity, we can make use of dialectic, as a shattering noise that awakens sleeping echoes”
(Bachelard, On Poetic Imagination and Reverie 32-33).

Creative, imaginative activity in this sense of ‘precipitating’ and ‘participating’ plurality thus has the dynamic quality of dialectical movement, a going-back-and-forth that dematerializes, awakens, shatters, traumatizes—and is ‘beautiful.’ Such activity cannot then readily be ‘participation’ in a smooth, monadic unity, but rather in the rather more dramatic ‘dialectically metamorphic dynamism.’

Dynamics replaces composition, the energy of color and form replaces the illusion of outward reality, the amorphous replaces the conventional and matter of fact, and disintegration and the abyss banish comfort and “still life.” This deconcretization is also expressed in the two-dimensional trend of painting, which relinquishes the corporeality of world and body for a dynamic of form and color—a trend, by the way, which has its analogy in science, in both physics and psychology.

The human becomes demonic, things become human: a face dissolves into colors and forms, a blob of paint looks at us with a human eye. Everything shifts and leaps, now into empty banality, now into an abyss of cosmic suffering, now into a mystical transfiguration of color.
(Neumann 120)

Performance of Roles versus Enactment of Plurality of Identity

Manifestation of dynamical self/other/world relations is thus associated with enactment of ‘non-ordinary’ actions, attitudes or perspectives. Such activity is perhaps best elucidated in reference to ‘actual actors’ playing theatrical parts. If persons consider themselves as actors playing the ‘parts’ of their ordinarily identified personal selves and social “personas,” they may realize that for the most part they remain unaware of ‘performing’ those parts or roles because they are ‘identified’ *with* these—their existence is *equated* to those ‘roles.’ Thus, while ‘performing’ the behaviors ‘dictated’ by the “ego complex” or “persona,” the individual might behave in dramatically differing modalities in different circumstances yet never be aware of the expressed diversity. If one’s is ‘identified’ with the seemingly singular ‘role’ of persona and its pre-established ‘script’ then there is no ‘position’ of identity to be ‘aware’ of ‘playing’ that ‘part.’ Only when one deliberately takes on/enacts ‘other’ roles or characters is one likely to experience the dynamic of self-as-actor-of-self-and-world. There is a distinction to be made here between ‘performing’ a set ‘role,’ such as the habitually reflexive ‘part’ of one’s “persona,” and ‘enacting’ a ‘role’ that one’s egoic function is not ‘identified with.’ In order for the sense-of-self to ‘become plural’ it must experience ‘being other.’ Thus the term ‘enactment’ is here used to suggest a ‘reflectively conscious’ attitude about engaging in ‘non-ordinary being.’

Bertolt Brecht, as theater director, insisted on maintaining a conscious attitude of alienation in the style of his actors. He termed this ‘technique’ the alienation or “A-effect.” The purpose of his “epic theatre” was to enable a ‘space of awareness’ in his audiences that would allow them to reflect on both their own motives and those of others, particularly about socio-political concerns. Brecht’s actors were trained to maintain a state of ‘half-transformation’ into the characters and roles they enacted.

A representation that alienates is one which allows us to recognize its subject, but at the same time makes it seem unfamiliar. The classical and medieval theater alienated its characters by making them wear human or animal masks; the Asiatic theatre even today uses musical and pantomime A-effects. (Brecht, Brecht on Theater 191)

In order to produce the A-effects the actor has to discard whatever means he has learnt of getting the audience to identify itself with the characters which he plays. Aiming not to put his audience into a trance, he must not go into a trance himself. (Brecht 193)

The actor who 'becomes the role' is thus seen as 'going into a trance', which encourages the audience to do similarly, to 'identify' personally with the actor/role, experiencing the 'performance' from the 'inside,' as it were. That 'identification' leaves one 'unaware' of the exhibited behavior 'as performance' of certain attitudes and identifications that direct the 'actor' like a 'script.' Brecht sought to create a theater that could enable his audience members to act with reflective awareness in their own lives rather than be reactionary puppets of their habits, established societal hierarchies, and political demagogues. That is to say, he attempted to make people aware of how their 'identities' were 'scripted' by "normative social structures." His techniques suggest that we are all actors whose identifications are variable, and that these have contrasting, potent social and political consequences. Brecht was convinced that society could become less hierarchical and exploitative only if individuals became aware of how their behavior was 'predetermined' by 'identification' with social roles and standards.

Richard Schechner provides an exceptional analysis of performative dynamics ranging from archaic to modernist cultures, from religious ceremony to daily activity. His work acknowledges both Turner's anthropology and Brecht's theatrical technique.

The distance between character [role] and the performer allows a commentary to be inserted; for Brecht this was most often a political commentary, but it could also be—as it is for postmodern dancers and performance artists—an aesthetic or personal commentary. [. . .] Thus Brecht, like other master performers-directors, emphasizes techniques necessary for this kind of acting: acting where the transformation of consciousness is not only intentionally incomplete but also revealed as such to the spectators, who delight in the unresolved dialectic. (Schechner, Between Theater and Anthropology 9)

Again an emphasis on the dialectical dynamism of the transformative or metamorphic moment is stressed, here held in a state of continually conscious suspension by the "alienation effect." Actor and audience are not allowed to 'fix' identifications but encouraged to focus on their plurality, their 'unresolvedness.' Schechner sees the 'actor' as encountering the being of one's selves by being others.

While performing, a performer experiences his own self not directly but through the medium of experiencing the others. While performing, he no longer has a "me" but has a "not not me," and this double negative relationship also shows how restored behavior is simultaneously private and social. A person performing recovers his own self only by going out of himself and meeting the others—by entering a social field. The way in which "me" and "not me," the performer and the thing to be performed, are transformed into "not me . . . not not me" is through the workshop-rehearsal/ritual process. This process takes place in a liminal time/space and in the subjunctive mood. The subjunctive character of the liminal time/space is reflected in the negative,

antistructural frame around the whole process. This antistructure could be expressed algebraically: “not (me. . . not me).” (Schechner 112)

Here again the notion of a transformation of time and space relations is crucial to the experience of concurrent plurality. Individual identity is ‘alienated’ from itself while continuing to be ‘present’ as self, and not-self, and not-not-self. Schechner portrays the conscious enactment of oneself or an other as a “restoration” of behavior, which implies a mutuality of past and present.

Put in personal terms, restored behavior is “me behaving as if I am someone else” or “as if I am ‘beside myself’, or ‘not myself’ “ as when in trance. But this “someone else” may also be “me in another state of feeling/being,” as if there were multiple “me’s” in each person. The difference between performing myself—acting out a dream, reexperiencing a childhood trauma, showing you what I did yesterday—and more formal “presentations of self” is a difference of degree, not kind. (Schechner 37)

Restored behaviors of all kinds—rituals, theatrical performances, restored villages, agnicayana—are “transitional.” Elements that are “not me” become “me” without losing their “not me-ness.” This is the peculiar but necessary double negativity that characterizes symbolic actions. (Schechner 111)

Obviously, this dynamism of being self variously and simultaneously must be the ‘actual continual status of being.’ But identity consciousness can only be ‘assimilated’ to this ‘reality’ by deliberate interruption of an assumed, unconsciously identified-with, ordinary, singular sense-of-self. The “I” and “Not-I” or “me” and “not-me” of ordinary orientation can be shifted into a more participatory “Not-Not-I” in an enactment of ‘assimilation’ to the interpenetrating, overlapping fields of action or agency normally identified with fixed entities in separate dimensions of time and space. Yet such a move is both enabled by ‘alienation’ from ‘the role’ one is ‘playing’ (“I” or “me”) and subsequently increases ‘relation’ with some ‘other’ such that there is a sense of “not-not-me.” Thereby comes some sense for the ‘egoic function of identification’ of ‘being-yet-not,’ of being in more than one space or time simultaneously by being as ‘actor and enactment.’ Such ‘activity’ thus ‘appears’ not only on the canvasses of Picasso and in the figures of Einstein’s ‘deforming’ scientific imagination, but in the conscious enactment of ‘roles’—even the ‘parts’ of ‘one’s self.’ Much of more contemporary performance art is fundamentally generated by such ‘playing with’ and ‘enacting’ the overlapping perspectives of the self-reflexive subject with its divergent personal< >impersonal, political< >apolitical and literalistic< >imaginal perspectives. In such a way the self-reflexive subject can generate a ‘self reflective subjectivity.’

Perspectival Shifts Beyond Ordinary Identification in Literature and Literary Theory

A last category of consideration in this chapter on artistic expression as ‘enactive’ manifestation of psychic plurality concerns language and literature. Language, and its literary expressions, are the

medium of the very 'enactment' of expression attempted in this study. The assumption of this 'act' is that commonly shared denotations and connotations of the words here presented and the grammar and syntax of their usage will convey a complex of 'meanings' that reader and author may agree upon as in some sense 'accurate,' 'true', or 'appropriate' to their experience of various aspects of being alive. But the inherent difficulty of arriving at such accuracy and agreement is in a sense the very subject of this study. 'Deconstructive' postmodernist thought is rife with notions of the indeterminate meanings or references of language, calling into question any possibility of 'definitive expression' or accurate representation of reality.

Reflection upon the 'inexactness' of language and whether that character is a 'fault' or a 'necessity' might derive from confusing the manners in which it is employed for 'knowing.' This notion suggests there are at least two assumptions commonly made about the function of language: firstly that it can convey a relatively consistent experience of literal, ordinary reality, and secondly that it can convey a less obvious yet potent realm of experience and dynamism in/among/behind that 'ordinarily' perceived identity of self/world/other. Phillip Wheelwright attempted this distinction between what he termed "open" and "closed" language.

Briefly there are two ways in which steno-language, or closed language, language consisting of static terms, may arise: by habit and by prescription. Language becomes closed and static by habit when imagination fails, so that the same words are repeated without examination or critical integrity. (Wheelwright, Metaphor and Reality 37)

When language is closed by stipulation, on the other hand, as is done in scientific and logical usage, the aim is to get rid of ambiguity as far as possible and to establish semantic precision combined with sharability by all "normal observers," or, in the case of technical matters, all "qualified observers." Language that is closed by stipulation—which is to say by definition, combined with a rigid adherence to the law of identity—may be called logical language. It is deliberate steno-language, as opposed to the accidental steno-language that enters into common speech. (Wheelwright, Metaphor and Reality 38)

Wheelwright equates literalistic, denotational definition to 'identity' as a fixed, singular, inarguable reduction of one-to-one meaning as "steno-language." Yet he does not limit 'specificity' to that form of 'equational identification.'

It does not follow, however, that open language must give up the quest for exactitude altogether. Language that is open may be loose and flabby, or it may be taught and alive; its openness is simply a general precondition. In order to speak as precisely as possible about the vague, shifting, problematic, and often paradoxical phenomena that are an essential part of the world, language must adapt itself somehow to these characteristics; the openness of language permits such adaptation but does not guarantee it. Language that can adequately, or almost adequately, speak forth the living truths of human existence, must itself be living; and since those truths are always somewhat dark, kaleidoscopic and elusive, an appropriate language will to some extent, and with chosen controls, reflect those qualities. (Wheelwright, Metaphor and Reality 43)

The language usage of this study relies primarily on the communicative ‘mechanisms’ of “steno-language” to convey its deductive discourse. Yet the ‘object’ of study here is the inherent limitation of that reductively analytical orientation of linguistic identification in conveying the totality of human experience as psycho-somatic beings. Thus the ‘logic’ of that reductive orientation is being applied to explicate its own limitations and thus ‘illogic’: “steno-language” is here seeking to show its own incapacity to “speak forth the living truths of life itself” in such a way that it becomes a ‘living truth.’ Somehow, the intention thus becomes to make the ‘illogical’ ‘appear’ ‘logical,’ the ‘imprecise’ be revealed as ‘the most precise’ in expressing ‘inclusive’ or ‘totalistic’ being. The vicissitudes of this endeavor require many words and terms to be applied variously, to have their ambiguities or ambivalences emphasized with ‘quotational’ marks and parenthetical qualifications, all playing off their literalistic, denotational, and connotational meanings. This ‘expressive style’ is not intended to ‘discredit’ the ‘accuracy’ of language but to emphasize the ‘inconsistencies’, the pluralities of association, the ‘figurative ambiguities,’ so that the words and associated notions and images become deliberately, some way accurately, ‘polysemous.’ If the ‘subjective’ perspective of this study ‘succeeds’ in conveying the subjectivity of the ‘object’ of its scrutiny, it will have to enact a ‘logic’ that is ‘poetically dynamic,’ yet still ‘exact.’

Metaphor in its radical, which is to say its semantic sense, is far more than a grammatical maneuver or a rhetorical stratagem. The essence of metaphor consist in a semantic tension which subsists among the heterogeneous elements brought together in some striking image or expression. Poetic language implicitly crossweaves multiplicity-in-unity and unity-in-multiplicity; it is tensive because of the precarious balance between two or more lines of association which it invites the imagination to contemplate. (Wheelwright, The Burning Fountain 102)

Here appears a fairly explicit, “steno-language” statement of the metaphoric and metamorphic nature of identification; a status of being that is “tensive,” ever ‘in motion’ between singular states. But is this an ‘actual’ state of being, is this the ‘nature’ of ‘reality?’ Or is this ‘notion’ of ‘metaphoric reality’ an ‘artifact’ of human consciousness and language as expression of that consciousness? Is it even basic to that consciousness and its ‘literally practical’ or “steno-language?”

The ability to speak and think literally has been assumed to form the bedrock for most theories of mind, language, and meaning. Yet the search for a theory of what is literal about language and thought has not provided any clear answers to the question of what it means to say we speak and think literally. Simply put, there exists no comprehensive account of literal meaning. What we think of as literal depends on a variety of factors, including culture, the individual, the context, and the task. People often fail to acknowledge that certain knowledge and assumptions drive their judgments of the literalness of words, sentences, and concepts. (Gibbs, Poetics of Mind 78)

“People often fail to acknowledge” what set of identifications of self/other/world they are utilizing for their perspective, their sense of the valid, real, or meaningful. These ‘under-lying’

‘assumptions’ are often in conflict or contrast with each other, or one’s ‘conscious’ attitude, which is not acknowledged. To so “acknowledge” the ‘assumed’ basis of ‘literal meanings’ one must become ‘alienated’ from the identity that relies upon, is ‘identified with,’ those assumptions. The language relied upon to express some logically ‘exact’ and ‘true’ ideas and feelings is, like Einstein’s version of the universe, complicated—much more complicated than normally ‘acknowledged.’ Yet some critiques of the seemingly contradictory nature of language conclude that the ‘underlying’ complexes of meaning in it are ‘arbitrary.’ If so, then language would seem to be ‘expressing’ the ‘arbitrary’ character of consciousness.

Instead, people have complex intuitions about the meanings of polysemous words that are not arbitrary but motivated by people’s figurative understanding of various concepts. Under this view, the various meanings of a polysemous word can be related through meaning chains to a radial category. In a particular meaning chain, any two adjacent members may be related in meaning, whereas those not adjacent may well have very little in common. (Gibbs 45)

Gibbs’s analysis locates meaning in “radial categories” rather than in the classical categories having absolute and consistent definitions (or ‘identities’). Meaning, the ‘truth,’ is thus ‘located’ in associations between meaningful associations or nexes that overlap and interpenetrate. Their ‘validity,’ the ‘accuracy’ or appropriateness to ‘reality’ depends on the context, the perspectives involved, the dynamic of actions being conveyed or described. Thus the variousness of meanings in language, or “polysemous” words, expresses this inherently complex, but not arbitrary, complexity of consciousness that is itself inherently metaphorical. Gibbs’s comments on ‘metaphorical intelligence’ are not the ‘opinions of a poet’ or a literary theorist, but rather the rigorously reasoned, ‘logical’ conclusions of an ‘empirical’ researcher into the structures and functions of language as an expression of the human brain and consciousness. And the ‘mechanism’ that ‘drives’ these complex constellations of meaning is “figurative.”

We can’t help thinking about the mind in figurative terms, because the mind itself is primarily structured out of various tropes. These figures of thought arise naturally from our ordinary, unconscious attempts to make sense of ourselves and the physical world [. . .] language is not independent of the mind but reflects our perceptual and conceptual understanding of experience. Figuration is not merely a matter of language but provides much of the foundation for thought, reason, imagination. (Gibbs 434-35)

And the linguistic expression of “figuration” is metaphor.

Metaphor is not merely an instance of language, a special rhetorical device used for communication and persuasion. Instead metaphor is a fundamental capacity by which people understand themselves and the world through the conceptual mapping of knowledge from one domain onto another. The overwhelming ubiquity of metaphor in language, thought, science, law, art, myth, and culture illustrates that metaphor is an integral part of human life. (Gibbs 207)

One can begin to wonder if there really is a ‘war,’ and ‘ultimate discrepancy’ between ‘literal truth’ and ‘poetic truth’ after all.

[. . .] cognitive science cannot approach adequate explanations of human mind and behavior until it comes to terms with the fundamental poetic character of everyday thought. This argument is not similar to the Romantics' heralding of the imagination over rationality in which, as Shelley claimed, poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world. Figurative language is not the novel creation of unconstrained imaginative thinking, because the evidence presented in this book clearly indicates a picture of figurative imagination as a systematic and orderly part of human cognitive processes. My plea is for a greater recognition of the poet in each one of us—to recognize that figuration is not an escape from reality but constitutes the way we ordinarily understand ourselves and the world in which we live. (Gibbs 454)

Apparently, Gibbs would have people accept that their reductively definitive (identifying) 'literal-mindedness' is to be regarded with more 'realistic' suspicion than are their metaphorical sensibilities. Perhaps linear logic is the 'greater abstraction' from 'reality.' Imagination and rationality do not appear here as necessarily distinct and oppositional. Certainly, the "tensive" activity of metaphorical association and "polysemous" words constellated in Gibbs's "radial categories" of meaning indicates a lot of simultaneous 'leaping' back and forth in language. But does this notion of 'meaning' as generated by constellations of "radial categories" which overlap and cluster in various associations depending upon what 'strand' is initially 'activated' indicate an inherent 'meaningless' to language as often indicated in deconstructionist critiques? Perhaps not if one assumes the perspective that human intelligence is inherently structured metaphorically. But the deconstructive critique is most certainly dubious if 'meaning' is *not* identified as confined to a 'product' of linear and literalistic reasoning derived from exclusive categories. Whether or not 'reality' is metaphorical in 'nature,' it might only be possible to express it thusly if human consciousness is 'so-generated.' Whatever the 'ultimate nature of reality' might be, 'meaning' seems not a singular something to be arrived at going in one direction but rather a concurring 'constellation' of elements. So let us turn to the poets.

[. . .] my German teacher told us that there was a modern German poet who actually talked about having a tree inside his ear. How was one supposed to understand that? The teacher's literal-mindedness shows how slowly poetry sometimes makes its way into the world, but it also illustrates the way in which Rilke confronts his reader immediately with a breakdown of the normal distinctions between inside and outside, self and world. One can rather uneasily write off the tall tree in the ear as a figure of speech for Orpheus's majestic music, but the second sonnet, in which a sleeping girl "made a bed for herself inside my ear," leaves us no choice but to abandon our normal distinctions between the subjective and objective. Somehow the god and the girl are both within and without the poet-speaker. In taking all of existence inside himself, or distributing himself across all of existence, he jeopardizes his identity and coherence, but he promises us a magical pilgrimage, a time of heightened awareness and personal liberation. (David Young, in Rilke, Sonnets to Orpheus ix)

Very directly, Rilke's translator here 'identifies' the poet's 'transgressions' of ordinary boundaries of self/world, a 'movement' that the German teacher found incomprehensible. That 'transgression' is described as "jeopardizing" the poet's personal "identity," his familiar egoic positioning of 'who' and 'where' he is in 'the real world.' He is 'alienating' himself from 'himself' and

,
from the orientation of identity held by the German teacher. But the translator, Young, is ‘carried along’ by Rilke’s leaping over ‘the fence’ and into the “wild.”

One striking feature of Rilke’s imagination is its power of entering sympathetically into its subjects.[. . .] His imagination circles his subjects lovingly, and melts into them, again breaking down the subject-object distinction. [. . .] When he succeeds, we see existence in new ways, from new viewpoints and states of being that were closed off to us previously. (Young, in Rilke xi-xii)

In one sense, or perspective, the limitations of length and focus of this study do not allow for providing many examples of the overtly ‘poetic’ or metaphoric expressions of language. Rilke’s poetry is not being quoted here. Yet this may be appropriate in that the perspective here is concerned with the dynamical quality of identification, with the ‘genuine’ logic of that ‘activity.’ Another poet, also expressing his notions mostly in “steno-language,” provides an assessment of this activity in historical perspective.

In ancient times, in the “time of inspiration”, the poet flew from one world to another, “riding on dragons”, as the Chinese said. Isaiah rode on those dragons, so did Li Po and Pindar. They dragged behind them long trails of dragon smoke. Some of that dragon smoke still boils out of Beowulf. The Beowulf poet holds tight to Danish soil, or leaps after Grendle into the sea.

This dragon smoke means that a leap has taken place in the poem. In many ancient works of art we notice a long floating leap at the center of the work. That leap can be described as a leap from the conscious to the unconscious and back again, a leap from the known part of the mind to the unknown part and back to the known. (Bly, Leaping Poetry 1)

Here the analysis of the move from “tame” to “wild” seems to associate with “conscious” and “unconscious” as a leap from the “known” to the “unknown,” a leap of sense-of-self/other/world from the familiar “I” or ‘here’ to some unfamiliar “Not-Not-I” and ‘there.’ Such a leap trails the overtly ‘un-real’ matter of “dragon smoke” as the poet leaps into the chaotic “anti-structure” of ‘the sea.’ But is this ‘leap’ ‘actually’ a move from ‘here’ to ‘there’? Or is it a ‘move’ in the ‘here and now?’ “My idea, then, is that a great work of art often has at its center a long floating leap, around which the work of art in ancient times used to gather itself like steel shavings around the magnet” (Bly, Leaping Poetry 3).

Bly’s ‘figuring’ this leaping as a “gathering of steel shavings” in the invisible force-field of a magnet suggests a ‘being re-arranged’ in response to an all-pervading but ‘normally’ unacknowledged dimension of being. One that is overtly experienced only by way of ‘boundary transgressing,’ ‘fence jumping,’ ‘leaping.’ But his description conveys a strong sense of connection between ‘placements.’ The ‘leaping’ activates or constellates a ‘magnetic field’ which seems to bring many small pieces (the iron filings) into some potent ‘associational arrangement.’ But there can be no leap without a ‘here’ and some ‘there,’ which then co-exist by *virtue of the leap*. The ‘leap’ does not ‘leave behind’ empty space but ‘gathered filings’ which connect the ‘here’ and ‘there’ in some ‘totality.’ Such a ‘move’ that generates (or perhaps more accurately ‘exposes’) an ‘invisible’ force field can only be ‘logically’

characterized by the ‘reality’ of something ‘un-real’ — an ‘un-real real’ of “dragon smoke.” Bly goes on to assess what happened to such movement in the modernist era.

Sometime in the thirteenth century poetry in Europe began to show a distinct decline in the ability to associate powerfully. There are individual exceptions, but the circle of worlds pulled into the poem by association dwindles after Chaucer and Langland; their work is already a decline from the Beowulf-poet. By the eighteenth century, the dwindling had become a psychic disaster. Freedom of association had become drastically curtailed. [. . .]

By the eighteenth century the European intellectual was no longer interested in imagination really. He was trying to develop the “masculine” mental powers he sensed Socrates stood for—a de-mythologized intelligence, that moves in a straight line made of tiny bright links, a intelligence dominated by linked facts rather than “irrational” feelings. The European intellectual succeeded in developing that rationalist intelligence and it was to prove useful. Industry needed it to guide a locomotive through a huge freight yard, or to guide a spaceship back from the moon through the “re-entry corridor”.

Nevertheless, this careful routing of psychic energy, first done in obedience to Christian ethics, and later in obedience to commercial needs, had a crippling effect upon the psychic life. The process amounted to an inhibition of psychic flight, and as Blake saw, once the child had finished European schools, he was incapable of flight. He lived the rest of his life with “single vision and Newton’s sleep.” (Bly, Leaping Poetry 4-5)

Blake’s dreaded “single vision” is an attachment to one sense of perspective, one orientation to identity’s identifications, the ‘Newtonian version of Things’ that put much of one’s sense ability into a mechanistic “sleep”—a slumber which Einstein’s ‘leaps’ were to severely trouble. In the century of that trauma, Bly notes some of the poets, akin to the painters referenced above, who ‘awakened’ to more complex association: Blake, Novalis, Holderlin, and Rilke. “Toward the end of his life, Rilke began to describe the new powers—moving from one part of the brain to another, leaping quickly from conscious to unconscious—as if there were a new power in listening” (Bly, Leaping Poetry 74). Rilke seemed then to be listening to ‘some thing’ that was both ‘out there’ and ‘in here,’ that could be ‘heard’ or ‘voiced’ in associative ‘leaping.’ It was an attendance to some ‘source of agency’ that can here consider to be referenced by such notions as “anti-structure,” “liminality,” the “wild,” “space< >time relativity,” “surreality,” and “the unconscious.”

All over Europe poetry began to come more and more from the unconscious, from the black side of the intelligence. Freud pointed out that the dream still retained the fantastic freedom of association known to us before only from ancient art. By the end of the nineteenth century, both the poem and the dream had been set free: they were no longer part of the effort to develop Socratic intelligence. The poets began to devote their lives to deepening the range of association in the poem, and increasing the speed of association.

It is this movement that has given such fantastic energy and excitement to “modern poetry” in all European countries. The movement has been partly successful: after a hundred years of effort, some of the psychic ability to fly has been restored. (Bly, Leaping Poetry 5-6)

This “listening” and “leaping” in poetry has been a struggle. Many on Bly’s list of ‘leaping poets,’ like their kindred painters, suffered rejection, ridicule, even actual ‘madness’ resulting in

crippling depression and suicide. Boundary crossing is a dangerous business—especially when the ‘leaper’s’ culture does not validate the reality of his or her metamorphosis.

Before leaving the poets, a link back to enactment seems in order. Just ‘where’ does all this activity of leaping ‘take place?’

The body is not only an energy system, but a particular kind of energy system continually in touch with the world of things around it. My body is always engaged in acts of transformations. [. . .] My body is these series of transformations, acts caught in a net that well up out of the environment around me.

So my body isn’t the only body that exists, and at the same time it is closely woven into the material world around it. That’s my starting point for thinking about language. The first thing that strikes me about language is that it’s reciprocal. (Vernon, Poetry and the Body 13)

Wrestling with words, ideas, images, and ‘ineffable’ realities, one easily ‘forgets’ the body, that ‘place’ where all this ethereal thought and imagination ‘takes place.’ How difficult it seems to be for modernists, at least, to experience a continuity of thought and action, of mind and body. An integral aspect of language’s ‘identity’ is that language is originally speech (not to mention brain ‘activity’), then ‘subsequently’ literature: it is an action of both body and mind.

In fact, speech is a kind of physical possession, almost as if a demon were inside me. There is a demon: my body. I never know what my body is revealing or hiding in my act of speaking. [. . .] I think I am choosing, selecting my words; but words just as often choose me. (Vernon 23)

The body ‘makes’ speech, speech ‘moves’ the body—and yet language does not seem to have to ‘obey’ the same ‘laws of nature’ as does the body.

Language has no obligation to “reality”; reality is the lie that makes language true. [. . .] the relationship between language and the world is one of continual unrest, resistance, tension. (Vernon 17)

We don’t “see” the world in language in the same way we see a landscape in a window. The world doesn’t appear in language so much as disappear into it. At the same time, language disappears into the world, in the sense that the organization the world has for us is language. So the world and language are each, in relation to the other, both transparent and opaque; in fact, they overlap, and each has a residue the other can’t touch. And the intersection between them is a sliding, shifting one. Gestures show us that the theater for this intersection, this tug and pull, is the human body. (Vernon 20-21)

Language emerges from the order of the perceived world but then seems to devour the world, to reorganize or remake it—the world becomes language, begetting a tendency to ‘take the word for the thing.’ The identifications of language become the identity, the reality, of self and world. The ‘where’ where we are most able to ‘experience’ this interplay of empirical and ethereal worlds is ‘the body.’

Language is willing to take any form we give it, willing to bend, stretch, distort itself, willing to disguise our feelings, lie for us, sell us things, manipulate us. It is willing to be anything to enable us to be nothing. It has infinite resources, and can fill any silence that frightens us. It is a confidence man, a Proteus, a chameleon, but it is also a series of material designations that obey

mechanical laws. [. . .] On the other hand, language is a ghost, a presence, a perpetual other in our midst. It is a mystery. We are only learning how completely and thoroughly it invades our world, structures it, gives it to us. (Vernon 37-38)

Thus the poet finds ‘inspiration’ for the ‘ghostly’ expression of language in the embodied life, in things that then become both more known and more unfamiliar in gestures, in words and images. And there seems to be an ‘agency,’ an element of ‘intention’ in language that is not of ‘oneself.’ Language is the most common expression of identity yet it is ‘other.’ It is ‘expressed’ by acts of the body, but is like an ‘alien’ presence, a willful entity ‘in here.’ Again there is a notion of ‘something to listen to’ being presented that must be ‘intuited’ by an uncertain usage of language. To ‘speak of embodied consciousness’ is to ‘speak ambi-valently’ or ‘in terms of ambiguity.’ Such language is the ‘speech of embodiment’ that be/speaks its one-nesses and many-nesses as necessarily an un-real reality.

One’s deep dividedness, in language and about it, one’s intuition of some fundamental untruth in saying (insofar as saying instrumentally limits its own reference), amounts to a profound paradox for poetry and spirituality, the paradox, indeed, of incarnation itself—an act referring beyond itself, embodying its own opposite, a language yearning to comprehend the indefinable, the endless, the unspeakable (McHugh, “Interpretive Insecurity and Poetic Truth” 49).

Language that would ‘speak the unspeakable’ is not the language of everyday usage. Its semantics posit a multiplicity of status that is perhaps best described not as an ambiguous absence of meaning but, in McHugh’s term, an “interpretive insecurity” that manifests “poetic truth”—a truthfulness that is, in some sensing, unending. The poet whose work McHugh discerns as so consistently exemplifying that meaningful insecurity is one who wrote in the 19th century but has been read in the 20th: Emily Dickinson.

The explicable is not, finally, what interests the poet: she is drawn precisely to that uneasier thing, the greater-than-can-be-said. The inexhaustibility of literary construction is one measure of its adequacy to this truth; and Dickinson’s sentences and lines often seem designed (in judicious ellipses, elisions, contractions and dashes) to afford the greatest possible number of competing readings. Where a lesser writer might try to comprehend the world by adding more and more words to his portrait of it, Dickinson *allows* for it, by framing in opposites or absents, directing us to what is irresoluble, or unsaid. Where the addition of a word would subtract even one of the cohabitant readings in a text, she leaves the sense unsteady and the word unadded. What critics sometimes lament as cryptic or obscure in her work proceeds, I think, from this characteristic reticence—a luxurious reticence, a reticence which spouts and branches meaning in many directions, the way more exhaustive (less ambiguous) texts cannot. Her weakest poems are the most reducible; their surprises are cute. But her richest work is precisely what critics since Higginson have called “elusive,” and its signature is the sign of the dash—that suspense of punctuation, that undecidability, which is not to say an indecision. She uses the dash to avoid semantic over-determination: a dash occurs where a more exclusive choice of period or comma or colon or semi-colon would direct the sentence to a single end. Her semantics are multiplicate, so her syn-tactics need to remain flexible, especially at the junctures (McHugh 51).

An irreducibility, a winging out of bounds, a defiance for conventional denomination, is what

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animates Dickinson's best work. Here the authority of the sentence lies in its commutability; semantic oscillation is the energy to her illuminations. The characteristic gesture is one of deft poetic simultaneity or conflation, rather than discursive alternity; opposites are textually simultaneous because co-terminus, so difference inheres in literal sameness, thanks to convertible linkages, versatile parts of speech, puns and other stratagems (McHugh 53).

Her poems don't *argue* the coincidences of opposites; they embody that coincidence, in acts of poised equivocation. Here equivocation is the greater truth. A Dickinson text defies the simpler, more exclusive truth of dualism, and so must the reader's attention. It makes no sense to seek the *point* of such a poem: one's work as a reader is to hold the many afforded readings in mind—to be of many minds (McHugh 54).

Dickinson's very style, its formulation on the page, makes overt the dynamical polyphony of meaning in poetic diction's 'truth full tellings.' Excepting most poets, literary critics (and McHugh is both) have tended to elucidate the 'logic' of dynamical movement in such speech that speaks 'different worlds' and various orientations of identifications, as somehow tending 'ultimately' toward 'conclusive distinctions.' Even in this realm of theorizing literary artistic expression habitual cultural assumptions promote identification of meaningfulness with reductive, literal, definitive 'reality.' A valid status for the inconclusive *logos* of inclusive knowing as expressed in poetic dictions thus came to be associated with the term ambiguity—a status that somehow allowed the 'un-real reality' of concurrent meanings. Yet critics still tended to feel a need to discern some final unity and continuity in the meaning of literary works. After successive 'schools' of critical theory in literary analysis, anxiety about this tension between the concurrency of ambiguity and a need for some resolution of its pluralities seems to have culminated in the notion of "deconstruction."

Readers educated with the precepts of the "New Criticism" were taught to prize ambiguity, complexity, and irony as cardinal virtues in a work of literature. The ambiguity of a passage spoke in its favor. It was the critic's task to elucidate the ambiguity and show how it was resolved in the unified text; the analysis enriched the reader's experience of the text by deepening its meaning. For the deconstructionists, however, texts are not simply ambiguous but indeterminate—it is impossible for the theorist to decide which of several conflicting meanings is the right one. Meaning itself evaporates; the theory of indeterminacy suggests that interpretation is a futile or self-defeating exercise. In short, where "ambiguity" was a property of the text and supported the idea of meaning, "indeterminacy" is a property of the interpretation and argues in favor of meaninglessness.

For the deconstructionists, literature illustrates the fundamental instability of language as a medium for communication. Language is like a biological system, autonomous and beyond our ability to control it. The grammar of a given statement might be at odds with its rhetoric—the how and the what of a sentence can clash—as in the familiar linguistic paradox this sentence is false [. . .]. (Lehman, *Signs of the Times* 54)

Ambiguity thus first gained value as the 'precursor' to meaning as 'resolved variation' and has now become the 'ultimate' status of being: 'meaning' is inaccessible. Perhaps the 'quest' for meaning as something "determinate" and "conclusive" is by its own parameters too limited, an inappropriate perspective on totality that excludes its "anti-structural" and "wild" dynamics. Perhaps, in contrast to

that 'resolution oriented' perspective, "deconstruction" has at last posed the limitations of logic as we identify it. But if so, is this actually a 'defeat' for meaning?

It may be argued that any act of analytical intelligence entails taking something apart. Perhaps. But deconstruction ups the ante. If we are to take deconstructionists at their word, the task of taking texts apart is part and parcel of a more ambitious and more threatening endeavor: the dismantling of the "metaphysics of presence"—or what you and I would call Western thought. (Lehman 78)

In wrestling with language and reality and meaning, the 'crucifixion' point of reductive modernist mentality and its foundation in empirical reality, the 'metaphysics of presence' that presumes that 'actual reality' and inherent meaning can be 'positively present' in language and concept might have been arrived at.

As a critical methodology, deconstruction places its emphasis on tearing down a concept or a clause—on "putting it in question" or "problematizing" it, to use the approved jargon—without proposing anything new to take its place. Deconstruction's "thrust," writes the critic Sven Birkerts, "is to demolish the deeply-rooted conceptions of the Enlightenment, presumably so that the culture can evolve in new directions. Deconstruction itself offers no signposts for this evolution, only a method of taking things apart. In this, Deconstructionists are like members of a terrorist sect." Equally "terrorizing" is the deconstructive shift of attention from the content of a person's ideas to his or her hidden motives: you don't read a book, or even have a dialogue with it. You *interrogate* it. (Lehman 78)

The 'dismemberment' of language and the modernist version of logic in it, the "interrogation" of the structures of expressions and the assumptions 'behind' them, is the 'discernment of identifications.' But what, if any 'thing,' does this "deconstruction" pose as 'real' or 'true?'

Instead of a simple 'either/or' structure, deconstruction attempts to elaborate a discourse that says neither 'either/or' nor 'both/and' nor even 'neither/nor,' while at the same time not totally abandoning these logics either. The very word deconstruction is meant to undermine the either/or logic of the opposition 'construction/destruction.' Deconstruction is both, it is neither, and it reveals the way in which both construction and destruction are themselves not what they appear to be." (Barbara Johnson, qtd. in Lehman 82)

Thus there is no position, no meaning, that cannot/will not be 'deconstructed'—except perhaps the 'deconstructive.' Only endless binary oppositions to be deconstructed into further oppositions are posed. One is left 'no where,' in a state of 'dis-identification,' of 'deconstructive ambi-valence.' The world has 'come undone,' lost its 'structure' and the terror of being without identity (except one held only as 'opposition') stirs virulent debate on the intellectual and cultural 'battleground' of the 'war for truth and meaning.' It is as if time and space have ceased to provide reassuring coordinates. In a deconstructed state there can surely be no 'social order,' no 'moral' or 'ethical' code—none of Turner's reliable "normative social structures." Indeed, some frightful boundary must have been crossed—as if modernity is 'over' and the present status is some "wild" place, far from former fixed identities, at a

‘pointless’ point of swirling indeterminant references, which endlessly disseminate and postpone ‘meaning.’ There is some air of Turner’s “potency of the inferior” in such a context.

In the absence of a center or origin, everything became discourse. There are no facts, only interpretations, and no truths, only expedient fictions. It becomes possible for Paul de Man to declare that literature is everywhere; anthropology, linguistics, and psychoanalysis are merely branches of literature—but that is far from a consoling thought, since literature involves the “the presence of nothingness.” (Lehman 98)

“The presence of nothingness”: could this centerless, endless field of references, associations, deferrals, be a ‘figure’ of the ‘dynamical truth of thought and language?’ Could such a ‘figuration’ be suggesting that ‘truthfulness,’ if there is such a ‘thing,’ might be found in the dynamics of language or consciousness, rather than its contents? If so, then we shall need a ‘logic’ that ‘comprehends’ the “presence of nothingness” as a ‘some thing’ even if such presence is ‘thingless,’ composed of diffused, indeterminant references, whose ‘definitive’ character, if they have such, would be in the ‘way’ they ‘move.’

Here one may seek yet another perspective in the point of view that language is a technique, a “technology,” a medium of extending human consciousness that has value or meaning inherent in its dynamical nature. Perhaps the ‘deconstructive dilemma’ serves to ‘reduce’ critical theory to confronting the ‘message’ of ‘the medium’ of expression/communication as its “presence.”

Modes of Expression as Expressing Content: Conceiving the Medium as Meaningful

Focus on evaluating the ‘objects’ specified in ‘looking,’ ‘seeing,’ ‘showing,’ and ‘saying’ as ‘containing’ the meaning being expressed can detract from reflection upon what meaning may be expressed by the manner and means of perceiving/receiving and expressing ‘content’—be it image or idea. Thus the considerations of ‘form as content’ take on significance. But even this concern is approached variously.

Seeking after truth and meaning, to define and express reality, is often driven by unconscious assumptions. Critiques of the underlying ‘mentalities’ of historical and social discourse exemplified by the writings of Foucault have brilliantly illustrated the ‘content’ of perspective and methodology. In the terms of this study, one could say the analyst is often ‘identified’ with his/her methodology of analysis and assumes that the conclusions drawn from it are valid independently from it. ‘Method’ in this sense is related to technique, style, medium or technology. How one ‘takes action,’ both in thought and physical endeavor, turns out to be meaningful in how it ‘configures’ both sense perceptions and that which is ‘sensed’—how it ‘pre-figures’ the world one is to act ‘in’ or ‘upon.’ One’s consciousness and sense-of-identity of self/other/world are thereby ‘always already’ somewhat configured. To alter methods of acting and knowing is to ‘re-arrange’ both self and world. “Any invention or technology is

an extension or self-amputation of our physical bodies, and such extension also demands new ratios or new equilibriums among the other organs and extensions of the body” (McLuhan, Understanding Media 54).

To “extend” human capacities constitutes some “amputation of our physical bodies.” The human capacity to “extend” human capacity by way of the tools of mechanical and intellectual methods or “technologies” alters human capacities both of ‘action’ and ‘sensation.’ How logic is structured or defined defines what is logical or meaningful—it ‘forms’ thought. Logic is structured by language use and vice versa. Consciousness with versus without oral expression in language is different consciousness.

Speech comes with the development of the power to let go of objects. It gives the power of detachment from the environment that is also the power of great mobility in knowledge of the environment. So it is with the growth of the idea of money as currency rather than commodity. (McLuhan, Understanding Media 124).

The capacity to express thought as speech creates a ‘field of communicative exchange’ that is an abstraction, much like money as currency comes to be regarded as more important than the commodities it ‘represents.’ Such abstraction tends to alienate one’s identification from the original sensing of perception as one comes to identify with its linguistic expression, just as one comes to regard money as real value rather than the ‘things’ ‘it’ buys. Yet in that ‘abstractive amputation’ from sensation-as-thing or thing-as-value, a secondary ‘alienation’ is possible as one can more overtly ‘stand aside’ from the capacity to so-abstract. Such awareness of the ‘amputated’ or ‘extended’ capacity does not necessarily follow, however. One’s sense-of-self can become ‘identified’ with the ‘separations.’ Consciousness as formed by ‘oral culture’ is a different “amputation” of human capacity for sensing and expressing than is the ‘technological’ abstraction of ‘literary culture.’ The ‘flow’ of language and thought in the ‘abstraction’ of oral speech is fragmented and ‘objectified’ in writing. Self and world are inherently re-configured by literacy.

Literate man, once having accepted an analytic technology of fragmentation, is not nearly as accessible to cosmic patterns as tribal man. He prefers separateness and compartmented spaces, rather than the open cosmos. He becomes less inclined to accept his body as a model of the universe, or to see his house—or any other of the media of communication, for that matter—as a ritual extension of his body. Once men have adopted the visual dynamic of the phonetic alphabet, they begin to lose the tribal man’s obsession with cosmic order and ritual as recurrent in the physical organs and their social extension. (McLuhan, Understanding Media 118).

It would seem that literate culture simply cannot *be* archaic culture. Participation as ‘self in/of the world’ has been replaced by ‘self as abstractive, analytical medium of extension.’ Modernist mentality is generated by its development of intellectual and mechanical techniques conditioned by the

abstractions of a phonetic alphabet. Even 'this body' seems to be an 'abstraction,' a bio-technology 'amputated' from, though 'possessed' by, the "I" of 'identity.'

Blake, in a word, sees man as fragmented by his technologies. But he insists that these technologies are self-amputations of our own organs. When so amputated, each organ becomes a closed system of great new intensity that hurls man into "martyrdoms and wars".[. . .]

To behold, use or perceive any extension of ourselves in technological form is necessarily to embrace it. To listen to radio or to read the printed page is to accept these extensions of ourselves into our personal system and to undergo the "closure" or displacement of perception that follows automatically. It is this continuous embrace of our own technology in daily use that puts us in the Narcissus role of subliminal awareness and numbness in relations to these images ourselves .[. . .]

Psychologically, man in the normal use of technology (or his variously extended body) is perpetually modified by it and in turn finds ever new ways of modifying his technology. Man becomes, as it were, the sex organs of the machine world, as the bee of the plant world, enabling it to fecundate and to evolve to ever new forms. (McLuhan, Understanding Media 55-56).

To dis-identify with this "Narcissus" of abstractive media would require a traumatic 'identity crisis.' To get 'outside' of the identification of self/world with mechanistic language would require a 'loss of faith,' an alienation from what seems the very core of Reality and Truth as perceived from 'within' the perspective of that 'narcissistic' identity.

Henri Bergson, the French philosopher, lived and wrote in a tradition of thought in which it was and is considered that language is a human technology that has impaired and diminished the values of the collective unconscious. It is the extension of man in speech that enables the intellect to detach itself from the vastly wider reality. Without language, Bergson suggests, Human intelligence would have remained totally involved in the objects of its attention. Language does for intelligence what the wheel does for the feet and the body. It enables them to move from thing to thing with greater ease and speed and ever less involvement. Language extends and amplifies man but it also divides his faculties. His collective consciousness or intuitive awareness is diminished by this technical extension of consciousness that is speech.

Bergson argues in *Creative Evolution* that even consciousness is an extension of man that dims the bliss of union in the collective unconscious. Speech acts to separate man from man, and mankind from the cosmic unconscious. As an extension or uttering (outring) of all our senses at once, language has always been held to be man's richest art form, that which distinguishes him from the animal creation. (McLuhan, Understanding Media 83)

Yet by "outring" human capacities and awareness—by manifesting consciousness of perception, imaginal 'de-formations' of the perceived, as actions and their 'technologies'—the variousness of seeing, feeling, and thinking becomes apparent. There is thus 'meaning' in expressing, and various meanings in the varieties of expressing. The techniques of "extending," of "outring" the self are ways of knowing selves, others and world. If union with the "collective unconscious" is bliss, then dis-identification with it by way of expressed differentiation would surely be traumatically alienating. But, once alienated from unconscious union with 'the all' by generating the context of human linguistic culture, an impulse to be 're-alienated' (from the differentiated alienation) back into participation with the "liminal" totality would seem quite appropriate also. It would appear thusly that

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'alienated' capacities or 'mediums' are 'aspects of self' which, as 'amputated' "utterings and outerings," then confront us as modes of expression that are 'not-self' yet 'not-not-self.' All 'technologies' would be configured such a 'relationship.'

To return to the ambiguous nature of meaning in language, one may conclude that an anxiety about truth, a cautious attitude about identifying words with things, and of self or world with ideas, is the primary 'meaning' or 'message of the medium' of language. The polysemous dynamism of the medium of language makes manifest the dynamism, the many formings/beings of self and world. Persons, dynamically, *are* it. But when language is used in primarily oppositional, linear, reductive modalities, *that* sort of identification of selves, other and world will be induced, which obscures the 'polysemous-ness' of being.

Thus the "deconstructionist" dismemberment of literalistic identification with language and literature seems quite appropriate to 'the search for truth and meaning.' That this 'critique' does not tend to offer a new version of truth or locus of meaning 'in' language and refuses to seek one 'outside' it in the form of a transcendental signified also seems apt insofar as the critique thus 'respects' the limits of rational, linear logic to determine Truth. The logic of discursive or "steno-language" has thus been used to "deconstruct" the 'transcendent truth' forced upon it by assuming it is what it appears to refer to, its supposed "literal content." It turns out that when 'linear logic' is applied to the circular, "radial" meaning-fields of language, that particular forming of logic is a projection upon language as neither language nor human intelligence appear to 'reason' linearly but rather 'figuratively. Thus, the mechanistic 'Reality' that some *want* language to 'express' is often incongruent with the reality of its dynamic nature. And, whatever Truth and Reality are, such meaning gets expressed by the 'un-real' means of language—words that are not only not things they refer to, but not even 'things.' And yet, they, words, have all the presence and power of things, perhaps even more presence to those who 'believe' in them as 'things' and 'truth.' After all, without words what can we 'say' about either the 'true' or the 'false,' the 'real' or the 'un-real?' Words are, evidently, akin to paintings and scientific theories—manifestations of some 'un-real real.' Such pondering of 'artistic expression-as-language' and questions of how 'reality' is created by way of language can lead one to the considerations of philosophical discourse on the 'logic' and 'facts' of being.

Chapter 4

Philosophical Non-Reduction: Rationalizing Toward Some Truths of Knowing Radically Complex Totality Inclusively

In this chapter the focus of concern shifts from overtly metaphorical re-presentation as a mode of inclusive knowing to how non-reductive understanding is generated through intellectual disciplines of rational analysis. The topic thus becomes in part the interplay of reductive and non-reductive methodology in different intellectual disciplines. There are two aspects of the discipline of philosophical analysis considered relevant to this study. The category considered in this chapter is philosophy as “inquiry into the nature of things based on logical reasoning rather than empirical methods,” here taken to be “rational philosophy.” Arguments about the logic of a ‘singular’ reality or validity of definitive meaning are pertinent to the subject of this study. The second category is philosophy as “an investigation of the causes underlying reality (American Heritage Dictionary ’78, 985),” represented in empirical applications of scientific method. This latter category involving scientific theories and more specifically concerned with ‘literal’ or actual status is approached in Chapter 5.

Examination of reduction and non-reduction in rational philosophy begins with an overview of philosophical thought as characterized in Western cultural history and modernist societies. Rational philosophy is regarded here as representing an effort to pose self-consistently logical rules for knowing logically—and, by extension, for knowing knowing thusly. As such, the writing in this study classifies as rationally philosophic even though it attempts to present a rationale about the logical validity of what can appear irrationally paradoxical (i.e., inclusive knowing). Philosophical thought in Western cultural history is vastly complex and by no means ‘simply reductive.’ What is most pertinent about its range to the elucidation of inclusive knowing are its aspects which articulate what could be termed a ‘philosophy of improper knowing’—or some logic of knowing that ‘extends beyond’ ordinary or reductively positivized statuses. The brief consideration presented here is thus focused upon rationalizations of ‘improper,’ liminal, or marginal knowings that relativize more singularly reductive philosophical notions to a less reductive perspective upon inclusive totality. The search then is for indications of a rational ‘philosophy of many-ness in one-ness.’ Such a philosophy must necessarily be ‘of the hidden’—of inherent concealment and triangulatory constellation relative to ordinarily oppositional assumptions and linear hierarchies of logical self-consistency. Its metaphysical premises would have to be pluralistic and somehow radically complex in their presumptions about the dynamical activity of identification. An interpretation of the overall impetus in Western philosophical history is here proposed that identifies the

emergence of just such a perspective, becoming most overt in the contemporary contextings of poststructuralist and postmodernist thought. The transit in Western philosophical thought tracked here could be termed a shift from primary emphasis upon establishing The Truth to positing reasonable ways to discern what truthfulness might actually be, given a background condition of radical complexity.

What follows then is some exploration of the rational consequences of how the modernist attempt to reduce 'reality' to fixed and measurable qualities under human control appears to have generated great anxiety, expressed in 'movements' such as Romanticism, Fascism, and aspects of postmodernism. The 'rise' of rational humanism and scientific culture is readily paralleled with the 'decline' of religion as a source of authority about reality (exemplified by Nietzschean "death of God" sentiment)s. A brilliant lineage of rational philosophers has struggled with the subsequent consequences of a 'natural order' that appears random and alienation of human identity from 'experiential participation' in some all-pervading and meaningfully unifying sense of 'supernatural' or 'hyper-reality.' Any attempt to summarize the myriad critiques in works of rational philosophy of the literalistic and oppositional dualism of modernist Western culture would be a massive undertaking. The 'lines of reasoning' that challenge the so-called metaphysics of presence held to underlie materialistic modernist notions of 'the real' are complex and varied—as well as compelling and convincing.

Thus, for the purposes of this study, it is accepted that the method of Enlightenment rationalism has 'undone' itself in various rationalistic critiques of rationalistic reduction. The reductive quest for 'the Truth' has led to assertions that the only 'truth' is the absence of Truth. The limitations of linear logic in explicating and validating the totalistic range of human experience and 'reality' are thus accepted here as logically established. Yet a reasonable understanding of how reductive rationalism fails to define ultimate reality does not necessarily relieve the inability of mechanistic culture to validate a category of the 'un-real real' (a more-than-ordinary contexting). Thus modernist status, even in much postmodernist analysis, remains unable to effectively relativize the mentality of ordinary reality, of singular identification, to a more totalistic field of "anti-structural liminality" or the "wild." An experience of 'participation' with impersonal and non-human agencies that might mediate the alienating humanistic sense of antagonism toward "anti-structure" or 'the rest of the self' and radically complex totality, does not appear to be readily accessible. The relevance of rational philosophy to this study, then, is posed as its 'impasse' found to be figured in so-called postmodernist thought.

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The Archetypal Turn of Western Philosophy: Reductions Begetting Reductive < > Non-reductive Dialectical Reasoning

If one asks what has been the archetypal character of Western philosophical thought about, and reflections upon, existence (Western philosophy's 'particular turn of mind' or questing), one answer might be 'the search for the truth in reductively rational terms.' Such an overarching impetus is represented in the notion of a "perennial philosophy" that would, by definition, rationally explain phenomenon in so complete, universal, explicit, and self-consistent a manner as to remain essentially unaltered over generations of additional thought and discovery. As indicated, however, rational analysis exhibits a tendency to multiply differentiations of difference even as it asserts reductively particularized states of identification—analytical reduction thusly generates an exponential increase in associative complexity. It might well be asked then if such a procedure can be expected to 'arrive' at any final, definitive re-presentation of identity, truth, and reality. A certain ambivalence in this philosophical quest is illustrated in the contrast between more and less reductive versions of dialectical reasoning.

In one sense, a dialectical method of thought is associated with "the art or practice of arriving at the truth by disclosing the contradictions in an opponent's argument and overcoming them (Am. Heritage Dict. '85, 391)." This meaning indicates the importance of self-consistent rationalizing to the notion of 'truth.' As such it is reflexively reductive. In a modern context, the term is readily associated with the Hegelian "process of change whereby an ideational entity, a thesis, is transformed into its opposite, an antithesis, and preserved and fulfilled by it, the combination of the two being resolved in a higher form of truth, a synthesis (Am. Heritage Dict. '85 p. 391)." Here again there is an inherent reductive emphasis upon an 'arrival' at some conclusion that eliminates contradiction or contrast. But the dictionary also supplies the following definition under dialectics: "The contradiction between two conflicting forces viewed as the determining factor in their continuing interaction (Am. Heritage Dict. '85, 392)." That meaning is perhaps more evident in the derivation of the word from the Greek *dialektike* for the 'art of debate,' related to *dialektos* for speech. From that association dialectical reasoning can be construed as a way of elaborating and amplifying contrast or contradiction to heighten awareness of the 'determining factors in their continuing interaction'—to debate thusly is not necessarily to resolve or conclude. Such a model for analytical analysis as a process appears much less reductive. Thusly posed, it tends more to generate understanding through knowledge of dynamical association rather than by concluding in singularly positivized resolutions of hierarchical oppositions or conflicts. There appears, then, a dialectical reasoning concerned with conclusive resolution as well as one concerned more with the mediation of contrasts in an on-going process of mutual association. This contrast can also be posed as placing emphasis on simplicity verses complexity in seeking to analyze the composition of phenomenon.

It would seem reasonable then to attribute both reductive and non-reductive dialectical aspects to Western intellectual method. Perhaps, despite an ideological emphasis upon reductive purpose, the roughly 2,500-year quest of Western style philosophical investigation has been something more than a ‘turning toward The Truth as positivized definition.’ Perhaps its trajectory actually can be traced toward some ‘truths’ about identity and reality in relation to radically complex totality. The very proliferation of theoretical bases for ‘making meaning’ of identity and truth status subsequent to Kant’s investigation of the metaphysical nature of all philosophical thought suggests the validity of such a perspective. An ensuing crises about the validity of an objective basis for knowing produced a cascade of contrasting and competing schema for ‘telling how it really really is’: Hegelian historical processes of dialectical refinement orchestrated by some unitary Spirit, Romantic assertions of a unitary mythic irrationality, Nietzschean declarations of meaning as assertion of the will in response to a nihilistic social order, phenomenological origins of meaning in experience, biological reduction of consciousness to an epiphenomenon of neurochemistry, the seeming pragmatism of logical positivism, existentialist rejection of any truth but that which one chooses, Lacanian linguistic determinism of consciousness, Foucaultian socio-structuralist determinism of subjectivity, the indefinite disseminations of signification without transcendental signifieds loosed by Derridaian deconstructions of hierarchicalized binary oppositions in philosophical discourse itself, and other poststructuralist permutations of radical relativism.

That extra-ordinarily complex kaleidoscopic range of philosophical speculation on identity, reality, and truth with all its objective and subjective, positivistic and psychical contextings (for all their competitive attempts to assert the one and only true version), can be regarded as somehow expressing (in concert) an ‘archetypal turning’ appropriate to re-presenting the dynamical field of some radically complex, irreducible totality. On the way to exploring it as such, some brief reflections are offered upon philosophical thought as analytical reflection contending with reductive purposes.

Philosophy’s Tale: Making Order of Endless Diversification

Philosophy is defined as “love and pursuit of wisdom by intellectual means and moral self-discipline,” as well as “investigation of causes and laws underlying reality,” and “inquiry into the nature of things based upon logical reasoning rather than empirical methods (Am. Heritage Dict. /85 p.931).” These definitions indicate a linkage between wisdom, the intellectual method of logical reasoning, and “moral self-discipline.” Such association might be interpreted as suggesting that the ‘moral values’ guiding philosophy are derived from the tenets of its intellectual method—to philosophize requires disciplining one’s self to obey the ‘rules of logical reasoning.’ There is also the suggestion that such a subordination of self or self-interest is ‘in the cause of the love of wisdom’—wisdom derived by way of intellectual means. Plato, and his version of Socrates, present proto-typical models of such ‘intellectually moralistic love of wisdom as reason.’

Philosophy as such appears to be a ‘way of telling how things are’ —“investigation of causes and laws underlying reality”—by way of rational differentiations and logical associations. It would thus seem to be constrained in its conclusions only by its method—whatever conclusions reached by way of such method could be held valid unless they could be shown, logically, not to have been derived logically. As such, the definition does not appear to preclude the possibility that reasonably valid conclusions could be reached (by way of this intellectual method) that do not ‘logically concur.’ That is to state that rational analysis does not appear to be predetermined as always arriving at conclusions that manifest ‘the same logic.’ This point is being raised here in relation to the notion of a ‘logic of one-ness’ and a ‘logic of many-ness.’ Philosophical endeavor might apply its method in service to either ‘line of logical analysis.’ A similar context for disparities between the terms and formulations of logical analysis is found between different intellectual or academic disciplines that often appear irreconcilable (mathematics, sociology, biology, musicology, etc.).

Another relevant definition of philosophy is “all the disciplines presented in university curriculums of science and the liberal arts.” A person can be granted the academic diploma of “doctor of philosophy” in a variety of disciplines of study. The ‘tale of philosophy’ is thus one of many tellings. But there is yet another relevant definition: “the synthesis of all learning.” Here one is presented with a sort of meta-level of philosophical endeavor—the rational unification of the applications of its intellectual method in all fields of study or what are termed “domains of knowledge.” It is in this respect that philosophy confronts the indefinite diversifications of identity status and logical reasonings generated by its analytical method as approaches phenomenality as ‘a problem to be solved.’ Dedication to an ‘ideal’ of reasonably logical reasoning is thus one goal. Seeking to reduce all such reasoning to a singular unifying rationale is quite another. Western philosophy is virtually ‘born’ in an anxiety about the contrast between change and continuity, radical diversity and uniform continuity, among ancient Greek “natural philosophers.” Plato’s ‘founding works’ of Western philosophical tradition are present the “classical” struggle with establishing a unifying, unchanging order of logical explanation for ‘how things are’—and ‘ought to be.’ But it might well be said that it is Plato’s intellectual method more than his actual interpretive conclusions about the one-nesses of identity and reality. Similarly the works of Aristotle can be seen as bequeathing discipline of analytical rationalism more than final interpretations to Western intellectual tradition. In the writings of both these ‘seminal fathers’ of Western thought one can indicate a pair of ‘proper intentions’ or ‘intellectual morals.’ One of those ideals is the ethic of self-consistent reasoning in rational analysis, the other is a ‘responsibility’ to ‘arrive at the truth.’

It could thus be noted that philosophy is doubly metaphysical. In one regard its method imposes upon knowing (and the “unrepresented” it represents) the definitional criteria of non-contradictory rational logic. In its meta-level ideal of synthetic unification, it imposes a singularly self-consistent rationalism upon both knowing and its reasonably conceptualized re-presentations of the (ultimately)

“unrepresented.” It projects an *aprioi* status of rational order and self-consistent unity upon all it seeks to re-present. In so far as the accomplishment of these two goals together is impossible due to the conflict of the logics of many-ness and one-ness involved, the ‘tale’ of Western philosophy is a ‘mythic’ one—a task that constitutes a ‘great quest,’ such as the ‘search for the Holy Grail’ that only the most ‘pure of heart’ and intention (or method) might hope to attain.

Of Analytical Method and Idealistic Purpose: A Deterministic Western Penchant for Logically Reductive Certainty

This chapter offers a summary of how both the reductive intention in the philosophical idealism of the intellectual tradition of Western rationalism and the diversifying impulses of its methodology, are expressed concurrently in the positivistic determinism of modernist attitudes and the seemingly nihilistic relativism often associated with so-called postmodern ones. On the reductive side, a historical trajectory is here proposed from the materialistic reduction of ancient Greek theorists of “natural philosophy” and the idealism of Platonic forms, through Roman pragmatic systemizing, the religiously dominated rationalism of medieval Europe, and the mechanistic materialism of modernist science, to the Enlightenment absolutism of deterministic social logic and universally rationalized truth. From this perspective, the vast majority of Western intellectual and philosophical endeavor have been, in various contexts, subordinated to the cause of substantiating ideals of self-consistent linear rationalism and universal truth—the ‘guiding ideal’ has been the rational confirmation of ‘ideally self-consistent’ statuses. This assertion is not offered in any effort to deny the astonishing diversification of knowledge and understanding facilitated by the disciplinary developments of the methods of rational analysis. Rather, the intention here is to indicate a strange conundrum of the fecund relationship between reflexively reductive (idealized) intention or purpose and the intrinsically diversifying differentiations of rationally reflective analysis—its amplifications of the many-ness of seeming one-nesses. Whether from religious, scientific, sociological, or more purely philosophical motives, that intellectual method has tended to be deployed in subservience to reductively idealistic intentions that seek to define conclusive truth and singularly irreducible reality. Again, that dominance of reductive purpose over method is regarded as historically present in both the religiously dominated periods of Western history as well as the eras of scientific technology and humanistic secularism.

An intolerance of ambivalence and irreducible complexity are a principle trait of Western interpretation and explanation of ‘how it really is.’ This tendency is portrayed in post-structuralist critical theory as a reflexive belief in an idealized “transcendental signified” or ‘god-reference’ for those truth claims that are ‘actually’ the ‘true’ ones. What is of most importance to this study is to illustrate that the same impulse toward such reductively positivistic assertions of truth and reality as are associated with

science and Enlightenment thought also can be discerned behind the universal refutations of positivism and the metaphysics of presence by theorists associated with postmodernist critiques of modernist attitudes. That the diversifying effects of rational analysis thrives under the dominance of idealistically reductive purpose is perhaps the essential ‘mystery’ of ‘philosophy’s tale.’

A ‘Metaphysics of Presence’ as a Reflexive Positivizing of Linguistic Representation, Conceptualization, and All Phenomenal Occurrence

Western philosophical explanations of phenomenal reality have been associated with the concept of a “metaphysics of presence.” This term is employed in a critical effort to demonstrate that even scientific attempts to discern and articulate the ‘absolute truth’ that underlies all appearances (to rationally, positivistically, and exclusively explain what is really really happening), are essentially metaphysical. This term might also be paraphrased as a ‘metaphysics of one-ness.’ Thusly considered, even the most materialistic of philosophical perspectives proceeds from assumptions about “first principles” which provide the *a priori* criteria for truth and reality. A metaphysics of presence is then described as a basis for analysis and understanding that assumes that absolute and ‘actual’ statuses of identity, causality, and being can be ‘made manifest’ in the expression of signs and symbols used to re-present them as concepts. That is to say, what is being described would have to be ‘essentially present’ in the re-presentation of it for its actuality to be known directly. In addition, this reflexive positivizing of ‘true description’ implies the literalizing (or ‘thingness’) of all phenomenon in such a way that representations judged untrue, false, or imaginal are reflexively regarded as ‘non-existent’ or ‘negatively existent’—as the opposite of positively true and real status and thus positively non-existent.

However, any mode of knowing that bases its validity upon ‘direct knowing’ of the literal, positivized, absolute ‘status of ‘things’ would not be able to acknowledge that it is *taking its re-presentations as* those things positively known or else it would thereby deny the validity of such knowing. Direct positivized knowing does not appear rationally consistent with the concept of knowing as ‘knowing by way of symbols and signs’ that refer/defer to each other for their meaning and thereby are not ‘the things represented.’ In other words, what is represented is not present thus even the knowing of science is not direct knowing of ‘the known’ but a metaphysical, metaphorical, or imaginal knowing. As mentioned previously, the critique of such ‘metaphysical reduction’ of semiotic representation is typified by Derridean deconstruction that, in oppositional contrast, posits a non-positivizing or non-reductive concept of linguistic knowing—one that has prompted vigorous and often shrill reaction from those compelled to ‘defend’ the ‘truth of conclusive meaning.’ This concern becomes central to after-modernist philosophical reflection as it so radically destabilizes cultural assumptions about identity, reality, and truth.

(This context for construing metaphysics as ‘positivistic reduction’ can be regarded as rather different than its more ancient historical manifestation as an effort to relate rather than separate material and immaterial, physical and spiritual phenomena.)

Rationalizing Reason and the Anti-traditional Tradition of Western Intellectual Method

The very phenomenon of a psycho-philosophical ‘schism’ between reductive and inclusive modes of knowing that this book attempts to ‘delineate’ can be regarded as inherent in the ‘nature’ of human consciousness by virtue of its capacity for conceptual abstraction and re-presentational language. But the extremity of that diversity of knowings posed by modernist Western cultural attitudes has been linked to a complex of intellectual ‘origins’ amalgamating around ancient Greek rationalism and Hebraic/Christian monotheism. In reference to the influences of monotheistic religious belief, it has been analyzed as providing a religious impetus toward ‘one God, one Truth, one Reality.’ Such religious reduction provided a ‘spiritual’ basis for the idealized goal of a singularly true, self-consistently reasoned intellectual explanation of being and phenomenon derived from Greek philosophy and the *mythos* > <*logos* split. Yet even the cultural traditions arising from this combination of idealistic intellectual reduction and religious unitary one-ness did not ultimately repress the diversifying effects of analytical method. Just as the reductions of Greek rationalism were in a sense destabilized by the diversifying effects of rational analysis, the reductive authority that became institutionalized in the Christian Church was accompanied by a religious ethic promoting the value of critical self-reflection and personal responsibility for honesty and sincerity. Thus the religious aspect of this dyad contributed a diversifying impetus as well as a reductively monistic one.

To better understand why it seems so difficult to validate radically diverse complexity and inclusive states of knowing by ways of ones and manys concurrently, some reflection upon the role of reason-as-rationalism is useful. To be rational is defined as “having or exercising the ability to reason.” Reason is defined as “the basis or motive for an action, decision, or conviction,” and as “an underlying fact or cause that provides logical sense for premise or occurrence,” as well as “the capacity for rational thought, inference, or discrimination,” and “good judgment, sound sense (Am. Heritage Dict. ’85, 1031).” This definition indicates the characteristic linkage in Western thought between the basis for valid explanations and logical rationalism. The basis for a motive, action, or conviction is ‘a reason’ and reasoning is associated with rational discrimination and “logical sense.” The word logic derives from the Latin *logos* for reason. The words reason and rational derive from the Latin *ratus*, *ratio* and *rerum* for to think or reckon. But that ‘reckoning’ was associated with counting or calculating *as* thinking. Thinking is thusly directly associated with reason, and reason with rationalism, *as well as* a quantitative or calculative emphasis, Thus reason and logic are associated with the mathematical precision of counting or accounting as the method of thinking and judging. Logical and rational thinking then also are linked to

‘thinking in ratios’—by way of “relations in degree or number between two similar things and “the relative size of two quantities expressed as the quotient of one divided by the other (Am. Heritage Dict. ‘85 p. 1028).” To be rational is defined as “having or exercising reason,” and being “of sound mind; sane.” Thus to have ‘lost one’s reason’ is to exist in a status designated as ‘mad,’ insane,’ deranged. A status in which one cannot ‘properly account’ for reality or one’s behavior.

Rationalism is given as “the theory that the exercise of reason, rather than the acceptance of empiricism, authority, or spiritual revelation, provides the only valid basis for action or belief, and that reason is the prime source of knowledge and spiritual truth (p. 1028).” Rationalism is thusly figured as a theory that reasons that thinking *through* the ‘ratios of reason’ is “the only valid basis for belief” and “the prime source of knowledge *and spiritual truth.*” An intellectual tradition based upon ratio-centric reasoning as rationalism is thus one somehow resistant to empiricism and non-rational authority—even for spiritual truth. By inference then, spiritual truth would have to be rational or consist of rationales. Yet to rationalize is defined as “to make rational,” “to interpret from a rational standpoint,” and also as “to devise self-satisfying but incorrect reasons for (Am. Heritage Dict. ‘85 1028).” Thus whereas ‘to be rational’ associates with ‘counting’ and analyzing the ratios or relations between various aspects/parts/elements to pose some logical explanation of their composition or causal interactions, ‘to rationalize’ can be regarded as merely presenting the appearance of such logic *for the purpose of* justifying a claim that is not actually logical or reasonable. Some significant distinctions between logic, reason, and rationalizing are thus indicated.

Whereas reasoning ‘takes things apart’ in the loosening fashion of analysis so as to ‘take account of’ ‘ratios of relation’ between aspects of their many-ness, rationalism sets out to assert the only summary definitions, including the valid basis for belief, knowledge, and spiritual truth, *by way of* the intellectual method of logically consistent reasoning. A considerable impulse is implied in such an ambition to, if necessary, ‘rationalize’ one’s conclusions to ‘make it appear’ that the goal of such rationalism has been achieved *by reasonable method.* There is a reductive intention inherent in the ‘theory of rationalism’ that is likely to encounter ‘contradictory evidence’ generated by ‘thinking reasonably.’ Western philosophy has struggled with this inherent contradiction of its method and purpose in dazzlingly abstract and complex expressions. The impetus for the reductive subordination of logical analysis and its diversifying tendencies did not simply derive from the ambitions of theoretical rationalism, however. Again, the strain of religiously reductive monotheistic thought expressed in Hebraic and Christian religion can be regarded as providing much of the historical impetus for emphasis on linear self-consistency in logical thought and deterministic conclusions. In addition, the motives of a typically hierarchical social order have done much to subordinate reflective reason to its purposes of preserving a vertical structure of social status.

Nonetheless, the intrinsically non-reductive element of rational thought has persisted in Western intellectual tradition despite the evident ‘forces of reductive one-ness’ and linearizing hierarchy. In this

latter regard, the intellectual method of rational analysis has constituted a rather *anti-traditional* tradition, a persistently subversive aspect of the ‘reductive tale of Western philosophy.’ Oddly, perhaps, this contrast seems in keeping with that ambition in rationalism *not to* reflexively accept “empiricism, authority, or spiritual revelation” as the basis for action or belief—especially when in obvious contradiction to the evidence of ‘good reasoning.’ Thus one can observe how historically rational method has been the very cause of much resistance to and even refutation of the dominance of idealistically or mechanistically reductive purposes.

The Reductive Ratios of Reason, The Terror of History, and Modernist Anxiety about Identity and Meaningful Participation

One way of understanding the origins and character of the ‘gap’ between explanatory knowledge and participatory understanding in Western-style societies can be derived from the ancient Greek ‘inventions’ of rational philosophy and historiography. By disengaging explanation as intellectual reflection and analysis from established authority and the a priori domains of myth and religious belief (spiritual revelation), Greek thinkers composed a radically independent perspective for analyzing phenomenon. The deployment of ratio-centric logic proved a potent tool of investigation and explanation not only in what was termed “natural philosophy” but also in analysis of historical human events. Yet the same persistent impulse toward reductively self-consistent and conclusive theories rendered understanding through ambi- or poly-valence of *mythos* and experience ‘irrational.’ Nonetheless, these new modes of understanding, philosophy and history, became the dominant intellectual disciplines of Western culture, coming to characterize even the presentations of and justifications for the theology of religious belief.

The dominance of religion in Christianized Western culture then became dependent upon intellectual rationalism and was subsequently subordinated by the anti-traditionalist impulse of its intellectual method. That is not to say that reductive purpose ceased to dominate the applications of rational analysis but that the method became less devoted to rationalistic support of religious authority and the validity of biblical text in defining reality. Reasoning was thus given more liberty to operate with fewer predeterminations. This shift away from the dominance of traditional authority toward ‘new’ differentiations of identity, phenomenon, and causality brings the anti-traditional elements of rational method and Christian self-assertion into more direct competition with traditionally socialized or culturally habituated definitions of self, other, and world.

That triumph of rationalism over religious authority shifted the unitary cycling of time in pre-modernist and non-Western cultural imaginations toward a ‘linearized’ model more commensurate with progressive reasoning and mechanistic causation. The ‘ratios of reasoning’ became the very basis for all

explanation of time and event. Religion itself became first become historicalized as the 'literal miracles' of divine actions and incarnation that occurred in 'actual history' rather than some 'other world.' That 'literalized mythology' was subsequently displaced from its dominant position in Western belief by the materialistic mechanism of pragmatic scientific technology. Thereby, existence as the context of human consciousness and identity, became a defacto realm of mechanistic materiality in which the 'forces of creation' were knowable only through the 'ratios of reason.'

In so re-representing all basis for valid reality, Westernized intellectual culture presented its denizens with a singular context for being and becoming that posed no 'other-than-ordinary' or 'more-than-rationalized' reality. Time and life could only be validly viewed as a mechanical progression with no return or reprieve from the singularity of one life as an inexorable mechanistic progression ending in one death. All diversity is thereby subsumed in the hierarchical determinism of this ultimately materialistic context. The only basis for unitary one-ness thus becomes, with the implicit 'death of god,' purely materialistic. The anxiety of this contexting for life and consciousness has been termed "the terror of history," in reference to the 'dispiriting' effects of the mechanical identity and the deterministic implications of reductive historical explanation. Modernist societies and their philosophic expressions can be regarded as traumatically haunted by an anxiety deriving from a failure of such explanation to satisfactorily re-present human experience and its participation in the radical complexity of some non-reductive status of totality.

However, this anxiety appears once again to have provided sufficient impetus to the non-reductive aspect of rational method that it consistently destabilizes the dominance of reductive purpose. The philosophical impulse in modernist society has not completely resigned itself to the dominance of reductive explanation. One might assert then that the disturbing effects of radically reductive cultural mentality (i.e., the "terror of history") prompt a reactive assertion of the non-reductive applications of rational analysis that attempts to relativizes those reductions. One might sight here the Romantic philosophers' use of reason in extolling the value of irrationality and myth, or Nietzsche's turning of rationalism against its deployment as reductive socio-cultural summations of value and identity.

The Philosophical Problem of the Reality of Pluralistic Identity

The most pertinent philosophical question for the topic of this study arises in regard to the oppositional character of the binary logic reflexively utilized to define the nature of the 'real,' of 'being and becoming.' How is the 'reality' of pluralistic status or identity, of a non-definitive identification and metaphoric status of being to be validated in a culture whose mentality is structured around binary oppositions such as true > <false, real > <un-real ? If 'belief' in the validity of 'the real' is constituted by literalistic or positivistic 'proof,' then how can experience of co-existent ordinary and non-ordinary realities, of pluralistic identity in a non-reductive totality ever be validated? In the context of archaic

culture, there appears to be more ‘room to move’ in that there is both an ordinary and non-ordinary status of existence. Yet even in archaic context, traumatic ritual induction of metamorphic “liminality” appear to be required to relativize the reflexively reductive attitude of habitual identity to a more inclusive totalistic sensibility.

Thus concurrent experience of both a static or consistent ‘being’ and an ever changing, polyvalent ‘becoming’ appear extremely difficult to ‘hold,’ to ‘co-participate’ and validate, in either archaic or modernist cultural conditions. Such a difficulty might be posed as a ‘constant’ of ‘human being’ that manifests a consciousness somehow ‘alienated’ from ‘nature.’ But when there is an overriding cultural impulse toward a singular status of identity, truth, and reality, the difficulty must surely be the most extreme. A human tendency to generate a pragmatic, literalistic sense of ordinary reality, of individual self/other/world, is evidently inherent even in archaic cultural context—where it’s ‘necessary reductivity’ gets relativized by metamorphic experience in “liminality.” But modernist rationalism and humanism seem to have made that ‘pragmatic attitude’ the *only* valid basis for reality. The positivized personalistic perspective has in a sense become the ‘religious’ one, rather than one to be ‘relativized’ by mythical or religious experience. One might say that Husserl’s “natural standpoint,” which accepts sense-of-self-and-world as-established in one’s socialized persona, has become the ‘supernatural attitude’—the arbiter of all reality (Husserl, *Ideas* 101-03). ‘God’ has become the socialized rationale of mechanistic reductivity. That being the case, any non-reductive or pluralistic status is reflexively impossible to such an attitude.

The Search for Meaning and the Meaning of No Meaning

Anxiety about how the ‘ratios of reason’ in mechanistic rationalism can seem to devalue human consciousness and individual identity became primary concerns of Western philosophy. From the 19th thru the 20th century philosophical thought has grappled with the ‘question of meaning’ and nihilistic-seeming notions about there being no possibility of a synthesizing unitary perspective on identity, reality, and truth. Numerous sophisticated rational challenges have been posed to the assumption that there is an *a priori* status of reality and truth, much less one that can be positivistically manifested in philosophical terms. Reductive Hegelian-style deterministic dialectical reason that is ‘working out’ a ‘historical process’ has waxed and waned dramatically in popularity. Existential perspectives have ventured acceptance of ‘the truth’ as being, quite reasonably, no truth but what individual humans assert to be ‘the truth’—that meaning is only a construct of human consciousness validated by individual choice, rational or not, subjective or objective, and that such a ‘reality’ about definitions of reality constitutes human freedom as the capacity to choose meaning. Such uncertainty about certainty has provoked intense debates and radical propositions among philosophical partisans of reduction and non-reduction, determinism and relativism in what has been called ‘the search for meaning in modern life.’ (It has also

accompanied the most fantastic large-scale eruptions of violence and cultural disruption exhibited in human history.) Perhaps there is some meaning to be derived from these often agonized and evidently inconclusive disputations over the existence or non-existence of conclusive truth and meaning.

The search for meaning is the opposite of itself. It is what turns reality into that very senselessness that it intends to overcome; it is itself that symptom or illness the cure of which it claims to be. The longing for meaning is deluded about itself. What is the delusion? The search for meaning seeks something that cannot be sought because any seeking for it destroys what is to be gained. Meaning is not an entity that could be had, not a creed, a doctrine, a worldview, also not something like the fairytale treasure hard to attain. It is not semantic, not a content. Meaning, where it indeed exists, is first of all an implicit fact of existence, its a priori. It can never be the answer to a question; it is conversely an unquestioned and unquestionable certainty that predates any possible questioning. It is the groundedness of existence, a sense of embeddedness in life, of containment in the world—perhaps we could even say of in-ness as the logic of existence as such. Meaning exists if the meaning of life is as self-evident as the in-ness in water is for fish (Giegerich, Search for Meaning 2).

If Giegerich's insight is accurate, then philosophical contention about the existence of meaning in the forms of universal truth and positivized identity might be regarded as symptomatic of the 'conditions of consciousness' in modernist contexts. That context is then not so much configured by arguments over what meaning is or if it exists but by the lack of a "groundedness of existence," some experiential "embeddedness in life, of containment in the world." These terms suggest a status of non-participation for modern consciousness and human intellect in some inclusive field of totality. If such is indeed the existential status of contemporary consciousness and its intellectual reflections, the contemporary philosophical endeavor is not so much confronted with a further rationalizing of meaning as with finding some logical expression of 'life without meaning'—that is to say, life without *a priori* significance, fixed identity status, positivized reality, or absolute truth as extant in some universally valid, totalistically synthesizing, self consistent rationale.

Identifying the Philosophical Reality of Our Time: The (Potential) Modernist<>Postmodernist Dialectic

The very confusion over contemporary status and mentality as either modern or post-modern is suggestive of an 'crisis of identification.' While it is asserted in this study that this 'crisis' remains 'confined' within the reductive and oppositional terms of modernist mentality, such a 'furor' within 'one self' is an apt image of a context for 'knowing one's selves.' It seems that while the 'things of the world' are yet under the 'spell' of positivistic identification, conscious psychic identity has come 'unbound.' Thus it is 'internally' that the contemporary individual seems most likely to be able to experience the plurality of psyche and come to 'know' the 'realities of reality.' Thereby, one might 'participate' in the

metaphoric and metamorphic dynamics of psychosomatic existence, with/in the consciousness of one's individual selves, as self-reflective/reflexive subjects whose identity is elusive and various. A 'post'-modern 'crisis of identity,' of difficulty in locating 'the I,' enables an experience of sense-of-self as a 'representation' or 'figuration' rather than as the 'singular fact' of being 'individual.' Uncertainty about who or what or how one 'is' may enable capacity to experience 'self' as 'modalities of being' and a means of experiencing that is not positivistically literal but is genuinely 'real.' One might here participate in the co-creation and co-participation of some "Not-Not-I" by what is "I" and "Not-I." But such a sensing seems to require 'shape-shifting,' a metaphorical poiesis (creation, making) that might be termed a 'metaphoresis' of consciousness 'itself.'

Some would characterize Enlightenment thought in general as creating the modernist quest for an ultimate and inarguable version of scientific truth and moral law that would unite all humanity in a single 'reality' (resulting in various historical fascisms and the cultural 'homogenization' of democratic society and bourgeois capitalism). The critiques and deconstructions of such so-called totalizing notions have climaxed in the theories generally termed postmodernist.

It is no longer big news that the master narratives of bourgeois liberalism are under attack. There is a long history of many such skeptical sieges to positivism and humanism, and today's foot soldiers of theory—Foucault, Derrida, Habermas, Vattimo, Baudrillard—follow in the footsteps of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Marx, and Freud, to name but a few, in their attempts to challenge the empiricist, rationalist humanist assumptions of our cultural systems, including those of science [. . .]. (Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism 6)

The lineage of modernism's critics is long and varied. But the so-called "condition of postmodernity" has been characterized by shifts in knowledge and theory brought about by modernist attempts to deduce 'the truth' with finality or absolute completeness.

Fragmentation, indeterminacy, and intense distrust of all universal or 'totalizing' discourses (to use the favored phrase) are the hallmark of postmodernist thought. The rediscovery of pragmatism in philosophy (e.g. Rorty, 1979), the shift of ideas about the philosophy of science wrought by Kuhn (1962), the shift of ideas about the philosophy of emphasis upon discontinuity and difference in history and his privileging of 'polymorphous correlations in place of simple or complex causality,' new developments in mathematics emphasizing indeterminacy (catastrophe and chaos theory, fractal geometry), the reemergence of concern in ethics, politics, and anthropology for validity and dignity of 'the other,' all indicate a widespread and profound shift in 'the structure of feeling.' What all these examples have in common is a rejection of 'meta-narratives' (large-scale theoretical interpretations purportedly of universal application) [. . .]. (Harvey Condition of Postmodernity 9)

The quest for 'accuracy' or truthfulness in both rational philosophy and scientific theory have 'turned against' the reductive ambitions of modernist intentions, begetting successive reassessments of 'fact' and 'truth.'

Rather than 'take sides' in that debate and privilege the logical 'arguments' arrayed against a reductivist and mechanistic version of reality or truth as 'more real,' the 'philosophic reality' of the contemporary moment is here approached as inclusive of those arguments and the notions they critique, potentially constituting a 'totality' that is not reductively totalizing. Taken together, these conflicting assertions are here viewed for the most part as expressions of a polarity manifested 'within' the logic of modernist mentality. Thus the thought referenced by the terms modernism and postmodernism are here viewed as suggesting more the possible constellating of a 'complimentary pair' than an essential and inevitable 'opposition.' Indeed, their evidently antagonistic relationship is here approached as a consequence of their expressions being 'confined' or 'defined' within a mentality ('dynamic of identification'), incapable of validating their mutuality.

Discussions of a modernism versus a postmodernism often appear to be describing distinct historical periods and philosophical orientations. But such a distinction is neither consistently chronicled nor reasonably substantiated. Descriptions of both categories as historical periods include a mutual sense of rapid, rather chaotic change, paradox and contradiction. Indeed, much of what some commentators ascribe to modernism in artistic and intellectual movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century period bears great similarity to postmodernist notions of the late twentieth century. Many an avowed 'modernist' turns out to appear 'postmodern' from the perspective of contemporary distinctions, as well as vice versa. The more recent characterizations of philosophical intentions between the two categories provide a more consistent differentiation, though again these do not appear in any distinct historical succession.

To the degree that it does try to legitimate itself by reference to the past, therefore, postmodernism typically harks back to that wing of thought, Nietzsche in particular, that emphasizes the deep chaos of modern life and its intractability before rational thought. This does not imply, however, that postmodernism is simply a version of modernism; real revolutions in sensibility can occur when latent and dominated ideas in one period become explicit and dominant in another. Nevertheless, the continuity of fragmentation, ephemerality, discontinuity, and chaotic change in both modernist and postmodernist thought is important. (Harvey 44)

Thus it would appear that modernism and postmodernism are distinguished more by a set of attitudes toward "fragmentation, discontinuity, and chaotic change" rather than radically divergent cultural/historical conditions in time. The modernist perspective is characterized as accepting the trauma of change as the 'cost' of achieving an 'improved' or more 'advanced' status of culture and society aimed for by Enlightenment rationalism and idealism. The postmodernist perspective is characterized as accepting, even valuing, the fragmentary and discontinuous status of being as the 'true' nature of being unmasked by "meta-narratives" of universalized cultural hegemony. "Postmodernism swims, even wallows, in the fragmentary and the chaotic currents of change as if that is all there is" (Harvey 44).

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In order to avoid becoming the sort of reductive and thus inherently ‘fascistic’ “meta-narrative” which the postmodernist perspective takes as characteristic of the philosophical intentions of “modernism,” much “postmodern” thought eschews any attempt to ‘transcend’ or ‘improve upon’ the ‘unmasked’ chaotic status of existence and identity—as exemplified in “deconstructive” theories of language. Attempting to avoid becoming the reductively binary logic it critiques, postmodernist thought generally seeks to remain inconclusive. Yet in such a stance, much of postmodernist perspective appears to exist by virtue of its opposition to the so-called modernist. It is in a sense more anti-modernist than ‘post.’ Postmodernism viewed as a ‘reactionary’ impulse can thus be characterized as derived from the same oppositionalist mentality as is modernist thought: one seeking to assert absolute Truth, the other asserting the absolute impossibility of definitive truth or meaning.

Willfully contradictory, then, postmodern culture uses and abuses the conventions of discourse. It knows it cannot escape implication in the economic (late capitalist) and ideological (liberal humanist) dominants of its time. There is no outside. All it can do is question from within [. . .]. (Hutcheon xiii)

Because it is contradictory and works within the very systems it attempts to subvert, postmodernism can probably not be considered a new paradigm (even in some extension of the Kuhnian sense of the term). It has not replaced liberal humanism, even if it has seriously challenged it. It may mark, however, the site of the struggle of the emergence of something new. (Hutcheon 5)

Taken as a phenomenon that “may mark [. . .] the site of the struggle of emergence of something new,” postmodernist thought suggests some ‘new possibility’ in its retreat from modernist belief in the idealized intentions of its own mentality, its own version of reality.

Modernist sentiments may have been undermined, deconstructed, surpassed, or bypassed, but there is little certitude as to the coherence or meaning of the systems of thought that may have replaced them. Such uncertainty makes it peculiarly difficult to evaluate, interpret, and explain the shift that everyone agrees has occurred. Does postmodernism, for example, represent a radical break with modernism, or is it simply a revolt within modernism against a certain form of ‘high modernism’ as represented, say, in the architecture of Mies van der Rohe and the blank surfaces of minimalist abstract expressionist painting? Is postmodernism a style [. . .] or should we view it strictly as a periodizing concept? [. . .] Does it have a revolutionary potential by virtue of its opposition to all forms of meta-narratives (including Marxism, Freudianism, and all forms of Enlightenment reason) and its close attention to ‘other worlds’ and to ‘other voices’ that have for too long been silenced (women, gays, blacks, colonized peoples with their own histories)? Or is it simply the commercialization and domestication of modernism, and a reduction of the latter’s already tarnished aspirations to a laissez-faire, ‘anything goes’ market eclecticism? (Harvey_ 42)

The philosophical perspective inherent in this disavowal of idealized and absolutist modernist definitions and intentions enables some affirmation of a fragmentary condition of culture and identity, of a ‘value’ for ‘paradoxical diversity.’ It carries the phenomenological views of Husserl, Heidegger and others in its emphasis on the ‘actual’ and ‘present’ moment in contrast to that of a ‘idealized’ past or future (modernity’s “natural standpoint”). The significance of presence and the sensorial phenomena of

immediate experience are given primacy. But as a general attitude it seems to remain subject to that which it critiques. Postmodernism by its own assertions is in and of modernism. By refusing to validate any 'reality' or 'identity' it logically (if unintentionally) asserts a meta-narrative_of indeterminacy.

Thus it is offered here that modernism and postmodernism are not actually distinct but co-dependent perspectives that 'came into being' with the onset of whatever the 'modernist' era may be defined as. The philosophical attributes, the 'logical realities' of that era can be viewed as subsequently becoming differentiated as "modernist" and "postmodernist." Thus these categories can be posed as 'mirror images' of each other, as the polarities that 'drive' the 'frantic dynamo' of 'capitalist culture.' The 'schizoid' qualities attributed to more recent history and the "postmodern condition" can be readily associated with the oppositional dualism of the entire 'modern period,' articulated by such notions as Cartesian distinction between mind and matter. Postmodernist thought seems more intent on affirming than re-contexting a status of discontinuity and endlessly deferred or disseminated_schizoid identity.

But if, as the postmodernists insist, we cannot aspire to any unified representation of the world, or picture it as a totality full of connections and differentiations rather than as perpetually shifting fragments, then how can we possibly aspire to act coherently with respect to the world? The simple postmodernist answer is that since coherent representation and action are either repressive or illusionary (and therefore doomed to be self-dissolving and self-defeating), we should not even try to engage in some global project. (Harvey 52)

Such a 'renunciation' of the 'heroic' intentions of modernist impulses to 'improve' upon the world by imposing humanistic ideals and organizational controls is often viewed as nihilistic. It is as if postmodernist notions effect some 'surrender' to 'forces beyond our control.' Perhaps there is some basis here for associating this attitude with that imposed upon initiates in archaic ritual inductions. Perhaps the 'condition of postmodernism' might be understood as engaging a status of "liminal anti-structure" in which the "natural standpoint" of personalistic literalism and human-centered identity are 'deconstructed,' or relativized to a 'larger reality.' Yet, following Turner, that experience of altered status, in the absence of the contexting of ritual culture and a participatory mentality, likely remains "liminoid"—not central to cultural standards of significance and thereby relatively 'meaningless' or invalid.

Following on this notion of the 'postmodern condition' as a sort of spontaneous 'initiatory induction,' with its artistic styles and 'theorizing' viewed as an expression of "anti-structural" dynamism, one might well take note of how time and space are contemporarily experienced.

As space appears to shrink [as a consequence of faster transport and communication modes] to a 'global village' or telecommunications and a 'spaceship earth' of economic and ecological interdependencies—to use just two familiar and everyday images—and as time horizons shorten to the point where the present is all there is (the world of the schizophrenic), so we have to learn how to cope with an overwhelming sense of compression of our spatial and temporal worlds. The experience of time—space compression is challenging, exciting, stressful, and sometimes deeply troubling, capable of sparking, therefore, a diversity of social, cultural, and political responses. 'Compression' should be understood as relative to any preceding state of

affairs. (Harvey 240)

This notion of “time—space compression” harks back to the preceding discussion of how ritual “liminality” and the realm of the ‘supernatural’ in archaic culture are experienced as an non-ordinary dimension of being. Jameson views the

[. . .] spatial peculiarities of post-modernism as symptoms and expression of a new and historically original dilemma, one that involves our insertion as individual subjects into a multidimensional set of radically discontinuous realities, whose frames range from the still surviving spaces of bourgeois private life all the way to the unimaginable decentering of global capitalism itself. Not even Einsteinian relativity, or the multiple subjective worlds of the older modernists, is capable of giving any adequate figuration to this process, which in lived experience makes itself felt by the so-called death of the subject, or, more exactly, the fragmented and schizophrenic decentering dispersion of this last. (Jameson, “Politics of Theory” 351)

It is difficult to imagine a more extreme state of contrast to the modernist notion of directed, orderly assertion of humanistic control than this description of the “postmodern” experience. Yet, while the modernist < postmodernist contrast might be posed as a potential dialectic between linearly literalistic and non-literalistic perspectives, that potential dialectic appears to remain ‘suspended’ as a ‘conflict’ by being contexted within modernist ‘binary binds,’ such as the ‘literally true or false,’ in a contest for the exclusive or ‘real’ truth. A genuinely ‘post’ modernist mentality would thus rather have to logically validate both modernist and post/anti-modernist perspectives concurrently if a rational basis for ‘actual’ pluralistic identity is to be generated. To be sure, considerable intelligent thought in rational philosophy has elucidated various notions of some such dialectical logic of concurrent being and becoming during the historical period of ‘the modern era.’ But, again, a capacity to ‘live’ such a non-reductive logic seems remote.

That dilemma is not one first illustrated by so-called postmodernist thought. Nietzsche gave it some of its most noted and inflammatory expression, configuring the seemingly contradictory impulses of ‘creating a better world’ with that of the willingness to destroy all existing culture and much human life in the process if necessary. To this attitude he attached the notion of “creative destruction,” as summarized by Harvey:

All the Enlightenment imagery about civilization, reason, universal rights, and morality was for naught. The eternal and immutable essence of humanity found its proper representation in the figure of Dionysus: ‘to be at one and the same time “destructively creative” (i.e. to form the temporal world of individualization and becoming, a process destructive of unity) and “creatively destructive” (i.e. to devour the illusory universe of individualization, a process involving the reaction of unity). The only path to affirmation of self was to act, to manifest will, in this maelstrom of destructive creation and creative destruction even if the outcome was bound to be tragic.

The image of ‘creative destruction’ is very important to understanding modernity precisely because it derived from the practical dilemmas that faced the implementation of the modernist project. How could a new world be created, after all, without destroying much that had gone

before? [. . .] The literary archetype of such a dilemma is [. . .] Goethe's Faust. An epic hero prepared to destroy religious myths, traditional values, and customary ways of life in order to build a brave new world out of the ashes of the old, Faust is, in the end, a tragic figure. (Harvey 16)

If Faust is some ways a prototypical modernist in his fascistic drive to a 'new world order' he also expresses a nihilistic 'postmodernist' character, acting out of 'pure' self indulgence without respect for any existing 'order' as if none such could be valid anyway. Ultimately there seems no unraveling of modernist and postmodernist elements in the historical events or psychological character of the modern era, so rife with competing, conflicting '-isms.' But Nietzsche's association of the struggle for identity in such historical context with the mythical figure of Dionysus and "creative destruction" may prove to still hold considerable significance.

It is suggested here that a way 'around' the modernist > <postmodernist conundrum requires a shift in the basis for posing a totality—one not defined by the oppositional dualism of real versus un-real, true versus false, and correct versus incorrect, and thus one that is non-reductive yet 'inclusive.' While totalizing is a postmodernist term for the reductive effect of meta-narratives, this study seeks to express a sense of a multi-dimensional or pluralistic 'inclusivity' by the terms 'totality' and 'totalistic,' but not one that is 'literally' or 'quantifiable.'

To pose such an non-reductive 'inclusivity' a further category such as that of the 'un-real real' which might logically inter-penetrate categories of 'real' and 'un-real' seems thus required. But while aspects of rational philosophy might posit some logical basis for such a category, the over-riding mentality available for validating identification of it as 'reality' remains oppositionally configured—the modernist "natural standpoint" is inherently oppositional and postmodernism is configured by and within it. The rational method of modernism might ultimately (in its self-deconstruction) have generated the idea of such an inclusivity but its 'literal' validation as 'reality' seems to remain 'impossible.' Thus the 'problem' of evading the literalistic, positivistic reductivity of modernist mentality appears to persist. It appears then, quite 'reasonably,' that this 'problem' is not simply one of logic, but rather one of 'belief.'

Beyond the Reductions of Indeterminacy and Relativism: Derrida's 'Difference' of Difference as Reduction of Identity to the Identity of Non-Identity or a Shift toward Non-Reductive And Indeterminate Status of Concurrent Presence and Absence?

Perhaps a/the epitome of the consternations of modernist > <postmodernist con-fusions is given expression in Derrida's theory of "difference" as the "identity of identity and non-identity." In an attempt to evade the oppositional trap of either imposing arbitrary (metaphysical) hierarchies of meaning and truth on language and identity or else relativistically relegating seeking 'actual presence' to

the infinite regress of signifiers deferring to signifiers (re-presentations referring to other re-presentations) with no possibility of ‘actual meaning’ he posits a status ‘beyond oppositional duality.’

For Derrida, too, the difficulty of metaphysics consists in the fact that it begins from one of a pair of opposites which is treated as a founding term, even though it is in fact intrinsically bisected by its other. This is why Derrida insists, for example, that idealism cannot be defeated by counterposing a materialism, but—ultimately—only by going beyond the duality. Thus he argues that, ‘At the point at which the concept of *differance* . . . intervenes all these metaphysical oppositions (signifier/signified; sensible/intelligible, writing/speech; *parole/langue*; diachrony/synchrony; space/time’ passivity/activity’ etc.) . . . become non-pertinent’ (Dews 24).

Such a transcending of idealistic reduction that is not a ‘move to opposition’ requires a non-material, non-positive status of inclusion of such metaphysically presumptuous oppositions. If there is no transcendent signified to be ‘arrived at’ in the deferral of meaning in language, then what might be ‘actually’ transcendent of the reductively oppositional search for absolute truth and identity as identical to our re-presentations (signifiers)? Derrida’s response is the absolute difference of entities, rather than their sameness—what is ‘the same’ about them is that they are indefinitely different. Derrida proposes an identity that is not of ‘the same’ but of *the different*. Identity thereby becomes ‘of the identity of non-identity’ in so far as identity is reflexively composed in a reductive, oppositional manner. Thus Derrida conceives an identification composed through the all pervading ‘play of difference’—a play whose totality constitutes the unifying continuity of meaningful re-presentation he terms “difference”—a word derived in French from ‘to differ’ and ‘to defer.’

In his ‘Introduction’ to ‘The Origins of Geometry’ . . . Derrida speaks of difference as ‘transcendental’, indeed he speaks of a ‘primordial and pure consciousness of difference.’ By the time of *Speech and Phenomena*, however, Derrida has realized this is an incoherent formulation. Instead, he begins to speak of a difference, or ‘*differance*’, which would be a ‘primordial nonself-presence.’ For if presence and self-presence are essentially conditioned by the structures of time and writing, which cannot be reduced to presence, then the ‘movement of difference is not something which occurs to a transcendental subject. It is what produces it.’ *Differance* appears to be—in a non-historical sense—‘older’ than presence and the transcendental reduction . . . (Dews 18).

Difference-as-difference, as the originless origin of presence, an atemporal complex of associations that enables the meaning of signifiers through their interminable differing/deferring to each other’s identifications (re-presentations), thus necessarily transcends the grasp of ordinary consciousness. The very ‘presence’ of consciousness derives from ‘absent’ references (re-presented in words and concepts) that are determined/determining by way of a transcendent structuring of difference—difference precedes/pervades/in-forms all in a (appropriately) non-linear, polyvalent dynamical manner. Meaning and identity are constituted then in a ‘contingual’ ‘carrying over’ between signifiers characterizable as a ‘metaphorical hyper activity’ among re-presentations. Thus, any status of ‘transcendental consciousness’

would have to be of/in that activity's "primordial nonself-presence." As such, it 'exists' in a dynamical field that is, by any reductive manner, beyond rationalization: "There cannot be a science of difference itself in its operation, as it is impossible to have a science of the origin of presence itself, that is to say of a certain nonorigin (Derrida, *Grammatology*, London, 1976 p. 63/Dews 25)." It would seem reasonable to consider this a definition of an 'un-real real' status.

Yet such a summary determination about the all-defining role of 'absolute difference' appears itself to be rather reductive in posing identity as the identity of identity and non-identity that 'takes place' in the 'origin of non-origin.' To many this concept seems virtually 'unthinkable.' But as a 'deconstruction' of structuralist analyses of the role of difference in determining identity or meaning, it might suggest there is another context for mediating oppositional reductions than an abstract one—be it positively or 'negatively' transcendental, dynamically reductive or non-reductive.

Thus, although structuralism was correct to argue that differentiability is a condition of meaning, it cannot be seen as the sole determinant of meaning since the structure of differences can itself only be semantically discriminated. The identity of meaning is no less a condition of difference, in other words, than difference is a condition of identity. However, although this argument leads us towards the conclusion that identity and difference are not opposed to each other in the manner they have often conceived to be, it does not oblige us to adopt a philosophy of the absolute, of the identity of identity and non-identity. Rather, the relation between identity and difference must be seen as mediated by the peculiar lack of self-identity of the speaking subject, which thereby becomes an indispensable third term. The reciprocal relation between meaning and structure is secured by an interpreting and meaning-transforming subject which seeks to understand itself, to coincide with itself, through language, although this coincidence can never be complete (Dews 28)

After all the permutations of idealist presumptions about absolute truth and structuralist analyses of deterministic creations of meaning in the differential structuring of language it might well appear logical to accept a non-oppositional relation of identity and non-identity. Thus both truth and meaning can be regarded as 'taking place' not 'in absolute abstraction' or structural differentiability, nor in a pervasive non-present origin of non-origin as "difference," but rather in/as how a given subject mediates the confrontation of 'a self' seeking to understand/coincide with itself—as a presence that is somehow also always an absence due to the psychical character of its complex subjectivity—by interpreting the reciprocal relations between meaning and structure *through language*. Thereby, truth and meaning could be said to be experiential or 'of an embodied status' rather than objectively abstract or linguistically structural since neither can 'exist' without the mediation of the third aspect of the self-mediating subjectivity of a self that both has and does not have identity while it is experiencing the 'play of difference.' This notion of a status that is and is not 'a status,' that has and does not have 'an origin'—or perhaps is and is not 'originating'—might then be considered a pluralistic participation in the radically complexity of dynamical totality. The fragmentary effect of exclusive identifications of one-ness is

thereby transmuted to the relational inter-play of a many-ness derived from the polyvalence of “difference.”

And, if the “movement of difference is not something which occurs to a transcendental subject,” but “It is what produces it (Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, Evanston, IL, 1973 p. 81/Drews 18),” then a consciousness that ‘embodies’ that movement is transcendental of oppositional status by virtue of its participation in the radically complex dynamical ‘movement of difference.’ It is further reasonable to conceive of such a ‘context for making meaning’ as ‘taking place’ in a collective of persons striving to understand/coincide with itself and by interpreting the reciprocal relations between meaning and structure through language—and thereby ‘undergoing’ the ‘movement of difference’ that enables such a collective to embody a non-reductive, inclusive manifestation of “difference.”

Both apoplectic disdain and considerable enthusiasm have greeted Derrida’s deconstructive method and this notion of the non-original origin of meaning in ‘difference’ in certain academic contexts (most notably literary criticism). Yet these responses have tended to either condemn or promote Derrida’s notions for a sense of relativistic liberation from the constraints of meaning continuity—an emphasis that Derrida’s work in general can fairly be said to resist. Thus, in so far as relativism is the post-modernist corollary to reductive modernist literalism, Derrida’s model of ‘non-transcendental transcendent origins of meaning’ in the absent< >present play of difference-as-difference appears then to remain largely uncomprehended. However appropriate it is as a philosophical re-presentation of many-ness in one-ness and the non-reductive dynamical character of radical totality, it remains, to most of either modernist or postmodernist perspectives, essentially ‘beyond belief’—being valid only as a reduction of positivism to negativism, of absolute meaning to indefinite indeterminism.

It might well not be ‘fair,’ though, to expect philosophy, as an intellectual discipline, to be the modality of conscious expression responsible for crossing the threshold between the ordinary and non-ordinary, between the reductive and non-reductive realms of validity. Philosophical thought is, after all, *by definition* rationalistic.

Since the finitude and discursivity of thought renders it *in principle* incapable of attaining the absolute, an unclosable gap opens up between the *claim* of philosophy and its possible performance. If the absolute is unknowable, then the task of philosophy becomes nothing other than the explication of this unknowability itself. In a similar manner, Derrida is concerned with the unthinkableability of *difference*, with the incessant attempt to turn back language against itself, and with the necessary failure of that attempt. Furthermore, the restless character of the work of both Derrida and Schelling (‘the Proteus of German Idealism’) can be seen not as a manifestation of arbitrariness or inconsistency but rather as a logical consequence of their point of departure: it is only through the repeated development and the repeated collapse, of *Systementwürfe*, philosophical strategies and terminologies that the nature of philosophy’s ‘impossible’ object can be obliquely indicated (Dews 26).

The most one could thus expect is that philosophical thought could deconstruct its own intrinsic reductions of any absolutely inclusive, dynamically radical status. On that accounting, Derrida seem to have 'served the philosophical purpose beyond all expectation' and thereby to great consternation.

The Conflict of Reason and Belief for Positivistically Religious Mentality

'The problem,' then, regarding validating pluralistic identification, is not necessarily, or not only, a 'logical' one. It is also, or at the same time, a 'religious' problem. As Harvey summarizes, "The postmodern theological project is to reaffirm God's truth without abandoning the powers of reason" (Harvey, 41). Yet subsequent to the Enlightenment there is (arguably) no "God," (no intentional, creative agency), from which to 'derive' a 'truth' beyond human 'reason.' If the prevailing ordinary or "natural attitude" has thus become inclusive of the 'supernatural,' if rationalist, positivistic science has displaced myth and magic as the basis for validating a 'totalistic' reality, then 'reality' can only be validated by the affirmation of that now defacto 'religious' attitude. The scientific method becomes, by default as it were, inherently metaphysical—the "source of first principles and ultimate reality," on "the structure of the universe (cosmology)," including the "immaterial; incorporeal" and "supernatural," (American Heritage Dictionary '78, 825).

One can interpret the tangible experience imposed upon initiates in archaic ritual as an 'empirical affirmation' of the non-ordinary field of dynamical totality—a means of engaging 'literal experience' of the non-literal, non-positivistic dynamics of totality 'beyond' ordinary reality and habitual identity. For the objectified, non-participatory attitude of modernist mentality, such an experience, even if engaged, could be most difficult to validate. It would seem that the capacity to 'believe' in 'the real' is distinctly different between the archaic and modernist mentalities. While the archaic in general appears to 'prove' the existence of a 'reality' 'beyond' (yet also within) the ordinary one by deliberately induced experience of "liminal anti-structure," the non-participatory modernist appears to require such proof in the form of scientific positivism. Modernist 'truth' exists more as 'immaterial' logic or 'objective' fact than as experience of metamorphic participation with non-human 'forces.' If 'metamorphic dynamism' is to be 'believed' it will have to be 'proved.'

For the modernist perspective then, the 'truth' of 'reality' seems to exist 'out there,' whether as 'abstract' logic or as positivistic phenomena. Of these two versions, however, it is the later that is more 'tangible' and thus perhaps the closest to 'participatory experience.' The modernist opposition of 'mind' and 'matter' makes this 'dislocation' of the 'place' of 'reality' from the individual's intelligence particularly problematic. It would seem that in such a status of the separation of logical truth (as abstract thought) from body/matter, and of 'positive fact' (as measurable phenomena) from 'mind,' the tangible character of reality is ultimately validated by 'measure' and 'calculation.'

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In a sense then, the modernist relies more on ‘blind faith’ (in abstract logic and measure) than does the archaic for the ‘validation’ of ‘reality’ (by means of practical experience and metamorphic co-participation). If the realm of ‘supernatural’ totality is now portrayed by positivistic science, then what that now ‘holy’ scientific method ‘says is so’ must *be so*—regardless of personal experience or sense of ‘ordinary reality.’ Thus the ‘merely’ logical assertion of a ‘reality’ (as in rational philosophy or psychology) is not necessarily ‘endorsed’ by the ‘official arbiter’ of ‘literal truth’: calculation and measurement. Perhaps such a distinction about how ‘the real’ is validated suggests the reason for why a sense of ‘impossibility’ about validating the reality of any non-literalistic ‘reality,’ of some ‘un-real real,’ persists for a positivistic mentality.

Here is found an association between the phenomenological philosophic qualities of much postmodernist thought, or cultural activity, and the primacy of scientific method as arbiter of reality. The latter also places emphasis on ‘the actual’ as complexly and presently experienced rather than the ‘ideal’ as habitually defined or desired. As rationalism seeks to establish essentialities and ‘eliminate’ contradictions only ‘in the end’ to find ‘idealism’ and reductivity ‘irrational,’ so the scientific method encounters conflict between its hypothetical propositions of ‘the real’ established as ‘that which is not disproved’ and absolutist definitions or theories posed as ‘scientific truth.’

A Properly Improper Rational Knowing: Posing a Non-Reductively Transcendent Philosophical “a/Theology” of Wholly Erring

Confronted with the conflict between rationally certain assumptions about reductive fixity or oneness of ‘truthful knowing’ and the antithetical ones about an absolute uncertainty or many-ness in the very means of knowing, one is likely to be ‘at a loss’ or ‘without bearings’ as a self, in a life and world that are experientially real but rationally ‘in doubt.’ It would appear that not only theology but also philosophy have ‘failed’ in providing a ‘meaningful basis for knowing meaningfully.’ In terms of ‘faith’ one seems faced with a making a Kierkegardian ‘leap of faith’ in and for itself, a sort of existentialist resort to declaring one’s own choice as the source of meaning. Such a move returns one in a sense to Descartes’ assumption *cogito ergo sum*, indicating one has existent identity because one thinks, and thus that ‘things are real only because one thinks them.’ Yet thereby it would seem that the transcendental god/creator rejected by positivistic Enlightenment thought ‘reappears’ as the human mind that creates self and world (and thereby meaningful knowing) by way of thinking.

The typically (absolutely) literalized otherness or alterity of God to humanness is thus ‘relativized’—the inherent binary hierarchy of the opposition between divine power/purpose and human understanding is dispelled. Or is it simply thereby reversed? Human consciousness, even in the ‘un-thinking of transcendental gods and reductively absolute truth or reality, does not un-make the

metaphysical and transcendental logic of knowing, but rather assumes that reality and world-making power unto itself.

Thus yet another 'absolute power of creation and order' establishes its dominion over all things (and 'thinglessness') by virtue of its being the source of all structure and meaning (this time 'of' human rationalism). It is then the attitude of the human mind that stands as the reductive limitation on knowing inclusively and validating experience of radically complex totality in so far as it regards itself as the 'transcendental signifier.' How can such a god, 'made' now of positivistic self-consistent rationalism, be relativized to a radical 'otherness' or alterity of self and reality in such a way that rationality is neither defined in opposition to irrationality nor simply (reductively) negated? How are identity, reality, and truth to be reasonably known without the knower becoming hierarchically/transcendentally superior to, or abstracted from participation in/as self, other, and world? How is the 'creator of the world,' the 'divine arbiter of meaning,' here logically identified as human consciousness, to know itself as also both such a 'metaphysically transcendent source' and also the embodied phenomenon whose 'meaningfulness' is created by and also creates that 'non-positivized status of creative knowing' that knows itself as human subjectivity?

The logical dispersal of the existence of a transcendental signified, of any absolute status of truth, does not dispense with the phenomenon of meaning. The reasoning that arrives at the rational understanding of the indefinite disseminations of signification or re-presentation still derives from criteria, still has metaphysical *a priori* references,.

The quest for truth represents a futile effort to escape the world of appearances and to discover (or uncover) the fugitive transcendental signified. In spite of protests to the contrary, this pursuit is never disinterested. (Taylor Erring 177)

No matter how hard one tries to obey the 'moral rules' of rational analysis, how carefully one deploys the methodology of ratio-centric reasoning, there will be 'predeterminations.' Yet just as surely there will be 'mistakes,' errors of definition, summation, and identification that 'fail' to fully manifest the presence of the re-presented in deferring interminably to other re-presentations. Every assertion of a presence implies an absence and so errs.

The inescapability of erring calls into question the notion of truth that lies at the heart of the Western theological and philosophical network. Whether implicitly or explicitly, truth and God are usually identified: *Deus est Veritas* and *Veritas est Deus*. (Taylor, 175)

The making of meaning that is indefinitely meaningful ever remains a 'world making act' and thus somehow religiously a 'matter of belief.' The elimination of god from the 'ratios of reasoning' does

not, evidently, eliminate some inevitably 'divine creation' of the self, other, and world. Yet that 'creativity' appears now to arise out of an uncertainty rather than a fixed certainty.

When certainty is unattainable, everything remains undecidable. The undecidability is not temporary; it reflects "a permanence composed of impermanence." Such impermanence, however, does not necessarily imprison and does not have to generate malaise. To the contrary, it can actually liberate. [. . .] When it no longer seems necessary to reduce manyness to oneness and to translate the equivocal as univocal, it becomes possible to give up the struggle for mastery [. . .] (Taylor, 176).

If humans are not capable of being the 'masters of understanding' and there is (reasonably) no The Master/God positivized 'out there' somewhere, what or where is the source of meaningful knowing?

If, however, the divine milieu is an acentric or excentric totality, which neither begins nor ends, then it would seem that nothing inscribed within this noncentered whole can be centered or whole. It is important to recognize that this centerlessness is not the result of the loss of an actual center. While pure origin never was and perfect end never will be, fixed center never is (Taylor, 156).

The (reasonably posited) "divine milieu" thus becomes a centerless or excentric totality with no beginning or ending with/in which human consciousness seeks and co-creates meaning by way of its knowing and not knowing. Humans both individually and collectively become wanderers who know by way of 'crossing boundaries' between differences and distinctions—identifications that are made in the 'knowing' of them which is meaningful in reference to other knowings, etc.

The coimplication of differing viewpoints establishes the contextuality of all perspectives. Every interpretive stance is inextricably entangled in a formative context. This contextuality carries important semantic implications. Since perspectives are radically relational, meaning is irreducibly relative. There is no such thing as semantic atomism, intrinsic meaning, or meaning-in-itself. [. . .] As a result of this interstitiality, meaning is thoroughly liminal. It repeatedly appears and disappears at the threshold of interrelated perspectives. Such marginal meaning inevitably bears the mark of a cross, which delimits the place where signifiers play freely. In the absence of a privileged signified, this play of signification is boundless. [. . .] The disappearance of the transcendental signified marks the end of every form of authoritative monologism that struggles to contain and arrest the free exchange of signs. Since signs always entail difference and thus are never simply self-identical, meaning is unavoidable equivocal rather than univocal. The relativity of meaning presupposes the nonexclusivity of opposites. This complex interplay of differences escapes reflection that remains bound to and by hard-and-fast distinctions and firm definitions. (Taylor, 173)

Thus the 'erring' of 'arriving' at one status of knowing or understanding after another is the very 'way of making meaning' that plays out in the interplay of differing perspectives, contrasting knowings.

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This insight calls into question the common understanding of play as the enjoyment of a “timeless presence,” resulting from the actualization of an immediate present. As the ceaseless interplay of presence and absence, the present is neither properly present nor absent. The free activity of play enacts rather than represses this paradoxical coincidence of presence and absence. “Play is always play of absence and presence, but if it is to be [160] thought radically, play must be conceived of before the alternative of presence and absences. Far from realizing an immediate present or timeless presence, play always induces an absence that “is the disruption of presence.” [Derrida Writing and Difference p. 292] This unsettling disruption is evident in the undeniable risk of radical play (Taylor, 159).

The play of meaningful inter-play hereby becomes a movement between pre-supposed presences that are absences that ‘move understanding along’ through the erring tracing of meaning making. The ‘actual ground of creation’ is thus a groundless wandering. As such the ‘god source’ of truth is a wanderer, a ghostly transient.

The wanderer moves to and fro, hither and thither, with neither fixed course nor certain end. Such wandering is erring—erring in which one not only roams, roves, and rambles but also strays, deviates, and errs. Free from every secure dwelling, the unsettled, undomesticated wanderer is always unsettling and uncanny. Having forsaken the straight and narrow and given up all thought of return, the wanderer appears to be a vagrant, a renegade, a pervert—an outcast who is an irredeemable outlaw. The outlaw is forever liminal, marginal; he is curiously ambivalent, shifty, and slippery. Insofar as the outlaw is not only a heretic who transgresses but also a subversive who breaks the (power of the) law, erring points to the ways of grace. Erring is serpentine wandering that comes, if at all, by grace—grace that is mazing. But when and How? When is such serpentine erring possible? And how does mazing grace arrive?

The time and space of graceful erring are opened by the death of God, the loss of self, and the end of history(Taylor, 150).

In this “a/theology” of a postmodern modernist philosophy, Taylor signifies a reasonable status of statuslessness, a ‘meaningful wandering’ in/between meanings, as creators discovering creation in all its irreducible diversity—the mastery of which is the avoidance of any singular sense of mastery. This way of thinking about thinking, of logically making the contrast between the presence of one-ness and the ‘absence’ of many-ness reasonably non-reductive and meaningfully uncertain, poses some rational relativization of the (necessarily) restrictive mentality of ordinary identifications to a more inclusive, radically complex, totality. This notion of ‘holy erring’ whose “mazing grace” leads one on to/through a wholeness of the indefinite totality of significations. It thereby ‘transcends’ the opposition of reductive and non-reductive status without ‘going elsewhere’ but remains among and of them. Perhaps this is about as proper an improper contexting for knowing knowing, as thinking the un-real reality of understanding by way of re-presentations, that is rationally thorough yet reasonably self-consistent. As a philosophical expression of ‘truth’ it acknowledges the limits of its method of rational analysis by basing that truth on the actual way that method knows according to its reductive criteria for particularized identifications of

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differentiated one-nesses. Thus those ‘ethics of philosophical morality’ that demand ‘logical self discipline,’ appear to be fulfilled in so far as its method has arrived where it ‘actually’ leads. That is to say, when practiced in regard to “the theory that the exercise of reason, rather than the acceptance of empiricism, authority, or spiritual revelation, provides the only valid basis for action or belief, and that reason is the prime source of knowledge and spiritual truth (Am. Heritage. Dict. ’85, 1028).” There is, however, yet another perspective upon the ‘fate of reason after modernism.’

Thinking Truthfully as Conceptual Enactment of the Logic of Forms: Giegerich’s Historical Transit from Semantic Mythical Meaning ‘In the World’ to Syntactic Meaning in Non-Dualistic Dialectical Process

[Citations for the following section await a book in preparation for publication]

One of the critiques of meaning and its makings that most rigorously articulate the potential/intrinsic modernist < > post-modernist dialectic between reductive and non-reductive epistemics is found in the works of Wolfgang Giegerich. Perhaps because his disciplinary background is in psychology, his work most overtly elucidates the confluence between psychological and philosophical thought intrinsic to much of the ‘critique of modernism.’ His psyche-logical analyses of identity and the making of meaning in modernist collective consciousness extend the ‘logic of positivism’ so that its rationalism validates a non-dualistic, thus non-positivistic, status of logical truth. In gross summary, ‘truth’ from this perspective is ‘of the logical forms of things’ rather than ‘of the things themselves.’ To ‘know truthfully’ is thus to appropriately discern the logic of forms under analysis (be these biological, social, or conceptual) and to think them ‘as their logical configurations’ rather than as positivized things, images, or concepts.

Conceptual thought, in this view, can either be reflexively positivistic (assuming that its ‘contents’ are ‘things’) or ‘think through itself’ to know its knowing as abstracted re-presentation that can attempt a rational analysis of ‘how things are’ or ‘work.’ This latter style of thinking de-positivizes knowing without abrogating the validity of reason’s representation of ‘how things really are.’ It acknowledges that reasonable knowing is not ‘of things’ but of the ‘logical forms of things.’ As such, it is not a style of thinking that can presume to ‘arrive’ at the ultimate, definitive status of the things it analyses, but can continually refine its accurate assessment of their logical forms. There is a suggestion in Giegerich’s work that when such assessment provides a relatively accurate representation of the logical forms of things under analysis and one radically ‘thinks’ that form as non-positivized truth a sort of ‘logical gnosis’ can occur—truthfully thinking the logical form of a ‘thing’ could thus ‘participate in, with, or as’ that thing’s thinging. Two aspects of Giegerich’s thought are cited here to illustrate these notions.

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In his consideration of how philosophical analyses are structured and generally understood, he notes that there has been a persistent miss-interpretation of Hegel's dialectical method (Unpublished Paper, Seminar 6/04). In Giegerich's reading of Hegel, the dialectical method is not reductively oppositional. It does not portray a process pitting opposed elements against each other as thesis and antithesis that become a wholly other status as a synthesis. Rather, to Giegerich and other analysts he cites, Hegel articulates a process of dialectical relations between parts of a continuum involved in an on going series of reconfigurations of their 'logical form.' Though that process be conceived as indefinite or interminable, it does manifest particular 'formulations' at any given 'moment' or in any given context. His version of Hegel's dialectical process enacts succeeding negations of posited status or "logical form" of understanding that constitute a "negation of negation" thereby enabling a status of understanding that is of "absolute negation"—or fully abstract logical form not dependent upon positivistic references. Though this mode of knowing can be posited as 'what is really really going on' in consciousness (i.e., knowing by way of logical form not literal status), it can hardly be considered the ordinarily self-aware state of most person's understanding. It is thus a dialectical form of thought' that can be termed non-ordinary or extra-ordinary.

Given the complexity of the 'formulations of things,' there are various potential perspectives or references from which to compose an accurate 'dialectical logic' of their form. The various disciplinary perspectives and analytical methodologies of different sciences present an example of such differing yet mutually accurate modes of re-presenting the 'logic of forms.' Each such disciplinary 'field of rational analysis' continually seeks to refine the accuracy of its expression of the 'logical forms of things' relative to particular contexts of phenomenal occurrence or status. The interpretation of Hegel's dialectical process as being linearly reductive can thus seen as a 'projection' of reductive purpose upon a non-reductive model for analysis. Those who, consciously or not, seek to impose reductive purpose upon rational analysis appear then to have (illogically) attempted to claim Hegel's method for their own.

In developing his assessment of the non-dualist dynamism of dialectical process, and thus of accurate rational analysis of it, Giegerich elucidates a distinction between semantical and syntactical qualities of meaning. This differentiation is illustrated in his expression of a historical development from meaning in archaic mythical culture to that of modernist quantificational positivism (Unpublished Paper, Seminar 6/04). In the collective consciousness of a genuinely mythical culture, he asserts, meaning is epiphanic—it is encountered as an intrinsically existent, valid phenomenon 'out there' 'in the world.' Such a status of meaning is possible because in traditional non-modernist societies what is meaningful and true is in essence 'inherited' across generations in such a manner that the 'experience of meaning' is an intrinsic, unconscious response to the phenomenal world. The social collective derives its very identity from that 'inherited sense of meaning in the world' reflected in the particulars of myths and rituals. The gods or spirits and the validity of their stories and examples are intrinsic to 'the world.' Collective

consciousness, under such cultural conditions, has no need of philosophical analysis or radical intellectual abstraction of the 'logic of things' to establish a valid, shared sense of true and meaningful status.

Over the 2500 years or so of Western cultural development since the ancient Greek split between mythos and logos, Giegerich asserts, that context of mythical meaning 'in the world' has become psychically internalized as knowing meaningfully through logical abstraction. Consequently, collective socio-cultural consciousness is no longer capable of affirming personal experience of 'meaning in the world' because the orientation of that 'consciousness of modernity' (with its abstracting 'cult of positivistic measurement' and 'tradition of anti-traditionalism') is incapable of maintaining any continuity of trans-historic, trans-personal 'Truth' or fixed 'Meaning.' That historical shift of the basis for valid status in collective consciousness does not, however, prevent personal experience of 'meaning in the world,' but only of collective validation of different persons having the same experience of meaning 'out there.' It is not surprising then that society is fraught with anxiety about identity status and the 'existence of meaning' if the collective attitudes and forms of consciousness have some way dialectically subsumed 'meaning in the world' into 'meaning in abstract logic' since the latter context for meaning is a non-positivized status of 'thinking logical form.' Persons and groups of persons continue to experience or at least assert intrinsic, positivized meaning and truth 'out there in the world' — whether as 'scientific fact' or 'religious truth' — but the society as a whole, as a condition of consciousness existing under the rule of rationally validated logical validity, is unable to confirm, order, and unite around such meaning independent of abstract logical status *within* human thought.

Returning to the notion of semantic versus syntactic contexts for meaningfulness, Giegerich's concept of a historical transit from mythical to logical basis for collective consciousness presents a shift from positivized meaning 'in the world' or 'as the thing,' a status of semantic fixity, to non-positivized logic, a status of syntactical arrangement of forms. The semantical mode of meaning making thus follows more the logic of one-ness, whereas that of syntactical or logical meaning making derives more from the logic of many-ness. Modernist distress over the uncertainty, lack, or plurality of centralized, universal 'Meaning' thus manifests the semantical emphasis of reductive purpose in confrontation with syntactical methods of knowing logically without dependency upon positivized status. The semantic impulse can thus be regarded as the drive to establish a final, thus simple, *explanation* of 'how things are,' of the complexity of totality. Giegerich's contention that the collective consciousness of modernity is unsuitable, even incapable of validating such a basis for meaning provides insight into why the semantic perspective appears to assert itself so desperately, whether as 'futuristic totalitarian utopianism' or religious and political fundamentalism. The notion that the actual collective basis for meaningful status is now, however much resisted or unacknowledged, deriving from the rational (yet not reductively rationalistic) mode of knowing rather than the idealistic status of truth enables tracking of the "logical forms" of present manifestations in/of radically complex totality.

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This view brings mystery to *logos*—or perhaps logic back to mysteriousness by asserting a logical perspective that is in essence mythical in its syntactical dynamism—a *mytho-logos*. “Logical form” thus appears as ‘transcendental status’ that is ‘incendant’ in, yet not positivistically ‘of,’ the particulars of phenomenal activity (being and becoming). It is a ‘knowing of it’ that is and is not ‘it’—ever imperfect knowing of what is every changing: a dialectical knowing of the dialectical process, or ‘syntactics,’ of ‘things.’

With these philosophical thoughts about the inexhaustible yet actual statuses of reasonable truth in mind, this study turns then toward the logic of the scientific method and some of its ‘findings’ about reality as a potential source for a philosophical perspective on reality that presents a ‘realized’ (positivized) status of the ‘un-real real’ commensurate with a ‘after modernist’ interplay between ‘arriving’ at and being of the ‘erring’ truth.

Chapter 5

Scientific Reductions to Non-Reduction: Materialities of Concurrent Consciousness and Plural Realities in Theories of Dynamic Totality

The Conflicting Epistemologies and Purposes of Science

In this chapter the concern with the interplay of reductive and non-reductive methods and purposes for knowing is considered relative to scientific method and theory. Certainly there is considerable overlap of the ways identity status and phenomena are re-presented between philosophical and scientific thought in Western cultures. Reliance upon rational analysis and reductive method pervade both disciplinary fields. The history of both disciplines of knowledge both exhibits the contrast between reductive purposes for arriving at ‘the truth’ and the pluralizing effects of their shared method of rational analysis. In so far as Westernized materialistic science is ‘descended’ from its prototypical theoretical and experimental predecessors among ancient Greek “natural philosophers,” the character of its method and purposes are related to those of non-scientific philosophical thought. ‘Scientific endeavor’ is similarly concerned with differentiating and categorizing the ‘true’ or accurate statuses of identity and reality. The scientific approach can be distinguished as more overtly positivistic in its greater epistemic emphasis upon empirical verification, formal logical proof, and quantification than found in philosophical thought in general, yet it also asserts a more overtly hypothetical method. Scientific knowing derives not only from application of rational analysis (with its reductions that tend to further diversify particularized statuses) but also from the assumption that accuracy is not a condition of ‘final proof’ but one of being (‘so far’) *not having been disproved*. According to this maxim of scientific method or epistemology, all ‘truth’ remains hypothetical: the conclusions of all analyses are held valid subject to being demonstrated as inadequate by further analysis. Subsequently, scientific knowledge and understanding are continually changing as more and more differentiations are established. Consequently, much of what was ‘true’ even quite recently is no longer held to be so. Nonetheless, scientific knowing seeks to be exact in the accuracy of its quantifications and theoretical explanations of phenomena. Both within the professional practice of scientific research and in general public discourse, un-falsified hypothetical propositions are reflexively regarded as valid, definitive truths or statuses of identity and reality. Such a tendency to positivize the hypothetical conclusions of scientific investigation indicates an over-riding concern with reductive purpose in the application of scientific method.

One way of characterizing this reductively driven, ever-evolving search for exact definitions of phenomenal reality is by how it tends to seek to establish the most simple states of being. It is typically

applied to identifying the elemental ‘building blocks’ of all manifestation as a way of understanding the radically complex diversity of totality (whether in physics, biology, or astronomy). In so doing, however, the very reality posited by scientific methods often appears utterly ‘unreal’ relative to ordinary experience and perception. The simplistic elemental statuses of subatomic phenomenon are unimaginable to most ordinary human sensibilities except through fantastically complicated abstract mathematical reasoning and the data supplied by ‘inhumanly sensitive’ technological devices. Overall, this manner of knowing reality positivistically can be seen as de-positivizing both the ordinarily known reality and the very notion of ‘a concrete, singular reality.’ Scientific epistemology has not rendered ‘the world’ a simpler place to understand.

As in the preceding selective view of philosophical thought, this chapter focuses on examples of how aspects of scientific disciplines can be regarded as elaborating the more inclusive, non-reductive epistemic for knowing of self, other, and world—even while applying reductive epistemic methods.

A Modernist < > Postmodernist Discrimination of Scientific Theory

Following this comparison of the role of reductive purpose in both philosophy and science, the preceding chapter’s characterization of modernist and post-modernist elements in philosophical thought can be related to scientific theory. Again, this differentiation is not a periodic one but a dynamical one—not about historical periods in science or particular ‘schools of thought’ so much as about a dynamical distinction in how theories configure reality and causation. Thus in the more reductively definitive and mechanistic mode, Newtonian classical physics can be taken as an expression of the more positivistic impulse associated here with modernist ambitions for reductive simplicity and absolute continuity. In contrast, the bi-valence of Einstein’s space < > time relativity and quantum mechanical notions of particle < > wave complementarity in the behavior of light (notions that confound linearly predictive reasoning) associate more with the proposed dynamical character of thought in ‘post’-modernist approaches to truth and reality.

With that distinction in mind, some attempt is made below to demonstrate the ways in which scientific investigations and theories contribute to the validity of a status for the ‘un-real real’ and a non-reductive concurrency of ‘contradictory’ phenomenon in radically complex totality.

Science as Artistic Expression or Re-Presentation of the Un-real Reality of Radically Complex Totality

It is a primary concern of this chapter to consider science as an epistemic method that can radically challenge ordinary identity consciousness and habituated assumptions about valid reality. As such it was considered in Chapter 3 as a form of artistic expression. Recalling Danto’s notion that contemporary art

near the end of the 20th Century has become more about the psychological character of perception, apperception, and cognition than aesthetic pleasures and the literal ‘appearance of things’ (such that ‘art’ no longer tends to be defined in respect to a pure or proper style), a similar observation can be made about science. Though the methods and purposes of science remain primarily reductive in seeking to identify phenomena with predictable specificity, research and theoretical interpretation are less constrained by pressures to adhere to a singular, dominant, all-defining, self-consistent set of theoretical ‘truths’ such as once persisted under the dominance of Aristotelian, and subsequently Newtonian thought. That is to say, radically differing theories appear to be more readily entertained concurrently now than in earlier historical periods. Thus there is a sense in which ‘the history of science as singular truth’ has also ‘come to an end.’ Subsequently, reflexively reductive tendencies in socialized attitudes and ordinary identity consciousness are not so readily confirmed by contemporary scientific knowing as these might once have been. The more recently radical diversity and complexity of broadly accepted scientific data and interpretations pose a potentially destabilizing effect upon habituated assumptions and provoke overt reflection upon what is real or true under what conditions—not unlike the effects of much contemporary artistic expression. This more diversified, even poly-logical approach to scientifically derived knowing is nowhere more evident than in the field(s) of physics.

Physicist Brian Greene poses five general categories of reality as distinguished by ‘physical science.’ He begins with the “classical reality” of Newtonian theory and its assumptions about separate and absolute statuses for space and time—the perspective most useful for accurate prediction of material phenomenon on the more ordinary scale of human experience and endeavor. Then there is “relativistic reality” derived from Einstein’s theory of the relativity of space and time (rather than their absolute or unchanging statuses)—the perspective more applicable to predicting phenomenon of extremely large-scale events and thus more extra-ordinary relative to human experience of material reality. Then there is “quantum reality” concerned with the minuscule scale of subatomic particles and the unpredictability of their phenomenal interactions that allows calculation only in terms of probability. That is necessarily also an extra-ordinary context of phenomena and one in which the ‘governing rules’ differ from the preceding ‘realities.’ Next he discusses “cosmological reality” which concerns both the extremely large and minuscule scales of phenomenal events, combining aspects of relativistic and quantum realities. Lastly he considers “unified reality” as an inclusive or meta-reality theorized to relate all of the above contextings, currently relying on notions of “super string theory” in which subatomic particles are conceived as “filaments” formed from “frequency vibrations” rather than as distinctively singular “dots” (Greene, *Fabric of the Cosmos*, 7-19). Herewith are found a potent expression of the many-ness of ‘physical reality’ as well as the one-ness that is a many-ness in the last category which seeks a unified theory.

The following statements by Greene further indicate the radically diverse and inconclusive assumptions of contemporary scientific epistemology about reality.

What *is* reality? We humans only have access to the internal experiences of perception and thought, so how can we be sure they truly reflect an external world? Philosophers have long recognized this problem. [. . .] And physicists such as myself are acutely aware that the reality we observe—matter evolving on the stage of space and time—may have little to do with the reality, if any, that’s out there (Greene ix).

Surely, reality is what we think it is; reality is revealed to us by our experiences. To one extent or another, this view of reality is one many of us hold, if only implicitly. I certainly find myself thinking this way in day-to-day life; it’s easy to be seduced by the face nature reveals directly to our senses. Yet [. . .] modern science tells a very different story. *The* overarching lesson that has emerged from scientific inquiry over the last century is that human experience is often a misleading guide to the true nature of reality. Lying just beneath the surface of the everyday *is* a world we’d hardly recognize. [. . .] Breakthroughs in physics have forced, and continue to force, dramatic revisions to our conception of the cosmos. (Greene 5).

Whereas human intuition, and its embodiment in classical physics, envision a reality in which things are always definitely one way *or* another, quantum mechanics describes a reality in which things sometimes over in a haze of being partly one way *and* partly another. Things become definite only when a suitable observation forces them to relinquish quantum possibilities and settle on a specific outcome. The outcome that’s realized, though, cannot be predicted—we can predict only the odds that things will turn out one way or another. This, plainly speaking, is weird. We are unused to a reality that remains ambiguous until perceived. But the oddity does not stop here. At least as astounding is a feature that goes back to a paper Einstein wrote in 1935 with two younger colleagues, Nathan Rosen and Boris Podolsky, that was intended as an attack on quantum theory. With the ensuing twists of scientific progress, Einstein’s paper can now be viewed as among the first to point out that quantum mechanics—if taken at face value—implies that something you do over here can be instantaneously linked to something happening over there, regardless of distance. Einstein considered such instantaneous connections ludicrous [. . .] Under pristine laboratory conditions, what Einstein thought absurd really happens (Greene 11).

If superstring theory is proven correct, we will be forced to accept that the reality we have known is but a delicate chiffon draped over a thick and richly textured cosmic fabric. [. . .] The discovery of extra dimension would show that the entirety of human experience had left us completely unaware of a basic and essential aspect of the universe. It would forcefully argue that even those features of the cosmos that we have thought to be readily accessible to human senses need not be (Greene 19).

Greene’s summary assessments do not proffer a neatly ordered scientific expression of phenomenal reality; much less one that is readily intelligible to ordinarily socialized perspectives. One might assert that though the scientific knowing has not been particularly accessible to such perspectives since Newton’s time, the extra- or non-ordinary character of it has increased dramatically. 19th Century expectations of a ‘unified explanation of everything’ have not only failed to ‘arrive’ it seems more remote than ever. Whatever the ‘reality’ physical science might eventually ‘identify’ it will be an un-real one to ordinary attitudes and experience. As with the notion of ‘an end of the era of art’ being indicated by the validation of radically diverse artistic styles and interpretations, an ‘end of the uniform authority of

science' is suggested by this overview of physics. However, such a view does not indicate any end to the reflexive impulse to continue to use scientific knowing to assert reductions to one-ness. Again, the latter impulse seems to have helped precipitate the collapse of its very dominance in attempts to 'know truthfully.' Perhaps the more pertinent point in respect to the diversity of scientific knowings of reality is that, like those of artistic expression, 'the difference is all in how one looks at it.' No matter the degrees of diversity and disparity, a reductive attitude can still assert some rationale of a 'unified theory'—even if its logic becomes radically complex. Art critics and scientists continue to argue about who is right—and absolutely so.

With these thoughts about the radical character of much scientific knowing relative to ordinarily pragmatized identity consciousness and valid parameters for reality in mind, some further considerations about the non-positivistic character of scientific positivism are offered.

The Self-Deconstruction of Positivistic Mentality: Scientific Method and Transgression of Modernist Reality

Even as rational philosophy has led to the postmodernist perspective of 'multiple perspectives' or 'indefinitely disseminated meaning,' application of the scientific method to empirical reality in an effort to explicate its 'objective' mechanisms by experimental and mathematical proofs about 'how things are' has generated evidence that also contradicts a positivistic attitude. The very technical attempts to definitively elucidate and control the 'elements and mechanisms of being and becoming' have generated such theories as space/time relativity, quantum mechanics, indeterminacy, complementarity, and the more recent theories of chaos-complexity and string theory or multiple universes. The modernist project of establishing the ultimately positive status of reality has provided us with mathematically valid versions of the behavior of matter that present a contradictory yet complimentary status of existence in such concepts as the wave and particle states of energy. Wave energy is presented as non-localized such that it does not exist in the same status as physical matter. Particle or physical matter is contrastingly local or fixed in time and space. Yet both statuses are considered to be 'real' and codependent with particles manifesting 'out of' 'unrestricted field of non-local energy.' Such a notion presents a reality composed of two incommensurable 'realms of manifestation' that are, nonetheless, part of a somehow complimentary continuum. Wave and particle status are and are 'of the same reality,' yet the speed and location of a particle cannot be measured simultaneously. There is then a scientific basis for both fixed status that can be measured or quantified but also one that is 'un-fixed' and can only be mathematically characterized in terms of probability.

Inherent in such notions from the 'new' or 'post Newtonian' physics is the assertion that there is no absolute 'objective' perspective from which to observe and measure the phenomenon of 'reality' as it is

‘out there.’ Even the most objectively ‘removed’ perspective of quantificational measurement is deemed to influence the behavior of what is being observed. The very attempt to measure the position and speed of particles can affect the manner of their manifestation.

Einstein’s conception of relativity and the later notion of quantum mechanics confirmed that the observation and thoughts of the observer enter into the calculations and measurements of the “real” world. Children at play, artists at work, and scientists measuring quantum effects share this in common: They are all creating reality. (Shlain 148)

In so far as even scientific attempts to quantify phenomena actually affect how those phenomena manifest, it would seem that there is no ‘actual’ basis for exclusive, *non*-participatory identity after all. Human consciousness appears to inherently co-participate in the dynamical formulation of phenomena, whether in the activities of art or science. But a culture that continues to base its ‘identity’ on a ‘philosophy of oppositional dualism,’ on the ‘objective truth’ of the ‘metaphysics of presence’ and a singularly positivized status of reality is surely not able to assimilate these new ‘revelations’ even if they have been derived from its ‘holy’ methodology of scientific reduction. The Western attempt to forego metaphysical notions of reality in favor of The Facts has turned out to be dependent upon a metaphysical belief in its version of literal, sequentially mechanistic reality. A reality scientific understanding has brought into radical doubt with its own ‘facts’ of physics. The reductively oppositional dualism of its method appears incompatible with the insights generated by that method. But the ‘collective egoic identification’ with that reductive method is as resistant to re-orientation as any ‘fundamentalist’ religious identity. It is not surprising then that persons identifying themselves as scientists are typically reflexive devotees of such ‘religious’ identification with ‘oppositionalist method’ as the ‘right and true way’ to think and understand.

Considering notions of ‘accommodating’ versus ‘assimilating,’ it may be noted that the reductive method of modernity has attempted to *accommodate* all it can of observable phenomena to its ‘metaphysics of measure’ and to summarily dismiss from existence (or at least from ‘significance’) that which it cannot thus quantitatively ‘objectify’ as ‘real.’ Faced with the limitations of that modality of validation by ‘the new stories of science,’ its practitioners carry on measuring as best they can even in the ‘realms of probability.’ This seemingly astonishing level of ‘denial’ is not, in a historical or psychological perspective, surprising.

The transition from one mentality to another is not a simple accretive process of the increase of facts, opinions, and ideas; it is a transformative process in which the basic grammar, with its implicit world view that rules all the words, is changed. (Thompson, Imaginary Landscapes 157)

One can change one’s mind with facts, but to change mentalities one has to change the structure of one’s world view and one’s cultural process of identification with favored groups and

their value systems. This metanoia is so close to a death experience that people who survive it often do so through a sickness unto death or a conversion experience in which the personality is radically transformed. Most people would rather die than go through that agony and loss, and so the usual way in which a cultural shift is effected is through the death of the Establishment. (Thompson 111)

One need only turn to consider the fates of ‘philosophical’ heretics before the ‘Copernican revolution,’ and that of ‘scientific’ ones after, to sense the danger of breaking with the dogma of a metaphysics of presence. “No society can tolerate much heresy, and certainly not the greatest heresy of all, namely the assertion that its cultural grid is lacking in any particular, transcendent validity [. . .]” (Berman 79-80).

Yet if such orientation of identification of reality, and thus self, remains the basis of the cultural “Establishment,” then how are the expressions of the ‘un-real real,’ that may be denied but cannot have ceased, experienced in present context? “If the dominant institutions dismiss the mythic and the symbolic, the subculture seems to respond by insisting on taking the mythic and symbolic literally [. . .]” (Thompson.66).

One might well posit that the literalism of Christian dogma contributed ‘materially’ to the development of scientific materialism. The pervasive imperative of that ‘literality’ now forces expressions of any sense of an ‘un-real real’ to be posed as ‘literally real’ in order to be granted any emotional and somatic validity. One is thus forced into a rather schizoid existence where a materialistic perspective and metaphorical experience cannot confront each other without identities, so readily threatened by ambiguity and falsification by evident contradiction, dissolving. Yet in a world ‘made’ by a literalistic culture, the ultimate ‘arbiter of truth’ is necessarily located in its context—since it acknowledges no other. “The scientific establishment of the twentieth century is the real Church of the West, when you finally get down to it, because it is the ultimate (and official) arbiter of reality” (Berman 304).

Thompson’s “metanoia” of mentality is not possible within the frame of the reality reference of contemporary Western culture—no matter how bazaar and fantastic its ‘literalistic imaginations’ become, these remain either simply, merely, ‘un-real’ fantasy, or are posed as literalistic realities that cannot be scientifically validated as such. Unless, of course, these ‘imaginings; have a mathematically valid theoretical expression, whereby they are ‘entertained’ as ‘real’ and even utilized pragmatically—while usually discounted as a basis for re-orienting over-all identification of Reality and Truth. There is no ‘official’ category for an ‘un-real real.’ Again, in short, there simply is no valid “wild,” no field of “anti-structure.” There is, rather, only the as-yet-unknown-because-unmeasured, waiting for scientific investigation that will enable the expansion of salvific mechanistic control leading to ultimate and complete extension of the “tame” to the ends of creation—a ‘creation’ of human ‘making’ by virtue of having ‘measured’ it according to technical standards.

The 'actual' validity of the empirical method in such an attitude is not contested by the analysis of this study. At issue is the assertion that its orientations provide the underlying assumptions of modernist, Western-derived cultural conduct. And, such statements are in no way meant to deny the occurrence of 'experience' of the "wild," or the creative manifestations of the 'un-real real.' The point here is that there is no 'sanctified' confirmation of their 'validity.' Thus such experience is likely to remain "liminoid" rather than become "liminal" even when figured as scientific theories and proofs. Such "anti-structural" experiences and expressions can exist, according to cultural canon, only as references to, symbols for, or epiphenomenon of, the 'literally true reality.' Human consciousness, for example, is regarded as an epiphenomenon of physical brain function.

The conflict between the 'real' and the 'un-real' in collective philosophical orientation, along with the orientations of identity that it dictates, seem to prohibit any 'participatory philosophy' that would effectively (literally?) validate dynamical identity in a field of pluralistic psyche. The exception, perhaps, would be such existence *separated* from immanence in matter and body. Mind or consciousness, the more typically used terms for human agency, when not limited to genetically directed or environmentally conditioned behavior, are still most often posited as epiphenomenon of biological brain activity. Such 'identification,' while asserting an 'existence' of consciousness, definitely provokes an 'identity crisis': if "I" am not this body because my mind is not 'of' its matter, but the 'consciousness' that says "I" is not 'real' because it is not measurable, than what and who and where am "I?" If "I" am but a 'ghost' in this biological 'machine' then "I" either do not have validity or "I" exist in some 'other' dimensional reality as yet un-measured and thus 'ultimately non-existent.' Thus has the application of scientific method both asserted and transgressed the boundaries of the 'metaphysics of presence.'

Transcendentalist or Oppositional Bias of Identification and Objectivity in Scientific Method

Oppositional dualism of mind > <body splitting, preceded historically by the spirit > <matter and human > <nature oppositions, can be seen to have generated the attempt to evade the conflict by 'transcending' it. A disembodied god not-of-this-earth and a Heaven for the spirit once 'liberated from' the body can seem to justify a crisis of divided identities, of a lack of experiencing participation in the plurality of self and its continuities with other and world. But a 'transcendental' move positing an antithetically 'other' realm tends to literalize the 'un-real real' by making it *more* real than the ordinarily real. Again, that 'literalization' can be seen as the mentality that 'led' to the late-modernist scientific metaphysics of presence. Scholastic Christian dogma asserted the 'literality' of Christ-as-man-and-god, of the sacramental wine and bread as the blood and body of Christ, of Heaven and Hell, of the ultimate distinction between spirit/soul and flesh/body. Whatever 'un-real' characteristics these figurations had, to question their literality was considered heretical. Thus any psychical 'function' they might have as the 'un-real real' would tend to be confused with empirical actuality in conscious consideration. Such

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literalistic identification of any 'un-real real' experience or expression intensifies a motive to 'escape' from the oppositional dilemma in psyche by way of an attempt to 'transcend' the field of literality. There is no 'room' in this configuration of 'real' and 'un-real' for Bly's "leaping" or "dragon smoke." There is no 'in/between' or co-participation. There is only 'here' and 'There' — and the pure, spiritual 'There' is obviously 'better' and more desirable.

There is an important spatial quality to the 'transcendent' maneuver. While the archaic cultures often imagined 'flying' to the 'other world,' the world of some 'un-real real,' that move was often in a horizontal direction. While sometimes it was depicted vertically, it was often oriented both 'upward' and 'downward' to 'upper' and 'lower' worlds that were 'other' than 'this one.' The 'transcendent' move, as the term etymologically denotes, is definitely upward and superior to that which remains hierarchically positioned 'below.' This hierarchical structuring of verticality contributes to oppositional mentality, even as it is symptomatic of it.

Wherever we encounter binary oppositions, as the deconstructionists emphasize, we are likely to uncover hierarchical orderings of superior > inferior and these are not conducive to participatory experience of co-existence. However, the very notion of participation is predicated upon differentiation of entities or fields of activity so that 'one' may interact with 'an other.' The 'transcendent position' is one of 'overview,' modeled upon the hierarchy of a transcendent, singular, morally perfect God as judge of lowly human being. The 'other world' of spirit is 'above' or 'superior to' the mechanical workings of life, an orientation of looking 'down on' what occurs 'below' intelligent analytical consideration and moral judgment. It is the 'orientating' 'position' of 'scientific objectivity' and the tendencies of identification that such a positioning generates are oppositional and hieratic. And the empirical literality of 'scientific culture' can be seen as a reaction to the 'metaphorical literalism' of dogmatic Church doctrine that so confused 'ordinary' and 'non-ordinary.' The reductive literalism of church dogma about the 'miracles of god' begot an equally intense reaction in the literalism of scientific empiricism. Yet both 'systems' are utilized in establishing hierarchical orders and oppositions.

Applying this insight into the relation between oppositional thought and hieratic structural valuation to scientific mentality is difficult, as the 'scientific method' is theoretically unbiased about moral, ethical, and social values. However, its methodology *assumes* purely objective oppositions and linearly sequential causalities. Where its observation finds none of these, its practitioners may 'see' nothing of importance (or of 'useful' value). It is, in a sense, blind to both the 'un-real real' and empirically 'non-objective totality.' Careful differentiation here between method and habitual orientation of cultural value actually indicates that the spatial orientation of the 'objective point of viewing' implies a position 'beside' the 'action' being observed, but not necessarily 'outside,' 'above,' or 'superior' to that 'action.'

Thus the 'scientific method' is not inherently transcendentalist, nor necessarily non-participatory, though it can be and is 'practiced' from positions of such assumption. Thus, in spite of those assumptions, can it have lead to configuring a version of reality that suggests immanence of agency in a multidimensional existence—a co-participative field of 'real' and 'un-real?' And if it 'really' has revealed the 'un-real real' as a 'tangible reality,' how are we to 'feel,' to 'experience,' to 'participate' that 'tangible un-real real' as valid?

The Dynamical Activity of Observation and Information.

Much of Western, modernist philosophical thought is predicated by notions about fixed, classical categories of meaning and being. As indicated above, much recent study of mind and language indicate that such categories are not the basis of human intelligence. Similarly, the new physics has questioned such ultimate distinctions as well—the categories of 'time' and of 'space' being the primary examples whose relations are now found to be neither 'fixed' in consciousness nor in 'reality.' This shift in perspective has been generated out of a method that seeks differentiations of discrete entities and the 'mechanisms' of their interactions. That method's investigation of the dynamics of those interactions has 'revealed' that the very 'act' of observation participates in the interactions of the 'observed' or 'measured' entities and phenomenon (Heisenberg's uncertainty principle). *Observation and measurement precipitate activity in the field observed and measured.* Generating 'effects' in that field observed or measured surely constitutes *participating* in it. Similarly, one's being affected by 'an other' field could be 'identified' as 'being participated in' by that 'other.' But again: no differentiation of entities or fields '= \Rightarrow ' no possibility of participation. Participation or relationship presumes differentiation. Such a notion suggests that the greater the degree of differentiation the greater the possibility for experiencing both 'precipitating' and participation. But it also suggests that there is 'always already' an 'in/between' among, around, even a *within*, of entities and fields—a plurality of presences or 'presencing.' Possible distinctions among such 'aspects' are innumerable. But how 'real' are distinguished differences if every 'thing' is 'participated' by 'other things?'

The interaction between parts of mind is triggered by difference. (Bateson, Mind and Nature 100)

Difference, being of the nature of relationship, is not located in time or in space. We say that the white spot [of chalk] is "there," "in the middle of the blackboard," but the difference between the spot and the blackboard is not "there." It is not in the spot; it is not in the blackboard; it is not in the space between the board and the chalk [. . .] difference does not have location. [. . .] *Information* consists of differences that make a difference. (Bateson, Mind and Nature 105)

Bateson's epistemology finds 'mind' to 'come into existence' by way of the 'dynamical activity of observing difference.' Yet 'difference' is not a 'thing' to be 'located' in Euclidean space or linear clock

time. “Information” is thus not a ‘thing’ but a dynamical activity ‘between’ references. Difference ‘itself’ is an ‘un-real real.’ Similarity or dissimilarity do not ‘exist’ without ‘difference’ being ‘observed’ or ‘measured,’ either qualified or quantified. Yet ‘differing’ can be seen as being ‘manifested’ either by material interactivity of physical objects or immaterial cognition of it in thought. And the ‘expression’ of ‘thinking difference’ in language or action is precipitated by the ‘observational participation’ that dynamically constitutes ‘information.’

Such reasoning might well seem hopelessly contorted. But there are those among practitioners of scientific methodology, such as Bateson, capable of ‘admitting’ the evidence of non-mechanistic co-participatory totality. Such evidence is a ‘real’ consequence of ‘observed’ interactivity or co-participation whose dynamism is precipitated by the participation of being observed. Thus the seemingly distinct elements of information ‘brought into being’ by the ‘activity’ of observed difference exist in and as a consequence of that activity, of the ‘flow’ of the ‘participation of observation’. Thus scientific method is not confined to defining things, thoughts, or information as distinct ‘positivistic’ or ‘static’ entities but can approach them as of and in their discrimination. Dynamical activity can ‘reasonably’ and ‘empirically’ assert the ‘reality’ of non-positivistic ‘things’ (such as ‘information’) by way of their participation in more positivistic status as ‘mutual’ manifestation. Indeed, it is just such ‘real’ activity that enables the assertion of the ‘reality’ of positivistic entities so discriminated.

Science of Self, Consciousness, and Identity

The Explanatory Gap: Between the Radical Complexity of Consciousness and the Mechanistic Explanations of Neuroscience

Attempts to explain the ‘workings’ of human consciousness using scientific methods have gained greater specificity with the advent of technologies that allow detecting neurological activity in the brain. Yet in this area of scientific enquiry, just as in physics and cosmology, attempts at ‘final determinations’ about the dynamics and origins of consciousness remain unsuccessful. The materialistic basis of neuroscience elaborates ‘mechanisms’ of the brain that associate with aspects of perception, cognition, and emotion. But as Horgan notes in his recent survey of the field, ([The Undiscovered Mind](#)), a remarkably intransigent ‘gap’ remains between these neurological and neurochemical identifications and the radically complex dynamism of human consciousness and individualized identity.

Explaining consciousness [neurochemically] is not as important as understanding how the brain draws on both genes and experience to create a self, a personal identity, in each individual. “That is to me the big question: how our brain makes us who we are. Explaining consciousness would not explain that.” (Horgan, Ledoux, 30)

Like Gerald Fischbach, Torsten Wiesel, and other leading neuroscientists, LeDoux readily

acknowledges the shortcomings of his field. He once stated, “We have no idea how our brains make us who we are. There is as yet no neuroscience of personality. We have little understanding of how art and history are experienced by the brain. The meltdown of mental life in psychosis is still a mystery. In short we have yet to come up with a theory that can pull all this together. We haven’t yet had a Darwin, Einstein, or Newton.” (Horgan, 32)

Despite this admission of the present limitations of scientific method in elaborating how the brain can metamorphose biochemistry into self-reflective human selfhood and its emotional and intellectual capacities, it provides evidence of the complexity of that ‘mystery.’

Cognitive Science and the Literal Plurality of the Subject

Another survey of research in cognitive science ‘emphasizes the ‘mutuality of agency in human ‘consciousness.’

What challenges does human experience face as a result of the scientific study of mind? The existential concern that animates our entire discussion in this book results from the tangible demonstration within cognitive science that the self or cognizing subject is fundamentally fragmented, divided, or nonunified. (Varela and Thompson, Embodied Mind xvii)

Thus begins an entire review and analysis of recent cognitive research. Another book assessing how much of the ‘total’ activity of mind is indicated by such study to actually be accessible to conscious awareness is introduced thusly:

Consciousness is the experience of experiencing, the knowledge of knowing, the sense of sensing. But what is it that experiences the experience? What happens when one observes the experience of experience from *without* and asks, “How much does consciousness actually observe?”

In recent years, scientific investigations into phenomenon of consciousness have demonstrated that people experience far more than their consciousness perceives; that they interact far more with the world and with each other than their consciousness thinks they do; that the control of actions that consciousness feels it exercises is an illusion. Consciousness plays a far smaller role in human life than Western culture has tended to believe.

Historical studies indicate that the phenomenon of consciousness as we know it today is probably no more than three thousand years old. The concept of a central “experiencer” and decision maker, a conscious I, has prevailed for only a hundred generations.

Judging from the scientific experiences upon which the following account is based, the rule of the conscious ego will probably not last for many more generations.

The epoch of the *I* is drawing to a close. (Norretranders, User Illusion ix)

“The epoch of the “I” is drawing to a close” as ‘evidence’ for the variousness of cognitive ‘functions’ and intentionality mounts while resistance to it dissipates. That diminishing resistance comes in part from realization that even in science the ‘ways of knowing’ are ‘incalculable.’ Norretranders poses a virtually metaphoric dynamic for the way scientific figuration-as-equation conveys ‘what it is not,’ and ponders the mysterious ‘prescience’ of human intelligence and its expressions that ‘know’ more than the “I” of the person figuring the expression.

How can a summary of a rich and varied collection of phenomena occur with so few and such powerful symbols as those we find in the four famous lines that constitute Maxwell's equations?

In a sense, this is the very mystery of science: Not only can it pursue the goal of saying as much as possible in as few words or equations as possible, drawing a map of the terrain, a map that simply and clearly summarizes all the important data and thus allows us to find our way; but—and here lies the mystery—it can create a map that enables us to see details of the terrain that were unknown when the map was drawn! (Norretranders 3)

Maxwell's equations 'figured' most of what had been 'discovered' when Maxwell composed them but also pre-figured much that was yet to be theoretically and experimentally explicated. It was 'as if' Maxwell 'knew more than he knew he knew.' Put another way, Maxwell expressed an 'as is' that was 'as yet' unknown. How is one to 'understand' such intelligence and expressive capacity that one does not 'know' in conscious awareness or identity of self/other/world? Who or what is the agency of such knowing and expressing? Uncertainty about the 'location' and 'identity' of intelligent agency within a single individual's 'mindfulness' speaks of uncertain boundaries—including that 'between' 'mind' and 'body.' Without the 'biological body' there is no brain to generate cognitive functions. But embodiment is the very medium of so much of 'knowing,' both as perceptual 'mechanism' and as literal basis for psychical figuration and rational cognition, that distinguishing between 'mind' and 'body' becomes extremely problematic.

If we understand reason as embodied, then we will want to understand the relationship between the mind and the body and to find out how to cultivate the embodied aspects of reason. If we fully appreciate the role of the imaginative aspects of reason, we will give them full value, investigate them more thoroughly, and provide better education in using them. [. . .] It is important that we have discovered that rational thought goes well beyond the literal and the mechanical. It is important because our ideas about how human minds should be employed depend on our ideas of what a human mind is. [. . .]

We are at present at an important turning point in the history of the study of the mind. It is vital that the mistaken views about the mind that have been with us for two thousand years be corrected. (Lakoff, Women, Fire and Dangerous Things xvi)

"Rational thought goes well beyond the literal and mechanical" to include, perhaps actually arise from, metaphorical intelligence. Lakoff's extensive analysis of the expression of cognitive function in types of categorization concurs with much of what Gibbs has concluded as cited previously. This way of figuring the dynamics of knowing prompts us to refigure the composition of the 'world' we seek to know. If there are many in the one-ness of the "I" then there are likely many in the seeming one-ness of other and world.

Research in neurological science also suggests some 'mechanism' for polycentric psyche in terms of brain neuro-physiology. Cognition is said to be 'built up' in the development of overlapping neuronal networks that generate different memories, ideas, and complexes of associations when stimulated in

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differing combinations, vast numbers of which can be concurrently active and interactive. Various cognitive ‘functions’ are also detected to be concurrently engaged in different areas of the physical brain. Such notions can readily be regarded as posing an adequately complex and de-centered neurological context for multiple nexes of psychic agency.

There is also research related to how psychical ‘sense abilities’ are or are not developed. Studies on brain plasticity and learning show capacities to think and remember developing in response to repeated stimulus of certain neuronal pathways so that these become strengthened over time. Pathways not stimulated are likely to be ‘discarded’ during brain development so that certain types of learning or cognitive function can become more difficult to acquire in adults than in children (Sapolsky, “Biology and Human Behavior,” 5-22). Those pathways most consistently stimulated can be regarded as asserting habitual or reflexively dominant modes of thinking and feeling—or ‘habitual identity.’ These notions suggest that the capacity to be ‘sensitive’ to certain types of experience, and to think in, say, linear versus dialectical logics, require early and consistent stimulus of neuronal pathways in the brain appropriate for such ‘sense abilities.’ An absence of ‘metamorphic experience’ in childhood and adolescence could thus greatly delimit capacity for ‘metaphoric sense ability’ in the adult. Yet research also indicates that even in the adult brain, there remains some plasticity and new pathways can be emphasized or weak ones strengthened. Conversely, well-developed pathways that are subsequently deprived of regular stimulus can diminish in capacity, resulting in ‘un-learning’ of associations of pathways and networks, or loss of specific memory. Such a plastic or re-configurable capacity of the neuronal structures of the physical brain provides a material context for the ‘metamorphosis of identity.’

Science of Indeterminate Complexity

Destabilizing Assumptions about Certain Predictability and Homogametic Simplicity in a Non-reductive Dialectic of the Simple and Complex, or One-ness<>Many-ness

That the physical theories of Newton, which for some span of history appeared to define reality in mechanical and mathematic terms of understanding, could be so radically ‘amended,’ as it was by Einstein’s relativity and the discoveries of quantum mechanics and sub-atomic particles, illustrates on-going ‘revelations’ derived from scientific epistemology. That is, in so far as scientific method is deployed for the purpose of reexamining its re-presentations of phenomena. Theories positing multiple dimensions of existence (“string theory” or “super symmetry”) and cosmological evidence of some “dark matter” that is as yet undetectable yet constitutes a majority of the matter in the universe suggest just how inadequate present explanations of material phenomena might yet be. There are, it appears, ‘worlds out there’ we cannot yet ‘conceive’—aspects of existence beyond our capacity to ‘structure.’ The

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simplification of elements or one-nesses derived from the equational and quantificational methods of scientific analysis continues to ‘break apart’ aspects of seemingly homogeneous totality into more precisely defined fragments. Yet the relations between these fragments multiply as well. It is as if the greater simplicity of specificity begets insight into greater levels of complex interactivity or many-ness. It is, after all, the ‘world view’ of scientific thought that presents a valid status of utter randomness. That concept of such a status *without any order* has been experienced as so threatening to the validity of socially structured reality as to destabilize the very possibility of any socialized basis for meaning. Perhaps that is why even scientists often appear rather obsessed with validating a ‘theory of everything’—being one that can include the concept of randomness or non-order within one of order or ultimate and universal structure. That effort has, in recent decades, led to an application of scientific method in analyzing how causality can be deterministic yet not predictable, progressive but not linear, structured by its consequences or ‘out comes’ rather than its initial composition.

A major tenet of Descartes’ approach was the idea that complex systems can be understood by analyzing one part at a time, and then putting things back together to yield a comprehensive picture. This reductionism has been at the core of the most spectacular successes of the scientific endeavor, from particle physics to biology. But what if some natural phenomena simply cannot be so conveniently partitioned to facilitate our comprehension? What if breaking the components apart alters their properties so much that what we learn from the separate pieces of the puzzle gives us a different and misleading idea of the system as a whole? In other words, can reductionist science study emergent properties which, by definition, are the result of complex interactions? (Pigliucci, p. 62)

Such a perspective has led to study of how simplicity (one-ness) and complexity (many-ness) interact to generate more concurrent causalities, as opposed to more simply sequential progressions resulting in predictable ‘out comes.’ It has come to be associated with such terms as chaos theory and complexity theory. The scientific literature associated with these investigations present one with such terms as complex systems, multi-agent systems, non-linear systems, non-linear science, non-linear equations, non-linear dynamics, multi-factuality, sensitive dependence (upon diverse original factors), adaptive self-organizing behavior, contingency, and deterministic chaos. Oddly, perhaps, these rather non-reductive descriptors are part of complexity theorists’ attempts to rationally establish some simplicity of dynamical interpretation appropriate to explaining the ‘out comes’ of contexts of linearly unpredictable interactivity—contexts re-presented by such notions as “multi-agent” “chaotically deterministic” “systems.” But these terms are deployed to establish a realm of ‘interactivity’ that is neither ordinarily ordered nor randomly un-ordered.

What is chaos? In the vernacular, the word is a synonym for randomness, completely non-deterministic and irregular phenomena. [. . .] In mathematical theory, however, chaos refers to a deterministic (i.e., non-random) phenomenon characterized by special properties that make the

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predictability of outcomes very difficult. In fact, a chaotic behavior is such that even though it does not happen randomly, it looks like a series of random occurrences. (Pigliucci, 62)

Here then is a concept of ‘seeming disorder’ yet one that, for all its ‘chaos,’ exhibits some dynamical ‘pattern’ or ‘equilibrium’ if tracked and analyzed over time. A distinction is made, however, between complexity and ‘chaotic determinism.’

Chaotic systems are nonlinear systems, but not vice versa. In other words, not every nonlinear system (such as a simple pendulum) is chaotic. [. . .] While a chaotic system does appear complex, it does not follow that every complex system is chaotic in origin. Chaos is just one of many routes by which a system can become complex. A swarm of ants is very complex, but it is not chaotic. Each one of us is a very complex system—perhaps the most complex system in the universe—but most of us, most of the time, are not chaotic. (Pigliucci 73)

Chaotic complexity, then, is characterized by an unfixed ‘order of interaction’ among the components interacting in given context or system. Obviously, this use of the term system is not a standard one either,

A complex system is one that consists of a large number of simple elements, or “intelligent” agents, interacting with each other and the environment. The elements/agents may or may not evolve over times, and the behavior of the system cannot be learned by the reductive method, meaning that knowledge of its parts is not enough to predict the behavior of the whole system. (Lam 71)

One way of understanding this theoretical approach to a less reductive reductive understanding of complexity is conveyed in the concept of “emergent properties.”

Perhaps the simplest way to understand emergent properties is to consider the relation between hydrogen, oxygen, and water., Although the combination of two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen yields water, the complex properties (e.g., the temperatures at which it undergoes state transitions to steam or ice) are not derivable from the individual properties of hydrogen and oxygen. In other words, knowing all we know about the structure and behavior of the atoms composing water, allow us to predict the structure but not the behavior of water. This means that complexity produces the properties specific to the new level of organization (in this case, molecular vs. atomic) that are due not to the sum of the parts, but to their interaction. This, it would seem, is enough to stop the Cartesian research program dead in its tracks. (Pigliucci, p. 62)

This concept of “emergent properties” that are not ‘inherent in’ the structures that compose a system or ‘context of interactions,’ is also used to describe the dynamical character of human consciousness in relation to the anatomy and physiology of the brain. A reductive understanding of brain function does not predict the ‘out come’ of human consciousness—the phenomenon of consciousness is not reducible to the structure and function of the brain. One of the illustrative paradigms of chaotic determinism in complex systems is elegantly simple. It is modeled upon the context of a person walking

across a landscape that is readily influenced or ‘deformed’ by that walking, and the time of that walking. Thus it involves an “active walker,” a “deformable landscape,” and a time frame within which to track their interactions.

We proposed that the elements/agents in a complex system communicate indirectly with each other through their interaction with the deformable landscape they share. Each element is an active walker in the sense that it changes the landscape when it moves on its surface, and is influenced by the changed landscape in choosing its next step. Complex behavior of the system could result from very simple rules governing the walker’s interaction with the landscape. (Lam p.74)

The describing of an active walk thus involves two interacting components of the location of the walker as a function of time and the deformable landscape as a function of time and space. The dynamics of an active walk are determined by three constituent rules: (1) the landscaping rule, which specifies how the walker changes the landscape as it walks; (2) the stepping rule, which tells how the walker chooses its next step; and (3) the landscape’s self-evolving rule, which specifies any change of the landscape due to factors unrelated to the walker, such as, in the case of ants, chemical evaporation or blowing wind. These rules may evolve in time for “intelligent” active walkers. The details of these three rules should depend on the system under study. (Lam 75)

A non-reductive model of dialectical relation can be discerned in the way this perspective imagines how the interactions of the “elements/agents” generate unpredictable consequences or ‘out comes.’ A concurrency of causations between walker, landscape, space, and time are seen to create a ‘complex chaotic determinism’ that can only be ‘known as structure’ in retrospect or ‘after the fact’ of the interactions. Thus the specificity or one-ness of events and causation, of what happens and how, can be determined, but not in advance. Just how much of ‘ordinary life’ might this perspective apply to?

In practice, it is safe to say that almost all the subjects covered in the various departments of a university—except for those in the conventional curriculums of physics, chemistry, and engineering departments—are in the realm of complex systems. The topics studied span a wide spectrum, including human languages, the origins of life, DNA and information, evolutionary biology, economics, psychology, ecology, earthquake geology, immunology, cellular automata, neural networks, and the self-organization of nonequilibrium systems. In other words, the study of complex systems is a study of the real world. (Lam 72)

In so far as various aspects of the phenomenon analyzed through the disciplines Lam cites present not only “complex systems” but chaotically determinist ones, the ordinarily reductive modes of linear analysis might be deemed of limited usefulness in establishing appropriately complex re-presentations. That is to say, if the order/orderings of such phenomena as language, evolution, and consciousness are detectable but not predictable, actual but not linear, then meaningful re-presentations of them need be derived by some appropriate methodology of knowing and knowledge composition. It would appear that scientific reasoning presents two opposed statuses that are, in a sense, equally simple: utterly random

chaos on one side and uniformly predictable structure on the other. A third status of “self-organizing” but non-linear dynamical association then presents a sort of dialog or dialectic of those extreme opposites. However it does not appear to be a condition that is necessarily ‘tending towards’ either a condition of absolute order or orderlessness. Chaotically deterministic status is described as emerging out of and subsiding ‘back into’ states of predictable complexity as well as those of random unpredictability. It would seem then that there are ‘things’ that can be known by way of universally predictive ‘rules of order’ and ‘things’ than can be known, reductively, only ‘after the fact,’ and given a great deal of data.

The “self-organizing” characteristics of ‘chaotic determinism’ as a non-linear yet non-random ordering of ‘out comes’ among interactions of parts occurs under often vastly complicated contingent conditions. This “multi-factorial” portrayal of “intelligent elements/agents” concurrently influencing each other can be regarded as a status of metamorphic becoming. As such it stands in contrast to a predictable sequence of singular statuses that can be characterized as a series of specifiable ‘states of being.’

[T]he lesson that we learn as scientists from the existence of deterministic chaos (the correct technical term for what we have been talking about) is that science, at least in some cases, cannot be predictive. [. . .] Of course, there is no need to despair and give up on understanding complex systems. But the very nature of our understanding might be different from what Cartesian science has grown comfortable with. This is perhaps the most important legacy of chaos and complexity theory, and one with which future generations of scientists and the public will need to reckon. (Pigliucci p. 70)

Physics as Dialectical Philosophy of Being and Becoming

Physics and a Philosophy of Concurrent States of Being: Some ‘Factual Dynamics’ of the ‘Un-real real’

It is not the intention of this study to simply equate ordinary < > non-ordinary, “structural < > anti-structural,” “tame < > wild,” and Newtonian < > Quantum pairings as being ‘reducible’ to identical categories of association. Rather, it is the possibility of a correspondence between the dynamical relations in each association here found to be most significant. If a logical perspective can be offered that ‘relativizes’ the Newtonian and Quantum versions of ‘literal’ existence without reducing (accommodating) one to the standards of the other, one might find a mode of inclusive but non-reductive association similar to that of archaic mentality. That logic could then prove pertinent to the identity crisis of a ‘post’-modernity.

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For a scientifically derived philosophical perspective that attempts to bring the realms of the Newtonian ‘real,’ Einstein’s relativity, and quantum mechanics into such ‘complementarity,’ this study relies upon the reflections of a notable physicist, David Bohm. Bohm’s extensions of theoretical physics to a ‘general philosophy of existence’ is not presented here as a unique or conclusive version of reality. Its logic also manifests in critiques of Western reductivity within rational philosophy. The significance of Bohm’s notions is here found in their source in ‘scientific method’ as study of ‘objective reality.’ Similar work in explicating dynamics of complex systems and the theories of chaos-complexity could be sited in this cause as well. Bohm had the courage and temerity to confront the denial in his own discipline of the philosophical implications of the new physics. He acknowledged the ‘non-ordinary’ character of his effort to address the theories of relativity and physics in a philosophy of “wholeness-as-flowing-movement.”

Indeed, those aspects of relativity theory and quantum theory which do suggest the need for such a view tend to be de-emphasized and in fact hardly noticed by most physicists, because they are regarded largely as features of the mathematical calculus and not as indications of the real nature of things. When it comes to the informal language and mode of thought in physics, which infuses the imagination and provokes the sense of what is real and substantial, most physicists still speak and think, with an utter conviction of truth, in terms of the traditional atomistic notion that the universe is constituted of elementary particles which are ‘basic building blocks’ out of which everything is made. (Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order 14-15)

Bohm came to focus on the relation between “flowing movement” as the dynamic ‘background’ for the particularity of ‘static’ entities constituting the material ‘foreground’ which we tend to identify as the world of things. One of his core insights is that human ‘consciousness’ is indeed not ‘of’ the foreground realm, but a manifestation of the background dynamic flow—even though it appears to be constituted of the ‘things’ that are the ‘contents’ of thought.

I would say that in my scientific and philosophical work, my main concern has been with understanding the nature of reality in general and of consciousness in particular as a coherent whole, which is never static or complete, but which is in an unending process of movement and unfoldment. [. . .] Whenever one *thinks* of anything, it seems to be approached either as static, or as a series of static images. Yet, in actual experience of movement, one senses an unbroken, undivided process of flow, to which the series of static images in thought is related as a series of ‘still’ photographs might be related to the actuality of a speeding car [. . .]. (Bohm ix)

Such static images as a series of ‘still’ photographs of movement ‘figure’ sequential aspects of movement, but such figuring does not ‘reduce’ that movement or activity to those ‘atomized’ or ‘particularized’ figures. Such particularizing is ‘useful’ for thinking and reasoning but does not ‘define’ reality as such. Considering ‘consciousness’ as such movement, one’s thinking self or “I,” need not be a literal ‘thing’ but rather a manifestation of whatever phenomenal field ‘surrounds’ and enables the formation (differentiation) of the world of things or literal entities in general. Thusly posed, notions of

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'consciousness' as disembodied 'soul,' 'spirit,' or even 'mind-as-epiphenomenon-of-brain' seem more 'reasonable.'

The Presence of Particularity in Fluidity

Bohm seems to pose the possibility that thoughts or images form in consciousness as 'things' do in the quantum field. That which connects the 'things' is the 'flow.' However, by virtue of its 'forming' there is a tendency to then 'take the thing for the flow.' That is, the 'habit' of human intelligence seems to favor classifying totality as specified entities, as 'things,' not as 'flows' or 'movements' 'appearing' as things. The projected 'still' photographs of a 'motion picture' are not the dynamic that makes for the 'appearance' of continual activity or motion. However, without such particularized 'fragments' of a 'flow' there is no set of succeeding 'references' from which to create a 'sense' of flow. Recall here Bohm's observation that even professional physicists tend to view manifest existence as comprised of "elementary particles which are 'basic building blocks' out of which everything is made" while the 'flow' character of manifestation is 'merely' a "feature of mathematical calculus." The contrast and confusion between 'flow' and 'particularization' is illustrated by defining 'thinking' as 'thoughts' and then 'thoughts' as 'things.'

[. . .] fragmentation is continually being brought about by the almost universal habit of taking the content of our thought for 'a description of the world as it is.' Or we could say that, in this habit, our thought is regarded as in direct correspondence with objective reality. Since our thought is pervaded with differences and distinctions, it follows that such a habit leads us to look on these as real divisions, so that the world is then seen and experienced as actually broken into fragments. (Bohm 3)

Here one can note a contrast between a habitual mode of interpreting reality (as the fragmentary 'things of thought' equaling material objects or physical actions differentiated and identified by them) and how it obscures a wider dynamical totality. Such a habit of fragmentizing totality and 'reducing' its dynamical character to particularized fragments can be seen in the "collective representations" of socio-cultural "structure" used to 'identify' self/world/other. That obscuration of background 'flow' by foreground 'fragmentation' in the form of evidently-static social "structures" suggests the archaic need to disrupt ordinary reality for the purpose of contacting the 'divine' or 'sacred' 'other world' and thus experience a re-orientation to a sense of inclusivity and participation in a larger field being. Habitual attitudes take the positivized "structures" to be 'real' and all pervasive thus these must be abrogated to 'release' identity from such reduction.

Bohm terms the realms subject to Newtonian law and quantum dynamics as "explicate" and "implicate" "orders," respectively. The "explicate" is obvious in particularized or fragmented identifications. The "implicate" is the less obvious "background flow" that "enfolds" all seeming-particularizations.

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In the enfolded order, space and time are no longer the dominant factors determining the relationships of dependence or independence of different elements. Rather, an entirely different sort of basic connection of elements is possible, from which our ordinary notions of space and time, along with those of separately existent material particles, are abstracted as forms derived from the deeper order. These ordinary notions in fact appear in what is called the *explicate* or *unfolded* order, which is a special and distinguished form contained within the general totality of all the implicate orders. (Bohm xv)

In seeking a basis for a non-reductive and non-fragmentary totality appropriate to a 'post'-modern philosophy it is important to notice that Bohm pluralizes the "implicate." His notion of the field of totality is not reductive to a simple 'oneness.' Here is the genuinely radical nature of his philosophy. Totality is not a static state whose 'order' is the order to which positivistic mentality habitually refers—for any 'fixed' status is, in this theory, necessarily an aspect of the explicate order and thus a sub-order of the "enfolded implicate." But neither is totality a simple causal consequence of "implicate" flow forming as "explicate" particularity and then flowing on into other forms. Rather, Bohm finds the "implicate" to be polyvalent or polycentric, a plurality of concurrent multidimensional 'flowings.' These 'flowings' and 'formings' constitute a non-linear field in the totality of which co-exist various contrasting but non-hierarchically ordered elements, much as multiple theories of a set of phenomena can be 'valid' concurrently. Such a conception of 'relativistic' totality is radically non-reductive. Thus it is tremendously difficult to 'think about' without thinking in terms of mechanistic fragmentation.

What is needed in a relativistic theory is to give up altogether the notion that the world is constituted of basic objects or 'building blocks.' Rather, one has to view the world in terms of universal flux of events and processes [. . .]. (Bohm 9)

What is called for is not an *integration* of thought, or a kind of imposed unity, for any such imposed point of view would itself be merely another fragment. Rather, all our different ways of thinking are to be considered as different ways of looking at the one reality, each with some domain in which it is clear and adequate. One may indeed compare a theory to a particular view of some object. (Bohm 7-8)

Thus every theory or perspective may have validity but none can be conclusive. There will be, in his vision, no ultimate conclusion, no 'final truth' to be arrived at.

In this activity [of continually re-vising theories], there is evidently no reason to suppose that there is or will be a final form of insight (corresponding to absolute truth) or even a steady series of approximations to this. Rather, in the nature of the case, one may expect the unending development of new of insight [. . .]. (Bohm 5)

Bohm's philosophy of 'unity in fluidity' does not negate the reality of the "explicate order" of 'appearances' (the 'things' of thought and objects) as some Eastern philosophy can be taken to posit the world in the notion of Maya or illusion. Thus the difficulty in grasping his 'totality of reality' is not one of 'disbelieving' the world of appearances but of somehow positioning the "explicate" realm of

objectified entities distinguished in 'time' and 'space' also in "flow" that 'does not exist' by, or at least is not experienced in, the same particularized, segmented modality.

The new form of insight can perhaps best be called *Undivided Wholeness in Flowing Movement*. This view implies that flow is, in some sense, prior to that of the 'things' that can be seen to form and dissolve in this flow. One can perhaps illustrate what is meant here by considering the 'stream of consciousness'. This flux of awareness is not precisely definable, and yet it is evidently prior to the definable forms of thoughts and ideas which can be seen to form and dissolve in the flux like ripples, waves and vortices in a flowing stream. As happens with such patterns of movement in a stream some thoughts recur and persist in a more or less stable manner, while others are evanescent. (Bohm 11)

There is a tendency to 'order' 'ordinary reality' out of those recurrent patterns in 'flow' that appear stable and thus tangibly real, yet are 'in fact' 'only' an "explicit" expression of an activity of "implicit" flow—a pattern of continuing movement, not a static 'thing.'

The proposal for a new general form of insight is that all matter is of this nature: That is, there is a universal flux that cannot be defined explicitly but which can only be known implicitly, as indicated by the explicitly definable forms and shapes, some stable and some unstable, that can be abstracted from the universal flux. In this flow, mind and matter are not separate substances. Rather, they are different aspects of one whole and unbroken movement. In this way we are able to look on all aspects of existence as not divided from each other, and thus we can bring to an end the fragmentation implicit in the current attitude toward the atomic point of view, which leads us to divide everything from everything in a thoroughgoing way. Nevertheless, we can comprehend that aspect of atomism which still provides a correct and valid form of insight: i.e. that in spite of the undivided wholeness in flowing movement, the various patterns that can be abstracted from it have a certain relative autonomy and stability, which is indeed provided for by the universal law of the flowing movement. Now, however, we have the limits of this autonomy and stability sharply in mind. (Bohm 11)

All is thus 'of' the flowing totality *and* much can be differentiated as recognizably stable pattern within that totality. Thereby totality and differentiated particularity are not posed as either in conflict or hierarchically as 'superior' and 'inferior.' They exist mutually and co-participate. Here is a basis for both an individual and interdependent/indeterminant (thus 'participatory') set of identifications. This "explicate" <> "implicate" complementarity can readily be associated with Turner's "structural" <> "anti-structural" or the 'positivism' <> 'anti-positivism' pairing. This perspective also suggests the metaphoric status of being and the metamorphic process of becoming initially presented at the beginning of this study. In regard to this notion, Bohm makes the following distinction.

In the interests of clarity, we shall therefore reserve the word *transformation* to describe a simple geometric change *within* a given explicate order. What happens in the broader context of implicate order we shall then call a *metamorphosis*. This word indicates that the change is much more radical than the change of position or orientation of a rigid body [. . .]. (Bohm 159-60)

This distinction between "transformation" and "metamorphosis" is primarily relative to the way people tend to 'think' about how they think about and experience "implicate flow" and "explicate form." Thus one might use the term "transformation" for changes that occur within the 'boundaries' of

ordinary or “explicate” reality, changes that *do not* tend to ‘assimilate’ habitual identities to the “anti-structural,’ the “wild” or the “flowing totality.” In contrast, “metamorphosis” is of an ‘other order’ of ‘qualitative’ magnitude—a change into another status of being, an experience or manifestation of the “flow” that ‘crosses’ the habitually identified ‘boundaries’ of fragmentary distinctions. In that ‘dimensional status’ time and space as sequence are modified in ways that are unimaginable from a “fragmentary” perspective of mechanistic causality. Perhaps this is a ‘logic of transubstantiation’ that ‘identifies’ the ‘movement’ of ‘creational flow’ into ‘literal form’, which then has a ‘multi-dimensional’ or pluralistic existence. Concurrences of ‘the mover’ and ‘the moved’ *as each* other and *as dimensionally* plural are then somehow ‘possible’ so that there is an experience of totalistic relationship of the ‘elements’ or ‘events’ of the “explicate”—otherwise there could be no ‘sense-of-totally’ or ‘the miraculous.’ In contrast, ‘transformation’ would be a change of form as form, rather than ‘into multidimensional status of flowing form.’

The Variousness of Presence in Multidimensional Being.

Such ‘presence’ in/as both “implicate flow” and “explicate form” establishes a basis for an unrestricted layering of “sub-totalities.” “What we have seen thus far is a progression from explicate order to simple three-dimensional implicate order, then to a multi-dimensional implicate order, then to an extension of this to the immense ‘sea’ in what is sensed as empty space (Bohm 193).”

Thus the “implicate order” is held to be ‘layered,’ again suggesting concurrencies—relations or ‘participations’ between situations that ‘appear’ as separate in space and time. The ‘emptiness of space’ is held to be ‘full’ of the “flow” of the “implicate”—which is ‘sensible’ only by way of the patterns or “sub-totalities” of the “explicate.” The “implicate” thus ‘pervades’ the “explicate,” manifesting in/as any of the latter’s particularized patterns as “sub-totalities” that constitute a holographic presentation of the larger flowing totality. Any ‘fragment’ of the “implicate flowing movement” is such a “sub-totally” which manifests that totality by way of the dynamical relationship or participation of ‘flow’ and ‘form’ which so constitute it. And, multiple “sub-totalities” that are variously distinguishable can participate in the ‘constitution’ of each other.

Quite generally, then, the implicate order has to be extended into a multidimensional reality. In principle this reality is one unbroken whole, including the entire universe with all its ‘fields’ and ‘particles’. Thus we have to say that the holomovement enfolds and unfolds in a multidimensional order, the dimensionality of which is effectively quite infinite. However [. . .] relatively independent sub-totalities can generally be abstracted, which can be approximated as autonomous. Thus the principle of relative autonomy of sub-totalities which we introduced earlier as basic to the holomovement is now seen to extend to the multidimensional order of reality. (Bohm 189)

Bohm here generates a term for a ‘totalistic’ reality as “holomovement”—a complex of “implicate” (and ‘abstractable’) ‘orderings’ of flowing movement-in/as-form. There is, in this theory, no

need to set a limit, a final definition on the realms of reality. The distinction that relativizes the conundrum of 'distinctions' is the 'unifying' principle of "wholeness in flowing movement." There is difference but 'it' is not 'definitive.' Difference distinguishes the patterning of 'form' in flow but does not delineate 'parts' into 'fragments' by way of any singular, ultimate boundaries between 'flowing forms.' That is to say: "sub-totalities" can be "abstracted" from the 'totality' which are not 'fragments' because they are 'holographic' of the totality, manifesting "implicate" flow as "explicate" form just as the 'larger totality' does.

A 'musical note' manifests a "sub-totality" of music as the 'flow of form' typical of 'music.' The complexity of "holomovement" is suggested in how a sequence of notes in a musical composition do follow one after another in an "explicate order" but (also) one does not experience them thusly, rather music

[. . .] is *sensed immediately* as the presence together of many different but interrelated degrees of transformations of tones and sounds. In the latter, there is a feeling of both tension and harmony between the various co-present transformations, and this feeling is indeed what is primary in the apprehension of the music in its undivided state of flowing movement [. . .]. (Bohm 199)

The music participated by being heard immediately takes form and thus flow not only as a 'sensed continuum' but in various concurrent contexts—such as "emotional, physical, and other responses."

In listening to music, *one is therefor directly perceiving an implicate order*. Evidently this order is active in the sense that it continually flows into emotional, physical, and other responses, that are inseparable from the transformations out of which it is essentially constituted. (Bohm 199-200)

In this order, movement is comprehended in terms of a series of inter-penetrating and intermingled elements in different degrees of enfoldment all present together. The activity of this movement then presents no difficulty, because it is an outcome of this whole enfolded order, and is determined by relationships of co-present elements, rather than by the relationships of elements that exist to others that no longer exist.

We see, then, that through thinking in terms of the implicate order, we come to a notion of movement that is logically coherent and that properly represents our immediate experience of movement. Thus the sharp break between abstract logical thought and concrete immediate experience, that has pervaded our culture for so long, need no longer be maintained. Rather, the possibility is created for an unbroken flowing movement from immediate experience to logical thought and back, and thus for an ending to this kind of fragmentation.

Moreover we are now able to understand in a new and more consistent way our proposed notion concerning the general nature of reality, that *what is* is movement. Actually, what tends to make it difficult for us to work in terms of this notion is that we usually think of movement in the traditional way as an active relationship of what is to what is not. Our traditional notion concerning the general nature of reality would then amount to saying that *what is* is an active relationship of what is to what is not. To say this is, at the very least, confused. In terms of the implicate order, however, movement is a relationship of certain stages of *what is* to other phases of *what is*, that are in different stages of enfoldment. This notion implies that the essence of reality as a whole is the above relationship among the various phases in different stages of enfoldment (rather than, for example, a relationship between various particles and fields that are all explicate and manifest). (Bohm 203)

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Totality-as-flowing-movement thus is neither definable as linear sequence or singular status because it is not thusly “fragmented” nor ‘bound’ by separable coordinates of time and space. Innumerable flows take form and interact concurrently as both flow and form—a manifold dynamical model of being and becoming, of ‘variety of presencing.’ Yet such seems ‘unimaginable’ from the perspective of “explicate” reality and a causality derived from the mechanics of static things as parts. From that ‘point of view’ this “implicate” dynamism of ‘flow-taking-form-while-flowing’ is impossible, ‘un-real.’

One reason why we do not generally notice the primacy of the implicate order is that we have become so habituated to the explicate order, and have emphasized it so much in our thought and language, that we tend strongly to feel that our primary experience is of that which is explicate and manifest. (Bohm 206)

Again, this seeming contrast of simultaneous concurrence and particularized sequence in “flow” and “form” that is not oppositional is perhaps best illustrated by examining one’s own sense of consciousness.

We see, then, that each moment of consciousness has a certain *explicit* content, which is a foreground, and an *implicit* content, which is a corresponding background. We now propose that not only is immediate experience best understood in terms of the implicate order, but that thought also is basically to be comprehended in this order. Here we mean not just the *content* of thought for which we have already begun to use the implicate order. Rather, we also mean that the actual *structure, function* and *activity* of thought is in the implicate order. The distinction between implicit and explicit in thought is thus being taken here to be essentially equivalent to the distinction between implicate and explicate in matter in general. (Bohm 204)

The notion that one’s ‘actual’ immediate experience is of “implicate flow” which is habitually identified as “explicate form” may seem implausible—and so it is to the habitually “fragmentary” mode of identification. Here is just the ‘problem’ addressed by archaic cultural inductions of “liminal anti-structure.” The ‘continuity’ of “explicate” and “implicate” is ‘accessible’ only through a “metamorphic” experience of the two modalities of being being co-existent. The most vivid human context for engaging this metamorphic co-existence is in the ‘seeming’ distinctions between an ‘actually’ indivisible unity of “implicate” ‘mind’ and “explicate” ‘body.’

This connection of the mind and body has commonly been called psychosomatic (from the Greek ‘psyche’, meaning ‘mind’ and ‘soma’, meaning ‘body’). This word is generally used, however, in such a way as to imply that mind and body are separately existent but connected by some sort of interaction. Such a meaning is not compatible with the implicate order. In the implicate order we have to say that mind enfolds matter in general and therefore the body in particular. Similarly, the body enfolds not only the mind but also in some sense the entire material universe. (In the manner explained earlier in this section, both through the senses and through the fact that the constituent atoms of the body are actually structures that are enfolded in principal throughout all space). (Bohm 209)

‘The mind enfolds matter in general and therefore the body in particular’ by being a primary manifestation of non-fragmentary “implicate flow.” The body, as particularized pattern of “constituent atoms” that flow, is an “explicate form”—yet, by virtue of being a holographic “sub-totality” of the larger totality, the body ‘holds’ the mind in the manner “implicate flow” holds form or matter and the universe ‘holds’ or ‘enfolds’ the totality of “implicate flows.” Here is a ‘duality’ that is neither oppositional nor reductive.

What is crucial in the present context is that, according to the theory of relativity, a sharper distinction between space and time can not be maintained (except as an approximation, valid at velocities small compared with that of light). Thus, since quantum theory implies that elements that are separated in space are generally non-causally and non-locally related projections of a higher-dimensional reality, it follows that moments separated in time are also such projections of this reality.

Evidently, this leads to a fundamentally new notion of the meaning of time. Both in common experience and in physics, time has generally been considered to be a primary, independent and universally applicable order. [. . .] Now, we have been led to suppose that it is secondary. [. . .] What we are proposing here is that sequences of moments that ‘skip’ intervening spaces are just as allowable forms of time as those which seem continuous. (Bohm 210)

Following this notion then, both experience of time in mechanistic sequence as well as in some more concurrent convergence of sequentially dissociated ‘moments’ would have to be considered ‘valid.’ Such configuration of time and space allow for a concurrence of causal elements or flows—again, such as the mutual validity of differing theories of phenomenal activity and manifestation.

The fundamental law, then, is that of the immense multidimensional ground; and the projections from this ground determine whatever time orders there may be. Of course, this law may be such that in certain limiting cases the order of moments corresponds approximately to what would be determined by a simple causal law [. . .]. (Bohm 211-12)

A Reasonable Logic Alien to Fragmentary Mentality and the Persistent Problem of Rationalistic Validity

Whether Bohm’s “fundamental law” is ‘accurate’ or not, modernist mentality is not conditioned to ‘identify’ its validity, even if one’s intellectual logic can reasonably ‘configure’ it. To validate it would be to invalidate accepted reality by the oppositional terms of the latter. Yet there exists a tendency to believe that what can be imagined can be done, or ‘believed.’

But if our whole way of thinking is penetrated by fragmentary perception, this implies that we are not capable of this [an open approach to think differently], for fragmentary perception is in essence a largely unconscious habit of confusion around the question of what is different and what is not. So, in the very act in which we try to discover what to do about fragmentation, we will go on with this habit and thus we will tend to introduce yet further forms of fragmentation. (Bohm 17)

People desire to ‘think holistically’—but efforts toward that goal usually proceed ‘habitually’ and thus in oppositional and fragmentary terms that can only conceive unity as singular and undifferentiated. But a monistic ‘singularity’ is not a ‘unity.’ How then can the inability to ‘think’ of the ‘reality’ of “implicit order” be analyzed if thinking is habitually fragmentary?

Questions of this nature cannot be met properly while we are caught up, consciously or unconsciously in a mode of thought which attempts to analyze itself in terms of a presumed separation between the process of thinking and the content of thought that is its product. By accepting such a presumption we are led, in the next step, to seek some fantasy of action through efficient causes that would end the fragmentation in the content while leaving the fragmentation in the actual process of thinking untouched. What is needed, however, is somehow to grasp the overall *formative cause* of fragmentation, in which content and actual process are seen together, in their wholeness. (Bohm 18)

But ‘how’ can one “grasp the overall *formative cause* of fragmentation,” the ‘projection’ of the character of the “explicate” onto that of the “implicate,” when all one ‘knows how to do’ is “seek some fantasy of action through efficient causes,” by way of a ‘formally mechanistic mentality?’ This dilemma may indeed be at the core of ‘post’-modernist anxiety of identity—as defined in quantitative terms of ‘measure’ that suggest a positivistic ‘solution’ to its distressing fragmentation.

Actually, there are no direct and positive things that man can do to get in touch with the immeasurable, for this must be immensely beyond anything that man can grasp with his mind or accomplish with his hands or his instruments. What man can do is to give his full attention and creative energies to bring clarity and order into the totality of the field of measure. (Bohm 25)

To “bring clarity and order into the totality of the field of measure” would be to assimilate the sense of ‘measuring’ found valid in the “explicate ordering” to the nature of the ‘immeasurable’ “implicate.” Bohm’s scientific technique, complete with mathematical equations configuring the dynamical nature of that ‘immeasurable’ field of “flowing wholeness” may ‘in fact’ offer a ‘real’ image of the ‘un-real real,’ of the ‘other worldly’ dynamism that so threatens particularized, ‘objectifying,’ time-vs.-space identifications of “explicit” form and linear causality. His non-technical reasoning explicates ‘the problem’ of becoming conscious of the participatory relations of ordinary (explicate) and non-ordinary (implicate) realities that are and *are not* ‘different.’ From his perspective, human consciousness, as actually a manifestation of that ‘thingless’ dynamism which ‘generates’ the as-if ‘things’ of thought, constitutes a context for the multidimensional “implicate” to ‘know itself’ in the manifestation of seemingly independent (“explicate”) singularities which are its “sub-totalities.”

These configurations suggest a field of ‘activity’ of an ‘agency,’ whose composition is inclusive of the psycho<>somatic sub-totality (a holograph or “holomovement”) of the multi-dimensional ground of unlimited totality. What ‘identity,’ attempting to orient ‘it’s self’ in such a context, would not experience extreme anxiety? ‘It’ exists “betwixt and between,” in both the “anti-structural” field of the “implicate” and the ordinarily structured one of the “explicate”—where there can be no ‘either/or’ of

oppositional identity but where the most ‘tangible’ aspects of ‘experience’ are identified with the somatic materializations and causalities of the “explicate” order. Surely this is an exposition of the ‘always already’ “many in the one that is the one among the many.”

But is Bohm’s explication a philosophy or a ‘portrait,’ some other sort of ‘abstract’ painting of dynamical activity? His reasoning constitutes a radical shift, as do the styles of the ‘revolutionary modern artists.’ A different ‘awareness’ is indicated.

[. . .] the act of reason is essentially a kind of perception through the mind, similar in certain ways to [holistic] artistic perception, and not merely the associative repetition of reasons that are already known. Thus, one may be puzzled by a wide range of factors, things that do not fit together, until suddenly there is a flash of understanding, and therefore one sees how all these factors are related as aspects of one totality (e.g. consider Newton’s insight into universal gravitation). Such acts of perception cannot properly be given detailed analysis or description. Rather, they are to be considered as aspects of the *forming* activity of mind. A particular structure of concepts is then the *product* of this activity, and these products are what are linked by the series of efficient causes that operate in ordinary associative thinking—and as pointed out earlier, in this view, one regards the forming activity as primary in nature as it is in the mind, so that the product forms in nature are linked by efficient causes. (Bohm 13-14)

Thus the ‘insight,’ the sensing that comes in a “flash of understanding” as some ‘mystical’ connection with the totalistic field, is habitually and necessarily given expression in the “explicate” order of efficient causes or “ordinary thinking.” Such a situation is not unlike the religious dilemma of expressing mystical experience in terms accessible to ‘ordinary’ consciousness.’ But if Bohm’s language and reasoning remain dependent on a ‘linear logic’ to generate an understanding of a multi-dimensional totality with co-presencing by way of ‘opposing’ the ‘dynamic’ of flow and the ‘static’ of form, has he ‘expressed’ the insight in some ‘totality?’ To ‘be’ these ‘aspects’ concurrently is not to ‘be’ conscious in the way of ordinary thought—the way even he expresses his reasoning in the linear rationality of his deductive writing.

This re-defining the definitions in the same language usage generated by the previous definitions is some ways akin to the deconstructionists proving the meaninglessness of language using the ‘meanings’ of that language usage. Bohm explicitly states that one cannot ‘do’ anything about fragmentary denial of totality if one ‘does’ as one is accustomed to ‘doing’ in terms of habitual thinking about thinking. The modernist is trapped in fragmented identifications by belief in difference as ‘literal’ and as definitive truth—difference and truth as static rather than dynamical. The ‘un-real real’ remains inaccessible to the mechanistically fundamentalist mentality even though it ‘conceives’ a ‘portrait’ of “undivided wholeness in flowing movement.” Bohm acknowledges this conundrum. One cannot ‘know’ one’s fragmentary selves unless one ‘gets out’ of them, gets ‘alienated’ from them ‘as fragmentary,’ in one’s thinking (which ironically is not fragmented in its “implicate” dynamism regardless of ‘how’ one ‘thinks’ about it) but one cannot ‘get out’ of fragmented identity if one’s

perspective is 'identified' with it. There appears no 'getting there from here.' And yet, we must always already be here *and* there.

[. . .] by a rather interesting sort of irony, fragmentation seems to be the one thing in our way of life which is universal, which works through the whole without boundary or limit. This comes about because the roots of fragmentation are very deep and pervasive. [. . .]

So fragmentation is in essence a confusion around the question of difference and sameness (or one-ness), but the clear perception of these categories is necessary in every phase of life. *To be confused about what is different and what is not, is to be confused about everything.* Thus it is not surprising that our fragmentary form of thought is leading to such a widespread range of crises [. . .]. (Bohm 16)

Such "fragmentary form of thought is leading," in general, to the 'identity crisis' of 'post'-modernity some distinguish from the identity crisis of modernism by characterizing the latter as of "alienation of the individual" and the former as 'fragmentation of the subject.' However, perhaps there is a 'motive' to the trauma of the collapse of modernity's mechanical identity in its self-deconstruction or de-centering. Perhaps the only possible means of shifting identification away from fragmentary oppositionalism is through initiatory 'torment' that loosens habitual identity's 'grip' on who and what and where 'we' are. Perhaps moderns are living in a long drawn out, 'spontaneously' generated 'rite of initiation' into 'relativized' identity consciousness. Perhaps, even as many cry out for 'more order,' and even Bohm tries to imagine how embracing "undivided wholeness in flowing movement" might better "harmonize" human actions, it is the collective experience of the "implicate" in the 'seeming' chaos of "anti-structural liminality" that is being 'called forth' by pluralistic psyche.

Bohm also 'equates' the dynamic "implicate" field with the (however briefly) perduring "explicate" one by terming both as 'orders.' (Recall here Turner's contrast as "structure< >anti-structure" rather than posing social structure< >nature structure.) Perhaps it is not 'order' being (unconsciously) sought in this self/other/world fragmenting, but a form of thought about thought that is not 'identified' with this identity-as-singularity or with difference as fixed, objective status—which leaves us with nothing but paradoxical contradiction by which to 'understand' a non-oppositionally dualist totality.

Such a shift of "thought form" requires something more than the insights of self-deconstructing scientific rationalism. 'Post'-modernity as a crisis of modernism is not just logical but *psychological: it is a crisis of the 'logic' of self in the confrontation of singular and pluralistic being. And the crises of modern psychology (it is offered here), is mythological.* To 'think' and thus to 'be' as embodiment of the flowing totality of "implicate" and "explicate," "anti-structural" and "structural," "wild" and "tame," is a 'mythical task.' There has to be 'acknowledged' "dragon smoke" involved. However, the analytical perspective of rational materialism *must* formulate the mythic *psycho-logically*. "The postmodern theological project is to reaffirm God's truth without abandoning the powers of reason" (Harvey, 44). It is the "powers of reason" that are now invested with determining 'ultimate' or totalistic reality.

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Thus those “powers” shall have to be psychologically re-configured to account for any ‘divine’ ordering, any agency that is ‘immaterial.’ If the Humanist assertion that there is no ‘literal’ God stands, then the ‘truth of God’ must be a discernable, if dynamical, ‘matter of psyche.’ And such ‘discernment,’ it will be argued, is ‘expressed’ in the “thought form” of ‘the mythical.’ But any ‘rational’ understanding of ‘the mythical’ will require a ‘logic of psyche’ adequate to the dynamical character of “wholeness in flowing movement” or manyness in oneness.

Chapter 6

Psychologies of Radical Self-Complexity: Subjectivities of Internal Fragmentation and the Participatory Dis-ease of Plural Identifications

Like that of science in general, the disciplinary field of analysis known as psychology seeks a logically self-consistent basis for explaining phenomena, specifically in reference to mind, consciousness, personality structure, and behavioral motivation. That effort can be posed as an attempt to differentiate how the status and processes of consciousness or behavior can be rationally described. Categories thereby tend to be generated for differentiating the conscious processes of a ‘human knower’ as either logical or ill-logical—in the sense of being rational versus irrational. In posing such distinctions, psychological theory exhibits a range of more and less reductive approaches to re-presenting identity. The more reductive psychological theories re-present the phenomenon of consciousness and psychic life in dynamically deterministic and mechanistic ways. These can be said to include, in regard to the general structuring of core concepts, behavioral, neuro-biological, evolutionary or genetic psychologies, and the more Freudian styles of programmatic psychoanalytic theory. Therefore, this brief review of how psychological perspective can elaborate a less reductive model of the radical diversity of psyche and its epistemological processes is focused elsewhere in the spectrum of psychological theories. That aspect of psychological theory necessarily exhibits the most self-consciousness of its attempt to objectify its subjective definitional identification of psychic subjectivity—or to more openly acknowledge that it ‘analyses itself.’ Thus the focus in this chapter is with psychological re-presentation that most exemplifies the dynamics of the ‘thing analyzed.’ In this respect, the such ‘logics of psyche’ are more akin to complexity theory in science than to Newtonian physics in that these attempt to re-present ‘nature’ with less reduction of its complexity to simplicity.

As it happens, this emphasis constitutes a turn toward psychological theory and practice that more overly acknowledge the derivation of psychology from the ancient Greek schism between *logos* and *mythos*, or the (linearly logical) rational posed in opposition to the irrational. In that very opposition the ‘logic of psyche’ and thus identity status become ambi-valent. Plato archetypally posed a pluralistic status of human consciousness in the image of a person attempting to control a chariot drawn by two horses, one of Reason and one of Passion or illogical ‘un-reason.’ This inherently diverse, interminably dynamical model of consciousness or psyche is a sort of ‘root reference’ for ‘radically complex psychological theories.’ However, it also presents an archetypal move to definitively, thus reductively identify consciousness as oppositionally divided between reason and un-reason, order and disorder, reflective and reflexive consciousness. It is thus those theories and methods which tend to re-present mind and psyche in more radically complex ways that are considered below.

Psychological Engagement with Psyche's Versions of the Real and Un-real

The notion of agency in self/other/world and expressions of its plurality in metaphoric/metamorphic 'un-reality' is here considered in specifically psychological theory and practice. The focus remains on some 'un-real real' and how it may relativize habitual identity to a larger sense of radically complex totality—but specifically such complexity of 'the psyche.' Primary to this consideration is how the 'egoic-I' as some 'agent' of identity and its relation to 'real' and 'un-real' status are 'figured' in psychological theory. The perspective taken on this question is shaped considerably by the foregoing posing of 'real' and 'un-real' status as co-existent elements of totality—as expressed in some anthropological analyses of archaic cultural attitudes and even some scientific notions (such as space-time relativity and the "string theory" of a concurrent, non-locally multidimensional universe).

This discussion of psychological notions focuses on those 'psychologies' (logics of psyche) identified with the general theories of "depth psychology" deriving from concepts of a conscious < > unconscious division of personal psychical phenomenon. Most specifically, the theories cited here are from the Jungian rather than Freudian models. Some of this theory is termed "post-Jungian," and titled archetypal or imaginal psychology. The criteria for this orientation in this study is that the guiding notions of psychic agency in these psychological theories are explicitly and non-pathologically pluralistic in that they resist identifying 'the self' singularly with either egoic function, personality, or biological brain function. Compared to most other psychological perspectives, these tend to accept a 'divided' or plural status of consciousness as necessary rather than deviant or pathological 'condition of mind.' This distinction can be characterized by stating that these psychologies are 'less anxious about' psychical plurality and more affirmative of its tendency to disturb or threaten egoic and socially reductive sense of self, other, and world. That is to say, from these psychological perspectives, the anxiety induced by psychic plurality is essential, as is that about what is 'ultimately' real versus 'un-real.' Further, it is in these theories that the non-literalistic aspects of thought and experience are often granted some validity as 'logically real' phenomenon. It is in these perspectives on psyche and its 'objective reality' that a co-participation of 'matter' and 'mind' is given primary emphasis.

Only such psychological perspectives that do not singularize and isolate sense-of-self from other and world in fragmentary and oppositional relations are found to pose the possibility of 'participatory identity.' However, it will be argued that if the overtly metamorphic status referred to as the 'un-real real' is posed as opposite to or separate from the 'literally real,' then, philosophically, subjective and objective status remain in an oppositionally dualistic relationship and the 'un-real real' is not, after all, granted full validity for dominant cultural mentality. For there to be a 'conceivable' totality that is non-oppositionally

dualistic, non-reductive to undifferentiated 'one-ness,' it is asserted that there needs be a 'logic of psyche' that substantiates identifications of 'real', 'un-real' and 'un-real-real' that, taken together, mediate many-ness and one-ness.

The Philosophical Challenge to Psychology: An Accommodating Resolution of Plurality or an 'Inhabiting the Gap' between Its Parts

'Post'-modernity and its crises of singular identity pose a similar 'problem' for religion, science and psychology: How can one 'figure' and 'engage' either a natural world or socio-cultural context that appears chaotic and overwhelmingly complex to an objectifying, oppositional mentality conditioned by a literalistic, linear perspective on causality? How can such a mentality have 'relations' or 'congress' with the "wild"/"anti-structural"/"chaotic" 'agencies' implicit in the particularity of explicit experience? How are individuals to have a sense of 'self' that is not neurotically alienated by internal and external conflicts in an essentially dissociative social context whose 'communality' is derived from mutually 'competitive' personalistic individualism?

We know that the core of the neuroses of our time is the religious problem or, stated in more universal terms, the search for the self. In this sense neuroses, like the mass phenomena resulting from this situation, are a kind of sacred disease. (Neumann 132)

The initial question for psychological philosophy is whether these "core neuroses of our time" are 'problems' to be solved/resolved by accommodating them to habitual mentality, or rather to be engaged as some way indicative of a 'larger reality' that 'post'-moderns might learn to 'participate' with/in? Is a linear course of 'reason' and 'action' that will 'arrive at' a 'position' of confident resolution to be taken as the 'objective' of psychological 'effort,' or is it consideration of how to consciously 'inhabit' the seeming dilemmas of 'post'-modernity that is 'desired?' What sort of 'truth' can be derived from exploring the "neuroses of our time?" Are there some conclusive 'facts' to be reasoned-out 'here' or rather a 'dynamic fact' of non-linear logic of totality to which one must submit?

For psychology as a 'practical theory' these questions may distil to whether it is to be a practice of 'individualistic personal therapy' that assuages distress (compensating neuroses and alienation), or *therapeia* in the older sense of attendance to 'the gods,' to the "Not-I" and the "I's" participation in a field of agency larger than the 'personal,' as in engaging some "Not-Not-I." Again, these 'choices of identity' for psychology can be seen as 'of the individual as a part' or 'of participation in totality.' There appears to be a choice of either 'identifying' with the function of 'protecting' the 'individual' identity from the 'dissociations' of psyche that are regarded as 'pathological,' or to assist that singular identity to 'submit' to a larger totality of self/other/world. It seems evident that to 'know' psyche is not to become 'personally happy.'

[. . .] psychotherapy is not a helping profession in the usual sense of the word. Its intent is not to set right, to cure, to better, be it the world or individual people. Such intentions are subjective wishes stemming from ourselves as ego personalities [. . .]. The immediate purpose of psychotherapy is ‘analysis,’ that is, gaining cognition, doing justice to psychological phenomena by penetrating to their innermost core and by comprehending them.[. . .] Psychology has no stake in changing the world for the better, nor in hope, or despair. (Giegerich, “The Opposition of ‘Individual’ and ‘Collective’ —Psychology’s Basic Fault” 2)

The term depth psychology designates a general theory of psyche and method of engaging psychic life that both ‘admit’ the notion of pluralities of psychic agency in the individual person and often affirm a value to the distresses, the ‘dis-ease,’ of ‘fragmentary identity’ which confrontation with that plurality can arouse. To psychological theories of singular identity, identifiable as ego psychology, this plurality is pathological; an illness to be ‘cured’ by suppression or by accommodation to a relatively secure hierarchy of elements subservient to a singular “I” of self as ‘personalistic’ personality.

In a more polycentric psychology, this gradual assimilation of other portions of psyche by the ego is not the goal. In a polycentric psychology, one attuned to and respectful of the multiplicity of the Self, one would attempt to restore some autonomy to the colonies. (Watkins, Invisible Guests 119)

As stated earlier, it appears that the aspect of ‘post’-modern life that still enables the capacity to ‘confront’ dramatically the assumptions of hierarchical, oppositional, mechanistic mentality is that of ‘internal’ mental or psychic experience. In reflection upon the florid productions of ‘the psyche,’ of ‘one’s’ mental or psychic generativity, and how its variety and conflict can challenge the maintenance of a confidently unified identity, one comes ‘face to face’ with one’s ‘own’ plurality, one’s ‘Not-I-ness.’ Psychological theories that do not attempt to dismiss the ‘realness’ of such ‘internal otherness,’ or resolve it into singular unity, transgress the bounds of modernist objective identity. Such acceptance acknowledges that what ‘appears’ to habitual perspective as a ‘gap’ between the “I” and the “Not-I” (subject and object) implies a relational or participatory status of “Not-Not-I” *because* it occurs ‘internally’ with/in the seemingly singular self. It is this context for concurrent experiences of ‘neither/nor-ness’ *and* ‘both/and-ness’ that prompts this study’s attempt to focus on ‘psychological’ experience of ‘internal conflicts’ as plurality of being.

The basic principles of ‘depth’ psychological theory are viewed here as establishing the only adequate psychological basis for explicating the persistent and potent presence of ‘mythical’ expressions in human culture. Thus some exploration of the associations of such theory of ‘psychological depth’ with the anthropological and philosophic notions previously discussed is thus attempted.

The Seeming Chaos of the Self and the Reality of “Explicate< > Implicate” Dynamism

Addressing the question, “What goes on inside us?” begets extraordinary difficulties for the mechanistically objective mentality when more than biochemical processes are investigated. The ‘objective’ biological human seems accessible to this mechanistic perspective and its methods of analysis. But the ‘subjective’ entity cannot even be determined to be singular, much less measurable.

The human subject is a self characterized by an inherently divided psychic reality. Throughout the history of psychoanalysis, there has been the assumption that psychic life is inherently a divided or double kind of reality. “Divided” because psychic conflict has to do with experiencing the personality as divided, whether into consciousness and unconsciousness, or into various complexes, or as divided more elaborately and topographically into conscious, preconscious, and unconscious. (Kugler, “Jaques Lacan: Post Modern Depth Psychology “ 77)

Psychological theories abound as to the ‘structure’ and ‘function’ of ‘the psyche’ and its ‘parts.’ But even the implied ‘unity’ and ‘discretion’ of ‘individual psyche’ is tenuous—evidently far more so than admitted in ordinary attitudes.

This is an age-old experience of mankind which is reflected in the universal supposition of a plurality of souls in one and the same individual. As the plurality of psychic components at the primitive level shows, the original state is one in which the psychic processes are very loosely knit and by no means form a self-contained unity. Moreover, psychiatric experience indicates that it often takes only a little to shatter the unity of consciousness so laboriously built up in the course of development and to resolve it back into its original elements. (Jung, Nature of the Psyche 84)

Whatever ‘delicate balance’ sustains the “unity of consciousness” that allows for ‘a’ sense-of-self, normally termed ‘ego identity,’ it appears that it assumes to represent a field of psychic activity that is not actually under its control but rather a ‘contested’ field of assertive ‘complexes’ of psychic agency.

Everyone knows nowadays that people “have complexes.” What is not so well known, though far more important theoretically, is that complexes *have us*. The existence of complexes throws serious doubt on the naive assumption of the unity of consciousness, which is equated with “psyche,” and on the supremacy of the will. Every constellation of a complex postulates a disturbed state of consciousness. The unity of consciousness is disrupted and the intentions of the will are impeded or made impossible. (Jung, Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche 96)

Today we can take it as moderately certain that complexes are in fact “splinter psyches.” (Jung, Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche 98)

If this is an accurate supposition about the nature of ‘what goes on in “a” me’ then any anxiety an “I” experiences about ‘who’ or ‘what’ that “I” actually is, and what or where-from ‘one’s’ motives, thoughts and feelings arise, would seem duly justified and not simply neurotic insecurity or paranoia. A ‘person’ is thus figured as a constellation or ‘complex’ of ‘complexes of psychic elements’ or concerns exhibiting relatively independent intentions and psychosomatic effects and affects. Here Jung makes a

clear connection to the notions of archaic cultural mentality about the existence of plural agencies or identities.

The universal belief in spirits is a direct expression of the complex structure of the unconscious. Complexes are in truth the living units of the unconscious psyche, and it is only through them that we are able to deduce its existence and its constitution. (Jung, Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche 101)

Curiously, the very existence or manifest presence of “psychic complexes” is the ‘expression’ of ‘psyche’s’ existence *and* the differentiation that makes it ‘accessible’ to analysis. In addition, Jung and others posit the extension of this psychic field into a “collective unconscious” constituting a “transpersonal psyche.” Consider now the rather chaotic-seeming image of self-as-complex-of-complexes, among which is posited the self-identifying “ego complex,” and into which penetrates a ‘shared’ field of transpersonal psychic activity with innumerable other nexes of intentional agency—Jung’s “collective unconscious.” Surely this polysemous, polymorphous field-of-self (or “Self” in Jung’s distinction) is a figure of ‘participatory identity.’

But consider also how “wild” it must be ‘in there’—an *in there* which is also an *out there* due to the inter-penetration of personal and collective psyche. Consider how much of ‘one’s self’ one is not aware of, is not ‘identified with’ consciously. It does not seem inappropriate to compare this situation with Turner’s distinctions of social “structure” and “anti-structure”—the ‘egoic-identifications’ standing roughly as “structure” and the non-egoic as “anti-structure.” It is even offered here that the sociological function associated with those terms is likely a derivative of the inherent structure of individual-but-pluralistically-participatory psyche. The conscious sense of personal identity is a ‘structural field’ faced with a seemingly-chaotic ‘internal’ psychic multi-dimensionality that amounts to a veritable ‘wilderness of otherness,’ of unresolved and shifting plurality of agency, out of which it seeks to distill (or upon which impose) and preserve ‘an identity.’ (That relationship is posed as similar to the collective social confrontation of its “structure” with the ‘larger’ context of nature-as-“anti-structure.”) For such a psychic ‘field’ to maintain some ‘continuity’ there must be periodic ‘re-orientations’ between the ‘normative egoic structure’ and the relative “anti-structure” of psychic totality.

By absorbing the plural viewpoint of “splinter psyches” into our consciousness, there would be a new connection with multiplicity and we would no longer need to call it disconnected schizoid fragmentation. Consciousness, and our notion of consciousness, would reflect a world that is diverse and unsettled.

Not merely would our psychological ideas about self, consciousness, and even God change shape; not merely would precise differentiation of qualities replace the measurement of quantities as the method of psychological knowing; but we would find ourselves no longer alone in our subjectivity. (Hillman, Revisioning Psychology 41-42)

The psychological 'task' here is for that "subjectivity" or 'sense-of-identity' or 'ego-complex,' to have some 'intercourse' with the 'rest of the self,' else it must become either rigid or anxiously insecure, ignorant of 'who' and 'what' it is actually representative—and all the more at the mercy of the 'unconscious' influences of 'un-identified otherness' of "psychic complexes" or "splinter psyches."

This 'wildness' of the 'psyche' may well be the only 'wilderness of intentional entities' left for most 'post'-modern individuals to encounter and experience, due to both the literal domestication of the world and the philosophical mechanization of nature that dominates general mentality. (Not even the lion is really "wild" anymore.) Yet how can such a mentality grant that 'psychic wilderness' enough 'validity' to attempt conscious engagement with it when such 'wilderness' is reflexively regarded as 'non-existent,' when it is a no-where and a no-thing, or at the most 'merely symbolic?'

This very intangibility of some 'thingless thing' that may constitute the 'collectivity' of psychic selves and even connect individuals to each other beyond habitual awareness suggests the reality of Bohm's "implicate" and "explicate" fields co-presencing as 'flow' and 'form,' movement and pattern. In this configuration of psychic agency some 'thing' appears to take shape or 'objective identity,' to form out of intangible flow, yet its 'shape' or form remains relatively 'ethereal,' and yet again, has demonstrable effects in the empirically tangible bodies and actions of 'literally' "explicate" selves and actions. Psyche, in these pluralities, seems both an 'implicate explicate' (as psychic form that has no 'substance') and an 'explicate implicate' (as 'tangible' flow that 'forms' 'itself') In such a 'figuration' psyche's pluralistic concurrence in 'flowing form' and 'forming flow' manifest 'the many and the one as each other.'

Such a notion would seem to provide the most 'accessible' experience of the reality of the "explicate implicate" for 'consciousness,' as the 'reflective awareness' of 'egoic function' that is a 'thingless thing' objectively manifesting 'itself' as varied form and aware of its 'formlessness' as 'flowing.' The "anti-structural liminality" of the seeming-chaos of psychic totality might be 'experiencable' thusly as of an "implicate order." Perhaps it is possible to 'cultivate' an attitude of egoic-identification that does not experience such 'flowing' and 'forming' in psyche as inherently 'threatening' to sense-of-self. But, 'realistically speaking,' to be feasible, such an attitude still requires a radical re-discrimination of 'reality.'

Whatever determination might be 'ultimately' given to the 'structure of psyche,' the status of the "I" seems to be essentially that of a 'stranger in a strange land.' The reductive, singularly-identifying sense-of-self is a 'foreigner' in this realm of inter-penetrating, metamorphic nexes of agency. It is an 'alien' in an 'other worldly' realm akin to mythical heroes among gods and monsters, an explorer among the barbarians, or some bewildered 'space traveler' arrived on a distant planet unknown to his or her race and culture. For this 'singular I,' gazing upon the 'lands within,' every shift of position re-arranges the

‘internal entities,’ as a movement in the ‘outer world’ causes a shift of parallax between viewer and horizon.

Ego as Thing versus Dynamic of Identification

Perhaps the most confounding aspect of attempts to delineate (identify) psychical activity in the ‘structures’ and ‘functions’ of psyche, is that attempts to describe these actual ‘intangibles’ are configured in a language of literal things or thingness. The most prominent example is perhaps the term ego. Almost universally utilized in psychologies, and variously applied, it roughly represents conscious identity and self-agency. But if ‘self’ actually resembles the above noted ‘complex of complexes,’ what *is* ‘consciousness?’

Consciousness is an outside that is inside, and an inside that is outside. Normally, consciousness is “in” the world and “with” the things in the world. It is not “in” me. Or it is precisely “in” me when, and to the extent that, it is “out there.” It never leaves itself literally. Only within itself is it out there in the real world. There is no other way to the real world out there for us. Consciousness is that contradictory, dialectical institution that is only to that extent truly “with” the real things and people out there in that it stays inside itself, and that is never as much inside itself as when it abandons itself to some project or person outside (such as when one is in love). (Giegerich, Soul’s Logical Life 196)

Such an amorphous, fluid phenomenon of ‘awareness,’ variously associated with interior and exterior, characterized by rather contradictory or ambi-valent, and even polyvalent dynamical nature, does not provide a ‘consistent’ basis for personal identity. As Norretranders’ ‘figures’ in the title of his book The User Illusion: Cutting Consciousness Down To Size, consciousness as momentary or immediate self-awareness is a minor aspect of measurable mental activity and thus not equitable to psychic totality. Such notions suggest the Freudian ‘below’ or ‘prior to’ awareness of a “sub-conscious” or Jung’s ‘other-than-awareness’ of an “un-consciousness.”

If the unconscious [that psychic territory “outside” conscious ego-awareness] can contain everything that is known to be a function of consciousness, then we are faced with the possibility that it too, like consciousness, possesses a subject, a sort of ego. [. . .]

Once we give serious consideration to the hypothesis of the unconscious, it follows that our view of the world can be but a provisional one; for if we effect so radical an alteration in the subject of perception and cognition as this dual focus implies, the result must be a world view very different from any known before. (Jung, Nature of the Psyche 87)

Has such a radical notion of the context of human agency and identity *really* been seriously considered, much less assimilated, by socio-cultural mentality in modernity? Are its implications not reminiscent of the radical disruptions of Cartesian and Newtonian notions of ‘reality’ by the ‘new’ physics?

However that may be, it puts the very notion of ‘an ego’ as a ‘thing’ or ‘part’ of psyche (as well as of ‘consciousness’ as a ‘singular’ status of being), on dubious grounds. Rather, it seems to suggest

that 'egoic-identity' is a set of assumptions about 'one's' self which are likely contradictory and to some degree 'unconscious' even though 'one' habitually 'assumes' that 'one' is a consistent and self-aware 'entity.' Ego thus may best be considered a 'dynamic of identification,' an 'orientation' to self that tends to establish a consistency among psychic agencies or complexes, particularly by way of perspectives conditioned and validated by social and cultural valuations (Turner's "normative structures"). Yet there is also evidence that this asserted identity is various depending on context, 'posing' the self differently in differing situations. This 'egoic I' is a chimera, a shape-shifting dynamo, but its 'self delusion' seems essential. It exemplifies Bohm's "explicate< >implicate" dynamism of "form" and "flow."

The "I" has its function, which is expressed by its capitalization. The "I" is legitimately written with a large letter, not because it is the capital person of the psyche, but because it too has a particular mythic part to play in the dramatics of the psyche—as the one personification whose necessary perspective is to take itself as literally real. An ego's specific characteristic, and its specific function, is to represent the literal viewpoint; it means being locked into an ego. Ego psychology results from being trapped by the ego into its perspective: the other characters on the stage are merely characteristics, projections of mine. Only I am literally real.

Our symptoms, however, can save us from this literalism. (Hillman, Revisioning Psychology 48)

These notions of ego-as-identity-orientation-function, as impulse-toward-literal-identity, suggests it is not a 'thing,' not even 'actually' the 'complex' of psychic elements it tends to 'identify' as self but a facility for distinguishing and associating psychic elements. In these terms, it might be viewed as the 'mental capacity' for becoming 'self observant,' or reflective, providing a basis for a 'self participating self.' (Yet it seems a capacity of some necessity prone to generating a "natural standpoint" of 'literalistic' assumptions about self/other/world.) Again one may note in such notions about egoic activity some 'agency of ordering' that is itself intangible, implicit in the "explicate ordering" that seems to be a result of such 'activity.' 'It' is a non-entity that has the consequences of an entity—a play of some 'un-real real' and thus a 'player.'

A relaxed ego that honors the many offers considerable rewards. We find vitality in tension, learn from paradox, gather wisdom by straddling ambivalence, and gain confidence in trusting the confusion that naturally arises from multiplicity. (Hillman, Blue Fire 38)

So why not 'relax' and "gain confidence in trusting the confusion that naturally arises from multiplicity?" Such an 'adaptation' seems reasonable enough for a neurotically tormented 'ego' to consider. But 'acts of will' in a pluralistic psyche obviously cannot be simple matters of 'conscious choice' unless a 'fascistic hierarchy' is imposed. For egoic function to 'trust the confusion' it would seem to require an attitude that is not fundamentally oppositional about the 'real' and the 'un-real,' about 'the oneness' and 'the manyness' of the field of identification it negotiates, even as it 'literalistically' asserts 'the self' now 'this way,' now 'that way.'

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If this 'orientational function of identification' were to be posed as not necessarily 'in service' to the "I," not exclusively associated with "me," but rather as an agency of "implicate" dynamism that can 'formulate' discriminations of identity for *any* 'entity,' then 'egoic function' does not have to be defined either as a 'thing' or as 'personal.' (The term executive function used by some cognitive scientists to identify the ordering aspect of concurrent brain activities seems apt here.) There is perhaps no greater personalistic "inflation" than to claim that all one's 'identifications' are 'generated' for the sake of establishing one's 'personal' identity. Hillman's description of 'ego' as inherently literalistic might then be regarded as a characterization of egoic activity that is not reflected back on itself. What if this human capacity to 'identify,' to create "explicate" forms (psychical *and* material) out of "implicate" flow, is posed 'in service to' other and world as much as to 'self?' In Genesis, Adam is given the task of 'naming' the forms of God's creation. But does he do so for his 'purposes,' or theirs, or for God's?

This question about 'what is egoic identification for' prompts the notion that the 'origin' of singular identity occurs in 'identifying with' the function of identification. If 'egoic-function' is granted the status of 'dynamical thingless thing' then perhaps the "I" and "me" can be more variously and concurrently experienced. A 'purpose' of 'consciousness' (that 'in here' *and* "out there") then could be to 'perceive' and 'express' the 'realities' of totality, rather than primarily an agency of personalistic individual 'contention' with other and world. Consider asking if Picasso was painting all his life 'for the sake of' establishing 'his own identity' or perhaps in/as some 'service to' the 'identities' of other and world, or even as agent for a manner or dynamical mode of identification. And then consider that even his egoic-sense-of-self may not have been 'aware' of such a 'devotion' yet still 'possessed' by *its* intentions. Whether 'consciously aware' or not, such activity of 'creating' dynamical identifications seems to express a co-participation with/in self/other/world. Such an assessment would hold true for the generation of scientific, psychological, or anthropological theories as well.

Jung's notion of a personal or egoic self confronted with the psychic life of a 'larger' and relatively impersonal "Self" (out of or within which that personalized identity becomes constituted and undergoes successive re-formations) poses the 'internal' relational field of 'depth' psychology. Such a self< >Self or ego< >Self configuration of the 'individual psyche' as two general realms of psychic activity, like 'conscious' and 'unconscious,' that are each composed of various aggregations or "complexes" of psychic elements, presents a radically non-reductive status for identity. It is an imagination of an intra-psychic field where 'forming' and 'flowing' between psychological complexes might be experienced within a the 'container' of a 'larger' identity than the habitually egoic.

In such a context of intra-psychic or intra-subjective dynamism egoic function is necessarily confronted with differentiating or identifying polycentric 'agencies.' However, 'reality,' as established by the "self" as personalized identity of egoic function, will inherently *be at odds with* the context of the "Self" as psychic totality. The realm of what is 'real' or 'ordinary' or 'of the self' to the personalized

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identity will tend to exclude or deny much of the experience, feeling, and intention of the ‘larger’ “Self.” Expressions of the “Not-Not-I” aspects of the psyche will then by necessity be given/taken on a ‘fantastic,’ ‘foreign,’ or ‘not real’ character as viewed by the egoic perspective. But this ‘self/Self’ context for ‘self’ knowing is dependent upon the ‘egoic function of consciousness’ engaging ‘unfamiliar’ and even ‘un-real’ aspects or expressions of the very psyche which generates it and with which it must struggle to remain ‘attendant.’

The ego, as far as we can see, functions properly only when it achieves a certain adaptation to the whole psyche, which means that it functions best if a certain plasticity is kept— in other words, when the ego is not petrified and therefore can, through dreams, moods, and so on, still be influenced by the Self so as to adapt to the whole psychological system. It looks to us as though the ego were meant by nature not to be a ruler of the whole psychological setup, but to be an instrument, which functions best if it still obeys the basic instinctual urges of the totality and does not resist them (von Franz, Interpretation of Fairy Tales 60)

The interactivity of egoic-self and the “Self” of psychic totality is not posed as a ‘process’ with a conclusion, but rather the inescapable context of ‘unfolding’ individual psychic life. The ‘larger’ “Self” is in this sense ‘inexhaustible.’ As some aspects of it are engaged and ‘brought to consciousness’ by egoic reflection, other aspects will be presented that are likely to be just as ‘foreign’ to habitual consciousness as were any previously engaged ‘images’ of the “Self.” Part of the mystery of this notion of the ‘undiscovered Self’ is that it may not merely be ‘buried’ and awaiting ‘discovery’ but actually ‘come into being’ or ‘form’ when it is ‘sought for.’ Emma Jung considers this notion in her analysis of an aspect of the Grail stories confronting the hero with an ‘empty grave.’

It is natural to suppose that things buried or hidden merely refer to something unconscious which only needs to be dug up or uncovered, like a treasure raised to the light of day. The concept of an empty grave, however, seems to point further. It could be a question here of something which did not merely need to be uncovered but which to some extent had to come into existence first. This then would be that other life referred to above, not the natural, bound-to-nature life of the body but the life of the inner man, transcending nature, that encompassing personality which Jung has called the Self. In the dreams and fantasy pictures of modern man this hidden, invisible something is occasionally depicted as a meaningful and numinous void. There is one picture in which an egg-shaped numinous void, from which rays stream forth, forms the centre of a world or of a mandala with an empty centre. The words of Meister Eckhart beautifully express what is meant by this image: “Everything must be lost, the soul must exist in unhampered nothingness,” or “Whosoever would come to God must come as nothing.” Or, expressed in Eastern imagery: “In the purple hall of the city of jade dwells the God of Utmost Emptiness and Life.” The Confucians call it “the centre of the void.” A nothingness, a void, is therefore the inescapable condition for the emergence of the Self. The Self is not already present from the beginning in a comprehensible form, but manifests itself only through the outer and inner realizations of a life lived to its end. [. . .] The self is therefore not complete, but is present in us as a potentiality which can become manifest only in the course of a specific process. Certainly, the Self is not invariably realized through the unfolding of the natural biological life processes. There appear to be many lives where this does not come to pass (Emma Jung, The Grail Legend 132-33).

The 'task' of an egoic function seeking 'inclusive' self-knowing then, as advised in many esoteric traditions, seems to be both to 'empty' itself, to surrender established identity, and to 'seek' where there is 'nothing' or for an 'unearthly place,' an 'other world' where one cannot 'literally' or 'ordinarily' expect to arrive. The attempts of the Grail knights to 'achieve' the Grail castle present an imagination of this effort on behalf of the egoic identity. Such, evidently, is the 'ordinarily unnatural nature' of psychological life and the heroic quest of its 'function' or 'agency' of identity.

Psychological Life: The Reality of Un-Reality

'Complex self' and 'egoic orientation' express an interplay of agencies 'out of which' emerge the 'contents of consciousness,' as well as 'unconsciousness.' Again, delineating the nature of those contents can be 'confusing.'

Before modern times psychological life was multiple and dispersed. It was, so to speak, in the middle of things, and one could find it everywhere and nowhere. But with the appearance of the term psychology this confusion is overcome. The multiplicity of psychological life gives way to the unity of psychology. The studies pertaining to soul become study of mind.

In the sixteenth century the name psychology appears, a name which subsequently casts a negative light on the long past of confusion. The long past is a story of error and the subsequent history of psychology in modern times is a record of its correction. But confusion is not necessarily error, and this negative viewpoint on confusion need not necessarily be adopted. In fact its adoption conceals an essential feature of psychological life.[. . .] Confusion has a place in psychological life. Psychological life is confusion. (Romanyshyn, Psychological Life 4)

Psychological life *is* confusion: the fusion of 'perceptions' and 'imagination,' of 'sensations' and 'cognitions,' of 'things' and 'thingless things,' of 'reality' and 'un-reality.' And psyche-ology as "psychology" has sought to 'sort them out,' to 'correct' the 'mistakes' in an effort to 'unify' psychological life, to make psychic life 'logical' to a mentality of 'linear causality.' Such an intention is, as previously noted, not only naive but dangerous. To attempt to separate, to un-fuse and correct the elements of psychic life is to deny the vitality of its relativizing effect on habitual identity and 'correctness.'

Our nightly descent into dreaming is not a compensation but a mode of initiation which, instead of supplying the missing parts to the ego-consciousness, voids it of attachments to and identification with the surface of things. (Avens, Imaginal Body 10)

"Attachments to and identification with the surface of things," suggesting the habitual sense-of-self/other/world, is thus seen as requiring not some "compensation" by dreaming but a "voiding" of egoic identity 'as-habitual-perceptions.' After all, what are taken to be the 'things' of the world, the 'real' tangibles, are only known to by way of perceptions that are psychically processed. 'Remembering' that knowing is always thusly 'con-figured' requires a "voiding" of the habitual modality of 'figuring' and its specific figures.

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Far too little in theory, and almost never in practice, do we remember that consciousness has no direct relation to any material objects. We perceive nothing but images, transmitted to us indirectly by a complicated nervous apparatus. Between the nerve endings of the sense-organs and the image that appears in consciousness, there is interpolated an unconscious process which transforms the physical fact of light, for example, into the psychic image “light.” But for this complicated and unconscious process of transformation consciousness could not perceive anything material,

The consequence of this is, that what appears to us as immediate reality consists of carefully processed images, and that, furthermore, we live immediately only in a world of images. In order to determine, even approximately, the real nature of material things we need the elaborate apparatus and complicated procedures of chemistry and physics. These disciplines are really tools which help the human intellect to cast a glance behind the deceptive veil of images into a non-psychic world.

Far, therefore, from being a material world, this is a psychic world, which allows us to make only indirect and hypothetical inferences about the real nature of matter. The psychic alone has immediate reality, and this includes all forms of the psychic, even “unreal” ideas and thoughts which refer to nothing “external.” We may call them “imagination” or “delusion,” but that does not detract in any way from their effectiveness.[. . .]

We are steeped in a world that was created by our own psyche. From this we can judge the magnitude of the error which our Western consciousness commits when it allows the psyche only a reality derived from physical causes. [. . .] Between the unknown essences of spirit and matter stands the reality of the psychic—psychic reality, the only reality we can experience immediately. (Jung, Structure of the Psyche 383-84)

The reality we determine to be ‘out there’ is thus ever figured ‘in here.’ And whatever the ‘objects’ of perception might be, though measured with ‘objectified’ methods and mechanisms, even those measurements are still given form and significance by psychic agency. The ‘productions’ of psyche, whether corresponding ‘accurately’ to ‘perceived’ objective reality, or demonstrably ‘fantastic,’ are representative creations *of* psyche—not the ‘things’ represented—and yet these ‘representations’ are often treated as ‘objectively’ or ‘empirically real’ in consciousness. That ‘con-fusion’ is “psychological life.” The many attempts ultimately to literally differentiate the ‘real’ from the ‘un-real,’ the material from the psychical, thus do not hold up to epistemological scrutiny of consciousness and its ways of knowing.

Since psyche and matter are contained in one and the same world, and moreover are in continuous contact with one another and ultimately rest on irrepresentable, transcendental factors, it is not only possible but fairly probable, even, that psyche and matter are two different aspects of one and the same thing. (Jung, The Nature of the Psyche 84)

Such a unity may seem ‘confusing’ to an oppositional mentality, but it ‘stands to reason.’ ‘This’ body and ‘this’ mind, world and psyche, may *seem* separable from the perspective of certain ways-of-knowing (modes of identification), but how can that ‘actually’ be? These ‘separately identified’ fields are co-dependent or co-generating, mutually participating aspects of a totality—one cannot exist without the other(s). The opposing notions of ‘spirit’ and ‘matter’ are abstracted from that totality.

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The idea of an “imaginal body” stands between these two extremes of spiritualism and materialism. It denotes, not an artificial combination or crossbreed of two independent things called “spirit” and “matter,” but a *sui generis* reality which is ontologically prior to and paradigmatic of the so called spiritual as well as material realities (Avens v)

“Psychological life” is not a phenomenon separable from ‘the world,’ from ‘mechanical’ matter. Nor is it ‘identical’ with that so-defined reality. Their con-fusion is both an actual inter-penetration and yet not a linear equation or fusion, much like the relations posed by Bohm’s notions of “implicate” and “explicate” orderings. The body is ‘psychical,’ so to say an “imaginal body,” and psyche is inevitably ‘embodying.’

In their seeming or abstracted distinctiveness, spiritual matter and material spirit may reveal something of the other that it’s ‘form’ seems to conceal—thus the necessity for ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ realities.

While realism may be the developmental measure for objective reality, it is not always for experiential reality. The mother figure who rapes the dreamer in a dream or waking dream could be entirely at odds with objective reality and yet capture an experiential reality in a most apt and poignant way. (Watkins, Invisible Guests 72)

Such a distinction may not indicate an ‘un-real fantasy’ but a psychical imagination that ‘perceives’ a ‘psychical content’ in less overt physical behavior by ‘the mother’ figure in ‘real life.’ Such ‘un-realistic’ awareness of an ‘underlying’ or covert ‘quality’ of overt relations can be considered a sensing of the “implicate flow” in the totality of relations of ‘movement’ behind/within the objective ‘form’ of physical activity. Dismissing the validity of such a ‘fantasy’ because it cannot be found to fit literal events may be as reductive as taking such imaginations *as* literal events. The ‘un-real’ may be intangibly or variously ‘real,’ it might be ‘accurate’ or ‘inaccurate’ as a representation of physical and/or psychical ‘events,’ but it is always ‘valid’ as “psychological life.” Without such ‘confusing’ possibilities of ‘meaning’ and ‘reality’ there could be no appreciation of one’s or the world’s complexity, the very plurality of how one is what and who one is.

Our cultural failure is a failure to identify a realm of experience which is not hallucinatory in the strict sense of a confusion with perception, but whose images rival or supplant the priority given to the objective. (Watkins, Invisible Guests 140)

The ‘psychic’ and ‘literal’ ‘worlds’ are not simply ‘other’ from each other. The distinctions between them are ‘genuine,’ but various rather than definitive. And, their differences are ‘contextually valid.’ It is as if ‘reality’ is ‘positional,’ depending upon the context of events, concerns, and perspectives. The ‘truth’ of a given context may be various, but that does not necessarily invalidate it. Here again is a ‘multi-dimensional,’ pluralistic quality, a concurrence of ‘times’ and ‘places,’ a plurality of seemingly-singular ‘actors’ (The Mother/mother), and ‘actions’ (the Rape/psychic attitude). As to later life-consequences for a child confronted with a ‘raping’ psychic attitude, who is to say which may be more

traumatizing for a given psyche, the ‘literal’ act that literalistic mentality validates, or the ‘energetic’ attitude expressed imaginally that tends to be denigrated by literalistic mentality? The past can quite readily ‘be’ the present in “psychological life”. To discount the validity of ‘immeasurable’ “experiential reality” in preference for the measurable domain of literal actions might be termed ‘psychic violence.’

“Anti-structural” Multi-dimensionality of Non-egoic Psychic Expression

The ‘line’ drawn between ‘ordinary’ and ‘non-ordinary’ consciousness, or reality, is often represented by egoic and non-egoic agency, or conscious and un/sub-conscious generativity. While obviously a most approximate distinction, what it seems to suggest is that the “I” of egoic identifications (‘this’ is “me,” ‘that’ is not), generally attempts to validate its ‘reality’ in literalistic references to the empirically ‘outside,’ to the habitually assumed ‘surface of things.’ It has a certain style of ‘seeing’ and ‘saying’ derived from its efforts to influence and control the material realities around one. It is generally very responsive to collective social and cultural values and expectations. It maintains those ‘normative standards’ as part of its function to ‘direct’ efforts to accomplish and survive in literal and social contexts. But the non-egoic expressions in/of/from one’s psyche seem to generally manifest out of a less linear and mechanical sensibility, from less ‘normative’ aspects of self. ‘Image,’ in ‘depth’ psychological theory, is often considered to be the very ‘language’ of the non-egoic self or psychic totality, if not its essence or ‘embodiment.’

An image is simultaneous. No part precedes or causes another part, although all parts are involved with each other. So we view the image level of the dream as non-progressive; no part occurs before or leads to any other part. We might image the dream as a series of superimpositions, each event adding texture and thickening to the rest.[. . .] They are all layers of each other and inseparable in time. Such relationship we might express as *while, when*. [. . .]. It does not matter which phrase comes ‘first’ because there can be no priority in an image—all is given at once. Everything is occurring *while* everything else is occurring, in different ways, simultaneously. (Berry, *Echo’s Subtle Body* 59-60)

This ‘view’ of ‘image’ illustrates how the manner of one’s ‘viewing’ has ‘content’ as to how ‘the viewed’ will be ‘represented’ or ‘engaged.’ As McLuhan has noted, modernist Western mentality is trained to approach letters and words in a linear fashion, reading from left to right with certain expectations about grammar and syntax. This ‘medium’ of expression and ‘informational perception’ has a certain mechanical, linearizing ‘content’ character. Yet in poetic ‘free verse’ those ‘proper’ word orders are often jumbled and the habitual expectation of the reader ‘frustrated’ and ‘redirected.’ The “structure” of deductive linear prose is thus contrasted by the “anti-structure” of recursive or “leaping” poetic diction. Berry’s attention to the simultaneity or mutually co-present aspects of image can be amplified by noting the egoically directive style of image composition encountered in Renaissance “perspective” painting where the viewer is ‘pushed’ into a particular position to ‘view’ the scene just as the painter intended. Such an ‘imposition’ of perspective is not so evident in the realm of medieval styles of pictorial

representation. It would seem that in the Renaissance style of painting the utmost attempt has been made to control relations of space and time, to dictate the manner and even 'sequence' of viewing, to impose a 'hierarchy' of value on aspects of image, a sort of visual "meta-narrative." Such can be considered a more 'narrative' approach to image than an 'imagistic' one. "In some varieties of structural thinking, form and matter, structure and content, can be separated; in imagistic thinking these pairs are one" (Berry, 63).

In this sense, 'image' is and is not "form and matter." Is the 'image' in/of a painting more 'real' than one 'imagined in the mind?' The paint cannot be said to be the 'matter' of the 'image' unless it is a 'different' image than the 'mental' one that is psyche's "representation" of the painted one. Thus both Image-as-painting and psychic-image have the plural quality of thingness and thinglessness, of implicit fluidity and explicit fixed form. Thus we must be in the realm of the 'un-real real,' of Bly's "dragon smoke."

In its 'very nature' image presents a plurality of modes of being. Of course, the notion here is that all 'things' are and are not fluid and fixed, and that this mutually dynamic and static character are elemental 'manyness-in-oneness.' 'Imagistic thinking' provides helpful 'illustrative' emphasis of this notion. In some contrast, one tends to expect 'narrative' to 'tell a story,' to link events in a temporal sequence. Yet when psyche tells stories even the progressive expectations of narrative can be deconstructed. Dreaming can be more 'imagistic' than 'narrative.'

One thing occurs before another and leads to another. But the sequence of dream fragments is often ambiguous—and from the point of view of the image this must be so, for the image has no before and after. Through our telling, dream fragments whose sequence is ambiguous tend to become one thing rather than another. Our narrating gives an irreversible direction and forms the dream into a definite pattern. (Berry 66)

The 'interpretation of dreams' as an abstractly logical explication seems necessarily 'performed' by the egoically directed conscious attitude according to its 'versions' or 'script' of 'reality.' "Interpretation" as 'response-in-kind,' as images arising in response to dream images, for example, seems of 'an other order' that is less 'narratively biased.' The more a culture ignores or discounts the significance of dreams or such imagistic responses to them the more egoically-identified, the more literalistic it appears likely to be regarding 'reality.' Thus the less sense of plurality and otherness is likely to be experienced in one's self-identity. The 'structuring' of dreams is 'confused,' 'illogical,' 'chaotic,' 'otherworldly,' and "wild" to the narratively linear modality of ordinarily directed ego consciousness.

If we give equal recognition to each aspect of the dream, we realize that all events affect and simultaneously constellate each other. So analytically it is the total situation we must insight, not one or another aspect which taken causally would tend to exclude the rest. Perhaps this is the real danger of causal thinking and why Jung warned of it. When anything is given priority as mover, all others become subsidiary, mere aspects with no more intentionality of their own than billiard balls. Purpose then is imputed only to the initial cause (or causes), and the rest falls into a state without anima, without movement or intentionality. (Berry 75)

Thus a 'complex' sense of totality-of-self as an 'imagistically' concurrent constellation of agencies is overtly opposed by 'a' psychology which makes directed egoic identity The Master of self. If egoic identity is equated with self then it will always appear central and superior in psychic images—like the hero of adventure stories. Yet such a tendency of self-imagining does not appear to be exclusively modernist. Archaic mentality was obviously forced to 'relativize' that singular, linear, literalist tendency of 'viewing' or identification as well. Its vastly complex engagements with the 'un-real real' in myth and ritual attest to a persistent impulse or 'need' to 'relativize' the habit of 'egoic-structuralism' with some experience of "anti-structural liminality" which can be associated with the expressions of the non-egoic, multidimensional "Self."

Archetypal Theory and "Implicate<>Explicate" Dynamism

A core notion of Jung's "psychology of the unconscious" is an 'existence of intangible patterns' that some ways guide the formation of images and ideas in the psyche: the archetypes. The 'actual' existence of such patterns as 'immaterial' versus their 'manifestation' in 'archetypal' images, actions, constructions (those 'perceivable' if not 'material' productions of psychosomatic 'activity') is a concept whose 'validity' is vigorously, sometimes rancorously, debated. Both the concept and the debate present concern and confusion about the 'real,' the 'unreal' and the 'un-real real.' Jung insisted upon the reality of the archetypes as causal 'entities,' a position of 'thingless things.' Hillman has essentially dismissed this point as irrelevant to the 'reality' of 'archetypallity.'

Rather than attempt to 'resolve' this difference or 'unify' a theory of archetypes and archetypallity, it seems not unreasonable to view the 'confusion' as indicative of the ultimately indifferentiable interplay or dynamism of "implicate" and "explicate" dimensions of flowing and forming, of patterns as dynamical tendency and specification, of "anti-structure" and "structuring," of 'this world' and the 'others.' Just 'where' within that dynamism patterns initially 'occur' and how 're-occur' is either an 'unsolvable problem' or variously identifiable. What is evident is that 'some (thingless) thing' consistently 'guides' the patterning of manifestation, as in the 'identifying' formation of types of crystals.

A somewhat similar notion to that of the role of the archetypes in generating forms has been put forth in biological science by Rupert Sheldrake, under the term "morphogenic fields." His theories, like Jung's in the broader 'field' of psychology, and Bohm's in physics, have received tellingly little attention relative to the incisive quality of his reasoning. To the 'habitual identities' of most biologists and psychologists, these notions are experienced as "liminoid," as peripheral to the "social structure" of 'reality.' To engage these notions as potentially valid, even if only because they are 'well reasoned,' would be to engage the "liminal" realm of "anti-structure," to approach a 'threshold' where the egoic-

ordering of their self-defining “normative structures” might risk being deconstructed—relativized to the dynamics of an irreducible totality.

What is critical to note in associating the “implicate < > explicate” orderings with the archetype/archetypal < > particular manifestation model, is that both figure the ‘emergence’ of discernable pattern in/as form in variable and characteristic dynamics ‘out of’ a multidimensional or polycentric field that is ‘ordinarily un-structured’ yet exhibits familiar “archetypal” patterning. Thus, by attending to those archetypalities of forming expressed in “explicate” forms one can come to ‘know’ something of the ‘character’ of the ultimately unknowable “implicate” realm of multidimensional psyche—or metaphorical being and metamorphic becoming. One might say that the ‘intelligences of the “anti-structural” forces of “implicate ordering” are known by their “archetypal” dynamics.

The Dissociative Character of Oppositionalism and Its Persistent Persona’s Philosophical Resistance to Psychology’s Insights

As discussed, the process or activity of differentiation involves noting and categorizing characteristics that can be compared for likenesses and differences according to various criteria. A tendency to establish and maintain categories as definitively exclusive results in more or less rigid oppositions of either/or distinction. Yet this is a most ‘human capacity.’

If tendencies towards dissociation were not inherent in the human psyche, fragmentary psychic systems would never have been split off; in other words, neither spirits nor gods would have ever come into existence. That is also the reason why our time has become so utterly godless and profane: we lack all knowledge of the unconscious psyche and pursue the cult of [ego] consciousness to the exclusion of all else. Our true religion is a monotheism of consciousness, a possession by it, coupled with a fanatical denial of the existence of fragmentary autonomous systems. (Jung, Alchemical Studies 35-36)

Human “tendencies towards dissociation” would seem then, in modernist mentality, to have contributed to a dissociation so extreme it generated a “monotheism of consciousness” where by all validity of plural consciousness is ‘revoked’—resulting in a habitually dissociating and thus oppositionalist or fragmenting characteristic of collective modes of identification. Extreme singularity of identity and perspective contribute to ‘seeing’ other and world thusly. Such a status of ‘ultimate dissociation’ is “godless and profane,” according to Jung, because it is incapable of ‘knowing’ the plurality of psyche and thus the inherent continuity of being once considered ‘divine’ or ‘sacred.’ It is clear that the mental attitude and activity of a “monotheism of consciousness” have proved extraordinarily effective in generating the science and technology of modern culture and what might be termed a ‘pathologically inflated’ dominance over nature. This perspective and method can be considered as a ‘posture’ or persona of modernist identity. If such a persona is thus accurately associated with the socio-

political and technological potencies of modernity's "creative destruction" in its mono-logical thrust to homogenize and unify, then a tendency of individual egoic function to 'identify' self with that collective posture seems likely. Yet, as indicated by the 'identity crisis of modernity,' this context *also* manifests a (more unconscious) 'persona of fragmentation,' or of a more pluralistic 'post'-modernity, since mono-logical reductivity and endless dissociative fragmentation are bound together in it. It seems unlikely that such a 'persona of monological consciousness' could dominate identity or identification without the existence of a fundamental 'belief' in a dissociated 'reality.'

The notion of persona need not be viewed as a necessarily false self but it is at least a notion of 'partial' self. Surely there are public, professional, intimate, and familial "personas," or a variety of 'postures-of-self' that one presents. The term, with its etymological origins in the mask worn by Greek actors, suggest a somehow 'superficial' aspect of self, and one that can be multiplied or removed. But it is not difficult to posit layers and even concurrent presentations of "personas," perhaps representing different 'psychological complexes,' that one 'wears.' It also seems accurate to say that one often *is* those 'faces' even while one is *not* only thus.

In this sense of various personas individuals have many 'faces,' they 'face' many ways—and do so concurrently. This notion might be taken to suggest individuals are 'Russian dolls,' just so many shells with no definitive 'inside' or else an 'empty' core or center. The image of a 'bag of masks' with no one necessarily more 'significant' than the others arises. Also, the configuring of many 'faces' facing many ways might suggest one is concurrently manifesting various or multiple aspects of self (consider the many-faced/facing gods of Hinduism and Tibetan Buddhism). These versions of multiple facings suggests a 'constellated identity' that might be 'uncentered,' a complex (if not inherently contradictory) nature to the self that is usually unsettling to modernist mentality and requires 'ordering' into a 'manageable,' or perhaps 'domesticated' hierarchy. Yet again, the irony seems to be that the differentiations of such hierarchies are fundamentally oppositional in establishing 'vertical orders of importance'—thereby dissociative and fragmenting despite their 'orderly' intentions. One of the most distinctive 'ordering' forces of modernist industrial society is the extreme emphasis placed on 'productivity' and 'efficiency.' Thus identity cannot avoid being 'oppressed' by the archetypal dynamics of mechanistic function.' The 'development of persona' in such a context will be inherently 'linearized' and 'hierarchically centered'—even when an individual's intellect and intelligence are devoted to elaborating the 'unity' or 'relational dynamics' of psyche.

Posing persona as a literal mask gives the notion a literal reference. Yet taken as a notion that suggests a 'pattern of behavior' it does not seem, as it were, simply 'removable.' Any persona would be constituted by some 'actual' aspects of conscious and unconscious 'self' along with some 'sense' of collective social valuation. It is another 'un-real' and 'thingless thing' that has a 'real' quality or expression. When attention is taken up with attempts to 'have no' "persona," to 'be simply one's self,'

then there appears an impulse to establish a single, genuine, 'true' identity. Such a 'facing' might be termed 'the persona of essential self.' That attitude suggests persistent conflict between aspects of 'self' that requires resolution: one thusly 'opposing' a sense of conflicting plurality might subsequently become 'identified' by an attitude of 'opposition.' A 'true self' becomes that which is obscured by 'other' behaviors and beliefs 'introjected' into it and thus is defined in opposition to them. In such a situation, maintaining a persona of singular, seemingly 'essential' identity could become a 'self-identifying posture' or primary aspect of persona that accrued greater psychic validity than other persona aspects.

The extremity of such 'self posing' is a fanatical assertion of 'unique individuality' and 'un-relatedness' of singular self to any other—except perhaps a 'perfected' God-image. Clearly there are inherent conflicts between such a 'posture of identity and identification' and the insights of 'depth' psychology into the "structure and function of psyche." And yet the 'reductive identity of individualism' and its contexting in a 'culture of competition' of such individual entities are primary inducements to the forming of personal "persona." Thus no matter how non-reductive one intends to be in thought and behavior, the 'dissociative oppositionalism' of modernist mentality is pervasive in the "collective unconscious" central to "persona' formulation.

"Tame" and "Wild" Psychology.

Maintaining the 'posture' of self 'shaped' by 'a' persona means keeping to certain patterns of conduct. It also implies a consistency of 'thought form,' a certain way of thinking as well as expressing. So much of Western modernist identification seems derived from or dependent upon oppositional distinctions (good > bad, right > wrong, true > false, real > un-real, correct > incorrect, fair > unfair) that 'oppositionalism' constitutes a primary persona or aspect of most of identity complexes. Inherently, such a quality of self-projection will experience a 'philosophical' resistance to notions of 'unresolved' participatory plurality and "anti-structural liminality." The "wild" is no place for an 'objectified identity' that assumes predictable and exact distinctions.

No, by definition science stays inside the fence. This is what it is all about. Certainty. Proof. Reliability. Validity. Even more than this. Science is the gigantic project of slowly trying to bring *all* reality inside the fence. Its job is to radically undo all wilderness. (Giegerich, Soul's Logical Life 234)

Yet, one might posit, modern psychology, including 'depth' psychology, is a 'production' of psyche 'through' this mechanistic, oppositional "persona." From the perspectives of the objectivist quest to 'know' nature and reality as the 'literal truth,' its theorists have analyzed and categorized the 'subject' of their 'study,' that 'other' 'the psyche.' However, unlike other scientific fields of investigation, psychology actually investigates itself. Yet this 'fact' of psychology being the subject of its own supposedly objective analysis appears to be rarely admitted. Most 'psychologies' study 'the mind' as linearly causal

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mechanism: 'cognitive functions,' 'biochemistry,' 'behavior,' 'personality structures,' 'relative pathology of mental health,' etc. Though 'depth' psychology theoretically acknowledges that psychology is psyche studying psyche, and that psyche and soma are inseparable, the methodology utilized, the language, the perspectives tend to be those of 'objective science,' which, as Giegerich emphasis, tends to be applied in an effort to 'domesticate' 'the wild.'

Jungian psychology, let alone all other brands of psychology, only takes responsibility for the *contents* of its studies, not for its own mind set, its own logical *form* of consciousness, or, to use Jung's words, the 'thinking form' that prevails in it *when* it delves into the phenomenology of the soul. (Giegerich, "The Opposition of 'Individual' and 'Collective' " 2)

Even 'depth' psychology thus appears to be 'operating' in a 'fantasy world' of 'objective reality.' According to its own theories, it cannot be 'outside' the 'subjectivity' it 'objectively' examines. Thus the position it's analytical attitude often assumes relative to psyche is an 'un-real' one according to its own precepts. Rather than simply viewing such a 'posture' as hypocritical or invalid for 'doing psychology,' one can consider it as indicative of the entire posture of 'scientific objectivity,' as indicated by the implications of the new physics and the purported effects of observation on the behavior of particles being 'observed' for measurement. 'Science says': "there is no 'outside' of psyche or world." An attitude of 'objectivity' then is 'subjective,' though 'effectively useful' — an 'un-real real.'

As Jung notes, 'ordinary consciousness' or 'ego consciousness' tends to be "directed consciousness": an attitude of seeking to accomplish, to manipulate, to control, to achieve and 'arrive,' utilizing 'means' of hierarchically causal differentiations and literalistic oppositions. Western modernist mentality represents an extreme development or emphasis on this attitude, or 'methodological persona.' So extreme is the emphasis that the repression of 'the unconscious,' or of psychic plurality and participatory experience of totality and the 'false' sundering of 'object' and 'subject' appears to have been necessary to achieve its primacy.

Civilized life today demands concentrated, directed conscious functioning, and this entails the risk of a considerable dissociation from the unconscious. The further we are able to remove ourselves from the unconscious through directed functioning, the more readily a powerful counter-position can build up in the unconscious and when this breaks out it may have disagreeable consequences. (Jung, Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche 71)

Such "dissociation" from psychic totality begets "disagreeable consequences" indeed, to judge by the events of the 'civilized' twentieth century. Yet it has proved very 'useful,' generating awesome 'powers,' but by way of the assumption of its particular 'un-real' version of 'reality.' And, rather mysteriously, it has, as one of the signs of the times of a 'post'-modernity, begun to deconstruct its own version of self/other/world. In this phenomenon one may see another expression of Jung's "disagreeable consequences"—but one of internal dis-ease for the persona of oppositional identity rather than of terrible violence and overt destruction 'acted out' in pursuit of ideal goals. Nonetheless, this persona persists

even in the ‘face’ of its own ‘self’-undoing. Much like the physicists that Bohm describes as approaching quantum data with a fragmenting ‘mentality of measurement’ (which might be termed an attitude of ‘religious Newtonianism’) most psychologists continue to ‘objectify’ psyche as ‘psychic contents.’ Such persistent orientation can be seen as the work of ego-identification with order, directedness, and control that are felt, by such identity, to keep the ‘chaos’ at bay and validate the self so-identified.

Psychology wants to teach, to emotionally move, to persuade, to console, to win over *the habitual ego* . [. . .]

[It says] you can stay in your home clothes, in your common sense mentality, and only have to *watch* all the psychological images and ideas (which may be *about* initiation, transformation, individuation, etc.) that psychological literature out there and your dreams and visions inside of yourself present you with. But you do not have to really go there. You do not have to suffer the experience of division in yourself, of your nonidentity with yourself. Psychology confirms and stabilizes the conventional self-identity. It (often unwittingly) strengthens the ego’s powerful need for its own self-preservation. (Giegerich, Soul’s Logical Life 19, 20)

How would psychology be different if it were not conducted from the perspective of the ‘oppositionalist’ persona of ‘scientific objectivity,’ if it were to acknowledge the ‘un-reality’ of its positioning, its ‘identity,’ if it were to subject the perspective of the analyst-ego to its theoretical insights? (As stated above, scientific method as a procedure of analysis does not appear to, by its methodological logic, privilege ‘itself’ as necessarily ‘outside’ the world or beyond self-scrutiny—the ‘method of measurement’ does not inherently assert the supreme reality of ‘the measurable.’ Such an impulse seems more likely attributable to habitual patterns of self-identification in human persona.) What *is* a psychology that is not determined to assert its primary identity as ‘outside’ psyche, to maintain the role of the “tame” as basis for identity and validity?

Psychology has to leave the “civilized sphere” of the positive and “natural” (in the psychological, alchemical sense of this word) and enter into the wild of the soul’s logical negativity.

A corollary of this statement is that psychology is not an ego activity. Nor is it ego-psychology. It is the work of the soul itself, the soul in search of itself and discovering itself in its ruthless truth. (Giegerich Soul’s Logical Life p. 210)

“The work of the soul itself”: with this notion Giegerich emphasizes the inherent participation of psychological reflection (theorizing) in/as “psychological life.” To ‘do’ psychology then one must ultimately submit one’s egoic identity, one’s ego-identified persona of objectivity, to the larger field of self/psyche—to the “anti-structural,” “wild” totality of psyche. His thesis is that the core of such psychology is the very “Notion” of soul. But what *is* “soul?” For Giegerich it is the ‘real’ “pre-existent” realm of psyche that is neither a ‘where’ nor a ‘what.’ For him “the soul is the logical (not temporal) *movement as such* from here to there and back” (Giegerich, Soul’s Logical Life 39). This is not the soul of literalistic religion nor the ‘soul-less-ness’ of positivistic science.

The Notion of the reality of the soul requires the double negation, the negation of the religious interpretation of the images as the “voice of God” and the negation of the scientific interpretation of the images as a mere (secondary) reflection of so-called real life experience or as caused by body processes and the like. Both interpretations are positive (positivistic). The reality of soul, by contrast, has its logical place in logical negativity, inasmuch as it is the result of the negation of the two forms of positivity. It has no outside referent. It displays *itself*. (Giegerich, Soul’s Logical Life 67)

“Soul” then is a most adamantly ‘un-real real’ entity, a really real thingless, imageless thing. Giegerich asserts that this “notion of Soul” is Jung’s primary insight: the reality of psyche as “Soul.” And, at his most provocative, Giegerich insists that psyche/soul is logical rather than mythically or scientifically literal. It has an impossibly complex and varied agency or intentionality, but it also has its form of logic—a logic that ‘negates’ positivism—and it is that logical form which psychology must adopt as its ‘subject’ to be genuine psyche-ology. “Truth,” for Giegerich, can only be encountered from within the “soul’s logic.”

In the very constitution of its logic, psychology has to be “*wild* psychoanalysis.” It cannot be construed as a science, i.e., tame, civilized—gazing from outside the fence (from the security and immunity that this standpoint grants) at the fenced-in realm of a prepossessed, finite reality called ‘the human psyche.’ Its place is the realm of pre-existence, not the sphere of empirical time. (Giegerich, Soul’s Logical Life 211)

Such psychology cannot be ‘performed’ according to a ‘script’ but must be ‘enacted’ as a co-participation of self-and-otherness. Such enactment requires acknowledging an ‘un-real real’ status and experiencing the trauma of habitual identity’s “tame” consciousness being overwhelmed by the “wild,” “anti-structural,” “implicate” pluralities of multi-dimensional psychic totality. Such a psychology would have to become a “sublation” of itself, to use Giegerich’s term, suggesting an alchemical or dialectical ‘self-deconstruction’ that reveals and incorporates unconscious assumptions and projective tendencies, a ‘turning’ of outward forms of positivized understanding and expression into ‘inner logic.’

Jung’s psychology is both *sublated* religion and *sublated* science. ‘Sublation’ is the translation of the Hegelian term *Aufhebung* in the threefold sense of a) a negating and canceling, b) rescuing and retaining, c) elevating or raising to a new level. His [Jung’s] psychology is sublated (*aufgehoben*) religion inasmuch as it negates the immediate religious interpretation *with which* the contents of the inner experience *come*, but it also preserves the religious contents and atmosphere, however only as a “moment” of the new Notion of the reality of the soul. It is likewise sublated science because it negates the naïve positivistic reductivism of the scientific approach to the psychological, but it also preserves the critical rationality of the sciences as a “moment” of its own stance by *not regressing* behind the intellectual achievement of the project called Enlightenment. It can only hold its place in the midst of this absolute contradiction between the two opposites by allowing its own consciousness to suffer a logical revolution and be catapulted onto a radically higher or deeper logical level. Psychology is not a field within science and not something between science and religion. (Giegerich, Soul’s Logical Life 67)

Giegerich use of the term sublation is in relation to the notion of logic in a dialectical process whereby one status of understanding or representation becomes reconstituted in such a way as to be even 'more of what it is' or re-presents. He gives the example of the concept of perception as becoming sublated when known as a psychological phenomenon rather than the 'thing represented.' The positivized assumption of vision 'as the things seen' is thus sublated to a more intrinsic status of understanding vision as psychological perception. Thus psychology, to be of the logic of psyche/soul, would have to 'digest' itself, as ideas and theories, to generate that 'really real logical moment' of "absolute contradiction" that is not oppositionally configured. Such an 'alchemical event' is suggested by the image of the oroborous snake that eats its tail. Such psychology would need to subject its own assumptions to its standard of analysis, admit and accept its own 'neuroses,' its own conflicts, as essential to the 'truth,' or 'inner logic,' it seeks—just as 'it' advises its 'analysands' to do when imploring them to 'integrate their unconscious or shadow.' It would have to cease 'trying to get somewhere' such as 'to the realm of the Imagination.'

We should not try to "get out of" our neuroses—because this attempt is the very neurosis, is the attempt to escape from Truth. We should take our neurosis seriously with all its contradictions and carry it to its own conclusion, where it would sublimate itself. The neurosis "has everything it needs" to become Truth "within itself." Indeed, it already is one's own truth, but in the form of its rejection, in the form of dodging it. Truth is inescapable. (Giegerich, Soul's Logical Life 274)

A psychology that tries to 'cure' and 'control' is 'projective' and 'neurotic.' A "sublated" psychology would not be able to 'act out' heroically or salvifically yet it could 'act' upon its "Notions" seriously without expecting to be in control of the process or know it was 'right.' "*More than a re-visioning: a real sublation of psychology is needed: a fundamental self-negation, self-putrefaction of an imagination-based psychology in favor of a logic of the soul* (Giegerich, Soul's Logical Life 191)."

A psychology based on Giegerich's "logic of the soul" would not be able to maintain the dominance of the literalistic premises of binary logic or attempt to evade them with a 'magical' "third position" of "the imaginal." It could not remain focused upon 'relieving the personal egoic distress of individuals' since to do so would betray its "Notion" of the 'reality' of a 'larger' "Self" to which egoic identity must submit for the fullness of life to 'unfold.' But such a shift would require a radical self-deconstruction that is much resisted by the mentality and personas that have 'created' and practice psychology—persons who have 'earned their livings' being paid to 'relieve' personal distress, persons who 'practice' psychology as compensation for their own personal distress. They would have to acknowledge their 'personal stake' in the status quo of society and psychology.

Instead of comprehending itself as *sublated* science, *sublated* religion, *sublated Weltanschauung*, *sublated* helping profession, it precisely tries to be their unsublated, immediate forms. By conceiving itself as one particular field (compartment) of science or medicine and seeing its primary task in managing psychological disorders, it settles in a niche within an already nicely compartmentalized and positivized reality. (Giegerich, Soul's Logical Life 84)

‘Self-sublated’ psychology is not an attendance to some ‘thing’ ‘positive’ or ‘objective’ nor is itself such a ‘thing.’ Somehow it is an ‘activity’ that *is itself* and thus, to be ‘accurate,’ must ‘see’ itself doing itself but not as a literal activity or entity. It *is* psyche seeking to ‘know’ psyche, thus it is ‘real’ and ‘not real’ and *that* is the ‘truth’ of its reality. This ‘identification’ is ‘logical’ but not ‘of’ the logic of positivistic habitual identities. The same conflict exists between scientific method and the mentalities, the intentions, of those who ‘practice science’ and ‘literalize’ its hypothetical ‘truths.’ Just as psychology has turned its psychically deconstructive perspective on science, religion, and medicine to reveal the literalism and projectivity in their assumptions it can do so with itself.

The mind that sees everything at once has left what I called above the empirical level and advanced to the level of thought, the level of “the whole man” and “pre-existence,” and it is able to see everything at once because it comprehends “everything” as logical determinations of the soul and as their strictly logical relations or movement. (Giegerich, Soul’s Logical Life 121)

Psychology that “sees everything at once” would be ‘seeing through’ a non-positivized identity, a non-oppositional “persona.” It would be ‘looking’ from a position of “pre-existence” because it is not locating its perspective, its ‘self’ or ‘reality,’ in the empirically determined dimensions of sequential space and time. That would be an “implicate” or “relativistic” way of ‘seeing’ because it ‘figures’ dynamically, poly-valently, and multi-dimensionally.

Identity of Theorist and Identifications of Theory: Persona as Threshold of ‘Self-sublation’

The confronting of an ‘objectivist persona’ with the implications of a ‘totalistic’ psychology raises the question of ‘who’ is to ‘do’ such a psychology? ‘Who’ is to ‘play the part,’ ‘embody the logic’ of psyche/soul? Giegerich suggests it is to be the person who submits his or her own habitual egoic-identity to ‘dismemberment’ in the immediacy of the psyche’s dialectical logic (or “anti-structural” dynamics: ‘anti’ to what is ‘structural’ in any given egoic terms). This is tricky conceptual terrain since the ‘absolutist’ inclination of the objectivist, either/or mentality is to see such a ‘move’ as having to be ‘definitive,’ even final, and in ‘oppositional contrast’ to *itself*. The oppositional persona seems only able to conceive of non-oppositionalism as an obliteration of its perspective, its validity. (A note here on Giegerich’s use of “dialectical”: the emphasis is upon the seeming opposition of thesis and anti-thesis becoming a concurrent presence and inter-relation rather than the opposition being ‘resolved’ as some ‘other’ unitary status.)

Anthropological data on archaic ritualizing and shamanic ‘transformations’ or metamorphoses indicate that these cultures do not necessarily regard such changes of person/self as ‘absolute.’ Obliterating the ‘objectivist persona’ would not only be difficult, but is, theoretically, impossible. A person without a literalistic, mechanistic aspect of identity would not be ‘functional.’ “One sidedness is an unavoidable and necessary characteristic of the directed process, for direction implies one-sidedness”

,

(Jung, Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche 70). A 'self' without an egoic function of identification orientation would not 'be.' The manners in which that function orients among the pluralities of the self that is its field (a field that, theoretically at least, extends to other selves and 'world'), seems to be the 'point' in question. It is not the 'obliteration' or 'invalidation' of the objectivist or positivistic persona but its *relativization* in identity that is here at issue.

That an individual can generate theory and practice that are in some essential ways philosophically and methodologically 'contrary' to primary identifications of his or her egoic-identity's principle persona is both obvious and mysterious. It can be taken as 'proof' that the plurality of self/psyche/soul can generate complex expression 'in spite of' habitual identities, orientations or 'beliefs.' Such 'self contradiction' is 'all too human.' Surely there is no better case as an example than that of Jung himself and his self-analysis of having two principle personalities. The 'primary' of which was identified with the 'empirical scientist persona.'

Empiricism is the license to *act out* (i.e., act out on the level or in the sphere of *theory*) and to stay unconscious. This in turn meant you could do psychology with the habitual everyday consciousness that prevailed in the sciences.[. . .] This means in familiar psychological terminology that it was the habitual ego, Jung's personality No. 1, that was allowed to do psychology (and thus also, among other things, allowed to preach individuation: becoming Self). (Giegerich, "Jung's Betrayal of his Truth" 56)

One might say that the 'managing ego' of Jung-as-empirically-identified-scientist managed to 'bend' the expressions of psyche coming 'through' Jung-as-psychic-totality which gave expression to its complex and irreducible ("anti-structural"/"wild"/"implicate") plurality so that these were 'characterized' by his "habitual ego's" 'domesticating' or normatively "structural" intentions. This may also be termed a 'heroic' motivation, an attempt to 'conquer' the 'dragon' of psyche, to 'make life better' even as one realizes that the 'dragon' is the revitalizing 'source' of life. Jung's remark on being 'forced' by psyche to write "Answer to Job" late in life after years of avoiding the subject, because of the "storm" he knew it would cause him to endure personally, are telling (Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections 216-17). Jung also wanted to 'fit in' with "normative social structure," to be 'appreciated' by 'collective persona.'

Given that this discussion is concerned with theories and attendance to the totalistic field of psyche, moral and ethical judgments of good or bad or right and wrong are not applicable here to Jung's conduct. Rather, the pertinent point is posed in his conflict of sense-of-self-and-task and suggests that to 'practice' psychology in the manner under consideration requires the development of some aspect of egoic function that constantly, or at least recursively, monitors the activity of the objectifying and domesticating identifications of itself, of egoic function, of acculturated "normative structure." This task of self-monitoring could be termed a work of pluralizing egoic activity so that it tracks its own

tendency to attach to or be taken over by certain “psychic complexes,” to become reductively or singularly identified.

In short, if one does not repeatedly become aware of the assertions of such ‘heroic’ identifications in one’s thought and behavior, of ‘scandalously stumbling’ over oppositionalist, objectifying or domesticating personas (so relentlessly encouraged by socio-cultural factors) then one is not ‘in’ an egoic orientation appropriate to ‘doing’ psyche-ology. (The word scandal derives from the Greek *skandalon* for trap or stumbling block.)

Michael Tucker provides examples of such ‘stumbling’ by Jung and some others of the most revered theoreticians.

The psychologist Carl Jung once asked: ‘What is wrong with our art, that most delicate of instruments for reflecting the [. . .] psyche? How are we to explain the blatantly pathological element in modern painting? Atonal music? [. . .].’

It is one of the most baffling mysteries of recent times that Jung, who did so much to open up exploration of the depths of the collective unconscious, should have had so little appreciation of modern art. For this art has often displayed characteristics of deep dream imagery, just as it has often been inspired by the type of non-Western imagery and symbolism in which Jung delighted during his travels through Africa or Native America. (Tucker 56-57)

Whether he knew it or not, Jung shared the great challenge of our century — making the old new — with the art he so disliked. Jung followed the ancients in holding to the deceptively simple command: know thyself. Just as modern art suggests that we need to penetrate the surface of things, and make far-ranging and imaginative spatial and symbolic connections in order to sense the deeper aspects of ourselves, so does Jungian thinking place the quest for self-knowledge within a framework of breadth and depth. (Tucker 58-59)

[. . .] Jung himself seemed incapable of seeing modern art as anything other than disturbing evidence of the fragmentation of contemporary life; the psychic breakdown of modern man, lost in his search for a soul.[. . .] Jung’s feelings about modern art have been shared by a great number of people. (Tucker 62)

and:

In his 1975 *Re-Visioning Psychology*, a generally superb, stimulating contribution to post-Jungian thought, even James Hillman’s customary open mindedness was soured by the issue of modern art. Hillman spoke to the twentieth century’s ‘contempt for representational painting; no recognizable images, no persons — anything, everything for the eye, nothing for the soul.’ (Tucker 65-66)

Tucker illustrates that such ‘reactivity’ to (post) modernist art’s ‘portraiture’ of contemporary ‘self-deconstructing’ Western mentality (or persona) has been widespread among intelligent commentators. Its most chilling association, however, is to violent totalitarianism.

Transfigured landscapes and expressionist portraits, painted with allegedly ‘deranged’ colours and scant concern for perspective, could only signify to the Nazis the sort of mental sickness which they were committed to extinguishing throughout the world. Even worse, many

of the artists had openly acknowledged that their high-keyed, ‘distorted’ expressionist imagery had been inspired by the culturally inadmissible ‘barbarism’ of prehistoric or tribal art. [. . .] It is hardly surprising that totalitarian governments have never been able to stomach the spiritual and political implications of modern art. What is surprising is the apparent inability of such usually far-sighted thinkers as Claude Levi-Strauss, Theodore Rozak and James Hillman to sense the potential meaning and psychic health in much of such art. (Tucker 64)

And as to *the* genius of the new physics:

Einstein’s repudiation of Laporte’s proposed linkage [of modern art and relativity] has been relied upon by many art histories to prove that there is no connection between Cubism and relativity. Unfortunately, they presuppose that Einstein understood and appreciated modern art. In fact, although much has been made of the fact that Einstein played the violin, he expressed little or no interest in the exploding movements of art going off like Roman candles all about him. Einstein made the following observation in 1934 giving us an insight into how he felt about contemporary art:

“Let us now consider the times in which we live. [. . .] The lack of outstanding figures is particularly striking in the domain of art, painting and music have definitely degenerated and largely lost their popular appeal.”

Genius physicist and mathematician that he was, Einstein was unaware that he was living through one of the greatest artistic revolutions in history. (Shlain 201)

So the contrasts of self seem to be manifest in every person confronting the reality of one’s selves as the multi-dimensionality of psyche, there manifesting as flow and form, even for the most brilliant. Individuals of all magnitudes of intelligence are bound by identifications and yet some way boundless. What might be called this ‘dilemma of persona’ configures a threshold for awareness and relation with psychic totality on which one wrestles with one’s ‘self’—as with some ‘scandalous angel.’ As Jung so eloquently elucidated, it is ‘natural’ to “project” that conflict outwards on others in order to ‘see’ it ‘out there’ and yet also not have to ‘admit’ it ‘in here.’ It is the appropriate practice of psyche-ology to ‘retrieve’ those “projections,” to engage consciously that struggle in/among one’s selves. Thus Jung’s notion that the ego-complex ‘appropriately’ absorbs what the ‘unconscious Self’ expresses seems a rather dubious if not actually dangerous orientation.

Psychology therefore culminates of necessity in a developmental process which is peculiar to the psyche and consists in integrating the unconscious contents into consciousness. This means that the psychic human becomes whole, and becoming whole has remarkable effects on ego-consciousness which are extremely difficult to describe. [. . .] Once these unconscious components are made conscious, it results not only in their assimilation to the already existing ego-personality, but in a transformation of the latter. The main difficulty is to describe the manner of this transformation. Generally speaking the ego is a hard-and-fast complex which, because tied to consciousness and its continuity, cannot easily be altered, and should not be altered unless one wants to bring on pathological disturbances. (Jung, Structure and Function of Psyche 223)

“Unless one wants to bring on pathological disturbances”: this notion seems to warn one away from the preceding assertion of the value of seeking “wholeness” by way of an assimilation of “unconscious contents” to “existing ego-personality.” Is Jung suggesting a difference here between

‘wholeness’ as “integration” or “assimilation” to “existing ego-personality” versus “alteration” of that “ego-personality,” or are there to be “pathological disturbances” in either case? Could the radical relativization of a ‘persona of objective oppositionalism’ be considered “pathological?” Certainly it could by an ego-complex identified with that “persona.” The term transformation seems to suggest a change of ‘form’ but not necessarily of ‘essence,’ of ‘internal logic.’ Terms such as integration and assimilation seem similarly to suggest a likely ‘preservation’ of some pre-existing order. However Jung meant these terms, there certainly is significant contrast between assimilation, transformation, and pathological disturbances. Perhaps metamorphosis provides an alternative sense of such becoming ‘other,’ of undergoing some fundamental re-ordering ‘from within,’ yet with a radical shift that could be almost ‘trans-special.’ Perhaps there are situations in which a ‘submission’ of “ego-personality” to ‘otherness’ that results in “pathological disturbances” for that ‘identity’ is actually valuable to gaining a larger field of reference for sense-of-self/other/world. Certainly elements of archaic initiatory culture suggest so. But in the absence of such *rites de passage* moderns are left with their neuroses to provoke re-identification.

The basic principle, underlying this experience, is that enlightenment must be attained by the same means which have caused perdition, occultation and bondage. “By what we fall, by that we shall rise.” (Giegerich, Soul’s Logical Life 245)

An ‘re-orientation’ of identity seems to involve a ‘fall,’ or a ‘falling over’ something ‘unseen.’ And that being ‘tripped up’ and ‘falling down’ some way can generate “enlightenment” about ‘how things really are.’ One might ‘figure’ this ‘fall’ as of one’s habitual identity stumbling over its own method of knowing self/other/world. Thus the ‘threshold’ of some metamorphosis of identity might be the very rigidity or limitations of one’s dominant persona—over which one stumbles. This threshold of persona is rough going. And stumbling is the ‘way to go.’ After all:

The consciousness that could do psychology is not finished. Psychology has not ‘arrived’. It does not exist yet. It is still on the way to itself and has a long way to go. Psychology is not simply a continuation of science (in that ordinary sense), of the scientific minds’ turning toward a new subject, the interiority of man. (Giegerich, Soul’s Logical Life 56)

“The consciousness that could do psychology is not finished. It does not exist” and ‘as such’ a personal persona of psychology may never ‘exist.’ In due respect to Jung (who it is hoped has been honored here by noting his marvelous manifestation of the inherent conflicts of ‘doing psychology’ in his various efforts to ‘know thyself’), the appropriate ‘approach’ to identifying psychic plurality could not be ‘direct’ but rather requires a “circumambulation,” a going around and stumbling over one’s selves, taking many ‘falls’ in the endless process.

Crossing Over or Being With/In The Gap

Once thusly 'faced with' that ever-so-human status of alienation, that 'gap' between self and self, self and other, self and world, between the one-ness and manyness, what psychological 'approach' is to be assumed? 'Depth' psychologists often pose a 'threshold' between the familiar identities of ordinary consciousness and 'the other,' the 'un-' or 'sub-conscious.' This 'transitional space,' reminiscent of the "liminality" of archaic rituals, echoes the many images in mythic imaginations of thresholds between 'worlds,' between realms of human and divine, sacred and profane, the living and the dead, the ordinary and the non-ordinary. These two-sided 'passageways' often 'appear' as oppositional, as posing opposites—at least to a cultural mentality prone to such identification.

However, as psychical or mythical figurations, these are 'demonstrably' 'un-real'—they do not 'function' as literal doorways which 'simply separate'. Yet they are treated, in archaic mentality, as ultimately valid—as an 'un-real real' that is granted a 'real' presence and 'function.' What the 'seeming-oppositions' *together* configure is *the threshold itself* that seems an in/between of neither/nor *and* both/and but exists as/of the contrast, the difference. In common experience this might be 'identified' with hypnogogic states of awareness 'between' waking and dreaming consciousness the experience of which suggests to some that conscious and 'unconscious' processes of perception and cognition, of "I" and "Not-I" psychic agency, are always already concurrently active and some way constituting each other. Thus it would not be this inter-activity that gets normally repressed but awareness of it. In archaic context, conscious induction into threshold status appears to be engaged as a 'hyper reality,' an emphasizing of the ever-present but ritually intensifiable existence of super-natural or non-ordinary forces or dimensions in/of the ordinary. Such 'mutuality' of threshold status is also a figuring of 'dialectical dynamism.'

For an oppositionally dualist mentality, all configurations of opposing contexts tend to be understood as 'about the opposition,' *about* difference-as-conflict, about being either 'here' or 'there.' Thus 'thresholds' tend to be regarded as lines of demarcation or '*points* of transformation.' On one side one is in one status, on the other side, one is changed into another, rather opposite status. The spiritualism of Christianity thus poses the 'fallen' state of carnal embodiment over-and-against the 'sacred' status of pure spirit: sacrality may be 'tasted' in the transubstantiated matter of communion or embodied once in the historical life of the son-of-god, but is otherwise 'out of reach' for the carnal realm. There is no valid 'sustainable' mutuality. The threshold between these opposites is thus biological death. Thereby there is no imagination of 'death in life,' and the 'after life' becomes more important than 'this life.' This may be taken as the model of 'transcendence' in general Western cultural mentality. As indicated above, such transcendence tends to be a 'over-leaping' of some gap, boundary, limit, or demarcation.

Psychological theory, even in ‘depth’ psychology, is entangled in this type of configuring as well. There is a tendency to reductively class ‘mental status’ as “normal” versus “pathological,” the latter having a massive book of minutely differentiated diagnostic distinctions devoted to it. A status that is ‘neither this nor that’ is an ‘un-measurable,’ and ‘unmanageable’ status. The core of the conundrum for ‘depth’ psychology is elucidating the ‘reality of psyche and psychological life’ *in* this cultural context of literalist objectivity, or mechanistic ‘positivism.’ ‘Positivizing’ is not just ‘materialistic literalizing,’ but also that habit of regarding even thoughts-as-things, thus ‘freezing’ the fluidity, the presence of the “implicit,” in consciousness and of the manifestations of psychic movement—both as ‘forms’ of thought and as tangible image/objects. In brief: when faced with a ‘threshold’ a typical impulse is to decide which ‘side’ one wants to be on and then either ‘draw back’ or *cross over*. Western mentality does not like ‘dwelling in/between.’

For the concerns of this study, the point in reiterating this conundrum is to emphasize the difficulty of ‘really’ ‘being present’ with *and as* the ‘un-real real’—of and in the metamorphic status/process or ‘metaphoresis’ of the ‘manifestation of the many in the one’—a multiple status as the ‘way things *really are*’ in totality always already. Being might thus be termed ‘thresholding’ or ‘gapping.’ Any attempt to ‘resolve’ what are perceived as ‘opposites’ tends to be reductive, to conceive a unitary ‘wholeness’ by way of a monadic fusion. ‘Transcendence’ can thusly be figured as either a ‘move’ from ‘bad-to-better’ or from confusing multiplicity and conflict to un-conflicted singular monism.

How is a totality to be psychologically figured that is *not* either oppositionally fragmentary or reductively monist? How to figure ‘being with’ ‘the all-ness’ that is not some oscillating between the realms of literally ‘real’ and metaphysically ‘un-real?’ How to ‘be’ the place where seeming opposites co-participate, to inhabit the ‘apparent’ gap, when there *is* no *actual* gap, no literal opposites? Even Hillman’s maneuver to evade this dilemma in imaginal psychology by posing a ‘third position,’ that of the “imaginal” as separate from real and un-real, can be seen to be entangled in the tendency to positivize.

The image of the “middle ground” and the “third” sets up two positive *realms* (matter or senses vs. mind or spirit), with the soul as the in-between. But the soul is the logical (not temporal) *movement as such* from here to there and back. ‘In between’ and ‘middle ground’ tend to freeze what would actually be sheer movement into a third realm as a kind of bridge, thereby fixing it in between and never allowing it to *arrive* yonder and *return* hither. [. . .] As long as it is a third that *links* the two opposites, it also fundamentally separates them, holding them apart like a partition wall. They can never come together. [Metaphor can never be real.] Such a conception of soul is responsible for the very split between a one-sided literal spirituality or intellectuality and a likewise one-sided literal materialism that it (the imaginal conception of psychology) wants to overcome. (Giegerich, Soul’s Logical Life 190)

Giegerich has attempted most determinedly to come to terms with the ‘in/between’ that is not a ‘place’ and is not antithetical to the ‘opposites,’ yet does not pose as a unity of them that is their resolution. He ‘heretically’ confronts the oppositionalist orientations and transcendent intention in contemporary notions of “imagination.”

A unity of unity and difference of the opposites cannot be *imagined*. The imagination never *really* leaves behind the ego-world of everyday reality and its modes, but it also does not give up its longing for the yonder. While it remains standing on the middle ground as a bridge, neither on this side nor the other, it is longingly *looking* forward to the other side. It even gets to see, (to “envision”) what is going on there (the archetypal images), but it is seeing *through the old eyes and categories* it brought with it from this side (imagination-bound pictorial thinking, spatial representation, the ontological prejudice). (Giegerich, Soul’s Logical Life 191)

Even as attempts are made to ‘move’ out of or ‘away from’ the traps of oppositionalism and literalizing, the ‘baggage’ of perceptual and conceptual methodology tend to configure the ‘new’ terrain. Even the notion of ‘moving’ to a ‘third’ position preserves some of the positivistic “persona.” “This holding on to the visible, spatial and ontological as a firm ground is really inexcusable for a field that wants to be true psychology beyond the ego-stance” (Giegerich, Soul’s Logical Life 191).

For the “ego-stance,” as Hillman notes, is ‘inherently literalistic.’ The ‘gap’ between ‘positivisms’ of the literally ‘real’ and the literally ‘un-real’ remains between both of these and the ‘ideal’ third position of ‘imaginally real.’ It is in that gap, in some ‘placeless place,’ not in the inherently ‘positivized’ images of imagination, that the implicit/ “implicate”/archetypal dynamism or fluidity of psyche that *is psyche* might be ‘inhabited.’ The ‘reality’ of ‘imaginal’ images (or the irrelevance of real > <un-real to them) is *not per se* the ‘reality’ of psyche/soul as “Notion” or “implicate movement.”

The full price for getting beyond the philosophical arguments and the conflict between positivisms and idealisms would be for consciousness to first have to pay tribute to both opposites unconditionally by surrendering to them, and thus necessarily, inasmuch as to honor both at once is contradictory, to have to go through a fundamental logical revolution and, through it, to then be catapulted into an entirely new logical basis of consciousness. It would be the experience of relentlessly, with full commitment, falling into the gap between the two, which gap, if really experienced, would turn out not at all to be a “gap between.” (Giegerich, Soul’s Logical Life 89)

The gap-that-is-not-a-gap is perhaps the appropriate ‘koan’ of the ‘psychological moment.’ Psyche has evidently ‘moved’ to new insights that are ‘invisible’ from the perspective of oppositional persona while being some way articulated. The ‘move’ is not to a new ‘position,’ but into the awareness of psyche’s ‘logical dynamism.’ The gap is not an emptiness, nor a thingless realm of image, but some multi-dimensional, polyvalent, dynamical non-locality of time/space that pervades all of the distinctions and seeming-oppositions of an inclusive reality. ‘The gap’ is an imageless image of inability to surrender to the dynamic of the dialectical logic of “anti-structural” totality—which ‘surrender’ would amount to Giegerich’s “absolute negation” of the positive > <negative oppositionalism that generates

‘the gap.’ The threshold is thus not a line to cross to become ‘other’ but the very ‘place’ that is dynamically everywhere and thus non-where. To experience ‘thresholding’ thusly would require *being* multi-dimensionally present, a ‘status’ that Giegerich asserts is accessible only through logic, not image—the latter being too ‘positive’ to habits of posing ‘reality’ literalistically. Inhabiting this status might be more difficult for the modern mentality than for the archaic because it seems to require not only a metamorphic experience but a metamorphosis of modernist cultural ‘logic’ as well.

In support of the Hillman’s “imaginal” approach, Avens asserts:

The Jungian concept of the psyche as the third thing is not the result of logic; it is a creative solution which owes its appearance to the flowing of opposites into one another. The emergence of a “third” is a “miracle”, i.e., a potentiality of which logic and reasoning is thoroughly unaware. (Avens 96)

But this point actually supports Giegerich’s view that ‘image-as-psyche/soul’ still traps one’s orientation into an object > <subject duality by positivizing the ‘thingless thing’ as the thing of an image. For:

Thus there is a necessary reciprocity, a correlation between what I see and the way I see; as stated earlier, an image is not what I see but the way in which I see. In this view the ability to perceive the imaginal realities must be attributed to a special kind of awareness (intuition?) — an awareness that is no longer a tool of the ego, but of what Jung calls the Self, to which we prefer to give back the religious and poetical name of “the soul.” (Avens 96)

Again, Avens seems to support Giegerich’s point: the ‘way of seeing’ of ‘seeing images’ is positivistic. It subverts the reality of the ‘un-real,’ since the ‘literalizing ego’ is still ‘present’ in perception and reflection even if the ‘image seen’ is generated from non-egoic intention. Note that “a miracle” is typically defined as the *literal* occurrence of the *literally impossible*. The positing of the ‘miraculous third’ realm of “imagination” depends upon maintaining the opposition of ‘real’ and ‘un-real.’

Avens’ reference to “a special kind of awareness (intuition?)” might actually be to a sensing of the “sublated” linear logic of objective > <subjective oppositionalism, a status that can be characterized in Giegerich use of the notion of “negation of negation” that enables one of “absolute negation.” The opposite of a ‘positive’ is a ‘negative.’ Negative status is dependent upon positive status for its existence and that oppositional relationship basically positivizes both statuses. If the opposite of an object is an image, image is thus effectively ‘positivized’ as a negative status. When this opposition is itself ‘negated’ as the basis for primary reality then a non-linear logic is enabled that does not depend on ‘binarisms,’ though it may well depend upon posing a concurrent multi-dimensionality. No ‘inclusive totality’ can be conceived, logically, within a binary context of subjective > < objective or positive > < negative opposition. The negating of the ‘false’ in favor of the ‘real,’ of the ‘unreal’ in favor of the ‘real’ must be negated to if positivism is to be *absolutely negated*—thereby enabling Giegerich’s “logical negativity.”

Psyche posited as image versus literal object or phenomena thus becomes a “logical form”—though one of ‘fantastical complexity’ from the perspective of positivism.

What Avens might then be ‘representing’ when writing of the “miracle” of “the third” is an awareness of the ‘dynamic of forming flow,’ of explicit “implicate” movement which is neither positive nor negative, ‘real’ or ‘un-real.’ Avens’ excellent summary of imaginal psychology seems to affirm this further:

Dualism breeds monism and monism feeds on dualism. For these two “isms” are nothing more than manifestations of one and the same tendency—the tendency to reconcile contraries, to reduce the manifold character of reality to a single explanatory scheme. In the final analysis it is the refusal to accept the human condition in its essential ambiguity and open-endedness.

In contrast to this, we have chosen to stress the reality of the psyche. The psychic perspective requires no “reconciliation” because it says that there is enough space for all views and positions including those of materialism and spiritualism. The only thing the psyche does to these views is to de-substantialize and to relativize them. But dissolution is always followed by transformation because soul as the “third term” is itself a transformative agency. (Avens 170)

But this “transformative agency” is thingless, thus it can have no particular form, not even an ‘image’—though ‘image’ as ‘un-real real’ (or “thought form”), is the ‘form’ closest to actually ‘being’ “implicate” flow, the dynamism or ‘logic’ of “anti-structural liminality.” Giegerich presents an extensive consideration of alchemy as a psychological enactment of engaging the non-linear logic of that agency (which, again, may be better termed ‘metamorphic’ rather than ‘transformative’), with its overt consciousness of posing and “sublating” images as presentations of dynamic being and becoming which the alchemist-as-en/actor is *involved in* rather than ‘objectively’ observing, performing, or orchestrating.

[. . .] the alchemical language is superior to the jargon of modern psychology. It unmistakably expresses the ultimate otherness, the (logical) *negativity* of the reality that it is talking about: *non vulgi*, *not* ordinary (everybody’s), *ou lithos*. The phrase about the Stone (*lithos ou lithos*) [stone that is not a stone] in particular makes explicit the self-contradictory, dialectical nature of the matter alchemy talks about. (Giegerich, *Souls Logical Life* 112)

He interprets alchemy’s version of the *opus contra naturam*, in contrast to Jung’s version as a “work against nature,” as a work against the ‘human version of nature’—a work performed *upon* the projection of oppositional egoic-identifications onto the ‘actual’ nature of self/world/other, which then configures the latter as a fragmentary realm of literalistic oppositions requiring resolution or transcendence. Thus alchemy is seen as a ‘practice’ meant to enable experience of the ‘dialectical logic of totality,’ of what the ordinary or “natural standpoint” might term the ‘super-natural.’ A ‘practice’ that could ‘relativize’ the egoic posture or persona to the ‘larger’ and more ‘complex’ interpenetrating fields of self/other/world. To ‘go against’ habitual ‘identifications of nature’ is to ‘cross the line’ beyond which the “structure” of self/other/world is not known. Yet that infinite multidimensional totality of flowing forming movement is not simply ‘un-structured’ but rather has its own logical modality which is of another ‘order’ from that of ordinary “structural” logic.

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The total inversion of the constituent categories of the given world is the prerequisite for its fundamental sublation, or the sublation of the corresponding status of consciousness. It is a precondition for the advancement to the notion of logical negativity. (Giegerich, Soul's Logical Life 143)

“As above, so below” is not a “paradox.” The talk of “paradoxes” is always a sign of a refusal (or inability) to *think* the opposites.[. . .] Alchemy is “implicitly” thought not “explicitly” beyond the opposites. It has advanced to a completely new level of consciousness, that of the soul, whose innermost nature is logical life.

Logic does not favor one opposite over the other one; the soul as logic contains both physis and pneuma as sublated moments within it. With this new level of consciousness, the plane on which the “ontologized” (reified, mythologized) opposites of physis and pneuma, caelum and terra, male and female, inside and outside, the human sphere and the cosmos were the fundamental categories and the real focus of human thinking has been superseded by a new plane on which the difference between positivity and negativity is now of categorical significance. Positivity and negativity are no longer ontologized “regions” or “realms” of reality, but two logical statuses or forms in which *everything*, the physical as well as the “pneumatic,” can be seen and comprehended. This is the plane on which *our* task is set for us. The difference between materialism and idealism has become more or less meaningless. (Giegerich, Soul's Logical Life 146)

Here is a ‘vision’ of the ‘work’ of human consciousness that does not ‘look’ ‘forward’ to a transformed or ideal status of heroic victory over some ‘other,’ over Nature as the “wild,” or human suffering as bad, or death as defeat. Rather, it acknowledges that ‘history’ has already ‘negated’ such quests as philosophically valid. And it calls psychology to account for this contemporary status of some ‘post’-modern psyche. Western cultural ‘leaping,’ either ‘forward’ or ‘away from,’ could be termed ‘transcendental heroics,’ a complex of compulsions to ‘transcend’ that has become neurotic, fragmenting, ‘wildly’ ‘chaotic,’ fostering astonishingly (and ‘creatively’) destructive ‘antics.’ These are the ‘positive’ symptoms of having ‘transgressed’ the limitations of habitual cultural persona almost without knowing it.

The real transgression is not comprehended if it is imagined merely in terms of stepping across a line. Something much more violent is required: the complete inversion of the world (cf. the “Inverted World” of Hegel), the radical reversion of the natural sequence of beginning and end or cause and consequence. (Giegerich, Soul's Logical Life 21)

The “transgression” is a move into movement, from a ‘status clinging to opposable positives’ to a ‘thinking’ of the all-pervading dynamism of psyche that inhabits seeming-oppositions concurrently. Thus the ‘there and back again’ of psychology is not now a move from ‘real’ to ‘un-real’ and back, not an oscillation between thing and image, nor to a ‘separate’ realm of the “imaginal,” but *from* such divisions *into* the polyvalent, multi-dimensional, *archetypal logic* of the subjectivity that pervades them and has innumerable loci, even ‘in’ one’s self. Such a shiftless-shift would be of ‘post’-modernist identity consciousness.

The interest in postmodern depth psychology, of such force and desire as it may have, is a certain experience of the impossible. It is the experience of the other subject, the experience of the other as the creation, the construction, of the impossible subject. The impossible is the only possible place, the only imaginable topos, out of which to create a new subject. (Kugler 183)

The only 'place' to 'do' 'depth' psychology is an "impossible" topography where one might *be* a "certain experience of the impossible." Such experience of the "impossible subject" requires 'going' to a 'place' that is, to the egoic perspective of 'ordinary' possibility, 'placeless.' That would be a 'place' where shamans and mystics 'go.' A place that in order to 'be' cannot 'be' in any positivistic sense yet must be *experienced* as 'real' if it is to 'be' at all. Such 'going' requires the 'work of imagination', which gives expression to the "implicate" flow of self/other/world into/as "explicate" form that can then be "sublated" into the "logical negativity" of its dynamism. One must 'image/imagine' an 'impossible place' to have a 'context' in which to experience the 'reality' of the 'un-real' as concurrent, multi-valent movement—some 'un-real real.' *But*, only when those 'un-real real' events and images are thus "sublated" ('digested' as psycho-somatic 'verity') will the 'actuality' of "impossible subjectivity," the "Soul's logic," be 'knowable.' For if they are even 'thought' as 'things' then their 'manifest expressions' (even as images) will not be 'sublated,' not be 'de-composed' into their 'archetypal presencing' Once again it is essential to note that to 'speak' of such 'transubstantiation' of 'matter,' even as 'positivistic notion,' into 'archetypal movement' as the 'stuff of soul' is to 'speak' in a 'tortured manner' for any 'ordinary egoic perspective,' the perspective of "persona."

This notion of the 'virtual' impossibility of 'speaking positively' about the reality of the 'un-real' brings this discussion to the subject of 'knowing by doing' and 'depth' psychology as enactment of psyche's 'impossible' plurality.

Performative Psyche and 'Depth' Psychology as Participatory Enactment

Besides a brief consideration of the relations of 'real' and 'un-real' to plurality of psyche in theories of 'depth' psychology, there is the 'practice' of 'depth' psychological 'therapy' to be considered in seeking 'validation' of an 'un-real real.' From the perspective of singularly personal sense of egoic identities in Western culture, 'therapy' is commonly posed as an attendance to the suffering of the singular, egoic "I" of a literal person. Yet viewed 'from the side,' as it were, 'depth' psychological therapies often appear as an inter-action and 'inter-activity' between aspects of self. In various ways, the habitual identity or 'dominant egoic orientation' of the client/analysand is led by the therapist, or certain 'practices,' to regard the expressions of "the unconscious" as arising from some 'other' agency in one's self, and to be 'engaged' by 'it.' Such 'engagement' can be viewed as 'enacting' relations with an 'un-real real.' In this context, the otherness of one's self may be encountered as divergent or contradictory

impulses, disturbing or 'illogical' behavior, fantasy, dream, internal dialogue, or non-egoically generated 'artistic' expressions. The 'doing' of such activity is predicated upon the notion that such 'material,' with its mysterious 'contents,' will bring the egoic consciousness into a more 'representative' orientation to the 'larger' self.

Were it not for the directedness of the conscious function, the counteracting influences of the unconscious could set in unhindered. It is just this directedness that excludes them. This, of course, does not inhibit the counteraction, which goes on in spite of everything. Its regulating influence, however, is eliminated by critical attention and the directed will, because the counteraction as such seems incompatible with the conscious direction. To this extent the psyche of civilized man is no longer a self-regulating system [. . .]. (Jung, Structure and Dynamics of Psyche 79)

In response to a 'tyranny' of the directedness of egoic function one is thus encouraged and assisted by such 'therapy' to relinquish 'directing' one's consciousness toward the habitual objectives, supported by the usual assumptions and beliefs, and thereby to experience an 'other' intentionality, which may have a "regulating influence" that will seem "incompatible with conscious direction." This notion implies that an initial impulse to seek 'therapy' is an attempt to 'direct' one's self toward regaining comfort, balance and confidence in a habitually directed identity. Yet it is the thusly "structured" sense-of-self/other/world which must be surrendered for the "regulating influence" of the "unconscious" to be allowed to express *its* 'directions.' And those 'directions' of the 'Not-I' 'others' are not likely to be linear or 'logical' to habitual perspectives, but rather 'confusing,' 'absurd,' 'obscure,' 'humiliating,' "incompatible," and 'unrealistic.' Obviously, such an encounter is likely to be resisted by the habitual attitude even when it is 'confronted' with 'feelings' of depression, longing, or desperation.

This situation provokes the question, "who or what is 'doing' this therapy?" Who or what is 'enacting' this expression if the habitual "I" that is attempting to cease 'directing' and attend to some agency 'beside' itself? But this typically mechanistic question is significantly 'unanswerable' in terms the habitual identity can readily understand since the agency of 'the self' is 'other' most particularly in the sense that it seldom appears to have a singular identity, locus, or form. By deliberately 'restraining' its habitual activity, egoic identity can allow some "Not-I" to 'perform,' as it were, from its "anti-structural" 'script,' some 'story of the rest of the self.'

Those 'practices' that engage this expression of the "Not-I" as creative productivity whereby some tangible image, form, or gesture is generated, create a 'reality' for the 'un-real' or 'non-validated' aspects of psyche as a 'thing' that has then 'un-real real' status. Both as image and object, these creations make a 'place' where the engagement of "I" and "Not-I" come together, in and by which a "Not-Not-I," the plurality of the one, is metamorphically 'made manifest.' A painting, poem, gesture, song, sculpture gives form to the "implicate" dynamics of psyche's explicit/"explicate" flow-as-

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image/notion/action, constituting a co-operative co-generation which ‘precipitates’ that form in the co-participation of agencies—habitual egoic and not.

Images are our co-participants in creative activity. There is intimate relationship between artists and their paintings but instead of seeing images as graphic signs of the artist’s inner nature, we can imagine them as children, psychic offspring. They issue from us but lead autonomous lives. (McNiff, Art as Medicine 63-64)

Such may well be the ‘relations’ in all ‘generative’ or ‘creative’ activity, but in this context of ‘therapy’-as-*therapeia*, as attendance to ‘impersonal agencies,’ the plurality of agencies and the co-participation engendered by ‘surrender’ of dominance by the habitual ego-identity is explicit. It is engaged also in the ‘activity’ of ‘imagining’ when the sense of agency of the “Not-I” is allowed to take ‘human form,’ or become “personified.”

When a complex is imagined as a distinctly separated entity, a full “person,” equal to my notion of ego in intentions, moods, and willfulness, then my relations to my complexes will be as in a dream where they are no more or less real than the dream “I.” When the complex is fully personified, I can perceive its specific qualities and yield to it the specific respect it requires. (Hillman, Re-visioning Psychology 34)

One’s habitual identity can have conversation and ‘bodily’ interaction with such ‘persons’ of the self/other/world.

It is exactly as if a dialogue were taking place between two human beings with equal rights, each of whom gives the other credit for a valid argument and considers it worth while to modify the conflicting standpoints by means of a thorough comparison and discussion or else to distinguish them clearly from one another. (Jung, Jung on Active Imagination 58)

An ‘imaginal context’ enables such ‘conversations’ with/in ‘the self.’ But even an analytical engagement of habitual consciousness reflecting upon the images, events, and situations ‘presented’ by the agency of some “Not-I” is a form of ‘participation’ in them. Whether seeking to thusly ‘participate’ in their ‘meaning’ by interpretation, or as ‘one of them’ in imaginal interaction, or in co-generative artistic creativity, the discipline involved is primarily the restraint of the habitual self-identity’s tendencies to control, direct, or interpret reflexively.

The first steps along both paths follow the same principle: consciousness puts its media of expression at the disposal of the unconscious content. It must not do more than this at first, so as not to exert undue influence. In giving the content form, the lead must be left as far as possible to the chance ideas and associations thrown up by the unconscious. This is naturally something of a setback for the conscious standpoint and is often felt as painful.[. . .] Mostly they are unwelcome, unexpected, irrational contents, disregard or repression of which seems altogether understandable. But contents that are collectively valueless [according to normative social standards] may be exceedingly valuable when seen from the standpoint of the individual .[. . .]

The unconscious contents want first of all to be seen clearly, which can only be done by giving them shape, and to be judged only when everything they have to say is tangibly present [. . .]

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To an egoic identification of self accustomed to presenting a 'unitary' person to be judged by the collective "structural" standards of 'external' society (self-as-persona), the "unintegrated," chaotic or 'unrealistic' expressions of the "Not-I" are likely to be 'unwanted' and difficult to 'value.' Typically, some assistance and support are required on the part of a therapist, or a group of other individuals seeking to 'surrender' some of their egoic control to the 'rest' of their 'selves,' to enable an individual's conscious attitude to 'allow' such inter-subjective expression. Thus group therapy and 'art' therapy create collective context that supports rather than resists this enacted 'relativization' of singular of habitual identity to the presence of the "Not-I."

In such contexts and engagements, one's habitual identity is not only confronted with that of 'others' but a perspective can develop 'beside' the "I" and "Not-I" in their positions as habitual ego-identity and other.

As psychic life is peopled with multiple characters who enjoy varying degrees of autonomy and who are known in their complexity, there occurs a radical shift with respect to the "ego." The "I" becomes not just the one who observes the others; it is now seen as well. It too is like a character, with certain styles of being and interacting which the imaginal others recognize: organizer, narrator, confidant, supervisor.[. . .] As the imaginal others speak and act, they do not just answer the "I"'s questions, but speak about the "I" and also *about* their relations with each other, seemingly apart from the ego. [. . .]

Through this process there is a relative decentration of psychic life, which can restrict the strength and functions of the ego. Truth becomes redefined: it is not the province of a single voice, but arises between the voices at the interface of the character's multiple perspectives. (Watkins, Invisible Guests 118)

Here is a critical potential effect of the submission of habitual singular identity to the co-agency of self: egoic function becomes differentiated from its 'identification' with the habitual image and role of its identifications. This 'function of identification' can come to realize it is not a 'thing' or a 'someone' but a fluid capacity or 'orientation' of identity, a sort of "I"-ing. In this 'status' this 'implicit' flow of identification is loosened from its confusion with any given, explicit formulation or persona of self. It may experience/witness the "wild" dynamic of the un-reduced 'nature' of self/totally in its 'plurality of presencing,' and thus validate that 'otherness' of the manyness of one's 'self.' Its role can become that of 'master of ceremonies' of the self in its variousness.

Thus the habitual identity is not only 'relativized' to the 'rest' of the self, but the 'movement' of its agency becomes plurally present in various 'personifications' or creations—some of which may be figured as non-human or 'inanimate' objects. This appears to be a metamorphic experience-by-expression of the metaphoric status of being. These notions of therapeutic enactment and the consequences for habitual identity are echoed in those about many yoga practices in Hindu philosophy where enlightenment about a 'larger' reality requires 'surrender' of habitual thoughts and preoccupations.

The intention in the 'practice' of 'depth' psychological insights is not, however, for the egoic function to be 'eradicated' but to become more 'relational.' One might also figure the egoic-function as taking on the role of 'therapist' as facilitator of expressive inter-subjectivity among 'aspects of self.' In this sense, not only 'habitual identity' but also other aspects of self are enabled to 'see' or 'hear' about 'themselves' from a "Not-I" perspective.

As soon as a painting is made, or a dream remembered, the images that constitute their being are experienced as wholly other. [. . .] It is through others that we discover who we are. When we learn how to step aside and watch ourselves, the other becomes an agent of transformation. Dialoguing with images is a method for expanding ego's singular vision. In opening to others, we do not have to give away our place within the interaction. Others have an experience of us that may be quite different from our experience of ourselves. All of these perspectives are elements in the psychic stew. Reality is an ever changing inter play and never a single, fixed position.

The dialogue between an artist and a painting is rarely limited to "twofold" communication. Many figures within the painting and the artist enter these conversations. It becomes increasingly clear that the first-person perspective of the artist, the "I" who is speaking, is composed of varied voices. (McNiff, Art as Medicine 2)

While 'conversation,' 'imagined events' and painting are all 'activity' and some ways 'creative,' that they involve 'embodiment' is perhaps not so obvious. The aspect of 'body' in all of these techniques or practices seems most significant in that it both brings 'tangibility' to the 'un-real real' and emphasizes the dynamic quality of 'being' other.

I imagine soul as *kinesis*, process, creation, interplay, and continuous motion. [. . .] Loss of soul is a "stuck" condition in which the flow has stopped. Psychology speaks of "fixations" as defenses against change. The "fixed" idea is nonvolatile, stationary. Artists accustomed to a vital kinesis of imagination fear the prospect of "drying up." The soulless state is one of desiccation, when "the currents" no longer run. "Stuckness" is an absence of movement and the inability to perceive motion in the moment. (McNiff, Art as Medicine 54-55)

To enact the expression of the 'other' with one's bodily being is to both 'enter into it' and allow it to 'enter into one.' This is a complicated form of consciousness that does not have to be 'con-fused' or 'confusing.' Discipline and practice enable a plurality of perspectives to be concurrently operant. In this sense "movement" or 'enactment' does not necessarily imply 'activity' or 'doing' so much as experiencing some plurality or otherness of agency. McNiff's comment on "the soulless state" as "one of desiccation" might not be apt for some conditions where a 'cessation' of habitual motion may be required for egoic awareness to relax its 'grip' of sense-of-self. The 'metamorphosis' seems more a matter of experiencing awareness of some plurality of being and becoming rather than 'positive' doing. But 'doing' while moved as by some "Not-I" seems effective in generating such experience/awareness.

People who respond to their art through performance in our studios report that the dramatic contexts brings the most complete release from debilitating self-consciousness. Theater offers

clearly defined structures—preparatory procedures, beginnings, endings. (McNiff, Art as Medicine 120-21)

Performers describe how the enactment “moves something.” When they play the image in the painting, it is experienced in another way, and they describe how it is the engagement of the body that deepens the work. (McNiff, Art as Medicine 127)

The “I” metamorphoses into “I”-and-the-image-in-the-painting that “I” and the image have co-generated. That ‘we’ becomes ‘one’ as “Not-Not-I” in the image and yet also remain ‘other’ as ‘we’ interact or ‘converse.’ Here is some “impossible subject” of Kugler’s ‘depth’ psychology and the ‘being’ of Giegerich’s “logical negativity” that can enable the “sublation” of the experience into its archetypal dynamic: the “movement of Soul” or “dialectical movement” of “implicate explicate” psyche.

From the perspective of ‘the other,’ the “Not-I,” these consciously co-operative engagements may also have some ‘re-orienting’ effects.

Our sense of the creative process moves beyond the self-referential world of the person of the artist. We are interested in the things that come through us, and influence us. The making of a painting is an expression of that aspect of the psyche that changes, transforms, and constantly creates new life. The psyche is itself restructured in response to the influences of its own creations. (McNiff, Art as Medicine 64)

Thus the “Not-I” may be altered in some way as it also enters into the becoming/being of “Not-Not-I.” Recall here Emma Jung’s remark about the Grail hero confronting the “empty grave” as the ‘act’ which may then make possible some aspect of “Self” coming into being where before it had existed only as potential. Thus such ‘inter-activity’ as made manifest in ‘depth’ psychological practices seem to enable not only the ‘unfolding’ of psyche in ‘expressions of the repressed and unknown’ aspects of self/other/world, but also create a context for more of its ‘self-creation.’ The un-resolvable question of who is doing what to whom, which is assimilating which, presents the very mysterious character of the “wild” and “anti-structural liminality” of this non-where/many-where realm. Such a view suggests also that the ‘un-real real’ is neither just the ‘realness’ of ‘positive’ objects and events *confronted* or *dissolved* by the ‘un-realness’ of ‘immaterial’ or formless ‘energy’/agency but rather their ‘actively’ dynamic co-presence *as* one’s awareness-in-experience.

Psychological Enactment as Ritual, Myth, and Poetry

Such ‘enacted’ ‘submissions’ of habitual identity, and ‘logical’ ‘becomings’ of the ‘un-real real,’ the mutuality of self and ‘otherness’ as ‘manyness and one-ness,’ suggest the ritual attitudes and enactments of archaic culture. Just what sort of “psychology” is this whose therapy seems to reconstitute archaic behaviors identified with ritual enactments, ‘mythic’ tellings and poetic dictions? It is a ‘heretical’ psychology in that it submits the objectivist dogma of positivistic scientism to the measure of

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the 'immeasurable' by surrendering the hegemony of the "I" to the collectivity of 'inhuman' subjectivity. This move is 'heretical' in so far as it is a 'return to chaos,' a submission to an "anti-structural" status found 'inadmissible' to the 'reality of objectivist mentality.' 'Depth' psychology offers a 'return' to the 'seeming-chaos' of the totality of self which ordinary, singular egoic identification and its realities tends to suppress. This move is viewed as having some 'therapeutic' effect by enabling a person's identifications to 're-order' —or rather, become re-ordered by an influx of non-self-identified self (Jung's "regulating" or "compensatory function" of "unconscious" psyche). Yet, the 'heretical' character of such therapy to modernist mentality is repressed in its having to be contexted as an 'ego therapy', a treatment for anxiety of/in the habitual identity—a 'repair job' as it were. The notion of 'repairing' a distressed egoic identity appears to be questionable by archaic perspective.

As the exemplary model for all "creation," the [archaic] cosmogonic myth can help the patient to make a "new beginning" of his life. The *return to origins* gives the hope of a rebirth. Now, all the medicinal rituals we have been examining aim at a return to origins. We get the impression that for archaic societies life cannot be *repaired*, it can only be *re-created* by a return to sources. And the "source of sources" is the prodigious outpouring of energy, life, and fecundity that occurred at the Creation of the World. (Eliade, Myth and Reality 30)

One might then argue that, in the 'practices' of its *therapeia* 'this 'heretical' psychology thus 'does' as myth, ritual and even poetry 'do' by 'returning' to 'experiential' awareness of a totalistic multi-dimensional field of "implicate explicate" consciousness that is 'creator' of self/other/world. Part of what makes such a psychology 'heretical' to egoically-identified culture is that its 'treatment' of the trauma of 'disorder,' of 'breakdown of structural identity/reality,' requires *submission* to/engagement with the "anti-structural," chaotic-seeming parts of self/psyche that are the evident 'source' of the initial sense of traumatic 'disorder.' In medical terms, this is homeopathic rather than allopathic 'treatment,' a sort of 'indulgence' in the 'illness' or 'pathology.'

That 'submission' to the 'source' of habitual identity's 'dis-ease,' though it may bring on a "transformation of consciousness" which could have "disagreeable effects," as Jung warns, is evidently in keeping with archaic insights. "Every ritual repetition of the cosmogony is preceded by a symbolic retrogression to Chaos. In order to be created anew, the old world must be annihilated" (Eliade, Rites and Symbols of Initiation 30). Eliade asserts the archaic is not concerned with "repair" of the identity that has existed but with re-generating it. Though there is a persistent contemporary tendency to pose therapy as 'repairing' what is 'damaged' or 'broken' (such as "self-esteem"), the process of the therapy may not actually be functioning in that manner. Thus an association of the archaic and 'depth' psychological 'treatments' is accurate at least as a 'dynamical' comparison. Both these contexts appear to 'induce' a field of "liminality" and concurrency akin to Eliade's "*in illo tempore*," the time that is outside of 'this' time, and thus 'sacred.'

This periodic reiteration of what was done *in illo tempore* makes it inescapably certain that something *exists absolutely*. This “something” is “sacred,” that is, transhuman and transmundane, but it is accessible to human experience. “Reality” unveils itself and admits of being constructed from the “transcendent” level, but this “transcendence” can be ritually experienced and finally becomes an integral part of human life.

This “transcendent” world of the Gods, the Heroes, and the mythical Ancestors is accessible because archaic man does not accept the irreversibility of Time. As we have repeatedly seen, ritual abolishes profane, chronological Time and recovers the sacred Time of myth. (Eliade, Myth and Reality 140)

Archaic myth and ritual deconstruct the literality of time-as-irreversibly-linear, allowing aspects of psyche *not identified with* that ‘reality’ to be expressed, and thus encountered, by egoic function—though at the ‘cost’ of ‘dissociation’ from the habitual perspective. That realm, where the creative forces are ‘at play’ ‘beyond’ the laws of linear causality is the “realm of origins,” the creational field of implicit/“implicate” flow, and thereby is “sacred.” While Eliade depicts this ‘move’ as “transcendental” he notes that such an ‘other’ and more ‘sacred’ realm does not remain oppositionally removed from ordinary life but “can be ritually experienced and finally becomes an integral part of human life.”

But here appears an essential difference discernible between the ‘reality’ of the expanded or open field of archaic myth and ritual, and the multi-dimensional field submitted to in ‘depth’ psychological practice. In a culture of absolute, categorical oppositions, of binary binds, between ‘real’ and ‘un-real,’ psychology cannot pose an ‘other’ reality, a separate plane of “transcendent” being, as a means of ‘opening’ us to the “realm of origins.” The only ‘opening’ in such a binary context is the “absolute negation” of oppositions. As Giegerich’s insistence seeks to reveal, psychology inherently asserts and maintains the presence of its ‘ology,’ of a ‘logical’ basis. It is this implicit and explicit ‘tending the logic’ of the psychical, ‘imaginal,’ ‘archetypal,’ that make this psychology the ‘inheritor’ of mythic and ritualistic ‘functions’ as the *intellectual* context for the emergence of a dialectical logic that is dynamically ‘poetic’ in its precise ambiguities. The ‘time’ of ordinary identity’s submission to ‘the rest of the self’ is ‘timeless’ in that it is ‘multi-dimensional,’ a ‘time’ in which agency is not linearly identifiable, thus “transhuman,” “transmundane,” “sacred”—as the co-participation of ordinary and non-ordinary self/other/world. It is just such a dialectical concurrency of ordinary and non-ordinary that are constituted by ‘depth’ psychological practices.

The participatory context of archaic mentality seems unlikely to have not required this ‘double abstraction’ on some conscious level in order to ‘reverse time,’ firstly to the timeless/placeless concurrence of some ‘un-real real,’ then secondly by way of a “sublation” of same to the “thought form” of “logical negativity.” Certainly modernist mentality does seem to require this further overt ‘relativization’ of ‘positivizing identity’ to constitute a genuinely ‘post’-modern mentality.

***In Illo Tempore* : Psychology and the Timeless Difficulty of Submitting to Timelessness**

‘Figuring’ both ‘sides’ of the seeming-gap between “implicate” and “explicate,” flow and form, material and immaterial, “structural” and “anti-structural,” and storying the movements of such figures back and forth to ‘give form in time’ to them (‘forming the fluidity’) appears as a primary aspect of artistic and ‘mythic’ expression. But by now it can be seen that this is also the nature of any rigorous, inclusive psychology: the assertion of a logically dialectical realism—of the concurrent, if non-local, validity of the ‘reality’ of the ‘un-real’ and the ‘un-reality’ of the ‘real.’ Psychology must be study of manifesting the many in the multidimensional one if it is to explicate and enable ‘knowing’ totalistically. Such a ‘function’ means asserting the validity of ‘timelessness’ and ‘non-locality’ in ‘variousness of presencing’ as some ‘post’-modern version of Eliade’s *in illo tempore*, that ‘time out of time’ which constitutes a ‘sacred’ experience of creational forces and that can be ‘brought back’ into ordinary context.

An awareness as experience of Jung’s larger or god-Self, is and is not a thing, or rather, is a ‘thingless thinging.’ It could be posed as participation in the generation of the “explicit” particularity in linear time from/as the ‘energy’ of the “flowing wholeness of totality,” a ‘status’ that is ‘un-real’ in terms of ordinary sense of measurable time. And: such an experience is both ‘nothing but thingless thought’ and the ‘thought of the body,’ as psyche and soma are ultimately indivisible. In a psyche-logical status of non-identified egoic function (when there is an “I” but it does not ‘define’ “me”), conscious awareness of plurality of identifications, of concurrent plurality of agency constitutes a sense of ‘lateral extension of being’ into ‘variousness of presencing.’ In that ‘positioning’ consciousness can experience ‘itself’ as not itself as well as some continuum of the “implicate,” the “anti-structural” or the ‘wild.’ One might say living is thus a ‘metaphoresis’ of “implicate” becoming and “explicit” being (and vice versa?)—awareness of which seems inherently ‘un-natural’ to ordinary states of identity.

Concerns with somehow ‘exposing’ conscious awareness to a timeless status of non-local plurality of presencing have become, perhaps by default, the province of psychology. Just as all rites of rebirth or resurrection, and the symbols that they imply, indicated that the novice has attained to another mode of existence, inaccessible to those who have not undergone initiatory ordeals, who have not tasted death, so a person having undergone genuine ‘depth’ psychological reflection is faced with a sense of dislocation from the time and place of ordinary identity. They are confronted with their inherent alienation from totality by their participation in it. There is no consistent implication in anthropological observations that such a shift was ‘easy’ even in archaic context. And those who have ventured to undergo such initiatory experiences in the ‘age of psychology’ have faced radical consequences, with no archaic mentality to validate the process. In a culture of fragmentary individualism, the suffering of inherent human alienation is ‘infinitely’ personal.

The consequence of my resolve, and my involvement with things which neither I nor anyone else could understand, was an extreme loneliness. I was ^{goig} about laden with thoughts of

which I could speak to no one: they would only have been misunderstood. I felt the gulf between the external world and the internal world of images in its most painful form. [. . .]

However, it was clear to me from the start that I could find contact with the outer world and with people only if I succeeded in showing—and this would demand the most intensive effort—that the contents of psychic experience are real, and real not only as my own personal experiences, but as collective experiences which others also have. Later I tried to demonstrate this in my scientific work, and I did all in my power to convey to my intimates a new way of seeing things. I knew that if I did not succeed, I would be condemned to absolute isolation. (Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections 194.)

Once again, there is no better example of both the insight required to ‘do’ psychology and the resistance to such insight encountered in habitual mentality than that of Jung himself and the struggle of his life’s work. He suffered submission to the notion of psychic plurality and the terrible alienation of habitual identity that is the consequence of such submission—both ‘internally’ and socio-culturally. He ‘stepped out of time’ and into the timeless mystery of timelessness, into a multidimensional field of being, and then he ‘brought it back’ to ordinary consciousness in the form of logic. For his ‘followers’ to ‘know the kingdom of the self’ a similar submission and suffering must be required. That ‘kingdom’ is not ‘elsewhere’ but all around and of this (seemingly singular) present moment. ‘Depth’ psychology asserts the appropriate insights and notions to enable a non-literal dissolution of the mechanistic reductions of space and time. But the assertion of those notions constitutes teaching and aiding in the painful suffering of self-deconstructions in a ‘practice’ of ‘mythical dynamism.’ That ‘dynamical mode of identity,’ as so much violent and traumatic imagery in mythical narratives attest, is not merely a ‘pleasurable entertainment’ or ‘diverting fantasy.’

Chapter 7

Mythological Theories of Non-Reductive Knowing: The Pluralizing Re-Orientations of Metamorphic Dynamics in Mythic Re-Presentation and Ritual Enactment

The preceding considerations of the scientifically derived reality of ordinarily or positivistically 'un-real' status in a multidimensional totality, along with the notion of polycentric psyche derived from cognitive science and 'depth' psychology, permit consideration of the 'realities of myth.' Thus the dynamical characteristics of 'mythical expression' or re-presentation are examined here for their mediation of the oppositional categories of ordinarily real and unreal, by way of some 'un-real real' identifications. Thus the focus of this study shifts back from emphasis upon the inherent interplay of reduction and non-reduction in specific disciplines of rational analysis (i.e., philosophy, science, and psychology) toward the dynamical character of non-ordinary, non-literalistic or overtly metaphorical expression. The disciplinary methods for analysis utilized here are archetypally comparative, referencing criteria in mythological, religious, anthropological, psychological, and literary studies.

In essence this is an investigation of how mythical narrative, and imagery, along with ritual activity (all typically classed as 'un-real' by ordinary identifications), can or once could generate sensing of an 'un-real real' and thereby enable radically inclusive knowing. It might seem that myth, for all its un-real re-presentations, would be inherently, even 'exclusively' inclusive as a mode of knowing. But, as indicated in the preceding overviews of other 'disciplinary modes of knowing,' the 'realm of myth' will be shown to be contexted in reductive as well as non-reductive ways as well. What is indicated here as distinguishing myth as a mode of knowing or epistemic method is that its primary 'logic of identity' is not that of one-ness, as with those modes based in rational analysis, but rather the logic of many-ness. Thus it is typically classed as irrational by other, more linearly logical, disciplines of re-presentation. Yet even a 'mythic modality' can be deployed in service to reductive purposes.

Contemplating myth in modernist perspectives, one confronts notions of 'it' as falsehood and fantasy, as social or religious indoctrination, as narrative versus image or ritual action, as primitive substitute for and the opposite of scientific understanding, and even a 'primitive' psychology. One needs recall here the ancient Greek dualistic distinction between *mythos* and *logos* that privileged the latter as the valid mode for knowing reality. From that distinction myth could be considered a rhetorical expression both socialized beliefs and socially unacceptable human impulses. The considerations presented here are not intended to refute or affirm interpretations of the socio-cultural 'roles' of myth. Rather, it is emphasized that while many of the works referenced in this chapter involve studies of historical cultural myth and its sociological 'functions,' the notions of the authors cited are applied here

primarily in a perspective of ‘psychological mythology’ rather than of ‘comparative mythology.’ It is myth as a dynamic of ‘psyche-logical epistemology’ and ‘phenomenological presencing of totality’ that is most important to this study—‘the mythical’ as a heuristic for knowing ‘the nature of totality’ ‘inclusively.’ Thus an effort is made here to ‘identify’ this concern with ‘mythical expression’ and ‘ritual activity’ as ‘ways of knowing’ versus a ‘thing known.’ The succeeding three sections of this chapter attempt to distinguish notions of ‘what myth is’ versus ‘how myth is mythic.’ That effort is somewhat conceptually contorted, as it requires a varied set of approaches to the character of myth that do not neatly concur and involve repetitive re-statements. Yet such an untidy analysis is found to be appropriate to those phenomena variously termed myth, mythic, or mythology, and seems unavoidable to assist in further establishing this study’s perspective. To foreground the relative impossibility of defining myth, the term shall remain underlined throughout this discussion.

As prelude to those distinctions, a summary of how myth and ‘the mythic’ are here regarded goes as follows: Myth as narrative is taken as manifesting an expression of relationship between ordinary and non-ordinary aspects of reality, between human and non/in-human psychic agencies, between the human perception of ‘nature’ and the ‘super natural,’ or the “normatively structural” and “anti-structural.” As such it will be elucidated as having overt and covert stylistic expressions. Myth as cognitive modality of representing, understanding, and accessing the dialectically dynamical character of totalistic reality is taken as both (a), a manner or *style of expression* (whether as narrative, image, or enactments), *and* (b), as an epistemological method that is non-reductive and inclusively logical—the ‘mythical’ style and method of myth. To repeat these notions: Myth is a form of expression that asserts totalistic realities inclusive of ordinarily real and unreal status, that can be figured in either overtly or covertly ‘mythical style.’ The mythic or mythical is a dialectically dynamic style of representation and logic inherently fantastic or ‘un-real’ to ordinary identity—the identity of reflexively reductive *logos*. Both myth and ‘mythical style’ tend to ‘relativize’ ordinary identifications of self/other/world to a more inclusive or totalistic version of ‘dynamical reality.’

Conceiving Myth as ‘the Mythical’

Becoming aware of what one is not normally aware of (that not ‘identified’ by ‘ordinary structures’ of social or personal persona and ‘reality’) tends to compose a more ‘various’ sense of self/other/world—to ‘pluralize’ identifications. The prototypical context for such re-figuring of the ‘reality’ of “normative structures” into a more inclusive reality can be approached as what is termed myth or the mythic. Thus it is essential for the purposes of this study and its assessment of the role of

the ‘un-real’ in pluralizing identifications to examine how myth and the mythic or mythical are identified.

The term myth is focused here to signify specifically narrative representations that configure phenomena as ‘extra-ordinary event.’ Such representation is ‘overtly mythical’ in expressive style or causative logic when its figuring is characteristically ‘un-real’ to ordinary identification. The cognitive ‘function’ of such stylistic figuring appears to be expression of what is ‘invisible’ or ‘intangible’ to that ‘ordinary reality’ yet is posed as related to it in some greater-than-ordinary totality. This definition is taken to mean that the style or mode of myth is inherently non-literal or ‘un-real’ to ordinary causality—being thereby *overtly* metaphoric and metamorphic in its ‘figurations’ and ‘representations.’ The ‘myth of Christ’s death and resurrection’ is thusly seen as asserting a relation between mortality and immortality in human experience, of death and rebirth in one life and body, that is not comprehensible in the terms of ordinary reality or ‘scientific expression.’

That the term myth is often applied to narratives considered false indicates a perspective incapable of comprehending an inclusive dialectical logic for ‘valid reality.’ And yet, there seems a viable application of the term myth to narratives asserting an ultimately ‘true’ or ‘real’ status of existence that *do not* employ a non-ordinary or fantastic mode of expression. This latter usage can be represented by phrases such as ‘the myth of the big bang origin of the universe’ or ‘the myth of Marxist dialectical materialism.’ Such usage presents a problem for this study’s definition of myth as these are regarded as having some validity since they apply to assertions of a status of ‘total reality’ that supercedes the perspective of ‘the ordinary’—though the mode of expression appears literalistic. Pragmatic, ordinarily realistic modes of expression can be used to assert such ‘mythic realities’ in a *covert* manner—that is, in the literalistic terms of ‘ordinary reality.’

The reductionist mode of modernist totalizing meta-narratives are ‘mythic’ in just such a way—they assert a conclusive reality in a ‘singular dimension’ of existence that excludes all non-conforming status as *invalid*. The validity of “normative structural” reality is thereby ‘elevated’ to an “anti-structural” one without being represented in ‘mythically appropriate’ style using “anti-structural” or “liminal” modes of figuration. Reductively totalizing narratives *covertly* asserting ‘inclusively mythical realities’ as ‘monistic totalities’ have dominated modernist sensings of ‘totality’ and thus understandably contributed to myth being regarded as a term for falsehoods and un-truths. These distinctions raise the question of how overt myth and ‘mythic style’ are used to assert literalistic “normative” realities—as in the use of metaphors to convey mechanistic causalities. That issue will be explored later in this chapter.

Once again, the notion represented here by the term mythic refers to both a style of expression and a quality of relations between the elements of *overt* myth-as-narrative which convey a characteristic ‘dynamical causality’ of phenomena. Thereby, mythic style and causality can be seen as that which

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overtly or ‘appropriately’ re-presents “anti-structural” totality and “liminal” experience of same. It is thus the dynamical quality of how phenomena are associated and represented that is taken here to be characteristically *mythical*. In this sense then myth is not mythical simply because it is fantastic or ‘historically false’ but because its stylistic expression is ‘identifying’ a ‘pluralistic causality’ constituted by concurrently ‘valid’ categories of ordinarily real and unreal status, of dialectically active “structural” and “anti-structural” contexts. Thus some criteria for distinguishing myth from fantasy are suggested. Fantastic style might be assessed as generally ‘mythical’ but not necessarily utilized to convey ‘inclusively mythic reality.’ Fantasy is thus regarded here as ‘mythic style’ used to *entertain* habitual egoic identity rather than ‘relativize’ it to a more-than-ordinary sense of self/other/world.

As an overall category this notion of myth would include many narratives from the genre of fairy tales often distinguished from myth by references to other criteria than here applied. It is further assumed that such ‘mythic style’ exists to express some ‘reality’ that is not expressible, not ‘accurately rendered tangible’ in more reductively literalistic or mechanistic modalities. In a more general sense, myth and the mythic are posed also as including the realm of ritual in so far as ritual and ritualizing are taken to involve ‘narrative’ sequences of activity and ‘fantastic’ or metamorphic formulations that are ‘un-real’ but engaged as some way ‘real.’ Both are also held to be ‘enactive,’ either as being ‘thought’ or ‘enacted’ modes of ‘mythic identification.’ The dynamical characteristic referenced by the term mythic will apply here to both the metaphorically representational mode of myth and the metamorphically enactive mode of ritual. Consequently, the adjective mythical can be applied to many examples of expression that are not necessarily found in narratives of myth or contexts of ritual, such as in literature, art, and theater. Similarly, many narrative myths are taken to include non-mythic modes of expression even while asserting some inclusive reality of ordinary and non-ordinary, singular and plural status.

This orientation to myth and the mythic, like the earlier one asserted about the concept of identity, is not neatly definitive. There is, for instance, the problem that the term mythic could be applied not only to style but also to those literalistic or mechanistic modes of narrative expression asserting reductively ‘final’ or ‘total’ versions of reality. But the distinctions posed here can be utilized to distinguish myth and ‘the mythical’ from scientific or other ‘modes’ of representational figuring by whether or not the ‘figurations’ expressed are overtly ‘reductive’ or ‘equational’ in intention—since even metaphors can be utilized as reductively literalistic illustrations. Expressions tending to ‘factualize’ or ‘literalize’ some ‘thing’ in a definitive manner, to represent a singularly exact status of reality or ‘identity,’ to ‘reduce’ or ‘equate’ that which is being ‘represented’ to the “structural” terms of ‘ordinary reality,’ would not be seen here as having mythic character or ‘intention.’ Such expressions can ‘render’ the ‘unnoticed’ more ‘noticeable’ but the ‘mythic’ is posed here as of and concerned with what is inherently not ‘noticeable,’ not ‘visible’ from the perspective of ‘ordinary status.’ Symbolic

expression as a *reference* to “normative structure” and ordinary reality is thus to be distinguished as ‘non-mythic’ in so far as it is not an attempt to render tangible some aspects of non-ordinary existence or presence in a context of “anti-structural liminality.”

After an attempt to specify some distinctions between how myth is typically identified and approached, various aspects of its ‘un-real’ metamorphic dynamism will be considered for their effects on pluralizing orientations of identity by means of posing an ‘invisible visible,’ ‘intangible tangible,’ or ‘un-real real.’ As will be suggested, in mythology, as a theoretical and interpretive approach to myth, confusions of ‘real’ and ‘un-real’ are encountered similar to those generated in psychological approaches to psyche. Myth, like psyche, is here assumed to be a term indicating fields ‘larger’ than those ‘bounded by ordinary identifications of reality’—thereby not accurately represented by the typical logic or “thought form” of those ‘ordinary identifications.’

Mythology and the rites through which its imagery is rendered open the mind, that is to say, not only to the local social order but also to the mystery dimension of being—of nature—which is within as well as without, and thereby finally at one with itself. [. . .] Nature is prime: it is there at birth; Society is next: it is only a shaper of Nature, and a function, moreover, of what it shapes; whereas Nature is as deep and, finally, inscrutable as Being itself. (Campbell, Flight of the Wild Gander 111)

Thus, if the ‘character’ of ‘totality’ is to become ‘visible’ or ‘tangible,’ then the ‘view of Nature’ maintained by “society,” in the latter’s self-generated “natural standpoint” (which establishes itself ‘within’ but also apart from “Nature” of which it is actually a part), must be “opened” to the “mystery dimension” that is ordinarily ‘invisible’ to society. The ‘invisible’ and ‘intangible’ of “Nature” ‘take place’ in the ‘dark,’ ‘beyond’ ordinary awareness, and are thus only to be ‘encountered’ in ‘the primeval forest,’ ‘over the fence’ in the realm of the “wild.” But, since mythology, like psychology, is configured in the mentality of “society,” many a con-fusion of “wild” and “tame” must be ‘stumbled over.’ But then, such confusion is quite appropriate, since “Society” exists as part of “Nature,” while also being “structurally” antithetical to all-pervading “Nature.” Recall that ‘myth as inclusive knowing’ is here regarded as necessarily mediating the seeming oppositions of “normative social structure” and the more-than-human field of ‘otherness’ as “anti-structural liminality.” Thus “opening” to or coming to ‘see’ “Nature” as “anti-structural” would also imply the “structural” character of “Society” ‘*seeing*’ itself—though differently than as it ‘ordinarily’ ‘sees.’ Such confusing dissociation is inherent in the complexity of ‘dialectical knowing.’

Campbell’s vast considerations of world myth led him to identify several “functions” of myth. He identifies a mystical function in which myth introduces the individual to the “mystical” dimension of being, “to awaken and maintain in the individual a sense of wonder and participation in the mystery of this finally inscrutable universe” (Campbell, Atlas of Myth Vol. 1. 8). Next he identifies a “cosmological” function that seeks to imbue the cosmos with such ‘mystical participation’ and

significance. Thirdly, he describes how a cultural mythology serves to infuse the local social and moral order with the mythical potencies of a ‘mystically experienced’ cosmos. Lastly Campbell discerns a “pedagogical” function that conducts individuals in social harmony through the successive passages of human life with mythically contexted rites, roles, and customs.

These “functions of myth” have contrasting, even contradictory ‘objectives’ in serving both the interests of the collective society and the independence of the individual. Those contrasts occur as myth asserts both the socio-cultural imagination of collective life as being inclusive of individual life while also asserting a submission of human culture to a ‘more-than-human’ totality, with which each person has an individual relationship. In noting that “mythology and the rites through which its imagery is rendered open the mind, that is to say, not only to the social order but also to the mystery dimension of being,” Campbell indicates that myth and rite serve to illustrate specific local “social order” but also have, as he calls it, a more universal “psychological function” that brings human consciousness into relation with the pluralistic complexity of psyche and totalistic being. It is this latter ‘dialectical activity’ of mediating oneness and manyness in individual and collective psyches, between human and in/non-human, as both social and cosmological ‘participants,’ that is conceived here as the ‘mythical nature’ of myth.

Making the Invisible Visible: Science and Myth as Modes of Rendering the Intangible Realities of Totality More Tangible

Figuration that ‘makes the invisible visible’ is not considered here as exclusive to myth or ‘mythical style’. Thus some distinctions about how ‘the intangible is made more tangible’ are important. Scientific and psychological theory and experiment can be viewed as expressions that ‘render’ obscure or inaccessible aspects of what is ‘actual’ or ‘real’ (thus likely classed as ‘un-real’ by ordinary perspective) so as to make these more ‘tangible’ to ‘sensing’—either as ‘notion’ or overt somatic experience. Both ‘theory’ and ‘experiment-as-experience’ can increase the ‘tangibility’ and thus validity of a phenomenon as ‘something real.’ Quantum equations and dynamical descriptions of psychological complexes can assist getting a ‘feel’ for phenomena that are ‘ordinarily’ ‘beyond’ perceptual and cognitive awareness. Such ‘figurations’ or “representations” that are not the “represented” but enable some relation to ‘it’ are ‘un-real’ manifestations of the ‘real’ that can thus be termed expressions of an ‘un-real real,’ serving to ‘make the invisible visible.’ Recalling the notion of ‘mapping’ both known and unknown ‘territory,’ as in Maxwell’s ‘mysterious’ equations, is illustrative of this point. ‘The map is not the territory’ but it can give some ‘sensing’ of the “unrepresented,” both tangible and (at least ‘as yet’) intangible.

The ‘territories’ so-mapped in “representations” by myth and science can be discriminated as those re-presenting the ‘empirically real’ and those re-presenting the ‘materially un-real.’ But even this distinction is ultimately untenable, as both the ‘scientific’ and the ‘mythical’ re-present phenomena that are often ‘immaterial.’ “Representations” of the theoretical notion gravity can make that ‘notion’ more tangible by way of illustrative phenomena, but do not render the ‘thing gravity’ directly sensible. In the terms of this study, all ‘modes of knowing’ that transgress ordinary sensings of reality or “normative social structure” have ‘mythical character’ in that they convey some more complex version of ‘totality’ than is valid in ordinary identifications. In this contexting, science and myth can be classed as covertly and overtly ‘mythical,’ respectively. The former asserts its “representations” in mechanistically logical terms whereas the latter expresses phenomena in metaphorical ones, yet both can seem fantastic or unreal to ‘ordinary reality’ when elucidating relationships between phenomena. This association is not intended to equate science and myth, but to acknowledge an “isomorphic relation,” to use Thompson’s term, between these ways of making the ‘invisible visible,’ of knowing the unknown and, to ‘ordinary perspective,’ the *un-knowable* (Imaginary Landscapes 62-63). Both modes of knowing function by ‘observing’ what is observable only by way of extra-ordinary ‘sensing’ — whose non-ordinary ‘observations’ are then expressed in either literally mechanistic or metaphorical styles.

To summarize: science and myth, as modes-of-knowing, both tend to induce awareness of a ‘greater than ordinary’ reality, that inherently conveys a metaphorically metamorphic status that can be termed ‘mythical’ because it pluralizes the status of ‘the real.’ Such status, however, is given expression ‘logically appropriate’ to ‘inclusive knowing’ only in overtly mythical style. Thus there is a scientific style for expressing non-ordinary totalistic realities as well as a mythical one. But the ‘realities’ of myth and ritual can be viewed as the more overt forms of “representation” inducing such knowing *as* ‘dialectical dynamism.’ ‘Scientific figuring’ can be regarded as becoming ‘explicitly mythic’ in a psychological sense when its mechanistic “representation” is asserted as constituting ‘ultimate reality’ or the ‘true nature of totality,’ even though it maintains mechanistic modes of representation that are not *overtly* mythical and thus inherently reductive — or “fragmentary.” Bohm has articulated an ‘extended’ formulation of totality in scientific terms that might be said to philosophically transgress its reductive method. Yet, as he admits, the conclusions of that ‘scientific logic’ of totalistic reality is essentially unbelievable to the reflexively fragmenting mentality identified with positivistic linear causality.

Whether ‘scientific’ or ‘mythical’ in style and intent, all “representations” can be assessed as being more or less ‘phenomenally accurate’ versus ‘phenomenally inaccurate,’ as more or less ‘appropriate’ to the ‘realities’ of the “unrepresented” being re-presented, or to the ‘territory’ being ‘mapped.’ The ‘territory’ of concern here is that of ‘dynamical inclusivity’ rather than the ‘mechanical exclusivity’ of science. While both scientific and mythic modalities can be applied to con-figuring a ‘multidimensional terrain’ that somehow includes the ordinarily true and false, real and unreal, accurate

and inaccurate, as aspects of a non-oppositional 'field,' these modes of knowing have differing 'logics of totality.' The logic of the more overtly 'mythical' might be seen as expressing the 'reality of realities' as 'impossibly real experience' that 'scientific logic' can only 'equationally configure.' Though both 'modes of mapping' can 'figure' complex relational dynamics that re-present plurality in oneness and oneness in plurality, one is more suited to constellating polycentric, concurrently active nexes of causality than the other. It seems 'reasonable' to assert that these differing heuristic modes are applied to the same totality of being and becoming and thus are distinguishable in their modality of figuring rather than by respective 'territories being mapped.'

However, when considering how to assess the *accuracy* of these 're-presentational mappings,' it might be found easier to validate the accuracy of 'scientific mechanism' than of that of 'mythical metamorphics.' For the mythical, such an assessment might be posed as evaluating how well a given "representation" con-figures an expression of the 'dialectical logic' or archetypality of a given context of manifestation—an 'experiential sense' of its particular pluralities. But a non-reductive, non-mechanistic mode of re-presentation does not generate a set of evaluational criteria that provide for conclusive validation of its 'findings.' Mythical narratives and images as 'mappings' of "psychological life" are not reducible to true or false, nor even to correct or incorrect because they 'figure' metamorphic plurality that is not 'fixed' or 'mechanical.' Perhaps mythical representation can be evaluated as more or less 'dynamically' or archetypally appropriate to a given context or set of relations between phenomena. The intent of the remainder of this chapter is to explore 'how' 'mythical mapping' 'figures inclusively,' how it renders "implicate" flow in appropriately impossible "explicate" form, thereby asserting some general criteria for evaluating 'mythical expression' for its 'mythic-ness.'

Identifications of 'Subjective' and 'Objective' Views of Myth

In "Myth-ology," as the logical study of myth in a modernist Westernized perspective, myth is readily identified as a positive category of cultural productions. The 'subject' of such study is approached by the 'objectivist persona' as an 'object' ('thing-of-thought') with component parts that have a 'mechanical' narrative or semiotic relationship that 'produces' meaning—contexted by the assumptions of a given cultural or psychological context. Myth thusly approached appears as a 'positive' or 'objective' 'thing.' The intent of this study's attempt to identify some distinction between 'subjective' and 'objective' approaches to myth is not meant to suggest that any or all analyses of myth or 'the mythic' are constituted by either one or the other approach. However, it is held as important to the methodology of this study to attempt such a discrimination to emphasize the psychological and epistemological approach to myth and 'the mythic' as an inclusively dynamical 'mode of knowing.'

When myth and 'the mythic' are identified as symbolic code or objective content the meaning derived from study of them is given a specific character. As 'symbolic code,' whatever 'reality' the 'un-

reality' of myth might manifest tends to be posed as a mechanically metaphoric 'device' referencing 'literal reality.' In this perspective myth can be regarded as 'bad' science, indoctrination to social order, or representations of ordinarily social and ego-psychological experience and behavior. In this view the 'operant identity' or persona of myth-ology is similarly oriented to its 'subject' as is that of most psychology to psyche: as the 'logical' study of the thing myth, which somehow references a positivized reality. Such analysis and interpretation of myth is conducted for the most part 'from within' the perspective of 'ordinary reality.' It is 'identified' with the objectivist position of a literalistically reductive, fragmenting logic of singular identification.

This approach tends to locate and 'interpret' myth and the mythic 'inside' the 'fence' of the humanly structured or 'domesticated' realm. Even when various interpretations are posed, a tendency to compose these in such reductive 'terms' persists. One might then say that there is a 'personalistic myth-ology,' much as there is a 'ego-psychology,' that is 'psychologically blind' to 'impersonal' or 'inhuman' agencies and concurrently plural identifications. Myth is taken thusly as a 'thing' that references 'things,' the meaningfulness of which refers to personal and collective concerns about life within hierarchically and ethically structured society. This distinction about approaches to myth is obviously similar to Giegerich's perspective on approaches to psychology. The association here also echoes Hillman's assertion that 'psychology *is* mythology'—but that *neither* is really 'about' personally egoic concerns as having primary importance for complex understanding of life.

Approaching myth as objective reference generates a mytho-logical perspective that examines myth as a discrete entity separate from the analyst. Such an objectivist perspective can examine myth and 'the mythic' without examining itself. Yet the foregoing discussions in this study indicate that all human expressions are figurations (whether classed as 'ordinary' or 'non-ordinary,' 'real' or 'un-real,' literal or imaginal). Thus all these oppositions only 'appear' to be 'real' versus 'imaginal,' when they are, more accurately, 'overt' versus 'covert' (or literalistic) *figurations* of some ultimately "unrepresented" phenomena. All analysis and interpretation of myth and the mythic are thus necessarily derived from metaphysical, or mythic, assumptions about reality. Thereby, to study the 'meanings' configured in the figurations of myth (taken here as 'overtly' not a 'thing,' and not a literal referent) is to examine the elemental making of meaning in all figuration. 'Myth-as-the-mythical' does not 'intend' to figure literalistically or equationally.

Posing mythological, psychological, or scientific perspectives as 'non-mythic' is derived from an objectivist configuration of fragmentary reality 'organized' by binary oppositions such as subject><object and real> <unreal distinctions. This contrast between such 'objective' mythology and a more 'subjective' approach suggested here is not meant to devalue the former configuration. The intention is to try to 'get at' what is 'mythic' about myth and thereby gain more subtlety in 'identifying' and analyzing 'it.' It seems that myth, if it is 'something other' than 'non-myth,' must be non-literalistic,

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non-equational, immeasurable, some 'how' "wild" and "anti-structural." Thus myth-as-thing is not 'mythic' in so far as 'the mythic' is some manifestation of 'totalistic dynamism,' of the realm of the 'un-real real,' or of the "explicate" patterning of "implicate flow." However, separating myth and 'non-myth' definitively is *also* an objectivistic, fragmentary distinction. If then the 'mythological dimension' is, like the 'psychological,' pervasive, inclusive of human consciousness, both an "implicate" and "explicate," "structural" and "anti-structural" manifesting, then the 'subject' of mytho-logical study is a 'subjectivity,' a form of consciousness or 'way of knowing.' And, as with psycho-logical study, mythology is confronted with 'itself' as 'mythic,' as some 'un-real' figuring. To 'study' thusly is to investigate the 'logic of myth,' to seek to know 'the mythic' *mythically*, rather than examine myth through the objectifying perspective of logical positivism.

Thus the myth-ologist becomes one examining the 'expressive logic' of one's own ("impossible") subjectivity, much like the egoically dis-identifying 'depth' psychologist. To study myth as manifestation of relation with the "wild" or "anti-structural" would require being 'beside' one's habitual sense of identity and 'reality,' to attempt a 'valid' perspective that is not determined by the literalistic identifications of the Western metaphysics of presence.

The first problem to be confronted by anyone wishing to deal with the metaphysical notions of mankind is that of distinguishing between symbols and their references—between what we may term the *vehicles* and their *tenor*. (Campbell, Flight of the Wild Gander 63)

"Distinguishing between symbols and their references" requires differentiating between their literalistic 're-presentations' as symbols and the dynamical 'mode' of such figuring that is its "reference." If all contexts for figuring identification and 'reality' are 'metaphysical,' being representations of some ultimately "unrepresented" existence "structured" by human assumptions about reality, then one can recognize a distinction in 'modes' of metaphysical representation. A metaphysics of presence poses the thing-in-itself, as it appears or is figured as an 'individual and independent object,' in terms of a predetermined 'true' and 'absolute' 'literal' 'reality.' Its 'mode' of figuring is thus 'literalistic' and 'positivizing'—that *is* the "tenor" of its figurative vehicle, one which 'denies' its own 'metaphysical' assertions (i.e., the literal, singular reality of positivistic 'presence'). Myth can thus be characterized by a differing 'vehicular' mode and "*tenor*." A myth-ology that does not acknowledge this distinction is hardly an 'ology' of myth *as expression of the 'mythic.'*

An evident 'confusion' of 'myth-as-thing' and 'myth-as-the-mythic-mode' can be sensed in the use of the term mythology to 'configure' *both* the 'study of myth' *and* to identify the 'mythic' 'oeuvre' of a given culture, as in Greek Mythology. Does this latter term 'identify' the 'study' of Greek myth by modernist perspective or the 'logic' of Greek Myth as somehow inherent in 'how' that particular context of myth is 'mythic' (for example, the central theme of anthropomorphic gods)? The 'logical study' of Greek Myths would seem to suggest reflexively imposing a categorically structured objective analysis

comparing and contrasting various aspects of that ‘mythology’ by means of another cultural ‘mode’ of understanding myth—that being, as a ‘thing’ having an objectively positive status (as in bio-logical study). It appears that one can ask, “How does myth manifest what it manifests and how is that ‘how’ meaningful?” (what is its ‘vehicular tenor?’), but also ask, “What is myth and what do the ‘things’ it manifests mean relative to each other in a given cultural context of reality?”—whether the latter be modernist Western cultural context or ancient Greek. These questions might be regarded as posing two methodologies of analysis: one that could be characterized as an ‘archetypal myth-ology’ and the latter as a ‘cultural myth-ology.’

Again, this convoluted attempt to distinguish between myth-as-thing and myth-as-the-mythical is not meant to deny the validity of identifying certain types of narrative as myths or cultural complexes of them as mythologies. Rather, it seeks to amplify the field of reference for the notion myth. The concern can be compared to Hillman’s critique of Jung’s use of the noun archetype which Hillman views as ‘literalizing’ what is more a psychical dynamic than a fixed entity.

Myth as an ‘As If’ or the Mythic as an ‘As Is’

Thus the perspective taken on myth in this study is that the ‘things’ of myth (narrative elements of images, events, characters, contexts) or the activities of ritual, can be approached ‘positively’ as ‘coded literal reality,’ ‘things of thought,’ or ‘imaginal realities’ referencing various social, cultural, or psychological “structuring.” In this way myth or its components tend to be taken ‘symbolically’ as ‘maps’ of either an ‘ordinary’ status in fantastic terms or of a super-ordinary ‘spiritual reality’ that is ‘believed in’ as if a literal truth—both being equally ‘positivized.’ Such an approach regards myth as posing an ‘imaginal’ version of ‘real reality.’

In contrast, mythic ‘elements’ can be viewed ‘negatively’ as ‘thingless things’ that manifest the ‘un-real real’ dynamism of patterning generated by “implicate<>explicate” inter-activity (un-real<>real). Such patterning could be considered ‘archetypal’ activity in the terms of ‘depth’ psychology and as Campbell’s “tenor” of ‘the mythic.’ This archetypal dynamism is found to be diverse in tending to ‘move’ or ‘form’ as characteristic or ‘persisting’ but ‘immaterial’ patterns, much as Bohm’s example of vortexes in a watery flow. In this dynamical view, the narrative form of myth is not identified with the movement of linear causality, just as the figures it presents are not taken to be ‘things’ of the field of literal “explicate” forms.

Mythical thinking is, in general, distinguished from a purely theoretical world view as much by its *concept of causality* as by its *concept of the object*. For the two concepts condition each other: the form of causal thinking determines the form of objective thinking, and vice versa. Mythical thinking is by no means lacking in the universal category of cause and effect, which is in a sense one of its very fundamentals. (Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms 43)

The 'literalistically symbolic' view of myth often approaches it as an 'as if' postulate: the world and life portrayed 'as if' they were 'fantastic' but actually 'translatable' as references to the "structural" reality of linear causality. The dynamical or archetypal view of myth and 'the mythic' poses the manifestations referred to by these terms as an 'as is': myth and 'the mythic' configure, in their dynamical mode and "tenor," 'reality-as-it-is' but is impossible to 'perceive' or 'experience' in the expressive mode and logic of linear, mechanistic causality and ordinarily singular identity. The 'mythic' 'reality' then is (ordinarily) 'invisible' or 'intangible' as its "concept of the object" is 'as dynamism,' its "concept of causality" one of 'concurrent multidimensionality in non-locality.' The 'mythic' has its logical movement, but that 'mode-of-connecting' is not 'progressively linear.' If myth and the 'mythic' are held to be 'merely' fantastic and impossible (dramatic and entertaining but unreal), then such expression can only be false, or else references to the 'literally real.'

[The symbolic notion holds that] the mythical consciousness resembles a code which is intelligible only to those who possess the key to it—i.e., for whom the particular contents of this consciousness are merely conventional signs for something "other," which is not contained in them. From this result the various types and trends of myth interpretation—the attempts to disclose the meaning, whether metaphysical or ethical, that is concealed in myths. [. . .] But if we examine myth itself, what it is and what it *knows* itself to be, we see that this separation of the ideal from the real, this distinction between a world of immediate reality and a world of mediate signification, this opposition of "image" and "object," is alien to it. Only observers who no longer live in it but reflect on it read such distinctions into myth. Where we see mere "representations," myth, insofar as it has not yet deviated from its fundamental and original form, sees real identity. The "image" does not represent the "thing"; it *is* the thing; it does not merely stand for the object, but has the same actuality, so that it replaces the thing's immediate presence. (Cassirer, Philosophy of Symbolic Forms p.38)

"The "image" does not represent the thing; it *is* the thing" and thus the 'thing' of myth is a 'thingless thing.' Thereby, the notions from mythological theory and commentary considered here tend to focus more on the dynamical character rather than the static 'forms' of myth; on the manner of meaning in 'mythic movement,' its 'mode' or "tenor," rather than on interpreting 'fixed' meanings from its static 'content' or the 'exclusivity' of its particular socio-historical cultural contexts. The term mythic is, thereby, used here to refer not to an unreal imagination but rather a 'dynamic quality,' an archetypality of manifestation—a 'way of thinging that is thingless' yet is given "real identity" by 'mythic manifestations.'

As indicated in the preceding references to the "new physics," such a dynamic can be represented even by the 'literalistic,' equationally reductive expressions used by physicists to delineate the relativity of space-time or complementarity in quantum mechanics. Again: myth, as assertion of some inclusive totalistic status or relationship, is taken in this study to be 'mythic' in so far as its overt form and style signify its 'un-real reality'—that it is a configuration of the 'as is' of "implicate" dynamics in "explicate" forms which attempt to 'con-figure' some "implicate > explicate"

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totality—the only ‘place’ (explicitly ‘placeless’) the patterning tendencies of the “implicate” can be ‘found.’ Conversely, ‘the mythic’ is regarded as myth when its characteristically expressive style is engaged in asserting a status of ‘totalistic reality.’

Thus this perspective is in no way meant to confine the ‘as-is’ of the ‘mythic’ to myth as explanatory narrative. The point here being presented is that the overtly fantastic style of ‘mythic’ expression is essential to ‘disrupting’ ordinary identifications and ‘reality,’ thus enabling ‘conscious’ awareness of the agencies of ‘wild otherness’ and the totalistic dynamics of “implicate,” or archetypal, ‘ordering.’ In this way ‘conscious identity’ can be ‘liberated’ from its ‘singular’ definitions of self, other, and world. In general, the term myth continues to ‘identify’ the ‘traditional genre’ of that mode of expression—or manifesting—of ‘pluralistic reality.’

It is also important to reiterate that this perspective assumes there is no ultimate separation of ‘modes’ of ‘interpreting’ myth. Both myth and ‘the mythic’ are engaged in accord with how one’s ‘sense abilities’ have been developed within collective cultural contexts. The very language and its usage applied to analyzing and interpreting myth, here or elsewhere, will carry impositions of objectivist modernist perspective despite an intention to express non-objectifying notions. One can, however, practice awareness of this tendency and attempt to moderate it.

The distinguishing first function of a properly read mythology is to release the mind from its naive fixation upon such false ideas, which are of material things as things-in-themselves. Hence the figurations of myth are metaphorical (as dreams normally are not) in *two* senses simultaneously, as bearing (1) *psychological*, but at the same time (2) *metaphysical*, connotations. By way of this dual focus the psychologically significant features of any local social order, environment, or supposed history can become transformed through myth into transparencies revelatory of transcendence. (Campbell, Inner Reaches of Outer Space 56)

Thus the ‘locally’ contexted experiences of, or culturally specific references for “psychological life” can, by way of the metaphysical functions of mythical figurations, become “transparencies” that allow one to ‘see’ “implicate” archetypallity ‘in/as’ the literalized “things-in-themselves” of ordinary reality—even though these tend to be ordinarily experienced as fragmentary, oppositional, and non-participatory in a ‘totality.’ And it is the ‘metaphorical status of being’ manifested in mythical expression that renders such a ‘metaphysics of transparent inclusivity’ accessible. Campbell’s “metaphysical” status is thus the genuine, the ‘real’ expression of the flowing-into-form of “implicate” movement, the experience of which seems to “transcend” the field of ‘reality’ as ‘ordinarily’ known in “any local social order, environment, or supposed history.” Yet this “transcendence” might be more accurately figured as a move not ‘out of reality’ but ‘into totality’ which *includes* rather than *opposes* the ‘ordinary’ identifications of ‘literal,’ ‘material,’ and ‘causal.’ It is a sensing of the ‘movement’ in those “explicate” forms *of* the ‘creational flow’ of ‘mythical’ movement or dynamism. The ‘mythic’ is thus here held to be this characteristic dynamism or archetypallity—which can be indicated even in

literalistic and equational expressions, such as, again, the equations of quantum mechanics or theories of psychological and philosophical ‘discourse’ — whose precipitating patterns generate the co-participation of the manifold all, a dynamical oneness of the manyness.

The universally distinguishing characteristic of mythological thought and communication is an implicit connotation through all its metaphorical imagery of a sense of identity of some kind, transcendent of appearances, which unites behind the scenes the opposed actors on the world stage. (Campbell, Inner Reaches of Outer Space 110)

Characteristically, then, myth’s imagery poses “a sense of identity of some kind, transcendent of appearances, which unites behind the scenes” and is thus ‘ordinarily’ ‘invisible.’ Such a unity of the “opposed actors on the world stage” that is an actuality, an ‘as is,’ can be ‘experienced’ by way of the ‘mode’ or “tenor” of ‘perception’ appropriate to its dynamical manifestation—the “tenor” of ‘mythical dynamism.’

Identifying Myth Versus the Identifications of the ‘Mythic’

Returning to notions of identity and identification, the ‘logical’ analysis of the ‘things’ of ‘mythic manifestation’ generally seeks to ‘identify’ their differentiated parts with linearly causal links between them and cultural phenomenon and meanings. Thusly are myths understood in terms of specific ‘identification’ with particular cultural or psychological roles, functions, and values. Myth can thereby be given a “normatively structural” identity. An approach that investigates the dynamic character of ‘the mythic’ and the archetypality of its patterning seeks to identify the manner of its ‘making meaning,’ the orientation of ‘identifications’ inherent in its modality as a medium of expression and manifestation. The specific archetypality of those patternings can be described as the recurrent tendencies of the dynamic flow of “implicate” movement that generate “explicate” form. The ‘un-real reality’ of the ‘thingless things’ of myth thus constitutes the medium for experiencing the ‘mythical movement’ of those archetypal patterns and their particularized yet not literalistic ‘formulations.’ An example of such an archetypal ‘theme’ of “implicate” flow into formulation is that of ‘death and rebirth’ or dismemberment and re-constitution seen as the ‘movement’ of a dialectical status rather than ‘positivized’ ‘thing’ of a literal event.

Related to this distinction in how myth and the ‘mythical’ are identified as ‘object’ versus ‘dynamic’ is how people identify *with* myth. Myths are often taken to be ‘about’ the struggles of personal lives, about ‘my’ life, particularly in the ‘heroic’ sense of struggle against adversity and opposition that results in personalistic triumph. In this way one ‘identifies’ with a myth ‘personally.’ Such ‘personalization’ tends to ‘literalize’ myth and the ‘mythic’ by confining them to the realm of ordinary reality in which one’s person and ‘the personal’ are identified. But myth and the ‘mythic’ as a

dynamical field rather than ‘thing’ is more difficult to ‘personalize.’ So contexted, ‘mythical’ expression can be regarded as ‘coming from’ and ‘being about’ some impersonal ‘entity.’

My position is that myth, as it is historically given, is not about people and their afflictions, but about the logical life of the soul. The soul speaks about *itself*. As Jung said, “In myths and fairy tales, as in dreams, the soul speaks about itself, and the archetypes reveal themselves in their natural interplay, as “formation, transformation / eternal Mind’s eternal recreation.” (Jung qtd. in Giegerich, Soul’s Logical Life 123)

Remembering Giegerich’s emphasis that “soul” is not a thing but a “Notion,” myth then must be about something ‘other’ than the overt literality of ‘ordinarily personal’ life.

But inasmuch as the soul is not a kind of “thing,” nothing positive, but *is* logical *life*, it has to display its full nature in many myths and images, each one presenting the same nature of the soul *as* it appears *in* another one of the moments of its logical life and *from* the perspective of those moments. Any “archetypal moment” of the soul’s life displays the *whole* truth about the nature of the soul, yet only as highlighted from the vantage point of this particular moment. The “moment of Truth” is that archetypal moment that (in addition to showing the whole truth about the soul) *also* shows this truth from the particular vantage point of the soul *as* absolute Truth or actual, fulfilled cognition, the Notion. The soul has many other moments from within which the whole truth about its nature can be portrayed. (Giegerich, Soul’s Logical Life 208)

This sense of the “truth” of the “soul” as being archetypal, as having a ‘formless form’ that is given in the specificity of ‘mythic’ portrayals which are not of ‘ordinary’ reality, further emphasizes the ‘meaning’ of myth as being in/of its archetypal patterning rather than the ‘as-if positive’ images and events of its tellings. It is difficult thus to take myth ‘personally’ since these dynamics are not of the ‘ordinary’ reality in which one conceives one’s self as a ‘person’ within “social structures.” Thus the ‘logic’ of myth, as the “logical life of the soul,” is not the logic of the concerns of ordinary, singular personal egoic identity. Giegerich is explicit about the *multiplicity* of the ‘truths,’ the ‘identifications’ of the “soul” and their varied archetypality. Thus to identify ‘personally’ with the characters of ‘mythic’ tales, or view their events in the same context as that of ordinary social and personal life, will likely obscure the ‘logic’ of the ‘mythic’ dynamic, the ‘movement’ of psyche or “soul,” of the forming of “implicate” archetypal complexities presented in the ‘un-real reality’ of the ‘mythic’ modality whose significance is contexted in a more totalistic field than that of the ‘personal.’ Thus to ‘personalize’ myth, to link it to personal identity in social context, or even to the collective identity of a society, is to miss-take representations of “anti-structural” dynamics for those of “normatively structural” identity.

[. . .] myths offer the multiplicity of meanings inherent in our lives, while theology and science attempt singleness of meaning. [. . .] Despite their graphic description of action and detail, myths resist being interpreted into practical life. They are not allegories of applied psychology, solutions to personal problems. This is the old moralistic fallacy about them, now become the therapeutic fallacy, telling us which step to take and what to do next. [. . .] Myths do not tell us how. They simply give us the invisible background which starts us imagining, questioning, going deeper. (Hillman, ReVisioning Psychology 158)

However myth is identified, 'the mythical' identifies the characteristic dynamism of being and meaning of psyche, "soul," totality.

Elucidating Mythical Modes of Metamorphic Dynamism

The 'Mythic' Medium is the Immeasurable Message of Metamorphic Plurality

Viewing myth as a 'medium' or 'extension' of human capacities, in McLuhan's mode of analyzing 'technologies,' the 'content' of it would not be the specific images, events, or social contexts it 'describes,' but the manner of its 'making manifest,' its dynamical nature as a "medium."

Media, by altering the environment, evoke in us unique ratios of sense perceptions. The extension of any one sense alters the way we think and act—the way we perceive the world. When these ratios change, men change. (McLuhan, Medium is the Message 41)

The "medium" of 'mythic' expression does not link elements in a linear fashion to 'communicate' a literally causal sequence. The "environment" as "altered" by 'mythic' "extension" alters human sense-ability.

"Precision" is sacrificed for a greater degree of suggestion. Myth is the mode of simultaneous awareness of a complex group of causes and effects. Electric circuitry confers a mythic dimension on our ordinary individual and group actions. Our technology forces us to live mythically, but we continue to think fragmentarily, and on single, separate planes [. . .]. (McLuhan, Medium is the Message 114)

Despite how the "medium" of "electric circuitry confers a mythic dimension on ordinary and group actions," thus "forcing us to live mythically," compensatory attitudes cling consciously to the modernist mentality of mechanical technology. This contrast is another indication that prevailing attitudes are not 'actually' 'post'-modern. But that 'out dated,' or more accurately, 'out moded' mechanistic mentality is instinctively resisted by youth that is born into an environment altered by the effects of the dynamically 'mythic' medium of electronic culture.

Young people are looking for a formula for putting on the universe—*participation mystique*. They do not look for detached patterns—for ways of relating themselves to the world, a la nineteenth century. (McLuhan, Medium is the Message 114)

The 'dynamic' character or quality of linear, mechanical, temporal sequence no longer describes much of experience in the electronic age of nearly instantaneous communication and the fantastically complex, centerless, simultaneously interactive "world wide web." McLuhan noted over thirty years ago how contemporary context of the late twentieth century thus more resembles that of archaic humans in an 'animated' world full of concurrently active human and non-human agencies than the 'modern machine age' of the nineteenth century. The dynamical character of 'post'-modernism is more 'mythic,' more polyvalent and thus seemingly 'chaotic' to a 'mechanistic mentality.' In a sense then, a 'post'-

modernity is actually a 'condition' of "anti-structural liminality" lived in as if it were the context of modernity's "normative structure." It does not then seem surprising that much of McLuhan's insight seems to have arisen from his study of literary modality as a Joyce scholar.

Listening to the simultaneous messages of Dublin, James Joyce released the greatest flood of oral, linguistic music that was ever manipulated into art. [. . .] Joyce is, in the "Wake," making his own Altamira cave drawings of the entire history of the human mind, in terms of its basic gestures and postures during all the phases of human culture and technology. As his title indicates, he saw that the wake of human progress can disappear again into the night of sacral or auditory man [. . .] Joyce could see no advantage in our remaining locked up in each cultural cycle as in a trance or dream. He discovered the means of living simultaneously in all cultural modes while quite conscious. (McLuhan, Understanding Media 120)

The dynamic of "living simultaneously in all cultural modes" (including the archaic), viewed from ordinary reality of linear causality, is 'contradictory' in that it 'moves' in many divergent directions at once rather than proceeding predictably, mechanically, to a knowable conclusion in a predictable direction. This latter 'style' of thinking and expressing is 'prosaic' in its linear reasoning or causality. Joyce's style 'confounds' 'prosaic' expectations of prose writing or telling. His style is 'mythic' in that it poses literal objects, persons, events, in a fantastic or impossible way: it asserts an "impossible subjectivity" of interfused, concurrent, polyvalent, metamorphic dynamic of 'being.' By expressing thusly "he discovered the means of living simultaneously in all cultural modes while quite conscious," rendering the 'invisible visible,' the 'intangible tangible. But whether or not such 'experience' is validated as 'real' or merely classed as 'entertaining imagination' appears dependent upon the dominating collective mode of identification.

'Mythic' 'things' resemble those of ordinary reality but, in the 'impossibility' of their context or functions, are thus specifically 'thingless,' as 'mythic' places are specifically 'placeless,' and 'mythic' events are specifically 'timeless' from the experiential and logical position of 'ordinary' identity and 'reality.' In this 'unbelievable' mode of representation, that which is figured is more difficult to literalize or 'positivize' and thus treat as 'of' the realm of the 'ordinary.' The perceiver is forced into either judging it as 'false' (if 'entertaining!') by the dynamics of oppositionally dualistic, linear causality or else to submit to the pluralizing of 'realities' and identity of agency in its metamorphic, "anti-structural," 'wildness.'

To acknowledge that both linear sequential logic *and* a more polyvalent sense of 'reality' are concurrently active in consciousness is difficult to the degree that egoic function is 'identified with' the objectively dualist perspective or a metaphysics of presence. But evidence that people constantly 'operate' in the 'mythic modality' is ever present.

Storytellers make an assumption that historians rarely do, namely that human beings are *not* rational, that they cannot be understood in terms of "objective" analysis, and that their deepest and most significant experiences are lived on a level that is largely invisible, a shadowy region

where the mind and the body move in and out of each other in an infinite number of elusive combinations, and that can only be evoked through allusion, feeling tone, rhetoric, and “resonance,” (Berman 118-19)

‘Story’ stimulates the “resonance” of overlapping identities, of allusion to the metamorphic dynamism, the archetypality, of “implicate” flow in “explicate” form, its “feeling tone” generates a ‘feel’ for ‘how things really are’ even though one assumes one is operating only ‘rationally’ — ‘in’ the ‘logic of mechanistic causality.’ The ‘history’ being told may be ‘literally accurate’ but the sense of its importance, the affect of response to it and thus the ‘meaning’ derived from the ‘tale’ do not seem to be consequences of such linear logic.

But in so far as these [mythical] events are truly mythic their narrative accounts are not important in themselves but only in their reference to their tenor, which is something perhaps vague but yet of vast importance for the interpretation of human experience. The truly mythic, in short, has archetypal implications.

Nevertheless the mythic is something more than the archetypal which it embodies. For the mythic involves not only archetypal ideas, but more characteristically archetypally significant events and situations. From a sophisticated standpoint — i.e., where one is an observer, an onlooker, no longer personally involved in the mythic pattern of which he speaks — the mythic can be conceived as the archetypal in action. [. . .]

Myth, then, is not in the first instance a fiction imposed on one’s already given world, but is a way of apprehending that world. Genuine myth is a matter of perspective first, invention second. This radically cognitive function of myth, as a kind of primitive epistemic is particularly stressed by Cassirer [. . .]. (Wheelwright, Burning Fountain 149, 150)

The “tenor” of ‘mythical dynamism’ is explicitly figured in the fantastic or ‘unbelievable’ style of myth. Archetypal patterning is brought into overt presence, into the ‘foreground’ of the telling, in this stylistic ‘form.’ Its very distortional, ‘un-realistic’ “tenor” advises that the ‘truth’ it is expressing is not of the reified, ‘idealistic’ sort but of the very ‘dynamic’ of ‘signifying.’

Consequently, mythical thinking lacks the category of the ideal, and in order to apprehend pure signification it must transpose it into a material substance or being. This is true in all stages of mythical thinking, but it is nowhere expressed so clearly as in mythical action. In all mythical *action* a true substantiation is effected at some moment; the subject of the action is transformed into a god or a demon whom it represents. (Cassirer, Philosophy of Symbolic Forms 38)

Thus the ‘things’ of myth and ‘mythic actions’ serve to ‘substantiate’ an insubstantial dynamic of specific archetypal ‘movements’ or patterns in “implicate < > explicate” flow. From the perspective of habitually literalistic, mechanical mentality, one readily finds this mode exasperating in its ‘materializing’ of the ‘immaterial.’ It appears that only in such an ‘illogical’ move can the archetypal patterns of the “implicate” be figured in the “explicate” context of habitual reality while emphasizing the ‘reality’ of the “implicate” or archetypal. The archetypal or “implicate” are only ‘accessible’ (tangible) in ‘forms’ that provoke one to assume a ‘dialectical’ logic.

But again, the issue is readily confused by attempting to analyze and understand the ‘mythic’ in ‘either < > or’ terms. The ‘mythic’ seems to illustrate metaphoric ‘identity-in-difference’ rather than

‘identity-in-opposition.’ The conundrum of this ‘difference’ in the role of difference in identity can be approached as a contrast in ‘actual’ differences of brain function between left and right hemispheres.

Now, one of the very curious things about the sacred is that it usually does not make sense to the left-hemisphere, prose type of thinking. This then can be disastrously exploited in two different ways. It’s a double exploitation problem. Because it doesn’t make any prose sense, the material of dream and poetry has to be more or less secret from the prose part of the mind. It’s this secrecy, this obscuration, that the Protestant thinks is wrong, and a psychoanalyst, I suppose, wouldn’t approve of it either. But that secrecy, you see, is a protecting of parts of the whole process or mechanism, to see that the parts don’t neutralize each other. But because there is this partial screen between the two parts—the prose and the poetical or dream—because there is this barrier, it is possible to use one side to play with people’s emotions, to influence them—for political purposes, for commercial purposes, and so on. (Bateson, *A Sacred Unity* 267)

The linear dynamic of prose, of ‘prosaic logic,’ is thus associated with the cognitive activity of the brain’s left hemisphere, while the metaphorical dynamic of ‘poetic logic’ is associated with the right hemisphere. The two are both invaluable to human cognition and intelligence. These dynamics are ‘interactive’ but to be so they must also be kept to some degree ‘differentiated.’ Yet when such distinction can be ignored, the two functions either conflated or ‘secreted’ from each other, when all thinking is assumed to have a logic that is ‘merely’ linear and reality is ‘merely’ mechanically casual, as in modernist mentality, terrible consequences can result. The ‘mythic’ or the metaphoric can then be posed as something ‘literally logical and true.’ The result is a ‘fundamentalism’ capable of drawing ‘mythic’ energies into the context of ethical “social structure,” such as in Hitler’s National Socialism.

Thus, valuing myth as a ‘formal’ mode of expression that brings the dialectical dynamic of ‘totalistic reality’ to the ‘foreground,’ and acknowledging ‘the mythic’ as the quality of that dynamic, are essential to any ‘comprehensive’ sense of ‘identity’ and ‘reality.’ Otherwise the ‘mythical’ aspects of thinking become literalized and the literalistic attitude ‘unconsciously’ becomes ‘mythically’ or metaphysically ‘identified.’ In other words, the seemingly divine ‘energies’ of inclusive, totalistic reality are identified with the personal and social contexts of identity so that ‘inhuman or ‘superhuman’ “anti-structural” forces are con-fused with the human realm.

Dialectical Movement in ‘Mythic’ Figuration: Paradoxical Oscillation or Concurrent Polyvalence?

A consideration of just ‘how’ the figuration of mythic style ‘functions’ in myth is important in accessing a sense of its ‘poly-valence’ or how it pluralizes identifications. A linear or oppositional perspective tends to characterize metaphoric expression as paradoxical. Such figuring ‘holds the elements apart’ in an ‘antagonistic’ relation. But if the ‘mythic’ is an expression of a totalistic dynamic then this binary opposition cannot be the logic of its figuration. If it is truly dialectical its associations and ‘causality’ must move in various directions from various loci of ‘agency’ concurrently.

The linguistic term “polysynthetic” has indeed been applied to the mythical imagination, and the term has been explained as meaning that for the mythical imagination there is no

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separation of a total complex into its elements, but that only a single undivided totality is represented—a totality in which there has been no “dissociation” of separate factors, particularly of the factors of objective perception and subjective feeling. (Cassirer, Philosophy of Symbolic Forms 45-46)

Since the ‘mythic’ field of ‘non-ordinary reality’ is reflexively approached from a habitually literalistic mentality, the assumptions of that mentality must be presented and ‘deconstructed.’

One beauty of mythic metaphors is that they elude literalism. We know at the outset that they are impossible truths. Like metaphor itself, the power of which cannot satisfactorily be explained, a myth also speaks with two tongues at one time, amusing and terrifying, serious and ironic, sublimely imaginative and yet with the scattered detail of ridiculous fancy. The metaphors of myth condense past and present together, so that the past is always present and the present can be felt from the detachment of the past. Myths also make concrete particulars into universals, so that each image, name, thing in my life when experienced mythically takes on universal sense, and all abstract universals, the grand ideas of human fate, are presented as concrete actions. And always a myth is the psyche telling of itself in disguise, as if it had nothing to do with psychology [. . .]. (Hillman, ReVisioning Psychology 155)

The “universal sense” of myth is in/of its ‘mythical dynamism.’ In a habitually reductive, mechanical sense of reality there seems to appear a longing for an ‘ultimate order’ in the ‘terms’ of that logic. But such is not possible. The totality of agency and action, of flow and forming, is too complex for such a logic. (Indeed, the modernist > <postmodernist ‘condition’ indicates the self-defeat of that longing.) Thus the ‘mythic’ must arise from some ‘aspect’ of psyche or nature of which the habitual egoic identifications are ‘unaware’ and ‘justly’ fearful. Yet if a person genuinely wishes to ‘know’ ‘truthfully’ the dynamical or archetypal character of totality, then habitual identifications must be ‘submitted’ to a metaphorical sensibility and metamorphic experience.

Mythic metaphors are the correct way of speaking about the archetypes because, like the Gods, they do not stand still. Like Gods they cannot be defined except through and by their complications in each other. (Hillman, ReVisioning Psychology 157)

The “Gods” are thus appropriate expressions of the fluid, creational ‘powers’ of “implicate” flow and the specificities of its archetypal formings. But if what is being ‘figured’ in such images are not ‘things’ then what is the ‘substance’ that the images and actions ‘substantiate?’ It would seem that these agencies and their patterns are primarily tangible not as ‘positivized’ images but ‘dynamism of thought,’ as ‘movements of intellect.’

Instead of measuring the content, meaning, and truth of intellectual forms by something extraneous which is supposed to be reproduced in them, we must find in these forms themselves the measure and criterion for their truth and intrinsic meaning. Instead of taking them as mere copies of something else, we must see in each of these spiritual forms a spontaneous law of generation; an original way and tendency of expression which is more than a mere record of something initially given in fixed categories or real existence. From this point of view, myth, art, language and science appear as symbols; not in the sense of mere figures which refer to some given reality by means of suggestion and allegorical renderings, but in the sense of forces each of which produces and posits a world of its own. In these realms the spirit exhibits in that inwardly

determined dialectic by virtue of which alone there is any reality, any organized and definite Being at all. Thus the special symbolic forms are not imitations, but *organs* of reality, since it is solely by their agency that anything real becomes an object for intellectual apprehension, and as such is made visible to us. (Cassirer, Language and Myth 8)

The images of “symbolic forms” are thus not mimetic imitations but “organs of reality” if what is ‘knowable’ is ‘known’ by way of the dynamical qualities such ‘formless forms’ manifest. If such notions are not ‘painful’ to ‘think’ then one is likely not genuinely *thinking* them, not granting them validity. Again, Giegerich’s notions about “soul” as movement of “logical negativity” seem related to such an “inwardly determined dialectic” that is not a mimesis of something objective but an “organ of reality,” of being totalistically. One could also say “symbolic forms” are ‘epistemological organs.’

The difficulty of such ‘thinking’ when engaging figurations such as the ‘imagoes of Gods’ is illustrated in the historical frequency of violent religious conflict over the ‘proper’ way to regard them.

[. . .] it must be conceded, as a basic principle of our natural history of the gods and heroes, that whenever a myth has been taken literally its sense has been perverted; but also, reciprocally, that whenever it has been dismissed as a mere priestly fraud or sign of inferior intelligence, truth has slipped out the other door. And so what, then, is the sense that we are to seek, if it be neither here nor there? (Campbell, Masks of God 23)

The conflicting “sense” of ‘here or there’ of prosaic versus poetic, of literalistic versus metaphoric, sensibilities is only obviated by seeking ‘sense’ in their mutuality or interpenetration. The very ‘un-reality’ of the ‘mythic mode’ of expression, the ‘how’ of its presentation of the topics of narratives or elements of images, can be posed as its primary “sense” or ‘meaning.’ Exaggeration, distortion, disproportion, transfiguration of ‘normal’ or ‘ordinary’ reality and identifications characterize the ‘mythic mode.’

As noted, the modernist Western mentality is often baffled by this mode of expression and can only respond by classifying it as ‘false,’ un-resolvably paradoxical, or as symbolic of some ‘real’ experience or phenomenon in the context of ‘ordinary’ reality and identity. Such ‘fanciful’ expression and behavior has the ‘un-reality’ of child’s play.

In all the wild imaginings of mythology a fanciful spirit is playing, on the borderline between jest and earnest. (Huizinga, Homo Ludens 5)

As far as I know, ethnologists and anthropologists concur in the opinion that the mental attitude in which the great religious feasts of savages are celebrated and witnessed is not one of complete illusion. There is an underlying consciousness of things ‘not being real.’ (Huizinga 22)

By considering the whole sphere of so-called primitive culture as a play-sphere, we pave the way to a more direct and more general understanding of its peculiarities than any meticulous psychological or sociological analysis would allow. (Huizinga 25)

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If this 'playful' modality is investigated for its own 'logic' it may be viewed as figuring non-linear associations, as posing a 'reality' that cannot be reduced to ordinary causality. The contradictory, paradoxical, metaphorical may be very 'real' manifestations of the 'play' of polyvalent dynamism.

Such images are not the final terms of our subject, if it is of metaphysics we are treating. They have often served, in deed, as vehicles of metaphysical expression, and part of our problem, certainly, is to collect, compare, and classify them; but we miss our proper point if we rest with them as they stand. For an image may signify various things in various contexts and to various minds. Furthermore, where an image has disappeared, it need not follow that the tenor of its reference has disappeared: this may be lurking under another image entirely. Nor in cross-cultural comparisons can we safely assume that because the symbolic figures differ from culture to culture the tenors of their references must differ also. (Campbell, Flight of the Wild Gander 63-64)

The "play" of these images is not 'of' them but in/of their "tenor," the archetypality of their dynamism, which may move about, be found "lurking under another image entirely," as their archetypality is not objectively 'in' the positivized image. The images that have prompted a sensing of that "play" may not always do so, "we miss our proper point if we rest with them as they stand. For an image may signify various things in various contexts and to various minds." Here is both the key insight into the image-as-intellectual-form *and* the terrible danger of positivizing that dynamism as 'the-image-itself.' The image itself is neither 'positive' nor 'dynamical' except in the character of co-participation of the perceiver and 'thinker' of it.

The 'mythic modality' and its 'playful' enactment in festival and ritual contexts are actually portrayed as manifesting a 'logical' co-presence of the linear *and* non-linear causalities, of singular personal identity *and* plurality of being.

The spirit of the festival, the holiday, the holy day of religious ceremonial, requires that the normal attitude toward the cares of the world should have been temporarily set aside in favor of a particular mood of dressing up. The world is hung with banners, [. . .] the logic of cold, hard fact must not be allowed to intrude and spoil the spell. The gentile, the "spoilsport," the advocates of Aristotelian logic, for whom A can never be B; for whom the actor is never to be lost in the part; for whom the mask, the image, the consecrated host, tree, or animal cannot become God, but only a reference. [. . .] For the whole purpose of entering a sanctuary or participating in a festival is that one should be overtaken by the state known in India as "the other mind" [. . .] where one is "beside oneself," spellbound, set apart from one's logic of self-possession and overpowered by the force of a logic of "indissociation"—wherein A is B, and C also is B. (Campbell, Masks of God :Primitive Mythology 25)

Campbell's notion of "indissociation" figures this status of a varied status, of interpenetrating boundaries of self and other agency that are not 'exclusively' or 'oppositionally' identified. The figuring here is not one of either literal *or* only metaphorical, but of a 'play' that engages both, a being in 'this' world of 'ordinary things' and of 'that' one of the 'the timeless garden of Eden.' One might call this a status of 'dis-identified' participation. Such an 'ambi-valent' move into being in/of *both* the singularly and plurally identified appears particularly difficult for Westernized mentality.

For it is *we* [of the Judeo-Christian West] whose god would keep men out of the Garden. The Oriental idea, on the contrary, is to go past the guardian cherubim [at the temple or 'garden' gate] and to pluck the fruit of the Tree of Immortal Life—ourselves—right now—while here on earth.

Such an aim and such a realization I am going to call “mythic identification.” Briefly, the underlying idea is that the ultimate truth, substance, support, energy, or reality of the universe transcends all definition, all imagining, all categories, and all thought. It is beyond the reach of the mind, i.e., transcendent. Consequently, to ask, as our [Western] theologians do: “Is the Godhead just? merciful? wrathful?” “Does it favor this people or that: the Jew, the Christian, or Mohammedan?” is from this point of view absurd. To think thus is to project human sentiments and concerns beyond their temporal sphere, and so, to short circuit the problem altogether. It is a kind of anthropomorphism [. . .]. (Campbell, Flight of the Wild Gander 195-96)

To “project human sentiments and concerns beyond their temporal sphere” is a “kind of anthropomorphism,” a ‘humanizing’ or ‘personalizing’ of the dynamism of the totalistic field of being and its ‘real’ and ‘un-real real’ inter-‘play.’ ‘Ordinary,’ ethically ‘human’ concerns are not ‘of’ that totality.

But now, on the other hand (and here is the great point): that which is thus ultimately transcendent of all definition, categories, names, and forms, is the very substance, energy, being, and support, of all things, including ourselves: the reality of each and all of us. Transcendent of definition, transcendent of enclosure, it is yet immanent in each. (Campbell, Flight of the Wild Gander 195-96)

Thus the ‘play’ of the totalistic is both ‘transcendent’ and ‘immanent’; ‘beyond’ us and ‘in/of’ us. Here is just the “intellectual form” of ‘mythic’ dynamism, the ‘spirit’ of its ‘dialectical logic.’

Behind the vast abundance of mythical forms we have thus sought to lay bare a unitary formative power and the law according to which this power operates. But myth would be no truly spiritual form if its unity signified merely a simplicity without contradictions. Its basic form does not unfold and imprint itself on new motifs and figures in the manner of a simple natural process; its development is not the tranquil growth of a scene which was present and ready made from the very first, which merely requires certain definite outward conditions in order to unfold and make itself manifest. The separate stages of its development do not simply follow but rather confront one another, often in sharp opposition. The progress of myth does not mean merely that certain basic traits, certain spiritual determinations of earlier stages are developed and completed, but also that they are negated and totally eradicated. (Cassirer, Philosophy of Symbolic Forms 235)

If myth is to ‘remain’ ‘mythic’ then, it must ‘contradict’ itself, but not merely as paradoxical oppositions—rather it must not only ‘negate’ what it asserts, but assert archetypalities variously, deform and vary its very formulations, move ‘backwards’ and ‘forwards,’ ‘upwards’ and ‘downwards’ and ‘sideways’—all ‘at once,’ as it were, in a mutuality of concurrent presencings. Thus a ‘cultural mythology, to ‘serve its mythic purpose,’ must be a ‘complex’ of many tellings that cannot be neatly ordered by hierarchies or sequences, nor reduced to simple meanings—certainly not to moral certainties. And its expressions must be ‘metamorphic’ to ‘be’ the “organs of reality.”

And this dialectic can be shown not only in the transformation of the contents of the mythical consciousness but in its dominant “inner form.” It seizes upon the function of mythical

formation as such and transforms it from within. This function can operate only by continuously producing new forms—objective expressions of the inner and outward universe as it presents itself to the eye of myth. But in advancing along this road it reaches a turning point at which the law that governs it becomes a problem. This may seem strange at first glance, for we do not usually give the naive mythical consciousness credit for such a change of attitude. And indeed we have not to do with an act of conscious theoretical reflection, in which myth apprehends itself and in which it turns against its own foundations and presuppositions. Even in this turn the mythical consciousness remains within itself. It does not move out of its sphere or pass into a totally different “principle,” but in completing its own cycle it ends by breaking through it.

This fulfillment which is at the same time a transcendence results from the relation of myth toward its own image world. Myth can manifest only in this image world; as the mythical consciousness advances it comes to see this manifestation as something “outside” which is not wholly adequate to its own drive for expression. Here lies the basis of the conflict, which becomes gradually sharper and sharper, which creates a cleavage within the mythical consciousness and yet in this very cleavage discloses the ultimate depths of myth. (Cassirer, Philosophy of Symbolic Forms 235-236)

“Mythical consciousness remains within itself” by deconstructing its manifestations, by shifting the “tenor” of its ‘image-organs’ to ‘ever-other’ images of itself as dynamical agency, of the archetypal patterns of that agency. If those patterns are regarded as ‘fixed’ in certain images, the dynamism of its creative agency is ‘lost’ because it is by its ‘nature’ un-fixable. It must be ‘at play’ to *be* at all. That is the dialectical ‘message’ of it as ‘medium.’

Plurality of Agency in ‘Mythic’ Image and Enactment: Personal and Impersonal ‘Forms of Conscious Motive’

The ‘who’ and the ‘what’ of agency in ‘mythic’ expression is variously and ‘fantastically’ figured relative to the standards of ‘ordinary’ identification. Motive for thought and action do not derive only from an ‘ordinary “I.”’

The mythical consciousness conceives of an I which is no longer material and which can be defined by no analogy to things, an I for which, rather, the objective world exists as a mere appearance. The classical example of such a version of the I-concept, hovering on the borderline between mythical intuition and speculative contemplation, is to be found in the development of Indian thought. In the speculation of the Upanishads the separate stages of the round that had to be traveled are most clearly distinguished. We see here how religious thought seeks ever newer images for the self, for the intangible and incomprehensible subject, and how in the end it can only define this self by dropping all these images as inadequate and unsuitable. (Cassirer Philosophy of Symbolic Forms p.173)

Kugler’s “impossible subject” of ‘depth’ psychology is echoed here as the “incomprehensible subject” of the “I” of myth. The ‘self’ of “this person” radically changes form and capacity in ‘mythical modality’—now a weak mortal, now transformed into an animal, now a hero ‘infused’ with the agency of a ‘God,’ and all of these concurrently. Consciousness and motive derive from both impersonal and ‘inhuman’ statuses. After such shifts of ‘identification’ just ‘who’ and ‘what’ *is* one? The identity and

identification of 'things,' 'time,' and 'place' are similarly metamorphic in the multi-dimensional being of myth.

The mythical image is a concrescence of name and thing: it does not re-present the thing but is experienced as a genuine presence containing the power, the significance and efficacy of the thing itself; it *is* the thing and the thing is alive. In myth the phenomenal (appearance) and the real are fused into one or, to put it differently, every phenomenon is always and necessarily an incarnation, a pure expression rather than representation. The meaning of images dwells in images themselves as life dwells in the body. (Avens, Imaginal Body 69-70)

The 'images' of self/other/world in myth are 'elemental' in that they are 'intellectual forms' — 'thingless things of presence.' These images and actions are what they 'appear' to be and are not, are 'fixed' and 'in movement' — just as, in an inclusive 'reality,' is this "I" and this body. 'Mythic' expression *is* the consciousness that "every phenomenon is always and necessarily an incarnation, a pure expression rather than representation." And the 'godly' or 'creational' dynamic of flowing and forming, of "implicate" and "explicate," is thusly 'con-figured' *as they are*, only can be, *as* incarnate, embodied.

"You, Shvetaketu, my son, are yourself that immortal Being of beings." The Oriental sages and their texts are unanimous in insisting, however that the "you" referred to in teachings of this kind is not exactly the "you" that you think yourself to be, individuated in space and time, a temporary member of this world of passing forms, named, loved, and separate from your neighbor. *Neti neti*, "not this, not this," is the meditation properly applied to everything so known, so named and numbered: all those facets of the jewel of reality that present themselves to the mind. "I am not my body, my feelings, my thoughts, but the consciousness of which these are the manifestations." (Campbell, Flight of the Wild Gander 196-97)

' "I" am consciousness therefore "I" am?' Could such a notion be comparable to Descartes' *cogito ergo sum* ? Perhaps, except for the mythical admonition: "Neti, neti . . ." There can be, after all, no end to the self-deconstructions of 'mythic pluralism.' Consideration that the "I" is not each or any one 'thing' that the "I" identifies as "me" but rather of the 'consciousness' that makes such distinctions is qualified by the "neti, neti . . ." which will not allow any ultimate hieratic opposition of thinking mind over body to stand as conclusive.

So the 'actual' modes of expressing that dynamism of being 'neither/nor' *and* 'both/and' must 'reflect' upon each other if these are to 'appropriately manifest' this 'play of the play' of poly-valence and plural loci of generative agency. Making images, telling tales, 'performing' abstract analysis, enacting ritual actions, and even acting 'literalistically' all 'remind' us of that 'play within the play' of which we are 'players.'

The choral lyric and the drama are based on ritual dance in which the divine world coincides with present temporal reality. This reality, however, differs appreciably from the reported events of the epic. It is not something that has occurred in the past and may now be faithfully—or falsely—chronicled, but a mythical truth which is revived by being enacted. The play, for the performers and the audience, 'is' the mythical occurrence; but then again in a certain sense it is

not, because everybody knows that the role of the hero is taken by some other man. Once more, and with greater urgency than the epic, tragedy confronts us with the question: what is mythical reality? (Snell, Discovery of Mind 97)

Once the enactor becomes ‘an actor’ and not ‘him-’ or ‘her-self’ directly identified with the mythical power, but ‘playing’ the part of an other who is/was ‘actually’ in ‘the myth,’ the dimensions of identity become rather infinitely complex. Greek tragedy as ‘the birth of drama’ thus seems to present ‘yet another’ deconstructive construction of the ‘mythic modality.’ The ‘actor’ may be a most ‘ordinary’ person, living in a most un-mythic context of ‘prosaic’ reality. But once engaged as ‘the player’ of some other part, the ‘archetypal truth’ beneath/within the ‘ordinary’ is engaged.

From the position of secular man (*Homo sapiens*), that is to say, we are to enter the play sphere of the festival, acquiescing in a game of belief, where fun, joy, and rapture rule in ascending series. The laws of life in time and space—economics, politics, and even morality—will thereupon dissolve. Whereafter, re-created by that return to paradise before the Fall, before knowledge of good and evil, right and wrong, true and false, belief and disbelief, we are to carry the point of view and spirit of man the player (*Homo ludens*) back into life; as in the play of children, where, undaunted by the banal actualities of life’s meager possibilities, the spontaneous impulse of the spirit to identify itself with something other than itself for the sheer delight of play, transubstantiates the world—in which, actually, after all, things are not quite as real or permanent, terrible, important, or logical as they seem. (Campbell, Masks of God 28)

The reality of ‘really playing’ an other’s part identifies the pluralistic play of identification. When reflected upon by ‘the player,’ the ‘playing’ becomes the action of an “I”-less “I,” an agency of movement taking form out of an indivisible plurality of other movements. The ‘personal self’ is not alone in the totality of self as it ‘takes part’ in enacting both ‘its selves’ and the agency of impersonal or mythic selves, of whose being the personal participates in precipitating the forms of their expression.

Of Human, Non-human and Quasi-human: Masks, Magic, and Identity of Metamorphic Participation

The reality of plural sources of agency, of the ‘identify’ of the ‘others’ in ‘one self’ and the seemingly-singular entities around us, of the movement occurring in the ‘evidently static’ forms of objects and situations, appears to be ‘given presence’ by blending ordinary images and actions of ‘humanness’ with non-human and in-human ones. Costume and mask are vivid examples of how one’s ordinary person and identity are ‘amended’ so that one’s appearance and actions precipitate and participate in ‘an other.’ In the archaic mentality, such action appears to be experienced not so much as ‘putting on’ a different appearance but as ‘becoming’ or ‘being infused’ with some agency other than who and what one ‘is.’

[. . .] the mask in a primitive festival is revered and experienced as a veritable apparition of the mythical being it represents—even though everyone knows that a man made the mask and that a man is wearing it. The one wearing it, furthermore, is identified with the god during the time of

the ritual of which the mask is a part. He does not merely represent the god, he *is* the god. The literal fact that the apparition is composed of A, a mask, and B, its reference to a mythical being, and C, a man, is dismissed from the mind, and the presentation is allowed to work without correction upon the sentiments of both the beholder and the actor. In other words, there has been a shift from the logic of the normal secular sphere, where things are understood to be distinct from one another, to a theatrical or play sphere, where they are accepted for what they are *experienced* as being and the logic is that of “make believe”— “as if.” (Campbell, Masks of God 21-22)

Is this “play sphere” ‘merely’ an enactment of ‘as if’ or does the precipitating actor “not merely represent the god” but *also* “*is* the god?” In one perspective, the enactment is a metamorphic ‘imago’ simply on the level of combining “A, a mask, and B, its reference to a mythical being, and C, a man.” The extent to which there is a ‘metamorphosis’ depends upon the ‘felt and thought experience’ of the ‘actor’ or the ‘audience’ when ‘con/fronted’ with such a ‘living impossibility’—or, the ‘possibility of such living.’

The mask is pure confrontation—an antipode, and nothing else. It has no reverse side—”Spirits have no back,” the people say. It has nothing which might transcend this mighty moment of confrontation. It has, in other words, no complete existence either. It is the symbol and the manifestation of that which is simultaneously there and not there: that which is excruciatingly near, that which is completely absent—both in one reality. (Otto, Dionysus Myth and Cult 91)

The mask itself ‘confronts’ us with an ‘imago’ of an ‘identity’ that is thingless. The ‘masking’ of another identity with that one is ‘metamorphic’ and thus ‘magical.’ The wearing of the mask might be seen to ‘complete’ the existence of its ‘identity.’ Yet the mask and the masked are also always ‘different’ while composing a participatory ‘identity-in-difference’ that is distinct from identity *as* difference. A culture that functions to provide such an overt experience of one’s self ‘conjoining’ with such ‘impersonal’ and ‘non-human’ ‘otherness’ provides an ‘experience’ from which ‘thought’ may reflect upon the being and becoming of those “organs of reality,” the “intellectual thought forms” of ‘mythic’ dynamism.

Civilizations like that of India, founded on a cornerstone of magic, help their children through those necessary transformations that men find it so hard to accomplish from within. (Zimmer, King and Corpse 18)

Therein lies the great value of magic areas of life for the guidance of the soul. The spiritual powers being symbolized as gods and demons, or as images and holy places, the individual is brought into relationship with them through the procedures of the investiture, and then held to them by the new ritual routines. A perfected, unmarred sacramental system of this kind is a mirror world, which catches all the rays sent up from the depths of the unconscious and presents them as an external reality susceptible to manipulation. The two hemispheres, the inner and the outer, then fit together perfectly. And any considered change of scenery in the tangible sacramental mirror sphere brings about, almost automatically, a corresponding shift in the interior field and point of view. (Zimmer 19)

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This ‘magical manifestation’ of “spiritual powers” by which “the individual is brought into relationship with them through the procedures of the investiture” may or may not be ‘believed’ as ‘literal fact.’ But an ‘experience’ of having one’s ‘former’ identity ‘infused’ by “the procedures of investiture” can generate a basis to relativize the habitual egoic identifications of self/world/other to some ‘larger totality.’ Yet a merely ‘literalistic belief’ in the ‘reality’ of those “spiritual powers”—what moderns would term superstition—would be a ‘reduction’ of their ‘mythical’ dynamism. Similarly, denial of their ‘existence’ or validity renders them ‘invisible’ and that dynamism ‘intangible.’

The gain which the rejection of this magic conditioning has brought to the modern man—our exorcism of all the demons and gods from the world, and the increase there with in our rationally directed power over the material forces of the earth—is paid for by the loss of this mirror control over the forces of the soul. The man of today is helpless before the magic of his own invisible psyche. It drives him whither it will. (Zimmer 19)

The liberation from such ‘magic’ which that mechanical literalism has provided the modern leaves an absence of valid ‘image’ for the thingless agencies of psyche. And when rationalistic analytical perspective ‘views’ archaic culture in attempts to ‘see’ what has become ‘invisible’ to it, the archaic experience is likely to be figured in terms of that ‘un-magical’ mentality. Thus ‘mythic’ metamorphosis is likely to be posed as ‘literal,’ and thereby to appear merely superstitious nonsense, to be idolatry.

What actually take place is not that the shaman *turns into* an animal, but rather that he has now experienced his ‘wild’, his ‘animal aspect’. Not until that happens will he be a true shaman. For he cannot *know* his human side until he also becomes aware of what it is not. To put it differently, he needs to become estranged from it, to have seen it, that is, to have seen it from the *outside*. After experiencing that, he is no longer what he once was. In pictorial representations, he now appears as a human bird or a human with bird’s legs. (Duerr 65)

The metamorphosis of ‘mythic’ dynamism is thus not a linear transformation from one discreet status into an other one. To ‘become’ simply animal would be to have no more human consciousness and thus lack cognitive capacity to ‘witness’ the metaphoric status of being as metamorphic becoming. To ‘become’ aware of an ‘animal consciousness’ while also being ‘humanly’ conscious makes possible a ‘knowing’ of the ‘human’ (otherwise unattainable) in an ‘inhuman’ mutuality of human and non-human. One thus comes into the presence of an ‘identification’ that is radically ‘non-ordinary,’ of an ‘other world’ or the ‘unconscious.’ Becoming ‘quasi-human’ or confronting the agency of the ‘non-human’ relativizes the habitual ‘order of things’ to a larger field of references.

This is the manner of the dragons’ service to life. It brings into undeniable statement the power of the missing, not-yet-integrated factor, and compels the warders of society to take that factor into account. This is the manner of the dragon’s “antagonistic co-operation.” Before it can be undone, the hero himself, the hero-society, must undergo a transformation, a crisis of disintegration and then reintegration on a broader base, whereupon the *raison d’etre* of the dragon will have been surpassed, and in despair of its now vain, purely destructive nothingness, it will evanesce, burst and disappear. (Zimmer 49)

The inhuman, fantastic 'presence' of dragon-ness gives 'being' to forces habitual identifications have minimized or ignored. When 'given' form their 'intention' can become accessible to awareness, creating an opportunity to 'thing' them as 'intellectual forms' that generate 'tangible' experience.

But, on the other hand, if conquered by weight of arms, the necessity for its reappearance will not have been eliminated, and after a time of recuperation, it will throw off the fetters of whatever underworld dungeon it may have been assigned to, come breaking through the fault in the walls of the current system, and precipitate "another war." (Zimmer 49)

Heroic attempts to battle and defeat the archetypal forces of the impersonal or inhuman, the "anti-structure" of 'dragon-ness,' are predictable and necessary efforts to preserve the "structure" of human culture and personal identity in the face of the 'inhuman' "anti-structural" "wild." Yet if these efforts 'appear' to be triumphant, if the 'dragon' is taken to be "conquered by weight of arms" and thus 'assimilated' by the habitual identifications, the 'con-fronting' of 'human' and 'inhuman,' of 'personal' and 'impersonal' has not generated a metamorphosis and a mutuality, leaving intact an oppositional hierarchy likely to 'feed' 'the fire next time.'

The werewolves of Livonia and the Benandanti of Friaul took up this struggle against the Powers of chaos over and over again. Or, to put it more succinctly, they participated in the struggle between life and death, which is the foundation on which rests the order of the world. For 'magic rituals' are less an *intrusion* into the events, as envisaged by those who would consider them a 'protoscientific technique of manipulation', but instead they are rather a *participation* in the cosmic crisis, which is both a threat to and a condition of life. (Duerr 43-44)

"A *participation* in the cosmic crisis" is a difficult concept for the 'thoroughly alienated' modernist mentality. 'Crisis' tends to be construed as a 'human affair.' 'Suffering' has been personalized to the degree exemplified by Descartes' assertion that animal's could feel no pain since they could not think. More recently there are political 'movements' for extending 'human rights' to animals, and concerns for the 'suffering of the earth.' Such notions seem further 'signs' of a genuinely 'post'-modern status. People appear to be giving image to some mutual agency and metamorphic interplay of 'human' and 'non-human' again, even if as 'anthropomorphic projection.'

A particularly significant image of human<>non-human dynamism is expressed in the contemporary figurations of human/machine entities as "cyborgs" and "artificially intelligent" robots. Such metamorphic beings are the stock-in-trade of science fiction movies such as Star Trek. The prevalence of such metamorphs in the contemporary imaginal literature of technological culture date back at least to Marry Shelley's Frankenstein. Such figurings may be the contemporary imagination of the "werewolves of Livonia" enacting participation of "cosmic crisis" in the 'ambi-valence' of human alienation from self and other. Where animals may have once been the most 'familiar other' for humans, computers and machines may be so now.

Directional Plurality in Spatial and Temporal Orientations of 'Mythic Modality'

Myth may be distinguished, in part, as the realm of expression that subverts the 'ordinary linear assumptions of cognitive awareness' by way of non-ordinary temporal and spatial references or orientations. Time and place in 'mythic' mentality are not organized as in "structural" 'reality' which is, of necessity, conceived and experienced as a progressive 'horizontal sequence' of singular moments: past>present>future>. Only in the realm of the 'un-real real,' in 'placeless places' of "*in illo tempore*," can the non-ordinary, polyvalent dynamics of totality be configured as the 'things of dialectical movement' that they 'are.' Orientations on a vertical world axis or world tree that pose concurrent but 'otherworldly' dimensions of existence to that of 'ordinary reality' de-lineate consciousness. Similarly, attention to circular movements in natural phenomena and the agencies of "the four directions" 'deconstruct' a singularly sequential orientation of past>present>future.

The concept of 'dreamtime' does not refer to any time in the distant past to which Australians supposedly think they can return, which can be 'called up', 'repeated', or 'emulated', which 'endures' or proceeds 'parallel' to ordinary time, or which could be 'projected' upon the present. The 'dreamtime' is not past, present or future time: it has no 'location' whatever on the continuum of time.

'Once upon a time,' a fairy-tale begins, 'and a very good time it was, though it wasn't in my time or in your time, nor in any one else's time [. . .]. (Duerr 119)

Any 'time,' every 'time' must have 'a' time. To 'think' a 'time,' some 'chronology of events,' that is not linear or 'clock' time still requires some 'imago' of 'time' to be accessed even as 'intellectual form.' Thus the 'seemingly literal' portrayal of time and place in 'mythic' figuring exist to be "sublated" into 'non-ordinary presencing.'

The thinking "I" can reflect upon the 'experience' of nightly dreaming as one figuring of such 'timeless time.' In 'actual' dreams one's egoic self is 'given' an imago, a 'dream ego' that 'plays the part' of self-consciousness in the dream. But one also can have the 'experience' of perceiving the dream as if it were a 'movie' *and* of being the dream-ego 'in' it from an other perspective, or of being more than one egoic figure of self in a dream concurrently. From such perspectives of non-egoic or poly-egoic identity one 'witnesses' all manner of 'distortions' of 'ordinary' reality and identifications, 'being' an 'impossible' concurrent plurality in the 'placeless places' of dreaming. Collective cultural imaginations in myth generate similar re-orderings of time and space.

The 'dreamtime', then, represents a perspective for seeing what we see without considering whether it once was or will some day be. In the same way, the 'dream place' is not any *particular* spot, although from the ordinary, everyday perspective, it is, of course, located somewhere.[. . .]

The 'dream place' is everywhere and no where, just like the 'dreamtime' is always and never. You might say that the term 'dream place' does not refer to any particular place and the way to get there is to get nowhere. (Duerr 121)

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To be “everywhere and nowhere,” “always and never” is to be ‘of’ the multidimensional movement of “implicate” flow which has no absolute past or future and yet that ‘permeates’ “explicate” form, that moves *as* and is not that form—yet is ‘not-not-that-form.’ Myths ‘demonstrate’ *and* ‘embody’ that movement by ‘multiplying’ its vectors and the ‘references’ for its locales and ‘enactors’ by ‘shifting’ the perceivers ordinary ‘positions’ and ‘orientations.’

There are so many accounts of the *descensus* in Greek mythology alone that one may suppose that each myth imagines one of the many ways of being “down,” one of many ways of viewing descent.[. . .] The myths in their variety not only differentiate ways of descent, but also they give a clue [. . .] of reasons why a person finds herself or himself “down” or “under.” [. . .] [Including] visiting the realm of vision and dream. [. . .] One may say of this motive that the deep dreams of self have a way of bringing ego and ego’s perspective “down” and “in.” (Miller, Hells and Holy Ghosts 29-30)

For the egoic-“I” to ‘go’ or be ‘pulled’ in a ‘downward’ direction is, relative to its habitual sense of ‘position,’ to descend into an ‘under world’—a realm other than ‘this one’ by virtue of being ‘below.’ If the ‘Gods’ are placed ‘above’ the human ‘realm’ and there is yet a third realm ‘under’ that human one, then ‘this world’ is both a ‘below’ into which ‘gods’ can descend and a ‘middle,’ from which humans can ‘ascend’ or descend. Such ‘layering’ of fields of being and acting greatly pluralizes the ‘dimensions of agency’ among concurrent ‘realities’ and aids in differentiating the archetypal complexes of “implicate” movements in self/other/world. The egoic-“I” is thus relativized by identifying super-natural or ‘lordly powers’ both ‘superior’ to its position and moving beneath its ‘feet.’

Cultures whose ‘mythic logics’ represent a linear causal flow of creation in ‘mythical history’ from ‘the Gods on down’ often complicate such a configuration with a recursive context: such as ‘before humans there were some human-like entities that created humans.’ The ‘superior Gods’ are also often posed as somehow ‘needing’ the attentions of ‘human’ agency, so a reciprocity, a dialectical, co-participating movement is configured. ‘Preferential’ orientations among such directions and levels of agency and being can be termed ‘un-real reals’ as manifestations of “implicate< >explicate” dynamism. Without the creational flow of “implicate” archetypal movement there is no “explicate” form, but the reverse is also accurate. When these figurings are posed as literally true, or ‘positivized’ as *The* models for social structure and morality, then they lose their dialectical dynamism and cease to be “organs of [totalistic] reality.” The ‘mythic’ can ‘inform’ ethical social “structure” but is not, due to its “anti-structural” ‘nature,’ an appropriate ‘model’ for such “structure.” ‘The Gods’ may be represented as posing ethical and moral issues, but often do not ‘behave’ accordingly in mythic narrative—a trait of myth that indicates it is ‘mythic.’ Thus by both ‘dis-ordering’ human structured time and space, as well as defying human ethical orders, myth figures the “liminality” of the non-ordinary “anti-structural” totality.

The Other Worlds in this One

Close to the theme of ‘directional plurality’ in mythic expression is that of co-existent ‘other worlds.’ How is the ‘ordinarily literal’ mentality to get a ‘sense’ of the multi-dimensional, polyvalent ‘activity’ one is *in* and *of*? To pluralize this ‘state of being’ one must come to sense being in more than one ‘status’ at ‘one’ time and in ‘one’ place. Habitual identity must be re-made, ‘re-gestated.’

Rites, then, together with the mythologies that support them, constitute the second womb, the matrix of the postnatal gestation of the placental *Homo sapiens*. This fact, moreover, has been known to the pedagogues of the race, certainly since the period of the Upanishads, and probably since that of the Aurignacian caves. In the Mundaka Upanishad we read, for example: “There are two knowledges to be known—as indeed the knowers of Brahman are wont to say: a higher and also a lower. [. . .] The Higher is that whereby the Imperishable is apprehended.” (Campbell, Flight of the Wild Gander 55)

“Higher and lower” states of “knowledge” configure plural states of being that are not necessarily ‘opposed’ or contradictory in “mythic thinking.” In that style of cognition the “imperishable” can be comprehended, ‘invested’ in the same consciousness that also ‘knows’ the perishability or fixity of ‘mortal’ form. Such a seemingly vertical ordering of ‘worlds’ seems concurrent and inter-fused for archaic mentality, with ascending humans and descending divinities. It becomes much more problematic in the context of a literalistic, mechanical status of identifications.

Another configuration of multiple worlds is ‘lateral,’ posing the possibility of movement from ‘here’ to ‘there.’ That sort of movement is often figured as ‘flight’ to another ‘world’ that is ‘over there.’ Such transits were often ‘induced’ by psycho-active trance states or pharmacological agents. But just ‘where’ *is* that ‘other world?’

What then *could* a statement such as, ‘I flew with the help of thorn apples’ actually mean? I believe we can only attribute a meaning to such a sentence if we change our manner of looking at things, or to use a term now in fashion, we alter our presently accepted ‘paradigm’. [. . .] A werewolf is not a human whose head suddenly sprouts horns [. . .]. It would be much more to the point to say that werewolves are persons who are able to *dissolve* ‘within themselves’ the boundary between civilization and wilderness, who can step across the fence separating their ‘civilized side’ from their ‘wilderness side’, their ‘wolf’s nature. These are people who can look their ‘animal nature’ in the eye, something usually kept under lock and key in their culture, and in this way can develop a consciousness of their ‘cultural nature’. (Duerr 86-87)

One who “flew with the help of thorn apples” to an ‘other world’ (in this reference “to” the “mountain” or “forest” where the ‘witches’ gathered) ‘went’ some where ‘else.’ Yet when the agents of the Christian Inquisition interrogated and observed such folk, they found that they ‘literally’ did not leave their homes. Thus the ‘place’ they went to must ‘actually’ be ‘right here.’ And yet, ‘here’ is clearly *not* the same place they ordinarily experienced it as being. The ‘ordinary here’ was some way re-configured. And thus, the person was not the same person as ‘ordinarily’ perceived.

We may have to admit then that our person contains within itself significantly more than is admitted by our everyday culture. [. . .] That which we include in our personality will then

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expand to the same extent as we, our everyday person, surrender our more or less firm boundaries. [. . .] The limits of our person now include matters we formerly saw as belonging to the 'outside' world. With lightening clarity we realize that these limits are not circumscribed by 5ft. 11 in. and 150lb. [. . .]

Such an expansion of our person can easily be described as 'flying'. To do so will seem exotic only to those who hold that the meaning of every term we use is completely fixed by the standard situation in which we learned it and in which we are accustomed to apply it. (Duerr 87)

If there is only 'one world' of meaningful references for common 'terms,' if 'truth' is limited to the 'terms' of literality, then being is just-so determined and circumscribed. Existence is then confined to the realm of egoically identified 'human' "structuring." Yet only a 'view' from some 'outside' can possibly provide such a 'realization.' And yet again, to pose 'worlds' as opposites, as separate realities with separate 'truths' remains literalistic on either side. Only a 'metamorph' can perceive that reductiveness.

For between the worlds, 'on the fence', it becomes possible to recognize that the 'true believers of science', as also the 'true believers in magic', are simultaneously right and wrong. 'Magical animals' do not talk the way they do in fairy-tales, but neither is their 'talking' mere delusion, as the psychiatrists would have us believe. (Duerr, 109)

Myth may often seem to offer 'literalistic' contrasts between human and 'non-human,' between persons and Gods, one world and an other. But myths are 'known' in the context of a collective 'mythology' that varies the images and events generating the "tenor" of mythic movement in multiple dimensions or plural 'worlds' interconnected by contrasting metamorphic transits. (Even the Christian New Testament, so often read 'literalistically,' has four varying versions of the Gospels.) Perhaps the most typical figure of 'mythic movement' back-and-forth is a metamorphic hybrid: a hermaphrodite, a 'trickster,' a 'shape shifter.'

As late as the Middle Ages, the witch was still the *hagazussa*, a being that sat on the *Hag*, the fence, which passed behind the gardens and separated the village from the wilderness. She was a being who participated in both worlds. As we might say today, she was semi-demonic. In time, however, she lost her double features and evolved more and more into a representation of what was being expelled from culture, only to return, distorted, in the night. [. . .]

To make sure that the witch was not a being of the 'inside', that she had at least one foot 'outside', beyond culture, a reversal of the ordinary has been used since ancient times. Thus, in the *Vatnsdaela Saga* we are told about the old witch Ljot: 'She pulled her clothes over her head, stepping backward with her head stuck between her legs [. . .].' (Duerr 46)

The dominant thrust of literalistically directed modernist mentality has 'progressively' discredited notions of 'other worlds' and thus the possibility of a "*hagazussa*," a "being which participated in both worlds" and thus gained a relativizing perspective on 'this world' of 'humanistic structure.' In Turner's anthropological terms, the 'witch' was once a manifestation of the "liminal" but now is 'merely' "liminoid" — a relatively insignificant peripheral or marginal 'figure.'

As we pointed out earlier the fence or hedge, separating the domain of the wilderness from

that of culture, was not an insurmountable boundary to the archaic mind. At certain times this fence was, in fact, torn down. Those who wanted to live *consciously* within the fence, had to leave the enclosure at least once in their lives. They had to roam the forests as wolves, as 'savages'. To put it in more modern terms, they had to experience the wilderness, their *animal nature*, within themselves. For their 'cultural nature' was only one side of their being which by destiny was inextricably bound to their animal *fylogia*, visible only to him who stepped across the dividing line, entrusting himself to his 'second sight' [. . .]. (Duerr 64)

In terms appropriately inappropriate to literalistic mentality, 'one who has not experienced being/thinking as an animal, as non-human, cannot 'know' the complex psychical nature of being human.' And, of course, the "fence" to be 'crossed' or 'straddled' is 'internal' as much as 'external' to one's person—thus 'crossing' it requires an ambi-valent or dialectical movement. To 'see' the ordinarily 'invisible' aspects of self and culture one must be 'looking' from both sides at once, both as self > other and as Janus-faced/facing self < other self.

Egoic repression of non-egoic impulses and 'other aspects' of self 'exile' much of one's psyche from acknowledged 'identity' by consigning such to the irrelevant, invalidated realm of fantasy that was once 'an other world.' Similarly psychological 'projection' of such "shadow" aspects of psyche onto others in the world 'out there' performs a psychic 'sleight of hand' that gives the denied and repressed a 'personal' or objective identity with which to 'struggle' literalistically in 'personal relations' or psychical manifestations but that thereby remains estranged or 'alienated' from self-identity.

Thus a dramatic image of an 'other world' 'out there' seems essential to induce the "intellectual form" of 'internal' psychic plurality. "Consciousness" and the "unconscious" in psychology configure this sense of contrasting psychic dimensions in which identity is 'composed' differently (most vividly contrasted as the 'worlds' of waking and dreaming reality). Jung's notion of the psychic contrasexuals of Anima and Animus are also pertinent to this sense of divergent agency of identity in 'one' psyche whose characteristics are 'worlds apart.' Yet to regard the motif of 'other worlds' as referring to only some 'external' sense of differing realms will immediately collapse its 'mythic' dynamism. The 'other worldly self' is perhaps thus the most potent 'experience' of such dimensional plurality—figured as such states of being as the hermaphrodite or (more oppositionally) a "Dr. Jeckyl and Mr. Hyde."

The Metamorphic 'Dynamic of Divinity': Participation as Co-presencing of "Implicate" and "Explicate," Sacred and Profane Status

If the term 'divinity' indicates sources of creative energies and those can be associated with "wild" "anti-structural" fields and "implicate" flowing movement, then awareness or experience of 'totality' could be termed participation in the co-presence of 'sacred' and 'profane' as "implicate" and "explicate," of the 'metaphoresis' or 'metaphorical becoming' of flowing-movement-as-metamorphic-form. "Explicate" particularity can be characterized as the 'incarnation' of the 'timeless' or eternal yet

metamorphic dynamism of “implicate” flow as ‘divine creativity.’ Such a ‘status of being’ must necessarily ‘occur’ in a placeless-place that is a place, a timeless time that is a time of ‘origins.’

Since in the eyes of the primitive the cosmogony primarily represents the manifestations of the creative power of the gods, and therefore a prodigious eruption of the sacred, it is periodically reiterated in order to regenerate the world and human society. For symbolic repetition of the creation implies a reactualization of the primordial event, hence the presence of the Gods and their creative energies. (Eliade, Rites and Symbols of Initiation xii)

The plurality of agency experienced in the act of habitual egoic identity’s submission to the presence of ‘other’ agencies in one’s self might thus be viewed as comparable to the archaic confrontation with the “presence of the Gods and their creative energies.” The ‘un-real’ but ‘real’ expression of the “explicate” forms of “implicate” flow, of the ‘immaterial’ but effective forces, the ‘thingless things’ or agencies of consciousness or psyche, is thus engaged. Such a ‘move’ opens the habitual realm of identity and ‘reality’ to the ‘impossible.’

On the Archaic levels of culture religion maintains the “opening” toward a superhuman world, the world of axio-logical values. These values are “transcendent,” in the sense that they are held to be revealed by Divine Beings or mythical Ancestors. [. . .] This “other world” represents a superhuman, “transcendent” plane, the plane of absolute realities. It is the experience of the sacred—that is, an encounter with a transhuman reality—which gives birth to the idea that something *really exists*. (Eliade, Myth and Reality 139)

The existence of the mundane or ordinary reality is actually *affirmed* by contact with the “implicate” flow of ‘creative energies’ or ‘divine agencies.’ The experience of the linearly time-bound ‘profane’ realm is re-vivified or ‘redeemed’ by such ‘experience’ of creational, “implicate” forces and their ‘transubstantiation’ of ‘mere matter.’ The so-called “mystery religions” focused their rituals on the ‘literal incarnation’ of ‘divine agency.’

The Mystery-Religions [. . .] undertook to effect such apotheosis not merely for outstanding personalities but for the humblest candidate. Divinizing was conceived in the main in three ways, which, however, cannot be treated separately: (1) mystic identification with the tutelar; (2) endowment with deathlessness and transformation into the divine substance; (3) in a more refined form, in the divine indwelling, by which the material man became spiritual. By mystic identification Lucius, after the sacrament of initiation, was ‘arrayed like the sun and set up like an image of the god’ before the spectators. The mystes of Attis became himself Attis. On an Orphic tablet, found at Petelia and now in the British Museum, the deceased declares, ‘I am a child of Earth and Starry Heaven; but my race is of Heaven.’ (Angus, Mystery Religions 109-10)

A third phase, the divine indwelling, expressed a religious experience which formed a ground common to the Mysteries and Platonic and Stoic philosophy and to Christianity. The experience and modes of expression admitted of great varieties. The devotee in the Liturgy of Mithra prays: ‘abide with me in my soul: leave me not,’ and ‘that I may be initiated and that the Holy Spirit may breath within me.’ [. . .] This condition of divine indwelling is the counterpart to that of enthusiasm whereby the mystic is in a real sense ‘in God’ by substitution or interpenetration of personality. The Mysteries were thus familiar with that mutual indwelling of human and divine so conspicuous in the mystical aspects of Paulinism, and still more in the thought of the Fourth Gospel, and in the highest reaches of Christian experience. To Paul ‘in

Christ,' 'in the Spirit,' and 'Christ in you' were synonymous expressions of a psychological reality (Angus, 111).

But, once one has been duly exposed to this multi-dimensional 'reality of reality' one's sense-of-self and world are subject to being dramatically, likely traumatically altered.

Let us mark and remember this fact, which is as it were a fundamental motif, documented in every kind of initiation: the experience of initiatory death and resurrection not only basically changes the neophyte's fundamental mode of being, but at the same time reveals to him the sacredness of human life and of the world, by revealing to him the great mystery, common to all religions, that men, with the cosmos, with all forms of life, are the creation of the Gods or of Superhuman Beings. This revelation is conveyed by the origin myths. Learning how things came into existence, the novice at the same time learns that he is the creation of Another [. . .]. (Eliade, Rites and Symbols of Initiation 19)

The "I" then is no longer "I" by virtue of being a singular or 'literal' "me." This "I"-ing becomes a consequence of the co-operative and somehow intentional creative activity of 'inhuman others,' of which "I" am variously composed and 'in' which "I," so composed, *also participate*. "I" am 'created' by the gods and am 'one of them' as a co-creator. *And*, thus must it be for society and culture, indeed for every 'thing.'

Every significant cosmic object has a "history." This is as much as to say that it can "speak" to man. Because it "speaks" of itself—above all of its "origin," the primordial event in consequence of which it came into being—the object becomes *real* and *significant*. It is no longer something "unknown," that is, an opaque object, inapprehensible, meaningless, an in the last analysis "unreal." It shares the same "World" as man.

This co-participation not only makes the World "familiar" and intelligible, it makes it transparent. Through the objects of this present World one perceives the traces of the Beings and powers of another. [. . .] The result is that, on the one hand, man does not find himself existing in an inert, opaque world; on the other hand, deciphering the World's language, he is confronted by mystery. For "Nature" at once unveils and "camouflages" the "supernatural"; and this, for archaic man, constitutes the basic and infathomable mystery of the World. The myths reveal all that has taken place, from the cosmogony to the establishment of socio-cultural institutions. But these revelations do not constitute "knowledge" in the strict sense, they do not exhaust the mystery of cosmic and human realities [. . .]. (Eliade, Myth and Reality 142)

Little consideration seems required to associate this description of mythical culture's 'knowing' with the method of science in seeking to understand or 'decipher' the 'origins' of 'things.' Thus does one 'enter into conversation with' the 'others' of self/other/world, with things and their thinglessness—not only in archaic mentality and 'depth' psychology but even scientific theory and experiment. And thereby one comes to 'be' in more than one 'dimension' of time and space, to participate in 'creational activity.' Much of 'how the world came to be psycho-dynamically and thus is' is thereby 'revealed.' Yet such a 'revelation' enhances the mystery of life, 'opens' the world further rather than 'closes' it down by reducing it to known and predictable 'structure.' The notion of the 'spiritual experience' of being present at or witness to a 'transubstantiation of matter' by the 'influx' of 'divine agency' (as with the water and wine of the Catholic mass) seems relevant in this context.

Ordinary reality 'as positivistically determined' must either discredit such an experience of 'wholeness-as-flowing-movement-in-explicate-form' or else 'give way' to an 'other' reality.

Experience of that 'being here *and* There,' in 'this world' and 'the other,' is thus, as co-presence with/in totality, a mutuality (metamorphosis) of 'human' (ordinary) and non-human (extra/non-ordinary or super-natural) being that is 'sacred' (at least in archaic culture) by virtue of 'straddling the fence' between 'dimensions of being.' Again, the image of 'incarnating divinity,' of being metamorphically half human and half god, is suggested. Yet, for 'humans,' being 'creatures' of the explicit, there appears ever an impulse to attempt to 'dwell' in the "implicate" status, to 'become one with god, is to seek an ideal 'transcendent status,' a fixed state that is not actually of fluid, "implicate explicate" nature, and thus reductively dangerous. Such a move would be from one exclusive reality (the ordinary or profane) to another (the non-ordinary or divine). To be 'permanently enlightened' or of-the-"implicate," would be to become 'divine' and preclude existence in/as "explicate" particularity (as 'ordinarily profane).

Such absolutist attempts to 'be with God' are expressed in "religious fundamentalism." It is just such 'exclusivity of status' that is 'impossible' in the context of 'totality.' For, 'to know God' as "implicate explicate," one must be (traumatically) alienated from the "implicate" and then (traumatically) alienated from the "explicate"—to 'be' both and neither. 'Experience,' or knowing of 'totalistic metamorphosis,' is not to be approached without trauma. But to 'transcend' its both/and<>neither/nor status would require obliteration of differential consciousness or manifestation which are intrinsic to totality. To be in/of such multidimensionality is then to 'experience,' or 'think the logic of' this dialectical 'dynamic of divine creativity' as "implicate explicate flowing/forming."

To know-by-participation that 'time in timelessness' constitutes connection to a multi-dimensionality of being would seem thus to be a 'knowing' of a plurality of creative levels of 'divinity.' Self/God/World are plural—both as "implicate<>explicate" and as the "multi-dimensional ground" of "implicate" infinity. An experience of the inseparable character of 'sacred' and 'profane' is thereby configured. The singularly-identified egoic function would seem unlikely to 'survive' such pluralistic 'orientation' without 'feeling relativized' in its importance—unless it 'identified with' that 'super-natural otherness' in a state of "inflation." Yet one would come to 'know' all this in part by being 'singularly' alienated from it in the 'profane' status of "explicate" from and its seeming-singularity—while 'actually' not being so in the context of 'sacred totality.' Such 'fullness' or 'inclusivity' of knowing would necessarily 'take place' in both an 'actual me' and an 'impossible not-not-me.'

Religion and the Domestication of “Wild” Identifications to Human “Structure”

In explicating the pluralizing effect of myth and the ‘mythic’ on identifications, it is useful to consider how the opposite effect can be generated by religious attitude. Religion as “the expression of man’s belief in and reverence for a superhuman power recognized as the creator and governor of the universe” versus religion as “any particular integrated system of this expression” suggests a distinction between archaic and non-archaic religious culture. (American Heritage Dictionary ‘78, 1099) The more ‘systematized’ and institutional religious life becomes, the more “normatively structural” and self-perpetuating an ‘entity’ it tends to function as. The ‘institutionalization’ of religious life and practice are historically identified with hierarchically structured civilized societies. Thus the ways in which ‘contact with the infinite’ is ‘used’ to form human “structures” tends to take on some differing characteristics in societies whose political and economic powers are configured by/as ‘the state.’

Eliade observes that religious practices tend to locate the origin of human culture ‘outside’ of human agency—as a gift or creation of ‘super humans’ or ‘Gods.’ That construction can be used to attempt to ‘maintain’ a relation of “human-structured” culture to the “implicate” or archetypal field of the “anti-structural” by ‘identifying’ with its multidimensional, immeasurable dynamism as in various ways the source of human society. (Recall Campbell’s similar notion of society being derived from nature but existing ‘within’ it.) Yet ‘relation with the divine’ can as easily be utilized for socio-political validation of existing socio-political “structure” in human society. In the latter case existing social structure is ‘projected’ onto the figures of the ‘Gods’ or tales of creation. In the former orientation ‘goddness’ is sought out as a manifestation of the non-human that can relativize humanistic perspectives of personalistic, egoically singular identification and political society. In the latter, the supposed ‘other world’ is configured to ‘justify’ the status quo of existing social “structures.” Thus there is always a question about whether ‘religious’ activity is an attempt to engage in affinity with some non-human, impersonal dynamism or to ‘worship’ the world as it is humanly ‘identified’ in existing “social structures.” One might term the latter an attempt to ‘domesticate’ the “anti-structural” “wild” by configuring it in terms of literalistic, humanistic concerns.

Historically, the latter maneuver actually seems to have been relatively successful in ‘acquiring’ human dominance over “wild” nature. Somehow modern culture has ‘harnessed’ the forces of ‘dragonness’ to its egoic wills by way of the modernist religion of ‘scientific materialism.’ Many would claim, however, that such ‘power’ has carried a devastating ‘cost’ to a sense of ‘participatory vitality’ and in human (and non-human) suffering.

Dogmatic Literalism as Equational Reduction

Myth is provocative in its fantastic and various figurings and tellings. Groupings of myths in any given cultural context (or “mythology”) most always present variations of particular story lines, of the specific traits of ‘mythic characters’ and events, complete with evident contradictions.

Wherever myths still are living symbols, the mythologies are teeming dreamworlds of such images. But wherever systematizing theologians have appeared and gained the day (the tough-minded [judging] in the gardens of the tender [feeling]) the figures have become petrified into propositions. Mythology is misread then as direct history or science, symbol becomes fact, metaphor dogma, and the quarrels of the sects arise, each mistaking its own symbolic signs for the ultimate reality—the local vehicle for its timeless, ineffable tenor. (Campbell, Flight of the Wild Gander 73)

The ‘reduction’ of myth to ‘factual truth’ “petrifies” its dynamism into “propositions.” It is no longer ‘mythic.’ What was polyvalent becomes an ‘equation,’ like a scientific formula of finite, linear movement rather than multi-dimensional ‘mythic’ movement.

[. . .] myths offer the multiplicity of meanings inherent in our lives, while theology and science attempt a singleness of meaning. Perhaps this is why mythology is the mode of speaking religion in polytheistic consciousness, and why monotheistic consciousness *writes* down theology. Polytheistic consciousness is ever reminded by myth of the ambiguity of meanings and the multiplicity of persons in each event in each moment. (Hillman, ReVisioning Psychology 158)

If polytheistic cultures tend to preserve the ‘mythic’ dynamism of myth as their mode of “speaking religion” while monotheistic ones tend to be more reductively dogmatic in their literary theology, then the move from many to one ‘God’ suggests a tendency to ‘domesticate’ the “wild” identifications of the ‘mythic’ by monotheistic religion. The irreducible variety of archetypal being of polytheistic religious expression becomes a singular identity confined by an impulse to maintain consistency and to generate all values of ethical social conduct. Dogmatic literalism appears more characteristic of the systematically monotheistic religions than any other.

Mythological identification, the living out of the myth, was terminated by separating the human from the divine. Dogmatism was substituted for conscious myth-making. Symbolic imagination was likewise curtailed by limiting the sacred to nonsensory concepts that cannot be seen and felt but only taught. Therefore they must be *believed*. Faith is no longer *pistis* (“trust in one’s own experience”) but henceforth blind acceptance, divorced from subjective personal experience. (Whitmont, Return of the Goddess 101)

With the termination of “mythological identification,” of ‘identifying’ with/as the ‘mythic’ dynamic through its non-literal images and their ‘movement,’ human participation in “the divine” becomes disabled. As the divine gets experienced less as feeling it gets posed more as dogmatic proposition to be *believed*. Idealistic belief can thus become the basis of ‘religious life.’ Yet even in the context of dogmatic monotheism there continues to be emphasis on ‘metaphoric’ meaning, though it can

get 'literalized' as a fact in which one could only 'believe.' Again, contrasts in hemispheric brain function exemplify such a 'dilemma' in determining the 'truth' of 'reality.'

So now if we go back to the proposition about the bread and the wine [over which Catholics and Protestants burned each other], we find that to the left hemisphere of the brain, it is perfectly sensible to say that the bread "stands for" the body or is a symbol for the body. To the right hemisphere, the side that dreams, this means nothing at all. To the right hemisphere, the bread *is* the body, or it's irrelevant. In the right side of the brain, there are no "as ifs," metaphors are not labeled "metaphors." They're not turned into similes. This is a good part of the problem with schizophrenic people, with whom I dealt with for a long time. They are more Catholic than the Catholics, so to speak. They feel rather strongly that the metaphoric is the absolute [. . .]. (Bateson, A Sacred Unity 266-67)

That a dogmatic monotheism could as easily literalize either the left or the right hemispheric 'perspective' on 'reality' demonstrates that 'empirical fact' is not the core concern of such reduction—rather, 'literalistic' or absolutist assertion is. Since the capacity to 'feel' participation with a 'divine' field of "implicate" movement in 'mythic' dynamism is thusly abrogated and belief in a 'given actuality' has become the basis of religious life, then the main concern is to assert 'a' particular, literalized symbol in which to 'believe.' But such an attitude led to the most vicious religious wars in all history—civil wars between adherents of the same basic religious idea, Christianity. The notion of what is 'sacred,' the literalized metaphor or the symbolic reference, became exceedingly 'deadly' in the context of the identifications generated by monotheism.

Now, it is my suspicion that the richest use of the word "sacred" is that use which will say that what matters is the *combination* of the two, getting the two together. [left and right hemispheric perspectives] And that any fracturing of the two is, shall we say, anti-sacred. In which case the Roman Catholics and the Protestants of the fifteenth century were equally anti-sacred in their battles. The bread both is and *stands for* the body. (Bateson, A Sacred Unity 266-67)

If the 'sacred' is posed as either 'one way' or 'the other' it cannot be inclusive, it cannot be a notion or image that 'holds' the dynamical movement of totalistic flowing and forming. If the 'sacred' is posed such that it 'equals' a singular, reductive, or static 'thing' as 'fact' or 'ideal' it cannot be of the immeasurable, the infinite, "anti-structural" realm.

Belief in categories of "purity and danger," of Self and Other, or Tame and Wild, is certainly a characteristic of all cultures; but the degree of preoccupation with this, the sharpness of the boundaries, is so severe in the modern period as to catapult it into a different category of existence. (Berman 82)

A 'puritanical categorization' has contributed to creation of the "category of existence" of 'equational reality,' whereby the 'real' *can* and *should* always be 'reduced' to an exact, positivized empiricism—just as there can only be *one* God and one version of 'the sacred.' The central 'belief' in dogmatic reduction persisted from scholastic Christianity to the 'culture of religious scientific materialism.' It remains the 'religious attitude' of supposedly secular and 'scientific' modernity.

Ethical Orientations and Binary Binds on ‘Mythic Dynamism’

The ‘problem’ of moral and ethical behavior in human society is often posed in the ‘mythical style’ of representation. As with socio-political society’s motives to preserve its status quo when figuring ‘the divine,’ the human need for ethical (“structural”) restraint on ‘in-humane’ impulses (the savage, brutal, violent, abusive, domineering, demeaning behavior of individuals or groups toward others) often seeks validation in the realm of non-human agencies. As noted, human society seeks models and justification for the “structural” order required to govern individual behavior (and thus maintain a given society) from a source ‘beyond the ordinary references of that society—be it as ‘God’s law’ or ‘natural law.’

This theme in itself suggests the human need for a plural sense of agency that will ‘relativize’ the inflation of singular egoic identity *as* human culture: the realm of ‘human agency’ seems to require an infusion of ‘non-human’ agency in its efforts to ‘behave itself.’ In an archaic cultural context of pervasive ‘identification’ with and participation *in* nature/the world, ‘mythical’ dynamism, readily derived from pragmatic intimacy with the archetypal dynamics of natural ‘order,’ ‘vitalizes’ cultural life *and* ‘informs’ the “structural” rules for ethical conduct by the requirements natural environment imposes on social life. Behavior is often regulated by taboos that represent human relations with natural forces and their ‘personified’ representations as divinities and spirits.

The more alienated human identity becomes from nature/the world by way of civilized “structure,” domestication and technological development (the more oppositional the identifications of human and non-human), then the more social ethics appear to become opposed to the “wild” and thus ‘unnatural.’ Generally, the greater the cultural differentiation between human and non-human, the more anthropomorphic become the figurations of the non-human, or ‘supernatural’ powers/agencies—i.e., the more humanly ‘personalistic’ become the figurings of “implicate” or archetypal forces. The ‘gods’ of the otherworldly flow of “anti-structural” creative generativity become the (civilized) ‘gods’ of human “structural” mentality—the ‘sources’ of social ethics. This move appears most extreme in monotheistic religions. ‘Mythic’ dynamism is thereby caught in the ‘binary binding’ of oppositional mentality when societal “structure” is ‘projected’ onto the “anti-structural” ‘other world’ and the moral/ethical/political “structure” of society is represented as myth which ‘sanctifies’ that “structure” by virtue of ‘coming from non-human agency.’ This distinction is not to say that archaic culture is ‘free’ of such projection, but rather that ‘civilized’ societies have more domesticated “structure” to “project” upon nature/the world.

There may well be ‘ethics’ of a sort inherent in the totalistic “implicate< >explicate” field—such as discernible ‘patterns’ of ‘egalitarian’ inter-activity *of* psyche. But these will not be simple oppositional rules derived from linear causality in the “explicate” field or ordinary human

identifications—of personal political concerns. The Ten Commandments may be ‘justly’ applied to human individuals in the context of “explicate structural” society. In myth such rules are found to seldom apply to ‘the gods,’ those “implicate” archetypal agencies from/around which “explicate” form manifests. Myth *as* ‘mythic’ is thus distinguished from more principally ethical religious doctrine and belief by its irreducibility to ethics. Its multidimensionality is an expression of impersonal forces rather than personal or social concerns. Religious narratives concerned with ‘divine directives’ for human social conduct are thus ‘mythically’ suspect.

Despite their graphic description of action and detail, myths resist being interpreted into practical life. They are not allegories of applied psychology, solutions to personal problems. This is the old moralistic fallacy about them, now become the therapeutic fallacy, telling us which step to take and what to do next [. . .]. (Hillman, ReVisioning Psychology 158)

To ‘pragmatize’ myth for ‘use’ in the context of ‘ordinary’ human concerns tends to violate its dynamism, which is not suited to ‘obeying the rules.’ Similarly in religion and psychological therapy, the ‘ethical’ is a humanistic/egoic concern for which ‘the Gods’ or psyche may have no regard. “God is no respecter of persons,” read the gospels. Basing religious life on moral ethics thus inherently collapses the ‘mythic’ manifestation of totalistic ‘reality’ and thereby the opportunity for human participation in same.

By closing off the psyche from the direct experiencing of the living cosmos, modern rationalism has deprived humanity of conscious contact with the divine. The lean diet of ascetic rationality that promoted ego growth threatens to starve our souls and destroy our world. We have lost the visibility of the living God. God is dead for us. We have been taught all too well to look for the divine only in the imperative world of “Thou shalt.” For lack of imagination we cannot see any spark of divine reality, except perhaps as a poetic metaphor, not to be taken really seriously [. . .]. (Whitmont 101)

Binary Opposition of Personal and Impersonal Agency as Religious Psychology of Relation

However, the above dire consequences of moralistic monotheism having been acknowledged, as a model of human < > non-human relation it effectively poses a potent psychological confrontation. While the more pervasive and ancient religious theme appears to be one of “mythological identification” that enables the ‘ordinarily human’ perspectives to ‘participate’ in the ‘divine’ field of ‘mythic dynamism,’ the monotheistic theme is one of utter opposition between divine and human.

The oxymoron, self-contradictory, the paradox, the transcendent symbol, pointing beyond itself, is the gateless gate, the sun-door, the passage beyond categories. Gods and Buddhas in the Orient are, accordingly, not final terms—like Yaweh, the Trinity, and Allah, in the West—but point beyond themselves to that ineffable being, consciousness, and rapture that is the all in all of us. And in their worship, the ultimate aim is to effect in the devotee a psychological transformation through a shift of this plane of vision from the passing to the enduring, through

which he may come finally to realize in experience (not simply as an article of faith) that he is identical with that before which he bows. These are, then *religions of identity*. Their mythologies and associated rites, philosophies, sciences, and arts, are addressed, in the end, not to the honor of any god ‘out there’ but to the recognition of divinity within. (Campbell, Flight of the Wild Gander 197-98)

“Religions of identity” bring the human and non-human into metamorphic identification, or mutuality. That move is surely meant to, at least momentarily, obliterate the inherent oppositional alienation of ‘humanness’ from ‘the world.’

But now, in irreconcilable contrast to this ancient, practically universal mode of experience of the world’s and one’s own dimension of divinity, which I have termed “mythic identification,” there is the order of beliefs derived from the biblical tradition, where Yahweh, as we know (arriving very late on the scene), cursed the serpent of the Garden, and with it the whole earth, which he seems to have thought he had created. Here God creates the World and the two are *not* the same: Creator and Creature, ontologically distinct, are *not* to be identified with each other in any way. In fact, an experience of identity is the prime heresy of these systems and punishable by death. Their formula, therefore, is not, as in the earlier and more general order, $a \neq x$, but a is related to x: aRx .

And what is the medium of their relationship? The local social group. For example, in the Hebrew context: God has ordained a Covenant with a certain Semitic people. (Campbell, Flight of the Wild Gander 202)

To be “ontologically distinct” from the creational powers, the “implicate flowing,” created by but not of it, is to be ‘ultimately’ alienated from it. Such a religious attitude, combining with ancient Greek material philosophy, seems to have come to constitute the modernist mentality. Thus the ‘problem’ of ‘being human’ versus non-human is given its most extreme and ‘thought’ provoking configuration. “Oneness” with the ‘divine’ creational flow is deemed ‘impossible.’ One is either its inferior creation in overtly religious terms, or a consciousness ‘outside’ the realm of objective nature in the rationalist perspective. The only religious attitude then open is one of ‘relation,’ in contrast to one of conjunction. Such ‘relationship’ was figured around issues of ethical morality by Judeo-Christian thought in which the arrogance of singularly egoic human identity was ‘commanded’ by the divine to obey God’s law and ‘participate’ in respectful collectivity—but only among humans.

The ‘scientific revolution’ of late modernism subsequently dispensed with the literalized metaphor of an ethical ‘God’ that demanded human obedience to ‘His’ ethical dictates, but continued the emphasis on the alienation of human consciousness from the world in its objectified perspective. The division between divine and human persisted in that between mind and matter. The ‘divide’ that had been configured between the ethically sacred divinity and the ethically profane human became that between a privileged human intelligence and the inanimate world of nature/matter. Curiously, the superior position of the divine became ‘transposed’ with that of human intelligence in the ideals of Humanism. Where God had been the judge and ‘measurer’ of all things now stood ‘Man.’

Yet it was that very 'trajectory' of human thought and its figurations that seems to have instigated the 'divine insights' of the notions of the 'new physics' and Bohm's empirically theoretical basis for participation that re-configures 'mythical dynamism' as a 'creational realm' of the 'really' 'un-real real.' Thus the very repression of participation (previously induced as "mythological identification") in the absolutist opposition of human > <divine seems to have contributed to a radical re-figuring of human alienation and the 'metamorphosis' of 'participation-by-feeling' to 'participation-by-dialectical-thought.' The binary opposition of personal (human) and impersonal (non-human/divine) agency thus seems to have 'begotten' the context for a 'religious psychology of relation' by way of the logic of pluralistic psyche engaged in 'depth' psychology's 'relational practice' of egoic < >non-egoic co-operation.

'Mythic Movement' as Ritual Enactment: The Sensible Activity of "Implicate" Creativity

Many mythologists, as exemplified by Jane Ellen Harrison, postulate that myth is a narrative form of expression derived from historically preceding ritual conduct. In this view, 'mythic' dynamism would have been expressed firstly in ritual actions, the experience of which became re-presented as myth. Such a 'sequence' of expressive development suggests that 'mythic dynamism' is initially a 'felt' phenomenon, even though a 'thingless thing.' The notion that the contemporary context of as 'post'-modernity enables a 'religious psychology of relation' between the human < >in-human/divine might be seen as a 'development' in such an historical sequence of cultural engagement with human alienation as suggested in this ritual > myth model. That 'movement' might be figured as ritual > myth > dialectical psychology. Yet this is not to suggest that one 'form' of engaging the 'non-ordinary' is superior to the others. Rather, an effectively pluralistic knowing is likely to require all three. Thus consideration of the 'mythical dynamism' of ritual enactment is essential to an understanding of 'inclusive knowing.'

Ritualization aims at the conscious enactment of archetypal drives, or emotional urges in ways that are socially and personally acceptable, while expressive, at least symbolically, of the intent of those urges. Although verbalization brings the drive to conscious expression, concrete nonverbal expressions carry consciousness more deeply into the substrata of the drive and are essential for clarification and transformation. (Whitmont 24-25)

The archetypally specific "impulses" of "implicate" agency which 'take form' in human "urges" or "drives" are variously viewed as both 'creative' and 'destructive' depending on 'how' and 'where' enacted in the context of social "structure." Ritualization enables these impulses or 'energies' to be 'given form' in a context or 'container' of reflective human consciousness. Thusly they can be 'enacted' deliberately rather than 'acted out' reflexively in ways that violate normative social ethics.

Through ritual energy is incarnated and the passage from one state to another is enacted. [. . .] The conscious personality can learn to disidentify itself from the affects evoked while at the

same time relating to them. A pattern of wholeness is found that enables one to endure the tensions of mutually opposing emotions and to balance affects with ego intents and needs. Ritual offers us an alternative to repression for dealing with potentially overpowering affect. (Whitmont 235-36)

To “incarnate energy” in archetypal patterns by enactment would seem to be ‘inevitable’ if their “implicate” status is to be ‘moved’ into more tangibly “explicate” form that can then become the “thought forms” of myth or theory and thus function as “organs of reality.” Again it seems appropriate to associate such a description with the notion of ‘transubstantiation’ of ‘spirit’ into ‘matter’ represented by ‘sacred’ rites like the Catholic mass. But deliberately to engage in such ‘metamorphic’ enactment for the purpose of enabling the “conscious personality” to “disidentify itself from the affects evoked while at the same time relating to them” is a means of developing an ‘unidentified egoic function.’ Such a ‘practice’ in ritualizing, and by which “a pattern of wholeness is found that enables one to endure the tensions of mutually opposing emotions” seems to bring one’s conscious awareness into contact with the non-ordinary expression of “implicate” flow coming into form as one’s own (psychosomatic “implicate > explicate”) being that is concurrently ‘now’ *and* ‘always.’

To re-experience that time, to re-enact it as often as possible, to witness again the spectacle of the divine works, to meet with the Supernaturals and relearn their creative lesson is the desire that runs like a pattern through all the ritual reiterations of myths. (Eliade, Myth and Reality 19)

Whether rituals “reiterate myth” or myth narrates the metamorphic experience of ritualization, the aim seems to be one of enabling a deliberate context for reflection on or observation of the infusion of the ‘impersonal’ into one’s personal field by way of enacting a ‘sensible’ experience of ‘mythic dynamism’. The ‘invisible’ takes ‘shape’ in the “intellectual thought forms” of myth and the ‘intangible’ is ‘felt’ in the ‘mythic’ dynamism of metamorphic ritual enactment. Thus the ‘mythic’ “organs of reality” are both formed as thingless figurations *and* phenomenal activity. Just how the narrative forms of myth re-present such experience might be studied for historical ‘trends’ toward a more overt expression of the inducement of conscious reflection of egoic identity upon individual plurality. In so far as psychology is considered ‘mythical,’ and even ‘ritualistic,’ a case can be made for ‘psychological era’ of modernity as a ‘stage’ of such ‘development.’

Ritual Making of Human Reflective Consciousness by Initiating Identity into Alienation

It does not seem unreasonable to assume some connection between the development of reflective consciousness or thought and a degree of ‘dis-identification’ of egoic function in the ‘personal’ psyche. The capacity of the egoic ‘identifying function’ to ‘consider’ various simultaneous identifications of self/other/world would enable a greater capacity for ‘reflection’—both more perspectives to reflect from and aspects of self to reflect upon. Yet such a status implies a differentiation of egoic function from

,
'primary personas' and attendant habits of reflexive identification. As noted, such a loosening of habitual identity usually proves difficult to attain. As discussed above, archaic cultures seemed to determine that before the personal identity could engage the impersonal concerns of collective adult society and the creational realm of the 'un-real real' it had to 'suffer' subjection to initiatory ordeals.

Initiation strips away what a person has and who he or she has been. It involves, first of all, losing everything or giving all that one has in order to become no one before becoming someone again. (Meade, Men and the Waters of Life 146)

During initiation someone or something other than our usual "self" takes charge. The "ego," the usual ruler of the person, must submit to some other force or authority and lets things go. All of the awareness and attention a person has will be needed to endure the ordeals. So, there is a loosening of personal identity that allows hidden, undeveloped, even denied aspects of the self to appear. (Meade 164)

When "someone or something other than our usual "self" takes charge" and the "ego," the usual ruler of the person, submits to some other force or authority and lets things go," 'identity chaos' can be experienced within a 'psychical container' or 'alchemical vessel' of a collectively sustained context such as initiatory ritual. In alchemical terms, the 'form' of 'self identity' can 'putrefy' while 'held' in a context enabling re-constitution.

In the scenario of initiatory rites, "death" corresponds to the temporary return to Chaos; hence it is the paradigmatic expression of the *end of a mode of being*— the mode of ignorance and of the child's irresponsibility. Initiatory death provides the clean slate on which will be written the successive revelations whose end is the formation of a new man. [. . .] we must note that this new life is conceived as the true human existence, for it is open to the values of spirit. What is understood by the generic term "culture," comprising all the values of spirit, is accessible only to those who have been initiated. (Eliade, Rites and Symbols xiii)

The notion that when a "new life is conceived as the true human existence" because "it is open to the values of spirit" can be taken to mean that one has 'matured' into an 'identity' that participates in the impersonal flow of agency from 'beyond' the formerly 'ordinary' sense-of-self. That 'transit' is generated by becoming 'alien' to one's previous sense-of-self, or that 'identity' becoming 'alien' to the 'new' experience of other and world. Ritualized initiations then allow one to be 'remade' by conscious engagement with 'non-human' agency characterizable as "spirit."

For archaic thought, then, man is *made*—he does not make himself all by himself. It is the old initiates, the spiritual masters, who make him. But these masters apply what was revealed to them at the beginning of Time by the Supernatural Beings. They are only the representatives of those Beings; indeed, in many cases they incarnate them. This is as much to say that in order to become a man, it is necessary to resemble a mythical model. Man recognizes himself as such (that is, as man) to the extent to which he is no longer a "natural man," to which he is made a second time, in obedience to a paradigmatic and transhuman canon. The initiatory new birth is not natural, though it is sometimes expressed in obstetric symbols. [. . .] The second, initiatory birth does not repeat the first, biological birth. To attain the initiate's mode of being demands knowing realities that are not a part of nature but of the biography of the Supernatural Beings, hence of the sacred history preserved in myth. (Eliade, Rites and Symbols of Initiation xiv)

Essential to this ‘alchemy’ of a reconstituted sense of self/other/world is the ‘unnatural birth’ that ‘enacts’ the participation with ‘powers’ located somehow ‘outside’ ordinary sense of ‘nature.’

In mythic perspective nature is not merely known, it is enacted. “Nature yields nothing without ceremonies,” Cassirer has observed; he might almost have ventured the more radical judgment that nature *is* nothing without ceremonies, for in order to know nature truly in a mythopoeic way one must engage in the gestures and ritual acts which bring oneself into active communion. [. . .] we can say that primitive acts of participation in nature must be undertaken tribally, or by a cult or totem group within the tribe. Mythos, then, is not self-intelligible; it has to be studied in the context of rite and ceremony which have engendered it or which at any rate have modeled its distinctive form. (Wheelwright, Burning Fountain 154)

To ‘enact nature’ is thus to ‘act’ as/in the agency of the archetypal expression of “implicate” flow. Or, following Duerr, to ‘cross over the fence into the wild,’ Turner’s “anti-structural” field, and thus to ‘know’ the personal human by ‘reflecting’ upon it from ‘outside’—as an ‘alien.’ Such experience *and* the engagement with “intellectual forms” that are the “organs” of such a ‘reality,’ *make* one more “*truly human,*” indeed, *constitute* one’s humanness as ‘apart from’ nature. Yet such a ‘maturation’ must necessarily be devastating to a formerly non-reflective, un-differentiated sense of self and reality.

Ritual knowledge is rendered unforgettable only if it makes serious demands on individuals and communities, only if it is etched deeply into the marrow of soul and society. A rite of passage is more than a mere moment in which participants get carried away emotionally, only to be returned to their original condition afterward. [. . .] when effective rites of passage are enacted, they carry us from here to there in such a way that we are unable to return to square one. To enact any kind of rite is to perform, but to enact a rite of passage is also to transform. (Grimes, Deeply Into The Bone 6-7)

To ‘effect’ a genuinely radical change in identification is to “*perform*” a “*transform-ing,*” to ‘metamorphose’ and be deliberately ‘held’ in that status to facilitate a ‘reflective’ perspective, a dialectical perception *and* experience of one’s or the world’s multidimensional status and the place of the ‘personal’ with/in the ‘impersonal.’

The individual life is “made” in those initiatory moments when the individual sees both ways into their own soul. The validity of that vision can only be verified by a return to community. A man cannot look back accurately enough or forward long enough if he is standing alone and isolated; there is just too much confusion, illusion, and disillusionment to be able to face it alone. Unless enough men can gather together and hold the genuine threads of their lives so that the pattern of community and of elders can be seen, even temporarily, there’s no promise of healing waters ahead. (Meade 19)

A “seeing both ways” is so devastating to the habitually conditioned egoic-identity that if it is not ‘supported’ in a collective context of other ‘initiates’ it may be ‘unsustainable’ and the totalistic perspective dissipates. The ‘initiate’ is not only ‘alienated’ from historically habitual identification by way of experiencing an ‘alien world’ but is, by way of any metamorphic experience, alienated

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from/among the plurality of selves exposed. Given a choice, most any individual person would refuse to submit to such an alienation without some social coercion. However, that sort of deliberate subjugation of an individual's personalistic persona to initiatory trials is unethical in a culture of personal identity. Yet 'life' itself subjects individuals to intense distress of their personalistic "persona." People suffer intense distress in attempting to maintain these identities when faced with traumas and oppositions. Threats to habitual identity engendered by loss of a job, divorce, death of a loved one, or the mere sense of personal insignificance in a 'competitive collective' can be experienced as a 'struggle for survival.' One can reasonably ask what the differences might actually be between ritualized initiatory subjugation of persona identity and the inchoate agony of modernist alienation of the individual. As Meade notes, 'life' initiates us, but ritual culture acknowledges this 'fact' and enables reflective experience of it in a context that validates the distress and its metamorphic 'revelation' of a more totalistic sense-of-self.

Hence, we must guard against being misled by the aberrant aspect of some initiatory mutilations or tortures. We must not forget that, on the level both of primitive and of more developed cultures, the strange and the monstrous are expressions frequently used to emphasize the transcendence of the spiritual. (Eliade, Rites and Symbols of Initiation 28)

"The strange and the monstrous" are acknowledged by 'depth' psychological theory as 'pathologized' expressions of repressed psyche—repressed by the un-relativized tyranny of egoically personalized identity. 'Depth' psychological therapy thus becomes a 'substitute' for, or perhaps, following Giegerich, a 'sublated' form of ritualistic religious culture, that attempts to assist individuals in 'remembering' the rest of their selves.

The religious ceremonies are, then, festivals of memory. "Knowing" means learning the central myth (the murder of the divinity and its consequences) and endeavoring never to forget it. The real sacrilege is to *forget* the divine act. "Wrong," "sin," "sacrilege" is "not remembering" that the present form of human existence is the reality of a divine act. (Eliade, Myth and Reality 107)

The "murder of the divinity" for moderns is the 'forgetting' of the 'divine activity' as "implicate" or "anti-structural" agency. "Not remembering that the present form of human existence is the reality of a divine act," an 'activity' of personal *and* impersonal agencies, is a failure to 'participate' in 'mythic dynamism' by deliberately precipitating it. That inter-activity becomes human and 'personally experienced' when 'remembered' by being 'initiated' into reflective alienation from singular and 'natural' sense-of-self. Ritual enactment 'makes' or precipitates a conscious context for embodiment of inherent fragmentary or alienated status that then enables reflection on a 'super-natural' totality that 'contains' the evident fragmentation.

Participating the Precipitation of Myth: Telling and Enacting identifications with the ‘Un-real real’

In the absence of collectively enacted ritual culture there are still contexts in which some engagement of ‘mythic dynamism’ is collectively manifested. The most accessible is a group engagement with myths, or tellings in ‘mythical’ style, by which identifications are multiplied through the expression of different individuals’ ‘sense’ of the meanings of the “intellectual forms” of ‘mythic’ imagery and narrative action presented. A storyteller or performer can facilitate the context for this interactive generation that both precipitates and participates the multi-dimensional field of the ‘un-real real.’

I’ve told this story [of The Lizard in the Fire] many times, to groups of men alone, to whole villages of women and men, to people of all colors and ages. When I tell it, the story itself acts like a fire thrown into the center of the room. Everyone who answers the burning questions adds to the fire because each answer sparks others who disagree. Everyone faces each other across the fire. The discussion of the story becomes a ritual of disagreement. The conflicts inherent in the audience come to the surface, and the fire of disagreement makes the audience into a community. (Meade 113)

“The burning questions” of peoples’ lives, of the conflicts of personal and impersonal forces, of the crippling limitations of un-relativized egoic “persona,” of traumatic lack of maturity in uninitiated adult identities, of the unexpressed complexes in individual and collective psyches, all tend to be provoked by such stories that manifest ‘mythical dynamism.’ Even though the story itself cannot constitute an ‘initiatory ritual,’ it generates a field for interaction that allows the ‘participants’ to gain some ‘validation’ of the inherent ‘initiatory events’ of their lives by collectively engaging the contradictory plurality of their sense-of-self/other/world.

Without rituals that show how mother and child walk together to a certain line and then separate, the psyches of mother and of child will continue to share a psychic skin. The story says that the line must be drawn by the community and that a lizard must die to mark the spot; otherwise, everyone will go back to living as before.[. . .]

In order to move the mother, there must be a place where the mother can go. [. . .] For the mother, the cloak on the other side of the fire is that worn by the wise old woman in stories. If a village doesn’t offer its mothers such a cloak, the mother gets stuck in a literal position. (Meade 116)

The ‘mythic dynamism’ of such a story’s figuration resonates with the same ‘movement’ of ‘impersonal agencies’ that shape one’s ‘personal’ and social life—but which social ethics and “structures” necessarily do not ‘figure.’ The ‘mythic’ events and images make these dynamisms ‘thinkable.’

Clothes, cloaks, and skins are being changed in the lizard’s fire. In the process, the main characters must become nakedly human, and they must be burned a little, scarred a little, in order to learn who they must become. No great change can occur, no birth, without something dying. The lizard moves from the waters of birth to the fire of death, and everyone watching sees something of himself or herself dying in the fire and something else coming out of the flames. Change is the essence of initiation. (Meade 119)

Such 'mythic' telling and the pluralizing collective responses to its "organs of reality" open up the field of habitual identifications to the 'invisible' and 'intangible.' A torrent of repressed sense of complexity is precipitated in these 'discussions,' enabling a collective participation in that 'divine agency' of archetypal formulation as a group struggles with many different 'senses' of meaning and significance in the 'mythical' images and events of the story. 'Ordinary life' is given a context for expression and discussion that is 'extra-ordinary' in such a context. Participation in such discussion by utilizing the 'mythically dynamic' images and events of the story brings the participants into the role of 'precipitating' that dynamic of expression and being. Ordinary ethical and "structural" social concerns can be considered from 'outside' "structural norms" by 'entering' the 'mythically dynamic' field of the story where right and wrong are not binary oppositions. People can witness themselves and each other speaking at one moment from ethical concerns and the next from a perspective of "wild" psyche's need to be given expression—in conscious 'thought form' if not unconscious 'acting-out.' Such engagement of 'real' life in/as the 'un-real real' enacts the play of the plurality of psychic being.

Altered States and Re-orientation of Identity Consciousness: Induction of Non-ordinary Epistemics through Dance, Song, Meditation, Sport, Psychoactive Pharmacology, Sexual Behavior, and Conflict

Participatory precipitation by sense-of-self or identity of/in 'mythical dynamism' is viewed here as being stimulated variously, if un-reflectively, by all activities which somehow alter the ordinary identifications or engage non-egoic aspects of self in creative generation. The general effect of such activity can be associated with the term altered states. The most common in contemporary culture may be sport and sexual behavior. But a cultural habit of posing athletic capacity as an almost exclusively egoic act of personal will power tends to obliterate an awareness of manifestation of any impersonal agency. A similar tendency to context sexual behavior as 'satisfaction of personal appetite' also seems to diminish awareness of 'becoming other.' Dance, song, meditation and psycho-active drugs are all ancient 'techniques' capable of displacing the dominant position of habitual identity. But again, in a culture of personalistic individualism, whatever the experience of 'otherness' of self or world that might be activated by such 'enactments,' conscious reflection and the radical 'thinking' of non-egoic identifications is systematically dampened. The 'experience' tends to be regarded as a 'performance' of the individual, personal self.

Conflict, particularly that which poses a literal threat to the existence of the 'personal self' as in physical or military combat, also manifest conditions for a 'dismemberment' of habitual identity. But 'war' is seldom approached as an initiatory 'ritual of self-revelation' in 'civilized ethical society.' It is, rather, viewed as personal heroism or 'sacrifice.' Personal trauma, be it physical or psychological, poses

potentially 'initiatory' contexts for habitual identity, though again, a larger context supporting reflection and valuation of the ensuing 'chaos' is rarely generated by a socio-cultural collectivity.

Nonetheless, it is important to note that such 'activity' asserts the capacity to induce the infusion of persons with 'sensible' presence of non-ordinary dynamics of identity and 'reality'—whether or not they 'know' what they are 'doing'. If people are capable of 'doing' so 'unconsciously' then there remains the possibility of doing so 'reflectively,' regardless of cultural resistances. Bateson's observations of such enactments in Balinese culture over 50 years ago contributed directly to his radical insights into the epistemological construction of 'reality.'

[Regarding three images of a woman becoming a witch] It seems that to embark upon a horrendous "trip" in the realms of altered consciousness a woman should go out in the night with a small altar, a live chicken, and small offerings (*segehan*) for the chthonic demons. All alone she will then dance with her left foot on the chicken and her right hand on the altar. As she dances she will gradually assume the shape and appearance of the witch (*Raganda*).

In other words, whether or not the Balinese "know" what they are doing and intend this outcome, they somehow sense and recognize in art that their kinesthetic socialization prepares the individual for altered consciousness—for temporary escape from the ego-organized world.

The use of dance as an entry into ecstasy and an ego-alien world is ancient and perhaps worldwide, but the Balinese (and perhaps every people) have their particular version of this pathway. (Bateson, *A Sacred Unity* 85)

Certain movements of the body, specific sequences of neuro-muscular manipulations, effect balance and can contribute to an alteration of ordinary body/mind consciousness. A non-ordinary sense-of-self can thus be precipitated and thereby participation in a multi-dimensional status, a metamorphic moment of identity, can become accessible to reflective cognition *if* a non-identified aspect of egoic function is present to 'think' it. The mere induction of such 'experience' by "esoteric" practices does not constitute a reflective awareness that can enable a sense of plurality. It is all too easy, particularly in a literalistic cultural setting, to regard the 'experience' of such 'non-ordinary consciousness' in the same egoically identified manner one 'sees' and 'interprets' the 'ordinary status.'

This tendency to extend or perpetuate 'ordinary identifications' into 'extra-ordinary' contexts is pervasive in both individuals and collective groups intent on preserving their singular and oppositional identifications, or, those 'un-initiated' into reflective dis-identification with manifest psychic plurality. The impulse to resist dissolution of habitual identity, whether in scientists clinging to the theories they have 'personally identified with,' religious groups asserting righteousness, or political groups seeking to preserve their social power, marshals intense psychic energy. From such an impulse's perspective, literal death of the person-as-organism is often preferable to being 'relativized' to a larger totality of psychic valuation and existence. Entrenched habitual identity usually seeks to preserve its dominance of sense-of-self/other/world by denial or projective interpretation of experience and notions that contradict its version of 'reality' and 'truth.' There is no shortage of historical example of how defiant assertion of personal or collective persona can lead to disastrous consequences.

Of Myth and Fantasy: Experiencing the ‘Un-Real’ as Mythical Dynamism of Psychic Totality versus Personalistic Drama

While habitual identity orients itself in a context of the ‘real,’ so identified by its categories of discrimination, the ‘un-real’ as ‘exaggeration,’ ‘hyperbolic statement,’ overt metaphor, and ‘un-realistic fantasy’ are almost ever-present in ordinarily descriptive language. The references in this study suggest that it is of utmost importance to distinguish whether such expression ‘serves’ the ‘self-interest’ of the habitual sense of self/other/world or disrupts and re-oriens those ‘identifications’ within a ‘larger field’ of psychic totality.

Considering such a distinction requires a context of the notion of psychic plurality. Even if the ‘conscious awareness’ in habitual identity does not register the ‘mythical dynamism’ of ‘un-real real’ expressions, some ‘unconscious’ aspect of psyche might register and respond to such expressions. But it is only ‘conscious awareness’ that we have relatively ‘direct’ analytical access to for evaluation of how the ‘un-real’ is registered, and whether it is acknowledged as some ‘un-real real’ or ‘merely’ a ‘signification’ for, or symbolic reference to, the concerns and valuations of the ‘reality’ of habitual identifications.

This concern about whether the ‘un-real’ in expression is experienced ‘mythically’ or not relates to Turner’s distinction between “liminal” and “liminoid.” Recall that he applies the term “liminality” to a status that is not just ‘outside’ of ordinary status but is regarded as the ‘creational’ source of the ordinary. The ordinary and habitual are thus ‘deconstructed’ by experience of the “liminal.” Referring to the ‘figure’ of the threshold, “liminality” is not ‘on the other side’ but ‘in/between.’ The ‘other world’ is not simply the opposite or mirror image of this one, it is utterly ‘other’ than this one *and* the *source* of this one which also *pervades* this one. Habitual identity cannot maintain its ‘grip’ on its singular version of ‘reality’ in the context of experiencing such a shift in status—though it may attempt to do so, and immediately after such experience successfully re-instate its dominance over identifications. This notion further complicates the assessment of whether the ‘un-real’ is experienced as some ‘un-real real’ because there obviously can either be no such conscious experience or it can occur and be readily de-valued and repressed by ordinary identity. After some non-ordinary experience individuals are often known to say words to the effect of: “I don’t know what the hell that was, but I’m glad It’s over.”

In contrast to the ‘utterly alienating’ contexting of “anti-structural liminality,” Turner poses the notion of “liminoid.” This latter status is located in a configuration centered upon ordinary or “normative structural” status of society and individual, rather than within or ‘around’ some ‘super-

natural' field. Whatever does not fit those habitual identifications of society and self is "marginalized," to use another of Turner's terms. "Liminoid" status is experienced 'outside' the normative, and is thus 'marginal' and so of less value. Habitual social and personalistic identity thus have little to 'fear' from the 'marginal' and "liminoid" since these are never made 'central,' not 'sanctified' as "liminality," by association with a 'super-ordinary' reality. However, "liminoid" context and experience can be 'useful' in relieving the distresses of maintaining habitual identity and conformity to collective social standards.

The term fantasy, in this context, is being used to identify expressions of an 'un-real' character relative to habitual sense-of-self/other/world that are experienced as "liminoid." Such is the realm of 'entertainment.' The peripheral, marginal, 'other,' are 'entertained' or 'entertaining' (as in diverting, distracting, titillating), for the habitual identity but not threatening—not capable of 'relativizing' it to a larger psycho-somatic totality. Thus the "liminoid," whether as fantastic stories and images or marginalized persons on the periphery of social norms, can function as a field for projecting repressed psychic issues and unethical impulses. These representations often take the form of personalistic social dramas where habitual identities 'compete' for dominance in a literalistic fashion but the 'un-real' character of expressions does not constitute 'mythical' dynamism or 'archetypal truth.' Movies, novels, and popular song are primary contexts for such "liminoid" performances, while socially marginal individuals such as "The Homeless' and 'threatening foreign demons' such as "Islamic Terrorists" serve as 'projections screens' for repressed internal aspects of self and society.

However, if the perspectives on psychic plurality presented here are accurate to a 'knowing' of psycho-dynamics, then there exists a 'necessity' for habitual identifications to be 'relativized.' If such an 'inversion' of identity status does not occur or is not registered by egoic function, the metamorphic dynamism of psyche can be assumed to seek expression either as exaggeration of fantasy production or an "acting out" of such energies literalistically, if 'unconsciously.' As Romanyshyn elaborates in Technology as Symptom and Dream, modernist technological productivity appears to be just such a 'literalized' expression of metamorphic psychic plurality by a collective consciousness who's reductive sense-of-self maintains resistance to its 'internal' complexity. By avoiding 'submission' to "liminality" people seem to become explosively 'productive' of literalistic expressions of metamorphic psyche: psychological life becomes literalistic technology, which eventually becomes 'psychically' "virtual reality." And yet in this socio-cultural context, myth and 'mythical dynamism' are devalued, their inevitable 'presence' in the media and productions of the culture unacknowledged.

"Special Effects" as 'Fantastic' Literalistic Assaults on Habitual Sensibilities

One particular example of this productive 'compensation' for the unchallenged status of habitual identifications is the obsessive attention given to making the 'un-real' both as 'fantastic' and as

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‘realistic’ as technically possible in motion pictures. For literalistic and personalistic identity, the ‘un-real real’ must be as ‘real,’ according to habitual identifications, as it can possibly be to be ‘valid,’ even though thereby such figurations lose much of their ‘mythic’ character. In the ‘telling of tales’ this motive produces the ‘plausibility factor.’ However unlikely, impossible, or absurd, the events of a story must be contextualized to some way ‘seem’ feasible to the standards of habitual identifications. Such ‘plausibility’ takes two forms—that of conformity to scientific notions of empirical reality, and that of personalistic psychology. Events must have some basis in physical ‘reality’ while character behavior must be explicable by the terms of ego psychology. These ploys allow us to ‘encounter’ the ‘un-real real’ but not have habitual identities or social “structures” seriously challenged by it.

What ‘response’ then, does impersonal psyche have to such an egoic strategy of ‘habitual sense-of-self-preservation?’ It would seem, as noted above, to increase the ‘productivity’ of ‘non-ordinary’ expressions. Certainly the technological culture of modernity is a ‘fantastic’ and highly ‘implausible’ set of phenomenon in nature—however ‘ordinarily’ it is regarded by contemporary mentality. But returning to that specifically ‘de-liminalized’ field of “liminoid” entertainment, one can view the devotion of so much technical effort and financial value to the production of ever more fantastically ‘realistic’ “special effects” and visceral violence as constituting a ‘hyper-reality.’ In the ‘face’ of the tyrannical grip habitual identity has on ‘reality,’ psyche seems to be pushing the limit of what will be accepted as ‘plausible’ within that set of definitions. It is as if what many decry as puerile indulgence in ‘sex and violence’ is actually also some ‘unconscious’ attempt to ‘break apart’ dominant assumptions, is an ‘assault’ on habitual sensibilities—on the existing capacity to sense the ‘real’ and the ‘un-real real’ as-conditioned by personalistic, positivistic cultural mentality.

Yet there seems no end to the cycle of ‘upping the ante’ on habitual sensibilities. Editing techniques in film and video become increasingly rapid and disjointed, utilizing sudden shifts of perspective, extreme lighting ‘values,’ sequence discontinuity and other ‘pluralizing’ effects on ‘point of view’ but conscious experience of ‘viewer identity’ seems to remain ‘singular.’ Here is an example of the ‘power’ of the dominant perspectives of habitual or persona identity to ‘see as it chooses to see’—even when a moment’s non-identified reflection would reveal it is grossly ‘miss-perceiving’ the “representations” of the “unrepresented.”

‘Perceptual Persona’ and Experiencing the ‘How’ of Archetypal Dynamism

Surely, ‘one person’s myth is another person’s fantasy.’ Such a contrast can even be posed as, ‘one person’s scientific fact is another person’s myth.’ Whether or not a telling has the ‘style’ of an ancient fairy tale, with its overtly ‘impossible reality’ or rather the ‘hyper-realism’ of science fiction film special effects or ‘true crime’ drama gore, the deciding factor for experience of the ‘un-real real’ seems to be the orientation of the individual ‘receiver’ of the expressions. What might be termed the

‘perceptual persona’ of an individual configures the ‘un-real’ as ‘mere fantasy’ or ‘mythical dynamism.’ Awareness of the archetypality, or the inherent, implicit patterning, of ‘how’ psychic contents are coming into being, being expressed, requires an aspect of reflective ego function or ‘consciousness.’

‘Depth’ psychology, in relativizing the perspective of ego psychology and re-validating the ‘mythic mode of knowing’ has made such a ‘sense ability’ more feasible again. Thus arguments about the ‘social value’ and ‘moral content’ of popular cultural expressions are ‘psychologically misguided’ in so far as the necessity for expression of repressed aspects of psyche is not acknowledged and the issue of ‘how’ one regards and interprets those expressions is more pertinent to ‘social responsibility’ than what is being portrayed or in what style. If ‘the public’ was more attuned to engaging the ‘archetypal dynamism’ of cultural productions, more complexly developed in its ‘perceptual persona,’ then the issue of ‘unconscious’ corruption of ethical behavior would be less significant.

Beyond Ideas of ‘Right’ and ‘Wrong,’ ‘Win’ or ‘Lose’

A particularly significant point of issue in orienting conscious awareness to archetypal or ‘mythic’ dynamism in expressions and experience is that of ethical and competitive values. The orchestrating role of “normative social structure” as ethical values, and of personalistic identity as competitive determination of worth between ‘winners’ and ‘losers,’ is pervasive. The ordinarily inherent values of ‘right’ over ‘wrong,’ ‘good’ over ‘bad,’ ‘correct’ over ‘incorrect,’ and ‘win’ over ‘lose’ or ‘victory’ over ‘defeat,’ must be ‘suspended’ if one is to engage and experience the relativizing effects of psychic plurality, of ‘mythic’ and ‘archetypal’ dynamism or an “anti-structural liminality” of being in/of some thresholding.

Thus, even so informed as one might be by the preceding insights into the interactivity of “implicate” flow and “explicate” form, of psyche and matter, and of the non-ordinary dynamism of ‘mythical’ expressions as “organs of reality,” one seems ever at the mercy, particularly in non-ritualistic culture, of an egoically identified “persona.” This ‘problem of the persistence of a “structural persona” and its ‘obsession’ with personalistic drama prompt the succeeding chapter’s investigation of an archetypal ‘model’ of pluralistic identification in historical myth.

The Ultimate Conflict of Psychological Reality and ‘Realistic’ Representation of Human Behavior for Modernist Mentality

In summation to all of the foregoing considerations of ‘reality’ and ‘un-reality’ in knowing self/other/world one can pose ‘the problem’ of modernist mentality’s seeming incapacity for ‘knowing’ thusly: Its rational impulse to delineate the causalities of human behavior as tangible mechanism proves

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to be limited by its methodology: it can only use modes of representation that are 'realistic' according to that methodology. If 'psychical reality' is not entirely accessible by that methodology, not ultimately 'figurable' in its perspective of 'valid reality,' then there can be no 'knowing-knowing,' no inclusive presencing in/as psycho-somatic being unless that reductive methodology is 'relativized' as the 'arbiter of reality' to a radically different (sacred) 'sense ability.' According to the 'mythical perspective,' the dominant socialized mentality necessarily will 'profane' self, other, and world by its non-participation in and denial of the 'divine' or 'mythical dynamism' of 'totality.' Given the overt rejection of mythical epistemics by post-Enlightenment modernity, that 'profaning' methodology can be manifested as much in 'art' as in 'science,' in 'love' as in 'war,' in religion as in politics when interpretive emphasis is placed upon quantification and reductive explanation. Reasonably stated, the distress of the modernist < > 'post'-modernist 'moment' is 'mythic.' Yet the very presentation of that 'argument' in the form of this rational discourse indicates that it is possible, 'after modernity,' to 'come to (reasonable) terms' with that anxiety by way of inclusive dialectical logic. However, a more tangible knowing, or perhaps 'gnosis,' of how positivistic socialized reality 'profanes' inclusive sense of self, other, and world, would still seem to require mythically dynamic figuration and participatory enactment.

Chapter 8

Mythic Manifestations of Inclusive Consciousness: Participatory Identifications in the Dialectical Configuration of Dionysus and the Precipitating Activity of Eros

Thus far these considerations of reductive and non-reductive modes of knowing have almost exclusively been articulated in abstract terms of rational analysis. Acknowledging that paucity of reference to specific rituals, myths, and art works of historical cultures, some attention is devoted here to a particular manifestation in cultural myth. Thus the emphasis in this chapter is shifted back toward a knowing as a mode of expression rather than of analysis. In so doing the focus is turned toward an example of the “intellectual form” in/as ‘fictional telling’ and gestural enactments that compose the ‘activity’ of mythic dynamism. Such expression is presented as constituting the “organs of reality” or mythical epistemic for knowing radically complex totality through a non-reductive dialectic of singularity and plurality. In considering specific cultural expressions of the theme of ‘manyness in oneness’ there are many examples from which to choose. Hindu philosophy and ‘mythic’ imagination readily provide an overt and elaborate cultural articulation of that interplay. However, as this study has sought to focus on this theme in the context of positivistic Western cultural mentality, an example of ‘mythic’ expression of ‘mythical dynamism’ has been chosen from the mythological lineage of Western cultural thought, namely ancient Greek mythology.

The Western expression found most pertinent to this discussion of the roles metamorphic dynamics of thought and experience have in ‘knowing’ self/other/world as more manifold and concurrent manifestation is that focused on/in the Greek divinity Dionysus. It is offered here that the figurings of Dionysus in mythic narratives and rituals, along with the more contemporary commentaries upon those “representations,” constitute an extended amplification of the ‘problem’ of singular versus multiple identity. These ‘Dionysian’ imaginations are found to suggest the confrontation with a status of identity as concurrent multiplicity that includes both an ‘alienated’ and ‘non-alienated’ status, or what will be referred to as ‘a’ Dionysian personae. This terming is intended to pose a concurrently singular and plural status of identity: a persona of ‘personae.’ That this figuring is in the Western cultural tradition and of the theme of the ‘dying and reborn divinity,’ and is constituted of human and divine/non-human agency, is all found to be significant for the Western struggle with the reductive effects of oppositional categorization. The concurrently singular and plural references of ‘Dionysian personae’ are taken as an apt figuring of the ‘actual’ psychical status of the struggle of identity in such an oppositionally dualist mentality. It poses the extremity of difficulty required for the re-establishment

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of participatory relationship between an oppositionally alienated “I” and ‘humanness’ from ‘the rest of the self’ and ‘divine’ or ‘creational’ powers of “anti-structural liminality.”

In addition to exploring some of the figurings of this ‘god of dismembered and re-membered identity,’ and commentary upon them, some consideration is subsequently given to those regarding the Greek divinity of Eros. Notions of Dionysus, ancient and contemporary, taken here as pertinent to the problems of pluralistic identity and the relativization of egoic-singularity, are regarded as constellation a ‘relational anxiety’ about singularity and plurality that provokes reflection upon participatory relationship. Notions posing and regarding Eros are taken to figure the ‘activity of co-participation’ between aspects of self/other/world that might enable an experience of ‘totalistic’ ‘oneness’ with/as ‘manyness’ capable of ‘containing’ the egoic anxiety of Dionysian dynamism. No attempt is made here to ascertain the most historically accurate versions of the mythic narratives referenced. Rather, it is assumed that the way those figurings are ‘figured’ in informed contemporary commentary are as significant as what can be ‘exactly’ discerned of historical culture. This study then focuses on the ‘psycho-dynamics’ of these figurings, ancient and contemporary, in so far as such appear to track ‘mythic dynamism.’

The Dionysian Imago of Mythic Dynamism: ‘Facing’ Dialectical Archetypality

As briefly noted above, Jung’s notions of “archetypes” posed immaterial ‘forms’ or patterns that psychic life ‘takes form around’ cross-culturally and trans-historically. Hillman’s variation of Jung’s notion is to emphasize the “archetypality” of the forms of psychic life rather than focus on any pre-existent ‘forms’ of the archetypes. What is often ignored in ‘application’ of these notions of archetypes and archetypality is the aspect of ‘range’ or ‘spectrum.’ Both Jung and Hillman asserted a complexity to each ‘archetypal valence.’ Every identifiable ‘patterning tendency’ is ‘various,’ has its own ‘complexities’ and also tends to ‘precipitate’ the activity or presence of another contrasting ‘patterning tendency.’ Archetypes and archetypality are thus not presented as fixed in singular ‘tendencies’ that can be objectified as readily opposable patterns. One might consider them in the mode of Gibb’s “radial categories” of meaning association in language. Thus just as words tend to be “polysemous,” configuring various meanings depending upon which aspect of a “radial category” the context of their usage ‘activates,’ so too archetypal tendencies are complexes of association ‘identifiable’ as ‘manners of patterning.’

Polytheistic culture such as the ancient Greek is thusly viewed as an example of diversified archetypal imagination of various ‘patterning forces’ that shape human and non-human manifestation or form. Each ‘God’ is taken to suggest some particular archetype or “archetypality” of the tendencies of forming, of manifesting some phenomenal ‘thingness’ of object or action. Each ‘God’ has its particular ways of ‘coming into being’ and ‘doing,’ a characteristic ‘dynamic’ of activity. One can pose these

tendencies as modes of generating identification. Such 'patterning tendencies' are 'anthropomorphically' figured in the Greek myths and images, being 'identified' with human-appearing 'divinities' that provide each with an 'imago' or identity of agency. In modernist science such 'pre-determining powers' tend to 'identified' by non-anthropomorphic and often categorically mechanistic terminology.

While archetypal 'tendencies' are held to be 'complexes' of various but related 'tendency', this study will postulate that one of the Greek 'Gods' in particular appears to 'personify' the dynamical qualities of 'mythic movement' as such, of complementary pairings such as "structural<>anti-structural," "implicate<>explicate," human<>non-human, personal<>impersonal, 'real'<>'un-real,' that can generate pluralistic identification. A consideration of that 'archetypal character' figured as Dionysus, and its 'mythical history,' is offered here as an "intellectual form," an "organ of reality," which may enable one to 'think' the 'thingless thinging' of the "absolute negation" of it as "Notion," and thus 'model' a 'persona of plurality.' Such an 'archetypal tendency' as a 'personified' figuring of the dynamical qualities of 'totalistic' presence and its dialectical logic, is not, however, regarded as 'appropriately' taken to pose a model of a 'human' personality confronting such multidimensional presence: thus did the Greeks 'classify' it as the of 'super-natural' or as a 'God.' In short, the figurings of Dionysus are not presented here as a literal model for human behavior. Such an assumption would be a 'dangerous' reduction, the likes of which is common in views of myth. "Apollo is the principle of simplicity, unity and purity, Dionysus of manifold change and metamorphosis" (Harrison, *Epilegomena to the Study of Greek Religion* 439).

These brief and oppositional characterizations of the archetypalities of Apollo and Dionysus are simplistic, and thus dubiously 'Greek.' Although they provide a ready distinction, they illustrate the often-reductive manner in which such complex configurations as 'Gods' are often approached in Western mentality. The reductive, mechanistic 'thrust' of modernist mentality is readily associated with such a narrow assertion of the 'Apollonic principle,' with its archetypality of precision in proportional 'measurement.' In theoretical thought, music, and social order, this aspect of 'the' Apollonic has been a dominant 'force of patterning' in Western culture's 'sense of itself' and 'intended productions.' Such an archetypality has a 'measured,' rather deliberate and directed dynamical movement: progressive, unemotional, constructive, 'objective.' This 'Apollonic' modality of 'reasoning' became the basis for assessing reality and identity. It is readily arguable, however, that the historical figurings of Apollo are more complex than this modernist characterization. Their being 'read' so narrowly thus says much about the oppositional impulse of modernist mentality.

Further, just because these particular traits of Apollonic archetypality are 'identified with' in modernist Western identity, one can make no reasonable argument that the contrasting(though not necessarily opposing) Dionysian archetypality has not also been much in evidence in Western history.

The latter has, however, been much less ‘valued,’ being viewed as “destructively chaotic” and even “demonic”—the ‘enemy of order,’ the ‘undoing of society.’ The dynamical character of Dionysus has not been intentionally central to the modernist “Enlightenment project” as has the ‘imago of predictable ordering’ associated with Apollo. Yet ‘Dionysian disruption’ has been consistently manifested by the modernist ‘march toward perfection and control.’ Such an association suggests Hillman’s assertion that manifestation of one archetypal tendency will constellate another. The more unacknowledged and resisted presence of the Dionysian in modernist intentions is thus ‘the place to look’ for ‘the rest of the story,’ the story of pluralistic being and knowing.

It is this very ‘devil in the details’ to which Dionysus gives a ‘face’ that can be taken as most ‘personifying’ the dialectical dynamism of multi-dimensional ‘mythic’ movement. There is no better example of this ‘demon in the works’ than the ‘disorderly’ thought of ‘postmodernism.’ Its disruptive and disconcerting ‘deconstructions’ of ‘orderly meaning’ have often been regarded as ‘indulgent cultural violence.’ But perhaps it has more about its modality than mere negation. After all, postmodernist theorists are ‘of’ the very ‘order’ they ‘deconstruct.’

In the Greek myth Dionysus is a power of both life and death, an underworld god, lover, son of the Great Goddess in both her life and death aspects as Rhea and Persephone. He is a force of death, a Hades as much as the light of Zeus. Stag god, he is a lord of wild beasts and hunted stag, torn to pieces by maenadic women or wild dogs (Actaeon). He is a hunter, devourer of raw flesh, and himself devoured. Killed as a child and himself killer of children, he is also awakener of life after death, the god who dies but does not die. He embodies the play, aimless joy, and neediness of life, as well as the aggressive murderous lust for destruction that lurks in all of humanity. (Whitmont 58)

What a ‘player’ this, whose embodiment ‘plays out’ “aimless joy” amidst “murderous lust” while hunting and being hunted, who tears while being torn, that eats as is eaten, and that “lurks in all humanity,” while ‘dying and being reborn. This ‘archetypality’ plays out more than ‘one’ part.

Thus Dionysus presents himself to us in two forms: as the god who vanishes and reappears, and as the god who dies and is born again. The second conception has evolved into the well-known doctrine of numerous rebirths of the god. Basically, however, both conceptions (his vanishing, which is paired with his reappearance, and his death, which is followed by his rebirth) are rooted in the same idea. Both tell of the god with two faces, the spirit of presence and absence, of the Now and the Then, who is most grippingly symbolized in the mask. With him appears the unfathomable mystery of life and death cemented together into a single entity, and the mystery of the act of creation affected with madness and overshadowed by death. (Otto 200-201)

What ‘face’ can be given to “the god with two faces, the spirit of presence and absence, of the Now and the Then” except that facing “symbolized in the mask” which is and is not the ‘face’ of ‘some thing?’ What sort of movement can manifest “the unfathomable mystery of life and death cemented together into a single entity?”

The Dionysian nature is *physis* and *logos* in one; it is physio-logical. Like imagination and fantasy, Dionysus is never merely chaotic and dangerous but also order-creating; even as a

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chthonian deity, he stands at the extreme limits of the Olympian light. He brings together the broad sky and the dark earth, the Olympian gods and the chthonian powers. (Aevs 125-26)

A “chaotic and dangerous” “order-creating” dynamic that “brings together the broad sky and dark earth,” the very ‘unity’ of “physis and logos in one.” Every configuration of archetypal patterning can be said to generate a characteristic ‘ordering’ or forming by the tendencies of its ‘flowing.’ But the ‘order’ of the Dionysian seems of a more dynamically complex character than most. Such a configuration is a departure from the more ‘consistent’ dynamics of the other Greek divinities.

It is important to realize that the myths about Dionysus move us in a different way than the myths of the other gods in the Greek pantheon. With Dionysus, our imagination is connected immediately to the most archaic complexes in humankind. [. . .] The well-known notion that the Greeks were the most archaic of the civilized and the most civilized of the archaic has its greatest significance in Dionysus. (Lopez-Pedraza Dionysus in Exile 14)

While the ‘supreme’ Olympians are associated with their ‘high’ place above humanity, from which they ‘descend’ to provoke the conduct of humans, Dionysus appears to ‘spend his time,’ to be most ‘in context,’ on ‘the dark chthonic earth’—where his dynamic is most ‘at home’ in the “archaic complexes in humankind.” This contrast of the more ‘idealized’ archetypal powers of the Olympians and the ‘un-fixable’ dynamism of Dionysus is primary to what indicates that “Greeks were the most archaic of the civilized and the most civilized of the archaic.”

My view of Dionysus’ epiphanies is that they are archetypal, and as such are incommensurable. We can detect them in many ways, participating in life, either enriching a personality or destroying it. Within the archetypal boundaries of Dionysus, countless Dionysiac experiences are possible. (Lopez-Pedraza 28)

The manifestings of the divine Dionysian principle “are archetypal, and as such incommensurable”: beyond measure, judgment, or compare in the terms of the relatively more ‘singular’ archetypal dynamics of the other Olympians. Perhaps the Dionysian is somehow essential to all archetypal movement, an agency that activates all archetypal patternings, the ‘dialectical’ motility that makes ‘some thing’ archetypal rather than formal, fixed, inactive—some ‘mere’ positivized ‘thing.’ The ‘truth’ of any ‘archetypal ordering’ a ‘way of moving or ordering’ seems to require the dynamics of a transformative or metamorphic archetypality to be ‘expressed’ as such, as patterning rather than as objective consequence.

Dionysos brings the self-realization of any archetypal situation. [. . .] any archetypal truth needs *its* own dismemberment or self-sublation in order to also attain the *form* of truth, the *form* of logical negativity, and to thus become truly psychological. We must also conclude that this Dionysian telos is *inherent* in any archetypal situation or image: the Dionysian “fate” does not come over it from outside. Without this self-sublation the archetypal truth would still have the logical form of a mere content of consciousness, some idea, ideal, message “out there” [. . .]. (Giegerich, Soul’s Logical Life 266)

The Dionysian then can be seen as that archetypal dynamic which ‘dismembers’ fixity, the evidently positive form, to ‘activate’ what is “*inherent* in any archetypal situation or image.” Thus the ‘Dionysian agency’ is seen as ‘activating’ various archetypal patternings and bringing about their “self-realization” in the “self-sublation” of the forms those patterns generate. The move from non-specific “implicate” flow into any given ‘archetypal forming’ is ‘carried through’ by the Dionysian dynamic to make manifest the “thingless thinging” of its “truly psychological” “*form* of logical negativity.” With/in every archetypal image or situation then there is a Dionysian “telos” or “fate” that is ‘activated’ by its dismemberment as positivized object or notion. Archetypality thus ‘appears’ as movement released from/manifest as the ‘form’ that ‘depicts’ it—made ‘evident’ by the dismembering, dying-and-being-reborn activity of Dionysian archetypality. Apollonic archetypality as consistency and measure creates a form of similar character, such as the Parthenon. A Dionysian archetypality renders that form back into its ‘manner of movement,’ its ‘creatively destructive’ manner of becoming that is not that form (the Parthenon) but the imposition of ‘that way of forming’ upon a world ‘not so formed.’

The Dionysian archetypality can thus be taken as the very ‘imago’ of ‘mythic’ dynamism, as dialectical archetypality which ‘moves’ all ‘types of movement’ into their particularities of patterning that is not a ‘static’ status, not only not a ‘thing’ as such but not concurrently poly-valent in its dynamism.

The history of art has had to wait until the twentieth century for the appearance of a painter, probably the only one, whose oeuvre is essentially Dionysiac. There is no doubt that the art of Pablo Picasso came from a Dionysiac nature, disregarding whether the themes of his paintings had an inner or an outer connection. With Picasso, we have at last a great artist whose vision came from a Dionysiac consciousness. [. . .] We could say that Picasso was a historical necessity. From his first painting as a child, with the motif of the bullfight, to the self portrait at the end of his life in which he reflects his own death, his work is under the aegis of Dionysus. (Lopez-Pedraza 29)

That most famous of visual ‘de-constructors,’ whose painting torments the ‘reality’ of forms and dismembers habitual modes of visual perception and assumptions about the realities of space and time, that defiler of artistic traditions, that lusty old ‘satyr,’ was a Dionysian devil with a paint brush. Only by such ‘crossing over the fence’ erected by modernity from the formings of Apollonic assumptions about ‘how to see’ could the implications of what that ‘fencing’ was and what it was erected to ‘keep out’ be ‘released’ or ‘sublated’ into their “logical negativity.” By an experience of their archetypality, by ‘seeing as Picasso,’ one might then see Apollonic ‘seeing.’ Similarly, postmodernist ‘de-constructors’ dismember language to reveal the dominant archetypality of its habitual usage. Such dismemberment of the forms of Apollonic ‘seeing’ reveals the ‘invisible’ yet “inherent” logic of it, which is not a ‘positive’ thing, not the objects so-ordered, but the particular character of that ordering as movement shown in its dissolution as relative to a greater ‘totality’ of archetypal movement. Yet this ‘crossing

over' is not 'actually' a 'leaving' of 'this' world but a 'deconstruction' of it as structured by habitual identities that further 'reveals' it.

[. . .] the Dionysian dismemberment and the ensuing frenzy: [. . .] the (de-literalized or sublated) madness that consists in a) having overcome ontology in favor of logic and b) having established one's thoughts within the complete contradiction of an identity of identity and difference, or of a bridging movement without a bridge. (Giegerich, Soul's Logical Life 262)

Only this distinction of "having established one's thoughts within the complete contradiction of an identity of identity and difference" can 'interrupt' identification-with identity-as-opposing 'literalities'—particularly those of 'literally real' and 'literally un-real.' But is such a 'realization' actually feasible for a 'literally human individual?' Perhaps the difficulties of such a move 'into' de-literalized identity explain the "ensuing frenzy" associated with Dionysian presence.

If then Dionysus personifies the archetypal move that moves all archetypalities 'out of' the 'fixity' of the forms which image them, sublating their 'substance' into "logical negativity" of the 'un-real real,' by dismembering their objective fixity, how might this dynamism configure 'the sacred?' How might it 'move' oppositional notions of 'the sacred and profane,' of 'purity and impurity?' From the Apollonic view, the sacred might be the 'measurably accurate' versus the 'chaotically unmeasured,' from that personified by Zeus or Yaweh obedience versus disobedience might figure sacred and profane, in the mode of Jesus it might be compassionately ethical versus selfishly unjust conduct. But in the Dionysian constellation, there seems to be no such either/or.

And there's this other strange business with the sacred, and that is that it's always a coin with two sides. The original Latin word "*sacer*," from which we get our word, means both "so holy and pure" as to be sacred, and "so unholy and impure" as to be sacred. (Bateson, A Sacred Unity 267-268)

In a Dionysian logic, perhaps, to be "so holy and so pure" is to be "so unholy and so impure" all at one concurrent, multi-dimensional, polyvalent once-and-for-all—the two sides of Bateson's "coin" turned 'face-to-face.' Such seems to be the Dionysian imago of 'mythical dynamism,' which activates 'dialectical archetypality,' bringing the polarities of an archetypal field into concurrent presence. The logic of such a figuring can be termed 'dialectical.' Dialectical not in equational terms of "thesis>antithesis>synthesis" but in the sense of the synthesis as a 'totality' constituted by 'mutuality'—a status that is no longer an opposition or polarity. The 'truth' of such a configuration is thus not so much a reduction but rather a status of co-participation of otherwise 'non-existent' abstractions of 'thesis' and 'antithesis.' Here a notion of the dialectical as a status of 'ambi-valence,' of moving in at least two 'directions' concurrently is stressed—a 'literalistic' impossibility.

Dionysian Dynamism as Divinely Human Self-Deconstructing Persona

The 'character of Dionysus,' the Dionysian "persona," constellated by these many contradictory and divergent aspects and actions, presents an 'identity' that is 'self contradicting,' is its own 'making' and 'unmaking.' In 'being itself' it must be dismembered and devoured as it dismembers and devours. It cannot be human without being divine, it is 'a God' but can be torn apart and suffer as a human. As such, Dionysus can be viewed in his half-god/half-human origins as a particularly 'ambi-valent' confluence of "implicate" and "explicate" being, a sort of 'transubstantiation entity.' Such 'incarnation' of 'creative divinity' brings the formative, archetypal forces of "implicate" flow and the 'static' forms of "explicate" being into the most intimate 'configuration' for human consciousness. This dynamism also is manifested in the human >divine figuration of Jesus. Such a 'God' is much 'closer' to the human realm than those divine figures who are 'simply' immortal and 'beyond' human injury.

[. . .] in the procession of the gods on the Francois vase, Dionysus assumes a different pose from the other gods. While the latter are shown in profile, he is the only one who turns his terrible face with its large eyes directly at the viewer. This remarkable peculiarity, however, is usually explained by the fact that primitive man and his successors preferred to present Dionysus in the mask. It would be much closer to the truth to say, *vice versa*, that Dionysus was presented in the mask because he was known as the god of confrontation. It is the god of the most immediate presence who looks at us so penetratingly from the vase painting. (Otto 90)

"The god of confrontation" is that one which turns its gaze fully onto the human sphere, rather than upon fellow divinities. Perhaps the Dionysian face is a 'mask' that a human might 'put on' more readily, or one that more fully 'confronts' humanness, than the face of other 'divine archetypalities.' None of the other principle Greek divinities suffer as humans do, thus there seems to be the greater chance that this 'God' would know us, and we it, the most intimately. The dismemberments and rebirths of Dionysus, taken as 'mythical' movements in psychical images, suggest the forming and sundering of sense-of-self, one's life-long attempts to maintain an identity and the countless encounters with otherness in one's self that habitual egoic identity struggles to repress but by which it is often torn apart. Dionysian chaos erupting in one's sense-of-self confronts the egoic function struggling to maintain order, to 'domesticate' the "wild" plurality of psyche.

Dionysian dismemberment is no more than the final determination of the wild (it is not a new event): to be *in* the wilderness as wilderness means to experience the dissolution of one's being "a being," the dissolution of ontology into logic and of anthropology into psycho-logic. (Giegerich, Soul's Logical Life 257-58)

"The Dionysian dismemberment," as "the final determination of the wild" tears down the 'fencings' of the habit of singular identity (particularly as reductive literality), transgresses its boundaries, deconstructs its fantasy of personalistic ontology, and reveals the dialectical "psycho-logic" in "sublated" anthropomorphic "structures." To be 'confronted' by the Dionysian, is for the egoic

identity, to 'face' the divine > human turmoil of psyche's polyvalent concurrencies, and thereby the inherent decomposition of 'an identity' into a realm of the 'un-real real.'

It means giving existence to the sphere of nonexistence (which can dialectically only happen through a putrefaction of the *notion* of "existent entity"). It means the *real* (not merely intellectual) shift of "my concept of reality on the plane of the psyche." "Sphere" (or realms) of "nonexistence" is, of course, a mythological way of speaking about the *logical form* of negativity. And this is what I mean by soul, which is another mythological expression. What we are concerned with is thus not a sphere or realm at all (both are ontological terms!). In our time, in the logical status we and our world are in, the Dionysian, far from having to do with emotion, drive, body, femininity, is initiation into rigorous thought and into the notion of the "logical form." (Giegerich, Soul's Logical Life 266)

With all its images of bodily dismemberment, the death of Dionysus is evidently not about the literal physical body, but the *notion* of that body, the *notion* that one's identity is of an ontological 'reality.' The Dionysian dismemberment is a deconstruction of the literalistic, positivized image or imago of self, a dismembering of the 'image of real identity' that can bring "initiation into rigorous thought and into the notion of logical form," the 'form' that is apprehend in 'mythical movement.' Dionysus 'self destructs' by his very 'nature,' by its inherent challenge to the power-identified, singularly-egoic 'tyrants' of 'civilized' "structure." For this he is persecuted. He or his devotees are pursued by Lycurgus, defied by King Pentheus.

The myth [. . .] speaks of bloody pursuit in which even Dionysus was vanquished and disappeared in the sea—in the watery depths in which he is at home, and from which he is called forth at regular intervals in cult. (Otto 77)

A 'God' of 'growing,' metamorphing things, of reality-transforming wine, of song and dance, frenzy and fury, of structural dissolutions—even a 'God' of such character infuriates the keepers of order and morality. He frightens the rigidities of identity. Yet those who defy him are driven to such madness that they murder and devour their own children.

He entered the world differently from the way in which we are told the other gods did, and he encounters man, too, in a very special way. In both instances his appearance is startling, disquieting, violent. And, like everything violent, it arouses opposition and agitation. Right at his birth gods arise as his enemies. Terrible disturbances are engendered in his vicinity. The destruction of his mother is followed by suffering, bitter distress, and violent death for his mother's sister, Ino, who plunges into the sea, out of her mind, with her own child in her arms. And in this way, even the revelation of the god who has become man creates wild emotion, anger, and opposition among mankind. [. . .] King Pentheus becomes aroused and does not wish to let the women tear their bonds of modesty asunder and dance with the frenzied deity. Perseus in Argos rushes out to meet Dionysus with armed might. In shifting forms the myth repeats the same image over and over again. They [the tales of Dionysus' effects] give a true reflection of the violence, the horror, and the tragedy which are inherently Dionysiac. (Otto 74-75)

"The revelation of the god who has become man creates wild emotion, anger, and opposition among mankind" because he brings the dynamism of totality, the uncontrollable, life-generating,

frenzied, simultaneous manifestation of archetypal impulse and its traumatic, ecstatic manifestation in form. Yet, as ‘form,’ such ‘impossible’ mutuality is ‘the form of formlessness,’ Giegerich’s “realm of non-existence” or “the form of logical negativity.” To ‘be’ Dionysian is to ‘suffer’ that turmoil of totalistic being and its dismemberment of habitual identifications.

Thus death encroaches upon the realm of the god, who is extolled as “the joyful one”, and the “giver of riches”. In fact, his realm actually becomes the realm of death, for the Agrionia festival, like the Anthesteria, the spring festival of Dionysus, was a festival of the dead. Dionysus, himself, is a suffering, dying god who must succumb to the violence of terrible enemies in the midst of the glory of his youthful greatness. (Otto 103)

“The joyful one, and the giver of riches” is related to the “realm of death”—perhaps due to his own experience of suffering and dying. For all the above, in his on-going confrontations with the repressions and rigidities of “normative structures,” for his very nature that provokes their violent reactivity, for his offering of himself to this role of so-provoking them, we can regard Dionysus as manifesting a dynamic of self-deconstructing persona in which personal and impersonal, divine and human, “implicate” and “explicate” aspects are given ‘free play,’ and the attendant ‘frenzy’ of totalistic being is ‘personified.’

The Terrifying Dynamo of Participatory Being: “Structural “and “Anti-structural” Identity

Thus Dionysian dynamism is traumatic *because* it confronts, faces and is the face of, a totalistic status. It ‘takes place’ as/in human<>divine incarnation—a ‘realm’ habitual identities avoid for fear of being ‘relativized.’ Such a configuration of the ‘un-structurable’ ‘wildness’ of divinely human complexity as ‘an imago’ of an archetypal ‘persona of personae’ seems an apt figure to ‘face’ a ‘post’-modernity and stand for the divine power called forth to initiate modernist mentality into its own self-deconstruction/sublation.

Dionysus is the god of twilight—the elusive region between day and night, life and death, the spiritual and the earthly; he is at home in that transitional place of liminal and luminous realities where our perception is governed by imagination more than at other times. The liminal condition of twilight is also the threshold, a “no-place” and “no-time” which belongs to the circularity and wandering of the imaginal psyche. The logic of this psychic wandering is not the logic of contradiction or of the excluded middle, but a Dionysian one; it is the logic of the middle region [incarnation], including the contraries and indeed thriving on their polemics. (Avens 126)

Positing this status as “the logic of the middle region” seems to be a way of ‘structuring’ a ‘place’ for it ‘outside’ normal reality. But if it is a totalistic status, that of the ‘really really real’—the indivisible totality where abstractions of mind versus body, spirit versus matter, real versus imaginal, interpenetrate or coexist as “implicate<>explicate” mutuality—then such a ‘structural’ status as “middle region” is misleading. As Giegerich emphasizes, it cannot actually be a logical “third” ground of “imaginal reality” if it is that of totality and thus of ‘actuality.’ Avens also notes that the “contraries”

are “included” in this so-called “middle ground.” They do not ‘exist’ ‘outside’ it (i.e., as ‘spirit’ and ‘matter’). The Dionysian ‘move’ brings identifications ‘down’ from their oppositional abstractions and into the only ‘place’ there ‘really’ is: the place of ‘incarnation,’ whose ‘logic’ is neither ‘purely’ literal nor imaginal, neither material nor spiritual. To ‘structure’ a ‘place’ for it ‘outside’ these categories ‘suspends’ its terrifying “anti-structural” totality.

The descent into the “middle,” into the “between,” then, implies a perspective of both-and. It is not the “place” of death only, or of life (resurrection) only. It is “between” death and resurrection, and it brings with it a perspective that is dialectical (moving back and forth), fundamentally ambivalent, seeing all things historical under the double sign of *coincidentia oppositorum*, a “coincidence of oppositions,” in the richness of imagination. (Miller, Hells and Holy Ghosts 60)

In the Dionysian status one is neither ‘here’ nor ‘there’ but here-and-there, on “the fence” as a Haguzussa, but also the ‘negation’ of ‘fencing,’ a being of both worlds in whom oppositions do not ‘oppose’ but are ‘co-incident.’ If that status is posed as a ‘middle’ the persistence of oppositional logic that cannot be validated as primary in a genuinely totalistic, inclusive, “anti-structural” or Dionysian contexting is revealed. To ‘enter in’ to inclusive totality is to ‘surrender’ any ‘external oppositions’ as definitive of ‘reality.’ This is a bi-valent rather than static participation that pluralizes *any and every* identification. It cannot ‘look’ in any ‘one’ direction ‘only.’ It cannot remain in opposition or ‘simple’ polarity. An ‘experience’ or the ‘rigorous thinking’ of such a notion, is bound to ‘dismember’ any ‘objective,’ non-participatory mentality as a status ‘between’ other states.

This ‘descent’ is *ad inferos*, into the ‘interior’ of self, into ‘actuality.’ It is ‘arriving where one always already is,’ on/in/as the ‘threshold.’ Miller notes regarding the ‘Self< >self-reflecting’ ironic tone of a ‘post’-modern status, “as Nietzsche and Deluze have said, the depth is on the surface. [. . .] It’s threshold all the way down. [. . .] Psyche as threshold. All threshold. Nothing on either side.” (“Irony’s Arrows/Eros” 5). Descent is not a ‘real’ or ‘positive’ ‘move’ but a ‘move into a relational field of concurrencies.’ To figure this status as generated by two opposing ones is to preserve oppositional duality as the definition of its reality. The opposition-as-definitive somehow becomes ‘un-real.’ Small wonder then that the ‘face’ of such dynamism is both ‘troubling’ and ‘empty.’

The mask tells us that the theophany of Dionysus, which is different from that of the other gods because of its stunning assault on the senses and its urgency, is linked with the eternal enigmas of duality and paradox. This theophany thrusts Dionysus violently and unavoidably into the here and now—and sweeps him away at the same time into the inexpressible distance. It excites with a nearness that is at the same time a remoteness. The final secrets of existence and non-existence transfix mankind with monstrous eyes.

This spirit of duality which already distinguishes Dionysus and his realm, in his epiphany, from everything which is Olympian, returns over and over again in all the forms of his activity, as we shall see. It is the source of the fascination and the confusion which everything that is Dionysiac evokes, for it is the spirit of a wild being. His coming brings madness. (Otto 91)

Perhaps Dionysian duality is not that of an either/or opposition but of unity-and-difference, or, more 'precisely,' unity-as-difference. Perhaps "his coming brings madness" to those incapable of 'co-inciding' with/as 'the opposites,' to those who will not/cannot surrender positivized identities. The 'specter' of such madness, of the terror of 'not knowing who "I" am,' of 'being' totalistically in the 'wilderness' of poly-valence, actually drives the habitual identity into the 'trap,' into such resistances that, like Pentheus and his mother, it destroys its own supremacy over selves without knowing that it is the agency of 'becoming Dionysian' after all. Its very rigidities eventually 'activate' some internal Dionysian dissolution or external violence. The ancient Greeks, as "the most archaic of the civilized and the most civilized of the archaic" were 'well-positioned' to generate such a troubled and troubling personified figure of confrontation with inclusive 'totality.' This Dionysian figuring can be contrasted to that notion of a Hindu yogi attaining 'enlightened oneness' with entirely de-literalized existence by realization of 'the world' as illusory "Maya." Such a status, in contrast to the 'frenzy' of Dionysian presencing, might be seen as non-participation in "structural" reality,' a 'reversal' of from the usual non-participation of identity in an "anti-structural" field.

Only because Dionysus, himself, is not merely the enraptured one but also the terrible one, has the terrible demanded him as its victim. That sinister truth which creates madness shows its horrible face in his actions no less than in his sufferings. The most celebrated myth of his destruction has him suffer as Zagreus, the "great hunter," the same fate inherent in his appalling actions. The "hunter" is himself hunted; the "render of men" is himself rent. (Otto 105)

"The terrible demanded him as its victim" because Dionysian 'madness' is not a punishment but a fulfillment of the total manifestation of the incarnation of creational divinity in/as humanness. It is the 'madness' of creational flow into form.

Much has been said about madness in relation to creation. The creative act is often depicted as coming out of chaos, a pattern found in many creation myths, and this can be seen as a regression into chaos out of which comes creation. Dionysiac madness, although it does not have the fantasy of a creation myth that ends in a world order, has similarities to this process. Dionysiac madness is not a mythical creation; it is a living experience out of which comes psychological rebirth. (Lopez-Pedraza 23-24)

"Dionysian madness," without the directed intention of some 'orderly' creation, creates "a living experience out of which comes psychological rebirth." By dismembering the 'figure' of habitual identity, by shattering the 'sanity' of 'civilized structure,' one is deprived of any fantasy of non-participation—an exhilarating and painful 'realization.' One is plunged into the 'co-incident' turmoil of "structural < > anti-structural" dynamism which is a 'dismembering' and terrifying participation in totality. Thus his followers and 'victims' 'break the bonds' of "normative social structure," thereby experiencing both terror and ecstasy in coming to know their "structural" identities from 'outside' while yet 'of' it.

The wild spirit of the dreadful, which mocks all laws and institutions, reveals itself in the

initial phenomena which accompany the approaching and imminent god. These are the phenomena of pandemonium and its related counterpart: deathly silence. (Otto 92)

This 'God' which is both "approaching and imminent," Here and There, "mocks all laws and institutions" with his poly-valence, his plural ambi-valent concurrencies, his complex but non-oppositional being that inspires "pandemonium and its related counterpart deathly silence."

What is the reason for this tremendous excitement, this deep trance? What did this bewildering clamor proclaim?

The world man knows, the world in which he has settled himself so securely and snugly—that world is no more. The turbulence which accompanied the arrival of Dionysus has swept it away. Everything has been transformed. But it has not been transformed into a charming fairy story or into an ingenious child's paradise. The primeval world has stepped into the foreground, the depths of reality have been opened, the elemental forms of everything that is creative, everything that is destructive, have arisen, bringing with them infinite rapture and infinite terror. The innocent picture of a well ordered routine world has been shattered by their coming, and they bring with them no illusions or fantasies but truth—a truth that brings on madness.

Greeted with wild shouts of joy, the form in which the truth appears is the frenzied, all-engulfing torrent of life which wells up from the depths that gave it birth. In the myth and in the experience of those who have been affected by this event, the appearance of Dionysus brings with it nourishing intoxicating waters that bubble up from the earth. Rocks split open, and streams of water gush forth. Everything that has been locked up is released. The alien and the hostile unite in miraculous harmony. Age-old laws have suddenly lost their power, and even dimensions of time and space are no longer valid. (Otto 95)

Dionysian 'truth' can thus 'make one free' in that it 'loosens' the grip of singular identifications, but such a 'liberation' will be 'terrible' to the habitual identity and likely 'violate' the "structure" of social 'laws.' This notion relates to the potency of 'taboo' in tribal societies. "The form in which the truth appears is the frenzied, all-engulfing torrent of life," this life, the only life there is and in which we cannot help but participate, the truth of "which wells up from the depths that gave it birth."

Dionysian Dynamism and Systems Theory

Another of the radical revelations of scientific thought suggesting a 'post'-modern context is found summarized in the notions of chaos theory or chaocomplexity. The notion of order arising out of un-ordered or un-predictable chaotic contexts also is evident in some aspects of epistemological and systems theory. The relation of these notions to psyche-ology, identity and the 'un-real real' can be viewed as 'Dionysian.'

Perhaps all exploration of the world of ideas is only a searching for a rediscovery, and perhaps it is such rediscovery of the latent that defines us as "human," "conscious," and "twice born." But if this be so, then we must all sometimes hear St. Paul's "voice" echoing down the ages: "It is hard for Thee to kick against the pricks."

I am suggesting to you that all the multiple insults, the double binds and invasions that we all experience in life, the impact (to use an inappropriate physical word) whereby experience corrupts our epistemology, challenging the core of our existence, and thereby seducing us into a

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false cult of the ego—what I am suggesting is that the process whereby double binds and other traumas teach us a false epistemology is already well advanced in most occidentals and perhaps most orientals, and that those whom we call “schizophrenics” are those in whom the endless kicking against the pricks has become intolerable. (Bateson, A Sacred Unity 224)

One’s epistemology, the manner of taking in and classifying ‘information,’ structures one’s ‘reality.’ But that reality and its fixed identity of one’s self and the world ‘conceal’ latent aspects that ‘prick’ one’s sense of order, of self/other/world, until one becomes ‘schizophrenically self-contradictory’ or submits to a Dionysian dismemberment. The ‘identified’ existing order of a system, and the epistemic sense-of-self and world its structures assert, inevitably belie how it ‘actually’ functions. For a ‘system,’ as Turner notes about a ‘society,’ is not the sum of its rules and structures, anymore than a person is the sum of his or her habitual identifications. Thus ‘belief in the ‘reality’ of identified orders leads to some ‘schizophrenia’—modernity’s assertion of ‘idealized reality’ being an example.

It is worth noting [. . .] that many parts of conventional individual psychology have long been ready for framing within systems theory, notably the Freudian concept of psychological conflict where the contrasting poles of thought or motivation are conventionally assumed to be interactive, each promoting the other.

In other areas the assimilation will not be so easy. Many of the common concepts of individual psychology, which are handled as nouns in the language of psychologists and even to some extent reified will, no doubt, be translated into a language of process. Such concepts as ego, anxiety, hostility, psychic energy, need, etc., will have a new appearance and a very different status in the total system of explanation. These changes will be difficult to assimilate. (Bateson, A Sacred Unity 260-261)

‘Systems’ are thus approached as ‘processes,’ again much as Turner approached societies. A ‘process’ is not defined by reified elements, by objects, but by ‘logical forms’ and ‘movements.’ Bateson understood that ‘mind’ is much the same.

Perhaps even more difficult [for psychology to assimilate] will be the [implied] shift in the boundaries of the individual mind. The basic rule of systems theory is that, if you want to understand some phenomenon or appearance, you must consider that phenomenon within the context of all *completed* circuits which are relevant to it. The emphasis is on the concept of the completed communicational circuit and implicit in the theory is the expectation that all units containing completed circuits will show mental characteristics. The mind, in other words, is immanent in the circuitry. We are accustomed to thinking of mind as somehow contained within the skin of an organism, but the circuitry is *not* contained within the skin.

Consider the case of a man felling a tree with an ax. Each stroke of the ax must be corrected for the state of the cut face of the tree after each chip flies. In other words, the system which shows mental characteristics is the whole circuit from the tree to the man’s sense organs, through his brain to his muscles and the ax, and back to the tree. This is not the unit which psychologists are accustomed to considering but it is the unit which systems theory will force them to consider. (Bateson, A Sacred Unity 260-261)

Such a figuring of the ‘circuitry’ of ‘mind’ is radically ‘participatory.’ It is also ‘maddening’ to the oppositionalist perspective. Bateson’s theories on epistemic life are Dionysian in their dynamism.

Titanic Forces of Reduction and Dionysian Dismemberment into Plurality

Before concluding this brief consideration of ‘the Dionysian’ as ‘mythic dynamism,’ an acknowledgement of the ‘enemies’ of Dionysus in myth is also pertinent to the pluralizing role of the ‘un-real real.’ While the archetypal movement of the Apollonic may be oppositional in its objective view ‘from afar’ that seeks to order-by-measure and harmonic ‘rhythm,’ as noted it may be presumptuous to assume that such archetypality is inherently adversarial to the Dionysian. Apollo and Dionysus are, after all, configured as ‘brothers.’ These two archetypalities might then well be explored as a ‘complimentary pair.’ Greek myth tells that the ‘enemies’ of Dionysus had a different archetypal character than the Apollonic. It was the Titans who assaulted Dionysus as soon as he ‘ventured out into the world.’ The Titans appear as personifications of irrepressible impulse which the more ‘reflective’ Olympians had battled and forced down into a subterranean prison in Tartarus. Except, that is, for one or two ‘Titanic’ entities who remained ‘at large’ to inspire ‘Titanic appetites,’ such as Prometheus.

We live in a world that is ruled by futuristic drive. Prometheus boasts [in Aeschylus’s *Prometheus Bound*] : “I planted firmly in their hearts [humans’] blind hopefulness,” a line written twenty-five centuries ago that could be said to be behind Ernst Junger’s prophecy of a Titanic future. This drive represses the Dionysiac essence in humankind to an unimaginable extent. Futuristic expectancy takes us out of the here-and-now and thus out of the body—in other words, out of the time and space of Dionysus. The endless promise of a happy future seems to be the carrot that moves the human donkey of Titanism. (Lopez-Pedraza 11)

“Out of the here-and-now and thus out of the body” is out of or ‘away from’ the space-time of inclusive Dionysian movement with/in the pluralistic present. It appears that not only a securely ordered “structural” context subverts Dionysian presence-in-totality. Eternal ‘hope’ for and narrow pursuit of some ever-greater satisfaction of appetites and sense of control also block submission to Dionysian ‘actuality.’ And such ‘hope’ was figured by the Greeks as planted firmly in the heart of humanness by the Titanic archetypality of Prometheus. The “I” that wants what *It* wants, according to how *It* has configured *Its* singular identity-of-self, constitutes a Titanic appetite and impulse which resists pluralizing diversions into diffusing complexities of self, motives, realities. Overwhelmingly powerful and assertive individuals are not called “Titans” without precedent. Greek myth suggests that as soon as the Dionysian makes an appearance, that Titanic “I” seeks to destroy it. The ‘Dionysian’ evidently antagonizes the ‘Titanic.’ A Titanic identity may seem “anti-structural” in its resistance to the ‘order’ of the Olympian Gods, in its individualistic assertion, but it also seems to configure a literalistic appetite for power and ‘independence’ and thus might be characterized as a particularly ‘personalistic’ modality of ‘self-serving’ reductivity.

The Persecuted God-Child and Metamorphic Survival

The motive here for exploring the ‘enemies’ of Dionysus is both to further ‘characterize’ the imago or ‘personae’ of a pluralistic Dionysian sensibility as well as to focus an imago of that which violently resists the pluralization of self identifications. The response of Dionysus in tales of his persecution is ‘mythically’ telling. As a child Dionysus is torn to pieces, cooked and eaten by the Titans. What does this mythical move indicate about both the Dionysian and childhood?

The Titans dismembering and devouring the child Dionysus can be seen as a mythical model for a particular initiation to which the person is subjected and suffers in early life. (Lopez-Pedraza 18)

I see the clash of the divine child Dionysus with Titanic forces as a first step into a Dionysiac process of life, as an initiation, or *teletai*. Taking such an archetypal and initiatory approach to this image in the myth implies that it is an unavoidable drama enacted in childhood, with all its horror. It allows us to see and begin to accept so-called childhood trauma as the appearance of the Titans coming to dismember and devour the child Dionysus. (Lopez-Pedraza 17)

To live fully, totalistically, “Dionysiacly,” one must be ‘initiated’ into “a Dionysiac process of life.” The assault on the child Dionysus appears to be that: an initiation into the dismemberment essential to living totalistically. Dionysus is not fully Dionysian until so-assaulted. Such ‘activity’ suggests the ‘dialectical archetypality’ of the Dionysian ‘activating’ the archetypality of the Dionysian. It also suggests that childhood must in itself somehow inherently provoke the Titanic forces to assault it. So childhood must be inherently Dionysian to begin with. ‘Reasoning’ this ‘complex’ ‘out’ is ‘painful’ but seems essential to understanding the ‘dualistic mutuality’ of Dionysian status.

I cannot imagine a childhood without trauma in the archetypal sense that I am introducing here. Remember that our view of childhood is imbued with worshipping the child of the sacred family, as well as with the modern paradise of Disneyland, a conception of childhood one sidedly pure, innocent, and happy. This archetypal view of childhood trauma goes against both traditional imagery and prevailing trends today of a personalized and literalized view of that imagery.

For there to be a childhood without trauma, we would have to imagine something truly horrible, namely an unvaccinated soul without defenses, without a third dimension, and without emotions—a condition that brings to mind hebephrenia or psychopathy.(Lopez-Pedraza 17)

A childhood without trauma would be one without initiation, and that would be “something truly horrible, namely an unvaccinated soul without defenses.” A person whose ‘totalistic childhood impulse’ has not been assaulted by forces of Titanic reduction will not have any notion of how to survive in a world whose “social structure” is so often dominated by Titanic reduction. It would remain ‘naively’ Dionysian. Thus the trauma of the Dionysian begins in its confrontation with the Titanic, and that confrontation initiates ‘consciousness’ of both ‘being’ Dionysian and the torment it provokes. It also serves to ‘activate’ the particular capacities of the Dionysian to ‘cope’ with assaults upon it.

Typical of the dialectical movement of the 'mythic' and the Dionysian, this 'initiation' moves in more than one way. It is both a initiatory traumatizing of the naive Dionysian totality of childhood and an activating of the inevitable dismemberment that is the confirmation of the Dionysian that enables it to reflect upon itself as a dynamic process, not a static form or status of being.

We are following Dionysus as a god of *teletai*, of initiation, one that allows us to see childhood within a tragic viewpoint. Within those terms of initiation, it is my objective to bring some reflection to the field of modern psychology, which is plagued by unconscious projections onto and theories about childhood. Thus the archetypal Dionysiac view of childhood, with its initiatory side, is neglected or repressed, with the result that it appears in other guises. It is not difficult to see that childhood trauma has obsessed modern psychology throughout this century, having been elaborated into theories that are, finally, reductive and schematic. No new perspectives have opened up. During the last few years, the theme of childhood trauma has appeared under the guise of "child abuse," betraying a collective hysterical manifestation that clearly lacks any psychological viewpoint. (Lopez-Pedraza 18)

Psychological perspectives are readily 'Titanized' by 'singular longings' for a 'better' life. But when Dionysus is chased away or torn to pieces, he always returns or is reborn (or, in another sense, is never really absent). His revenge on his persecutors is the 'madness' of obsessive pursuit of a singular notion of identity or reality, of maddening pursuit of order or satisfaction.

But what Dionysus actually does, particularly as a child or youth, when assaulted by the Titanic is also crucial to understanding both persecution prompted by 'being' pluralistically and the capacity to survive persecution that such 'being' enables.

There is another tale that tells of Dionysus walking along a path when suddenly a group of Titans appeared in front of him. They immediately fell upon the god and tried to destroy him, but Dionysus transformed himself into a snake and slithered away into the bushes. In both the Orphic and Homeric tales, Dionysus is still a very small child, but here he can be imagined as a youth, perhaps similar in appearance to the androgynous figure described by Euripides in the *Bacchae*, who is able to protect himself from the Titans. Instead of confronting the Titans, he metamorphosized himself into a snake and thus became invisible to them. In this way, he shows overtly his kinship to Hermes. This tale supports my idea that we have an obligation to protect our psychosomatic apparatus by whatever means at our disposal. (Lopez-Pedraza 21)

Faced with the overwhelming focused power of the singularly directed Titanic, one might attempt to defend one's self as habitually identified—that is, to 'stand and fight' or to 'plead' in/as one's 'habitual configuration.' Or, one might abandon the identity of that 'appearance' and 'metamorphose' into another version of 'self' in order to 'escape,' as Dionysus appears to do.

I would call this taking care of the soul, Dionysus taking care of his own Dionysiac soul. In modern psychological terminology, this would be expressed as an introverted personality able to retreat quickly into its own Dionysiac nature and there find protection from Titanic destruction. (Lopez-Pedraza 22)

Tales of Dionysus in more adult form show him using his 'metamorphic powers' to frighten and punish his persecutors, as when the sailors thought to sell his beautiful body into slavery and he caused

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vines to grow all over the ship and its masts, driving them to a such terror they leap into the ocean. It seems clear from these examples, and associations such as with wine, that the Dionysian is not only a traumatic movement of tearing apart but also an ecstatic one of ‘being variously,’ of metaphoric being and metamorphic becoming. Such a capacity, the tales seem to tell, is derived from initiatory dismemberments *of* and *in* childhood. To become ‘divine’ the child must be ‘persecuted,’ ‘dismembered,’ and learn *deliberately* to metamorphose. But such capacity for metamorphic being is initially derived from ‘forced dismemberment.’ There appears some association here with archaic practices of ritualized initiation of children. Both suggest that ‘participation’ in one’s own confounding plurality of participations requires traumatic inductions into such status that then enable a greater capacity to survive the inevitably reductive tendencies of structurally singularizing identifications by virtue of a ‘Dionysian personae.’”

An Eros of Relationship among the Dismembered: Participating Variously in Dionysian Plurality

One last reference to a specific archetypal figuration in myth is in order for this study’s concerns with ‘participatory identity’ and its inherently pluralistic character. As discussed, differentiation is held to enable participation. A singular identity cannot ‘participate’ in itself. Without difference there can be no contrast, without contrast no basis for discriminations of identification. It is, after all, *in* difference that identification is ‘born.’ But to assume that difference and distinction somehow obviate mutuality and co-participation or co-occurrence might be termed a ‘Titanic reduction.’

The archetypal figure in Greek myth that ‘negotiates’ the seeming ‘gap’ of difference is Eros. As soon as there is distinction and difference there can be/needs be the agency of relation, and, in the supposedly most ‘original’ tale of Eros origin, he is termed “the first born.” Thus an association is rather easily recognized between Dionysian and Erotical or Erotic movements. (Due to the rather ‘Titanic’ reduction of the ‘relational activity of Eros’ to explicit sexual behavior in pursuit of ‘appetite satisfaction,’ the term ‘erotic’ is used here “under suspicion.”) The Dionysian creates variousness within the ‘unity’ of the individual by way of dismemberment. Thereby a context for relationship among agencies of self is generated: an Eros-ing or ‘eros’ of the dismembered. Among the characteristics of Dionysus is his reputed femininity as a male figure, his androgyny.

Taking these aspects of Dionysus’s [androgynous] psychology further reminds us again of the tradition that equated Dionysus and Ariadne with Eros and Psyche and thus to conceive that the androgynous Dionysus contains within himself the dynamism of Eros and Psyche.

Dionysus’s androgyny moves us into depth psychology. Jung worked extensively on androgyny and gave great importance to it. He made a strong equation between the Self, that which regulates the balance of the personality and the hermaphrodite, that which synthesizes the

union of the male/female opposition. This allows us to speculate that the Dionysus portrayed by Euripides was a personification of the Self. We have to remember that the Rebis, as the hermaphrodite, was the final product of the alchemical process. (Lopez-Pedraza 57-58)

The alchemical process takes place in a vessel that holds all elements in ‘the process’ while activated by ‘heating.’ The imago of Dionysian plurality seems just such a ‘contained process.’ But this various, concurrent ‘eros of the self’ is only possible, is ‘fueled by,’ the trauma and ecstasy of ‘dismemberment.’ ‘Singularly Titanically impulses’ would seemingly have to be ‘surrendered’ to enable such a ‘erotic context of plurality.’ A ‘Titanic persona’ does not seem particularly ‘erotic.’

Fragmentation and the Possibility of an Eros of Personal Plurality

Dismemberment of habitual identity is ‘fragmenting’ to that identity’s perspective. The “I” of a singular-sense-of-self is inherently incapable of ‘identifying with’ the ‘strangers’ thus configured which are not located ‘out there.’ The ‘novelty’ of the loss of reductive certainty-of-self is ‘un-real.’

Strange and weird experiences are *inexplicable*. [. . .]. The reason we cannot explain or explicate these experiences is that we are woven into them, bound up in them, entwined in them. Not possible to get separate from them, not possible to get that objective distance. (Lockhart, Words as Eggs 221)

The ‘dismembered’ self is a stranger to itself. The extremity of such ‘trauma’ might be schizophrenia. But it is the very Titanic insistence on singularity of self that ‘participates’ the trauma of dismemberment. Yet, if some sensing of self takes ‘shape’ in that chaotic peculiarity which is not reductive, a sense-of-self that is not traumatized by the loss of single-focus, then an acceptance and even ecstasy of plurality becomes possible.

I would like to suggest that these experiences do not require explanation or explication so much as they require *eros*. We shy away from our strange and weird experiences. We hide them or from them. We secrete them. We don’t tell anyone about them. We are seen as strange or weird if we do tell them. Or crazy. Yet, if we try to ignore or depreciate or devalue these experiences, I believe we move against a basic pattern of our own life and increase the separation of ego and self, increase the knotted condition of the ego, increase the meaninglessness of our experience. (Lockhart, Words as Eggs 222)

“Our strange and weird experiences” provoke Titanic attempts to repress and control, or are taken to suggest we are “crazy,” mad—which may be taken as indicative of being ‘under the spell’ of Dionysus. But if one ‘flees’ them in/as one’s habitual identity one evades the possibility of an ‘eros of the self.’ To live as/with/in the weird and strange realities of the self, there must be some engagement, some conversation.

I have expressed the general idea elsewhere that eros requires telling. In this context, eros requires telling some of the strange and weird experiences that have profoundly affected me and seem both in their singular occurrence and in their interrelationship to reveal something of the essential threads that make up the pattern of my life. (Lockhart, Words as Eggs 222)

‘The essential threads that make up the pattern of my life’ are likely to be revealed and known only through strange and weird experiences, and only the telling of those experiences, an enacting of their ‘mythic’ dynamism, will reveal the “interrelationship” of those threads, a totality of ‘my life/self.’

I believe going through relationship entails going consciously into and through the depths (places beneath the surface); darkness (places without light); and despair (places without hope) of relationship. Too often we go or are dragged unconsciously into and through these places of trial and turmoil. (Lockhart, Words as Eggs 118)

The relationship of the self to its selves (egoically identified and not), is an eros that requires “going consciously into and through the depths [. . .] darkness [. . .] and despair.” Dionysian dismemberment thus appears essential to the possibility of being conscious of these ‘transits.’ “There are many myths concerning the birth of Eros. Let us see this as a statement that Eros may be born in many ways, that he comes into being out of different and differing wombs” (Lockhart, Words as Eggs 124).

This archetypal agency-of-relation, the divine dynamic of association and mutuality or ‘God’ of relationship, has a variously figured origin (like many other mythical divinities ‘posing’ archetypal complexes) that suggests the particular constellation of his/this agency. He is the son of Aphrodite, goddess of love; of Penia, need/want/hunger; of Nyx, black-winged night that laid a ‘wind egg’; and born straight out of original Chaos, as “first being” or “first born.” Like Dionysus, Eros seems mostly a loner, not one of the ‘high Olympians.’ And he, too, is often regarded as dangerous, uncivilized, a dark and dirty figure even, who, in one description, lurks in darkness on thresholds, dressed in rags. A figure for the respectable to avoid lest they be thrust into turmoil—the inevitably dismembering turmoil of relationship.

The birth of Eros from Chaos is an important image. Frequently our lives become Chaos; a relationship enters or reenters the Chaos stage; our experience descends into darkness with nothing to hang on to, where all things become black and disconnected. Relationship frequently brings Chaos or throws us into the gaping chasm of Chaos. About Chaos, Jung says, “One must not underestimate the devastating effect of getting lost in Chaos, even if we know that it is the sine qua non of any regeneration of spirit and personality.” We can get lost and devastated in the Chaos of relationship. Yet, if myth be right, if myth carries an archetypal truth, then Chaos carries a seed which, if nurtured and allowed time to come to birth, becomes Eros in us. Chaos is for the purpose of bringing in, giving birth to a new connection to life, giving birth to the very principle of connection, giving birth to Eros. If Jung is correct, then Eros is essential to any regeneration of the spirit and the personality. (Lockhart, Words as Eggs 125)

Chaos thus appears to constitute the most ‘fertile’ context for Eros to become ‘active.’ And it is clear how ‘chaotic’ Dionysian ‘being’ can be from the perspective of “normative structure.” But to be dismembered into a chaos of self out of which no eros, no connection from communication or conversance is nurtured, is simply to be fragmented, to be “liminoid” rather than “liminal”—to be, some

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would assert, 'postmodern.' An eros of personal plurality is apparently not a consequence of singular egoic purpose or an act of 'will.' A descent into chaos, a *descensus ad inferos*, into 'the interior' of self, and thus a dismemberment of the assumed self-as-exteriorly-presented, is unavoidable if an erotic sense-of-selves is to be complexly enabled. In the absence of such a 'move-that-is-not-a-literal-move,' 'depth' psychological insights suggest that identity will 'suffer' a compulsive, Titanic impulse toward a sense of mutuality 'out there,' beyond the perceived boundaries of 'one's self,' and thus 'project' 'un-related' self-aspects unto other's who are thusly identified 'singularly' by one's own singular sense-of-self. An eros of self/world/other might well be dependent upon an 'eros of one's selves.'

Chapter 9

Manifesting Many-ness in/as Oneness After Modernism: Facilitating Epistemological Diversity in the Knowing of Self, Other, and World in Relation to an Un-real Reality

(Epistemological, Socio-Cultural, and Developmental Implications of Knowing Self, Other, and World by
Way of the Un-Real Real)

Knowing Life with/in the Mystery of Radically Diverse Totality through ‘Wild’ and ‘Tame’ Epistemics

Taken ‘all together,’ rather than as some sequence progressing toward a definitive conclusion, what is one to ‘make’ of the proceeding notions regarding inclusive knowing and the roles of un-real reality in all knowing? If this analysis and its interpretations are regarded as relatively reasonable, then the broadest implication appears to be that any hierarchical privileging of either reduction or non-reduction promotes a generally reductive epistemology or ‘identity consciousness.’ Such an attitude is psycho-epistemologically one-sided, be it positivistic or relativistic in its emphasis. Reflexive or pervasive reduction fosters reactivity to un-defined diversity as well as analytical incompetence. A genuinely inclusive socialized mentality (turning of mind) would have to maintain some dynamically non-hierarchical relationship between reductive and non-reductive purposes for and methods of knowing, knowledge, and understanding. If radically complex totality, or the chaotically complicated associations of relatively simple/singular elements or components (i.e. electrons, quarks, concepts, etc.), is to be ‘known’ without resort to reductive definition, such knowing requires an inclusive ‘grasping’ of ‘reductively unknowable dynamic nature.’ This knowing of the manyness of oneness can be characterized as the complimentary conjunction of ‘tame’ or socially structured reduction to exclusively simple status with ‘wild’ or more-than-socially-structurable, radically inclusive complexity.

Yet since all aspects of so-knowing the ‘nature of totality’ derive from psychical processes, knowing knowing seems as much about self-reflective knowing of the ‘alien’ character of human consciousness (both ‘in the world’ and with/in its own pluralistic subjectivity and contradictory epistemic heuristics), as about ‘knowing the world out there.’ Some means of relating immaterial psychical process with the material realm of phenomenon, of being ‘a being’ of both inclusive and exclusive understanding

(of positivistically material and immaterially psychical body, of one-ness and many-ness), is required for any complex status of self-relation to self, others, and world. Various cultural ‘practices’ generally indicated by terms such as spirituality, mythology, initiation, and art have been considered here as such attempts to reflect/experience/mediate such a concurrent state of irreducible but intrinsically related statuses for knowing/being/becoming.

Such an attitude toward identification and re-presentation might be described as promoting a willingness to ‘live with mystery’—in contrast to compulsively seeking to ‘solve’ or ‘dissolve’ the complexity of the reductively unknowable. The term mystery is used here in reference to its meaning as “something that is not understood or baffles or eludes the understanding (Am. Heritage Dict. ’85, .826)” —baffling, that is, to an understanding derived from self-consistent, reductive methods of identification. The word mystery derives from the Greek *muein* for ‘to be closed.’ Thus, the status of radically complex totality (whether of self, other, or world) can be considered as ‘closed to’ understanding by reductive methods. To insist that it can be completely ‘opened up to definition by’ reductive rational analysis is to metaphysically impose the hierarchical priority of reductive, positivistic identity and reality upon all manifestation and phenomenon.

Thus an ‘egalitarian’ attitude toward both reductive and inclusive modes of knowing would, from the perspective of the reductive, constitute a ‘mystical relationship with totality’ because it is somehow ‘beyond’ the grasp of ordinarily reductive understanding. The term mystical is pertinent here for its meanings of “inspiring a sense of mystery and wonder,” “of, pertaining to, or stemming from direct communion with ultimate reality,” and, “of or founded on subjective experience (Am. Heritage Dict. ’85, 826).” To propose an acceptance of ‘ultimate reality’ as being ‘intrinsically mysterious’ to reflexively reductive modernist identity consciousness is as likely to meet with vehement intransigence as are suggestions that selfhood is a condition of inherently polycentric and radically complex subjectivity which no ‘I’ can adequately re-present. Nonetheless, this book ‘concludes’ with speculations on what such a ‘relativization’ of reductive attitudes to a more inclusive (and participatory), thus necessarily non-positivistic, mentality might require of us.

In the broadest sense, acceptance of radically complex totality as ‘a mystery to reductive understanding’ requires validating a status of ‘un-real reality’—relative to reductive standards. That validation requires not only the rational explanation of the limits of reductive rational explanation attempted in this writing, but also some effective way for ‘experiencing the mystery’ of radical complexity as a status one is *of*, or ‘knows by way of metamorphic participation.’ It appears evident from the preceding considerations that an effectively affective validation of metamorphic status in mythological dynamism is constituted in some more potent experience than that of ‘mere wonder.’ Otto’s phrase “*mysterium tremendum et fascinans*” suggests the character of experience capable of relativizing reflexively reductive epistemic method to the reality of the ‘un-real real.’ It translates from the Latin as,

‘mystery terrifyingly huge and fascinating,’ suggesting that to encounter the mystery of inclusive totality is so frightening that one wants to ‘turn away’ (toward fixed or ordinarily known statuses) yet cannot because one is fascinated the awe of encountering it. Yet such an encounter with totality as ‘reasonably mysterious’—to effectively affect a relativization of reductive perspective—requires a socio-cultural basis for validity.

Thus the more inclusive (“wild”) modes for knowing and understanding the dynamical nature of such totality must be promoted rather emphatically—by all reasonable means—if the reflexive reduction so vehement in assumptions of modernist rationalism (the “tame”) is to be ‘tempered’ in its dominance of epistemological processes and the subsequent configurations of identification and reality. Accomplishing that relativization is here understood as requiring a non-reductive dialectical association of the anthropological, aesthetic, sociological, philosophical, psychological, scientific, and mythological analyses previously presented. The concordant engagements of those analyses in such a potential shift in emphasis from reflexively oppositional reduction toward a more inconclusive dialectical relation of reduction and non-reduction are approached in three following categories. Firstly an overall perspective on reconsidering epistemological assumptions in all disciplines is offered, followed by one on reorienting conceptions of cultural values and social structures about reductive and inclusive understanding, and concluding with a consideration of psyche-logical development and educational emphasis relative to these concerns.

Reviewing the Assertions of this Analysis

In an attempt to bring the preceding considerations into some practical perspective on living more inclusively as after-modernist mentalities, this chapter examines how to approach actively defuse positivistic reduction *from within* a religiously positivistic status of identity. In briefest summary, this study indicates that the following understandings lead to a particularly acute modernist resistance to manifesting the many in the one.

- 1) Knowing derives from perceiving difference in reference to established criteria, thus generating the identifications of knowledge expressed in the form of psychical re-presentations (images, language) of what is being known—which remains essentially ‘un-represented.’
- 2) Representation of knowing and knowledge using psychical re-presentation is fundamentally differentiated in reference to a status as ones-ness and manys-ness.
- 3) Such representation of knowing requires an actual but non-literal, yet valid status of psychical consciousness—an un-real reality—to re-present the actual;
- 4) Knowing tends to become reductively positivized as one-nesses or ‘the things of knowledge’ (words, theories, diagrams), that configure ordinary socially valid reality and truth, but subsequently obscure the un-real reality of knowing by rendering it covert;

- 5) Identifications of self, other, and world derived from the reductions of ordinary reality necessarily become estranged from relation to the dynamical many-ness of complex totality;
- 6) Knowing polycentric psyche and the plurality of oneness thus requires ‘radically inclusive knowing’—an inherently non-ordinary consciousness enabled by mythically dynamic expression of overtly ‘un-real real’ status (exemplified by myth and much modernist art) that brings socially structured status into a non-hierarchical relation with “anti-structural” status;
- 7) Validation of such a relationship and its concurrent logics of radically inclusive knowing appears to involve somaticized experience of its metamorphic dynamism and some engagement with a ‘Dionysian personae’ (manifested in much archaic ritualization, dreaming, and altered states of waking consciousness involving extra-ordinary perception);

However,

- 8) Practical necessity imposes a reflexively reductive socially structured identity consciousness to enhance material manipulation of environments. Its ordinarily singular sense-of-self inherently then resists most shifts to what appears, from its perspective, an ‘un-real’ or ‘impossible’ status of pluralistic identity. That intrinsic resistance thereby requires a ‘relativization’ of its reductive structuring to the dynamical status of radically complex totality if human consciousness is engaging its full range of epistemological capacities and understandings in knowing self, other, and world—thus manifesting its ‘many-ness in/as its one-ness.’ Furthermore, this ‘natural’ resistance to inclusive knowing can be accentuated by socialized emphasis upon reductive criteria for valid identity and reality, as exemplified in Western style identity consciousness;

Thus:

- 9) The fragmentarily positivistic, Titanically reductive aspect of Westernized identity consciousness (in its idealization of conclusive, absolute definitions that regard pluralistic identity as impossible), is structurally incapable of validating inclusive knowing and a status of radical complexity. It thus rigidifies pragmatically singular identity to the extreme that a neurotic ‘identity crises’ has become part to the ‘self conscious’ sense of self in modern social contexts;
- 10) In explicating these notions, awareness of inclusive knowing’s epistemological character (knowing by way of the ‘un-real real’) has been shown to derive from self-reflective consciousness of polycentric psyche and experience of the latter’s metamorphic dynamism—as cited in a variety of intellectual disciplines of study. Related re-presentations of radical complexity have also been cited from fields of ‘physical science.’ That these insights have emerged ‘in spite of’ an historically extreme emphasis upon reductive purpose and method, is taken to suggest the presence of a ‘self deconstruction’ of the dominant reductive impulse. That concept has been presented as an emerging, non-reductive dialectical engagement between previously opposed perspectives such as modernist < > postmodernist, structuralist < > poststructuralist, and positivist < > relativist.
- 11) There appears then some indication that the oppositional split between *mythos* and *logos* that has favored reductive rationalism, presented here as an elementary characteristic of Western style social structuring, is somehow developing into a complimentary rather than oppositional relationship.

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Given these notions and their proposed interpretations, what implications might one draw from them about repositioning collective attitudes toward modes of knowing, structuring social identities, and enhancing the broadest range of human consciousness through educational efforts?

Radically Re-Cognizing Epistemological Method in Relation to Inclusive Knowing of Self, Other, and World as a Many-ness in/as One-ness

Engaging Epistemic Reflection with/in the Always Already Post-Modernity of Modernity

In brief, the concern addressed in this concluding chapter is how to configure and approach the after modernist challenge of engaging a modernist < > postmodernist dialectic. Given the perspective articulated above that there is no simple historical sequence of development from archaic to modernist to postmodernist bases for epistemic method or status of understanding but rather an accumulative conglomeration of methodologies to be acknowledged, this challenge cannot be ‘simply stated.’ Perhaps its most elemental or pervasive aspect is the requirement of foregrounding a differentiation between inconclusively reductive rational method and conclusively reductive purposes in knowing. The intimate, inextricable co-relation of these reductivities in Western intellectual history is intrinsic to the what can be paraphrased as the ‘always already post-modernity of modernity. That is, the self-deconstructing dynamic of knowing by way of rational analysis’ interminable differentiations in service to the intention to arrive at the reductively positive and final statuses of truth and reality. Somehow this inextricable relationship must be acknowledge for its radically complex implications about epistemological processes.

Finding Meaning in ‘The Search for Meaning’—by Way of Micro, Macro, and Meta Epistemologies

As noted, Giegerich has proposed that the contemporary ‘search for meaning’ indicates that any intrinsic ‘sense of meaning’ is effectively ‘absent’ from collective consciousness (i.e., meaning is typically an a priori ‘inheritance’ that modernist attitudes have ‘foresworn’ in the quest for endless revision of ‘the known’). What is then ‘most meaningful’ appears to be the seeking of meaning. It is added here, that the ‘how’ of that seeking might also be what is intrinsically meaningful to psycho-philosophical impulses constellating any modernist< >postmodernist dialectic of reductive< >non-reductive epistemic understanding. With/in contemporary contexting, ‘knowing what we know’ seems to require ‘knowing how we know.’ The ‘search for meaning’ thus might be experienced as meaningful or ‘meaning making’ is so far as it is engaged as the endeavor to know variously—including knowing knowing variously. It would seem that only a reductively impelled ‘search for meaning’ could assume there would be some conclusion to its searching. A searching that is impelled by a more inclusive,

polyvalent intention would seem to necessarily have to both ‘search variously’ as well as ‘search indefinitely.’

In the most general sense, then, epistemological method in such a searching might most appropriately be conceived of in at least three (distinctive but non-exclusive and ever interactive) categories: micro, macro, and meta. In this view, micro-epistemic method would be the most intentionally reductive, definitive and conclusive, concerned with ways of asserting discrete one-nesses or simplicities and ordering them in fixed hierarchies (monist, hierarchically dualistic, or oppositionalist perspectives). Macro-epistemic method would be more inconclusive in posing mutually significant statuses and allowing for overlapping boundaries of identification (multi-factorial, complexly contingent, non-deterministic, perspectives). This mode is more inclined to pose competitive dualities or chaotically complex contexts of bivalent relations (relativistic). Meta-epistemic method would then be poly-methodological in it’s a concern with composing knowing that correlates some concurrency of both micro and macro perspectives (a form of Thompson’s “metanoia” or mytho<>logos). Thus the latter would have to enable a knowing/understanding of many-ness in/as one-ness. This status of knowing resembles more Giegerich’s “absolute negativity” as a status of consciousness that is not dependent upon positivizing knowledge but accepts the reality of psychical re-presentation as the mind’s way of participating/precipitating self, other, and world. It ‘knows knowing as by way of the thingless things of thought.’ If each of these modalities of knowing and understanding were granted valid status, and none were reflexively assigned pervasive, hierarchically superior precedence, then perhaps participatory consciousness and its polycentric subjectivity could be more overtly acknowledged and engaged. However, it bears restating that ‘in actuality,’ it can be assumed that all these modes of knowing are typically co-operative in consciousness—it is the habituated self-conscious attitude of socially structured mentality that privileges one over the others and thus requires some ‘readjustment’ of its orientation to knowings,

How then can an assertion of the basis for meaning be established that is meaningfully inconclusive? From what basis can the reductive modernist ‘turn of mind’ re-cognize and so validate such a meaningfully various method of epistemic methods such that its ‘search for meaning’ is variously, and profoundly, ‘meaning full?’

Holding the Tensions of Opposition and Contrast and the Necessity for Epistemic Transgression of Ordinary Identity and Reality

Such a triangulated epistemological methodology of reductive, non-reductive, and both/and perspectives (micro<>macro<>meta), poses a radical shift away from the oppositional model of Western intellectual tradition in which conflict and contrast prompt hierarchical choices. The claim is promoted

here that such a shift is *actually already taking place* in contemporary societies. Such a fundamental shift has not, however, been widely articulated, acknowledged, or embraced *as such*. Perhaps that is because it involves the ‘institutionalization’ of the necessity for transgressing ordinary and habituated boundaries of knowing and knowledge. As such, a meta-epistemic attitude must both assert and deny the validity of monistic and dualistic criteria for identity and reality. Such a basis for the ‘search for meaning’ must, as it were, hold the tension of oppositions and contrasts without reducing their meaningfulness to oppositional exclusivity or hierarchical precedence. One might assert that its ‘metaphysical assumptions’ must be so complex as to be overtly self-contradictory in that these assert rationally incommensurate criteria for valid identity, reality, and truth—due to polyvalent, polycentric ‘sources’ of meaningfulness. And yet, to be coherent it must be ‘self-consistent’ in so far as it asserts a reasonable basis for its inconsistency. A ‘search for meaning’ so composed can be understood as meaningful in how effectively/affectively it ‘holds the tensions’ of many-ness in/as one-ness without favoring either reduction or non-reduction. Thereby it must ‘honor’ the (often inconsistent) reductions of ordinarily socialized identity and reality, yet include those in a knowing that necessarily transgresses their boundaries for valid status—it must both validate and invalidate them. In this regard, it will assert a valid status of ordinarily ‘un-real reality.’ What is being presented here can be understood as the challenge modernist reduction has, quite unintentionally/unconsciously, presented ‘itself’ with: how to ‘incorporate’ in one ‘psychical body’ the vast diversity it has so particularly differentiated?

Articulations of some meta-epistemic analysis, such as Derridaian “deconstruction,” can be regarded as attempting such a reasonable validation of what seems rationally inconsistent by ‘locating’ the meaningfulness of language in the principle of “differance,” or ‘identity of identity and non-identity,’ rather than that of likeness or ‘identity of identity and sameness.’ The notion of Derrida’s “differance” can be seen as ‘holding the tension’ of radical complexity and thus being more of a meta-epistemic re-presentation. It is more effectively re-presentational of the overall ‘how of meaning making’ that engages particularity in/as irreducible diversity. What Derrida’s notion does not seem to suggest—despite the assertions of many of his interpreters—is that there is no meaning or no valid status of identity.

Accuracy of Knowings as Both Methodologically and Phenomenally Dependent yet also Trans-methodologically Derived

Concern with ‘truth as accuracy,’ as accurate re-presentation of phenomenal occurrence (whether material or psychical) comes, in a thus triangulated epistemology, to relate to the methodological criteria of micro, macro, and meta perspectives. In this regard, accuracy derives from ‘appropriate applications’ of reductive, non-reductive, and radically inclusive criteria for knowing. Confusions of such categories of criteria in developing an analysis would be a basis for doubting its accuracy. The other basis for assessing

accuracy is, in essence, reductive since it evaluates how ‘precisely’ or ‘appropriately’ a given status or phenomenon has been re-presented through a particular set of epistemic criteria—asking whether an analysis or re-presentation actually/accurately represents that status. Yet, from a psycho-epistemological perspective, such an evaluation of an analysis or re-presentation in relation to what it re-presents is not ultimately determinable in any positivistic reduction since what is being psychically re-presented ultimately remains un-represented. Even the critique of that re-presentation is a re-presentation of how the original re-presentation represents the thing that can only be re-presented by psychological means.

Determinations of epistemic accuracy thus remain ‘relative’ to each other and it is in the correlation or constellation of both contrasting re-presentations and critiques of them from the perspective of other methodologies (whether between disciplinary or micro, macro, and meta criteria). That is to say, truthfulness is not accessible as any singular status but rather as a constellated one derived from both intra-methodological rigor and trans-disciplinary correlation.

A Need for Differentiated Modes of Knowing, Knowledge Criteria, and Heuristic Method as Enabling both Inter and Trans-disciplinarity

In regard to disciplinary differentiations of intellectual and academic analysis, a micro< >macro< >meta triangulation of epistemic methodology has at least three levels. In one regard, the specialization of disciplinary methods and topical orientations manifests a differentiated ‘search for meaning’ through various micro-epistemic methods and heuristics. That is, each diversified discipline of study deploys particularized criteria for analysis and interpretation. In another respect, efforts to effectively co-relate those differentiated disciplines of investigation and understanding could be described as ‘interdisciplinary correlation.’ In such an association the contrasts between disciplinary re-presentations can pose a hierarchy of one discipline being supported by others, giving a sort of extended micro-epistemic. But interdisciplinary association can also pose contrasting methods and interpretations ‘for the sake of’ their incongruities, presenting a more macro-epistemic effect. Yet another emphasis in disciplinary association seeks to generate a concurrently valid and somehow complimentary relationship, but one that is not reducible to any single set of knowledge criteria. That attempt suggests a meta-epistemic approach. This latter might be termed trans-disciplinarity in that it seeks to constitute meaning both ‘across’ and ‘through’ disciplines as differentiated micro and macro methodologies brought into some ‘fugue’ relationship that ‘makes meaning’ as a ‘concurrence of congruities and incongruities.’ It needs be emphasized, however, that such a contexting for knowing and knowledge is not only *derived from* disciplinary differentiations but also *remains dependent upon* both their inclusive and exclusive associations. Its meaningfulness depends upon a ‘complimentary tension’ among their likenesses and differences.

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It would seem inappropriate then to assert that there are hierarchical ‘layers of truthfulness’ among disciplines and methods (such as regarding physical science as the ‘most accurate’). Rather, they might be posed as constituting independent methodological contexts in which valid identification, reality, and truth are asserted relative to particular criteria, which, from a meta epistemic view exhibit significant mutualities. This work itself derives most of its impetus and references from thinkers operating ‘beyond’ their disciplinary specialties in an inter-disciplinary manner that provides the basis for a more meta mode of trans-disciplinary association. Note how the associations in this writing are derived from Turner’s ‘moves’ from anthropology toward sociology and dramaturgy, Tucker’s from aesthetic theory to anthropology and psychology, Jung’s from psychology to religion and mythology, Bohm’s from physics to philosophy, Giegerich’s from psychology to mythology and philosophy, etc, etc. No ‘hard and fast’ distinction between interdisciplinary and trans-disciplinary method is intended in this description, but rather some sense of how the effects of complex association become amplified.

Mediating the Epistemologies of Singularity, Plurality, and Concurrency as a ‘There and Back Again’ Practice

Assertions of meaningful status and determinations of its accuracy thus occur both within various disciplinary and methodological criteria for knowing and knowledge as well as between or among them. There is a this-versus-that as well as a this-and-that model for accuracy. On the reductive side, knowing is derived from hierarchically mediating between opposed or exclusive statuses. On the non-reductive side, knowing derives from mediating relations between differences in ultimately non-hierarchical constellations. The reductive mode mediates by hierarchical opposition, the non-reductive by way of non-identical affinity. The latter seems to have an oscillating dynamic that ‘makes meaning’ by ‘going back and forth’ rather than settling on one ‘line of reasoning’ or causation.

Perhaps in a more meta-epistemic mode, meaning is ‘made’ by mediating between these two bases for valid status assertion. The reductive mode of mediation asserts an either > < or basis for its meaning and accuracy. The non-reductive mode poses a this < > that complex of concurrently active references for its meaningful relations and accuracy. The more radically inclusive contexting of meta-epistemic perspective then constitutes more of a here < > there or neither < > nor/both < > and basis for its meaningful association. The reductive mode thus mediates difference by asserting a singular status of identity, reality, and truth. The non-reductive mode mediates difference by posing pluralistic sets of association and causation. The radically inclusive mode mediates difference more as a Derridaian “differance,” one might say—as the play/interplay of reductive and non-reductive differentiations that is ‘differentiated variously’ and so ‘indefinitely.’

However, given the difficulty of rationally validating such a radically inclusive status of consciousness, it would seem practical to assert that for most of us most of the time, the closest we can approach to it is to mediate between reduction and non-reduction by consciously alternating or oscillating between such epistemic modes and methodologies. Such a shifting of references can be described as ‘going there and back again—again and again.’

Radically Inclusive Epistemology’s Requirements for Initiatory Confrontation and Somaticized Understanding

Some ‘discipline of inter-disciplinary oscillations’ between reductive and non-reductive epistemic methods for knowing might promote a more trans-disciplinary capacity. But the meaningfulness of the ‘search for meaning’ appears to require some experiential ‘implosion’ of the ways the reductive and non-reductive modes differentiate difference. Thus any social structuring that derives from a cultural value for radically inclusive knowing is confronted with how to effectively affect the relativization of those modalities *to the exponentially meaningful status of their concurrent validity*. Such an abrogation of the reductive aspects of both singular and pluralistic identifications that relativizes them to a radically inclusive epistemic has been described here as inherently traumatic to both the socialized persona of individuals and the ordinarily socialized consciousness of collectives. It has further been characterized as an initiation into an ‘other worldly’ awareness (or ‘of relation to the cosmos’) that typically involves some somaticized experiential component. The ordinarily positivized status of identity consciousness appears to ‘demand’ a ‘crises of identity’ in order to be able to ‘submit to’ a larger ‘field of meaningful reference.’

What is being suggested here is that the homeostasis of habituated or ordinary attitudes (behavior regulated by dominant psychological complexes and social structurings) is both a necessity of effective human functioning and yet a potential threat to human survival in how it delimits knowing and understanding of self, other, and world. The narrowing effects of ordinarily reductive identification (be it systematic or idiosyncratic) are useful but dangerously restrictive on human capacity for rationally complex, broadly relational, reflective awareness. Perhaps the extraordinary epistemological capacity of the human species to reductively abstract and associate specific statuses from the continuum of radically complex totality is a ‘definitively human trait.’ But if so, then the capacity and impulse to relativize that perspective and its consequences ‘back to’ an ultimately irreducible diversity and complexity of existence and causation would appear to be not only also ‘definitively human’ but also similarly essential to species survival.

In so far as the capacities of human consciousness derive evolutionarily from adaptations for survival as a species, the dynamical qualities of mind and brain function can be regarded as having, as their ‘evolutionary purpose,’ the preservation of ‘the body.’ In this sense, the mind and brain ‘serve’ and

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‘refer back to’ the physiological body/being. Indeed, the body is the very basis for epistemological processes, both as sensory ‘mechanism’ and the material ‘medium’ or ‘culture’ in which consciousness is enabled to take ‘psychical form.’ This point is presented here in association with the character of a ‘meta-epistemic engagement’ between reductive and non-reductive knowings. If abstract, analytical attitudes and understandings derive from the sensorial references of somatic experience, then perhaps that is why those attitudes need to be ‘brought back to’ the potency of that experience in order to be relativized to a more inclusive status of consciousness in/as many-ness in one-ness—or participation in radically complex totality. That participatory experience appears to derive its capacity to relativize egoic, persona-centric, socially structured identifications to a field of greater complexity by way of *feeling* and *emotion*. One might say then that an ‘aesthetic epistemic’ is required to enable a shift away from reductive, positivistic assumptions. Thus some ‘larger than egoic/socialized homeostasis’ is derived from a ‘feeling’ the complexity of radically diverse totality.

Damasio explores the role of feeling and emotion in the evolutionary creation as well as the maintenance of complex human consciousness in his book, “The Feeling of What Happens.” He points out that not only is human consciousness typified by its capacity to bring feeling or emotion ‘in/to’ reflective awareness (constituting a self-knowing about feelings that can then be ‘thought about’ conceptually), but that emotion thus has the capacity to influence speculative thought. “I propose that, just like emotion, consciousness is aimed at the organism’s survival, and that, just like emotion, consciousness is rooted in the representation of the body (Damasio, p. 37).” “The feeling of what happens” is thus regarded as integral to any comprehensive human epistemology. There exists a particularly human dialectic of feeling and cognitive processing. However, modernist attitudes have primarily evaded or repressed awareness of that intimate association.

Given the magnitude of the matters to which emotion and feeling have been attached, one would have expected both philosophy and the sciences of mind and brain to have embraced their study. Surprisingly, that is only happening now (Damasio, 38).

Throughout most of the twentieth-century, emotion was not trusted in the laboratory. Emotion was too subjective, it was said. Emotion was too elusive and vague. Emotion was the opposite of reason, easily the finest of human ability, and reason was presumed to be entirely independent from emotion. This was a perverse twist on the Romantic view of humanity. Romantics placed emotion in the body and reason in the brain. Twentieth century science left out the body, moved emotion back into the brain, but relegated it to the lower neural strata associated with ancestors whom no one worshiped. In the end, not only was emotion not rational, even studying it was probably not rational (Damasio, 39).

It is the intention of this current writing to rationally substantiate the claim that emotion and feeling that ‘affect’ the body are essential to ‘effecting’ a shift in habituated patterns of consciousness and

behavior so as to relativize the reductive impulse to a more complex, meta-level engagement of the inclusive range of human epistemic capacities. In keeping with Damasio's perspective, these intimate, indeterminate interactions of 'mind and body' are re-presented in Avens' notion of the "imaginal body"—that inclusive status of psycho<>somatic being that constitutes a both/and of 'meta-physical psychical reality' and physio-logical phenomenon. That inclusive totality is not amenable to abstracting fragmentation without its 'ceasing to be what it is.' It is 'definitively' *more than the sum of its parts*. As such it is 'knowable' by way of some inclusive mind<>body *experience*.

That being asserted, it is not meant to suggest that more ordinarily reductive, socially structured knowing and understanding are 'somatically unconfirmed.' The reflexively reductive mode of knowing and knowledge are in fact continually being corroborated by experience of the tangible status of 'discreet things.' Ordinarily structured assumptions that take psychical representations of things to be those things (words, images, concepts) enables effective manipulative that is accompanied by potent somatic experience. Thus one could say that the reflexively reductive attitudes of social structuring are constantly 'initiating mentality' into a predominantly reductive epistemic modality by way of experiential confirmation.

Thus learning to mediate overtly, consciously, between one-ness and many-ness appears more a matter of coming to experienced our selves, others, and the world as more complicated than we typically experience them. Rather than becoming radically different selves the challenge becomes one of how to confirm the psychological and philosophical reasoning that indicates we are 'other than we habitually feel.' From that point of view, we are not so much confronted with a totality 'beyond knowing,' but one whose "wild" "implicate flow" that is not reducible to the "tame" status of social structuring is 'accessible' through experience experiencing differently. The discrepancy between an "implicate" self and world and our re-presentations of them is thus not one of 'ill logic' but lack of a means of mediating between the experiential statuses of one-ness and many-ness. There are, one might assert, experiential epistemics appropriate to both exclusive reduction and radical inclusion.

A Complimentary Triangulation of Epistemic Methods that Mediates Dualistic Oppositions through Symbolically Dynamical Knowings as a Meta-Epistemology

Discussion of symbolism has been largely evaded throughout this text. It is brought forward in these more summary remarks to stand in reference to the notion of a meta-epistemic knowing. Jung elaborated a distinction between what is re-presented by the terms sign and symbol that can be posed as reductive and non-reductive representation, respectively. Symbolic re-presentation thusly identified is that which presents a non-linear, non-literalizing dynamical 'impression' or 'version' of some radically complex set of meaningful associations. But the meaning of a symbol, unlike that of a reductively re-

presentative sign (such as a traffic sign) is not 'fixed' and therefore, it can be interpreted variously. It's meaning thus is not the same for everyone who encounters it, nor necessarily for the same person on different occasions. The meanings of symbolic re-presentation (typically associated with art or 'aesthetic expressions') is thus 'slippery,' and 'transient.' It therefore provokes both personal reflective consideration and reflective collective discourse (think literary criticism). A thorough meta-epistemic engagement with personal and collective assumptions is thus typified by some overt discussion of/engagement with how ordinary identifications might actually be 'acting as' symbols as well as signs, and how symbolic expressions have been 'reduced to' sign-function in epistemic practices. What the flag of 'the nation' is taken to 'sign' and what it might be experienced as 'symbol-izing' are worthy of consciously reflecting upon. Thus symbolic consciousness appears integral in any complex 'deconstructive' engagement with habituated attitudes and identifications. That engagement might be well described as requiring a confluence of rational analysis of and aesthetic feeling for meaningful dynamics 'identifiable' within and extending beyond any given set of associations (such as constitute a sign or symbol). All re-presentations are, at least potentially, both reductively sign and non-reductive symbolize meaningful associations.

Derridaian "deconstructions" and Foucaultian "archaeologies of knowledge" can be offered as examples of this type of non-reductive meta-epistemic engagement with habituated identifications. Perhaps these 'moves' into 'indecisive understandings of meaningfulness' are threatening to the modernist aspect of contemporary mentality because they tend to be engaged only as reductive verities. Seldom do their proponents or detractors discuss an embodied or aesthetic aspect to such knowing of knowing. Much analysis and interpretation of art tends to likewise restrict itself to a reductively rationalizing modality—even as it attempts to 'explain' the meaning of radically symbolic re-presentational images. Thus, yet again, the issue is raised of how to shift the modernist< >post-modernist contention away from a reductive dialectic of 'final resolution' (be that positivistic or anti-positivistic) and toward a non-reductive one that seems to require experiential 'verification.' Thus what such conceptual con-figurations of meta level epistemic understanding 'lack' are 'somaticized co-relational experiences' that might render their illogical logic reasonable.

From Mythos to Logos to Mytho-Logos: A Retrospective on Modernism< > Post-modernism as the Pluralistic Maturation of Rationalistic Epistemology

Coming to know our selves as we are—meaning more complexly—obviously involves analytical reflection upon how we have come to the point of being compelled to know our selves more complexly. Such asking how current attitudes and versions of epistemological method have evolved can be approached from somewhat 'outside' the bounds of habitual socio-cultural assumptions. Much of the

most complexly rational thought associated with poststructuralist and postmodernist critique of Western perspectives attempt such an intellectual maneuver. An overview of such side-long analyses of culture-founding philosophical method and metaphysical assumptions suggests there has been an historical transit from an identity consciousness dominated by non-reductive mythos to one asserting the primacy of self-consistent logos. That transit can be seen as extending most particularly from impetus in ancient Greek, Hebrew, and Roman structurings of self and world to a rather convulsive crescendo in the frantically fragmentary differentiations of modernist contexts.

The 'post'-modernist reflections upon the absurdly reductive truth claims of logo-centric rationalism, or singularly reductive logos, thus appear as some compensation for the extremity of the latter's role in defining identity for Westernized consciousness. Along with the radically diversifying impulses of "modern art," the logic-defying logic of these 'after-modernist' analyses beget what can be termed the 'maturation of rationalism' from obsessively exclusive to complexly concurrent logical association among ones and manys. In this view, Titanic reduction appears as a form of 'adolescent' experimentation with the powers of analytical rationalism taken to productive but also destructive extremes. The development of a meta-level of rational consciousness, however, seems to require dis-identification with those egoically intoxicating powers. The astonishingly adroit instrumental manipulation of material phenomenon its scientific version of the un-real reality of knowing has enabled can then be regarded as yet another 'religious alchemy'—all but one of exceptional practical effect in its accurate representations of materialistic phenomenal causation.

The historical struggle between the seemingly opposed validities of mythos and logos might be regarded as subsumed by that between empirically accurate, rationally consistent Platonic idealism and rhetorically effective Sophistic relativism. In this contest, the poly-morphic meaningfulness of mythos is supplanted by a 'logic of persuasion' in which the valid is that which convinces people of its truth, regardless of effectively manifesting either mythical dynamism or self-consistent rationalism. Admittedly, much postmodernist critique reiterates the case for rhetorical relativism. But in some more after-modernist analysis, these seemingly opposed bases for asserting valid reality appear to have been ever intertwined in their 'self-serving' uses of epistemological method. A 'post-modern epistemological pragmatism' now suggests not only that analytical intellect is not 'identical' with reductive self-consistent rationalism, but that an absolutely relativistic view of truth is equally reductive. Thus the inherent validity of mythos, of knowing by the dynamism of irreducible manys, now has an overtly logical basis in concurrently complex analyses of the true and the real. It then becomes reasonable to conceive of a *mytho-logos* that is complexly self-complimentary rather than self-contradictory or simplistically self-consistent. However, the maturity of that complexity comes at the 'cost' of having to dis-identify with a singular sense of self and socio-culturally structured reality. It also induces an inherent suspicion of all instrumental, systematic approaches to 'solving problems.' A perspective that is informed concurrently by

mytho-logical many-ness and ratio-centrally logical one-ness cannot conceive self, other, and world in simplistically mechanical terms or dynamics. Life viewed thusly is not a contest to win or problem to solve, but a *complex to be lived*—to be experienced, thought, and expressed variously.

Some Epistemic Poetics of Knowing by Way of Reduction and Non-Reduction

In so far as epistemic methods ‘make the self and world that is known’ a ‘poetics of epistemology’ can be suggested. The words poetry and poetic derive from the Greek *poiesis*, for creation, and *poiein*, for to make. Poetry tends to be understood as a ‘creative making,’ or use of language that ‘makes of something more than the ordinary experience and understanding.’ It can thus be considered a transformative or metamorphic ‘activity.’ The ‘ultimate’ effects of knowing by reductive singularity, as well as by inconclusive plurality can be viewed as similarly ‘making more than expected’ of the world so perceived. Despite the definitive intentions of the ‘logic of one-ness,’ when carried to an extreme it appears to ‘make many-ness.’ Rational analysis, in its identification of ever more differentiated one-nesses, tends to actually increase or amplify the many-ness of manifest phenomenon, having a rather indefinitely fragmentary effect. Such analytical reduction, entrained in rationalism’s purpose of self-consistent reasoning and final explanation, thus creates an interminable ‘search for final meaning’ by the very character of its epistemic method of reduction and exclusive conclusion.

Rationalism, as an impulse to ‘transcend’ contradiction, paradox, and irreducible complexity, can thereby be regarded as a ‘poetical re-making’ of what is known—metamorphosis from reduction to proliferation. ‘Under’ or with/in the ‘cover’ of its ‘terminal intention’ it can lead (as in much postmodernist, poststructuralist critique), to the very ‘deconstruction’ of the reductive impulse—producing a form of reasonable relativism that defies all hierarchical ordering. Such a dynamic is reminiscent of the Hindu phrase *neti, neti*, translated as “not this, not this,” suggesting the search for ‘the absolute’ as an indefinite succession of inadequate identifications or conclusions. There is a corollary observation to be made about inclusive association that seeks to resist fragmentary reduction, whereby the impulse to accept and elaborate many-ness as composing an indeterminable continuity prompts a reduction of many-ness to a one-ness that has no ‘ultimate distinctions.’ Thus the relational impulse of pluralistic knowing can generate a poiesis that creates assertions of reductive unity. The self-deconstructing aspects of both reductive and inclusive impulses would thus appear appropriate considerations for any radical reflection on epistemological methodologies. Taken together these self-recreating ‘poetics of knowing’ can be regarded as the non-reductive dialectical ‘making’ of a ‘meta epistemic poetics.’

The Epistemic Roles of Emotion and Feeling in A Diversified Function of Reason

The concept of emotion has not been much addressed in this writing. It is give dictionary definitions such as “a complex and usually strong subjective response, as love or fear,” “a response involving physiological changes as a preparation for action,” “a state of agitation or disturbance,” And “the part of the consciousness that involves feeling or sensibility.” The word derives from the Latin *emovere* for to move out. If emotion is regarded as a sensation-like phenomenon having somatic origins or effects that becomes evident to self-conscious cognition as a ‘psychical feeling’ then it could be considered part of a ‘somatic epistemology’ —a mode of knowing that ‘informs’ or directs cognitive activity ‘through feeling.’ In this sense something that ‘occurs’ in either an unconscious and/or physiological context ‘moves out’ into behavior as overt expression (i.e.. flight, fight, gesture) or ‘into’ self-consciousness as feeling. The impetus given to reasoning or rational analysis by the emotion>feeling epistemic appears important to any attempt at radically diversifying epistemological attitudes dominated by abstract idealism and reductive mechanism. Damasio’s neurological research indicates that reasoning is intrinsically supported by emotional phenomenon, since its absence has been shown to debilitate rational capacities.

These findings suggest that selective reduction of emotion is at least as prejudicial for rationality as excessive emotion. It certainly does not seem true that reason stands to gain from operating without the leverage of emotion. On the contrary, emotion probably assists reasoning, especially when it comes to personal and social matters involving risk and conflict. (p. 42) I suggested that certain levels of emotion processing probably point us to the sector of decision-making space where our reason can operate most efficiently. I did *not* suggest, however, that emotions are a substitute for reason or that emotions decide for us. It is obvious that emotional upheavals can lead to irrational decisions. The neurological evidence simply suggests that selective absence of emotion is a problem. Well-targeted and well-deployed emotion seems to be a support system without which the edifice of reason cannot operate properly. These results and their interpretation called into question the idea of dismissing emotion as a luxury or a nuisance or a mere evolutionary vestige. They also made it possible to view emotion as an embodiment of the logic of survival. (Damasio 41-42)

Here then is another context for considering the radical interdependency of non-reductive mind><body dynamics in epistemic processes —emotional and rational states are somehow co-regulatory. In analytical psychology emotion and feeling often are discussed as “affect” or “feeling tone” components of consciousness regarded as essential to elucidating more overt self->Self inter-subjectivity. Complex, relatively inclusive self-knowing (and by extension of other and world) would seem then to be intricately dependent upon a sophisticated awareness of emotional phenomena as self-conscious feelings. This

emotion/feeling < > reasoning dyad can be associated with the distinction made in the introduction between intuitive knowing and analytical explanation.

What the emotion > feeling phenomenon brings to consciousness awareness or knowing does not constitute rational analysis or conclusive explanation. Yet it can either inform/support the latter or potentially overwhelm and distort it in some 'irrational' manner. The dominance of *either* this somatic epistemic or that of analytically rational cognition would thus appear as potentially dangerous to the "logic of survival" with its evidently somatically embodied < > cognitively abstract dialectical interplay. This perspective supplies further support for the notion that relativization of habituated egoic and social reductions requires some somaticized component expressed as feeling to reorient ordinary assumptions about identity and reality toward greater complexity. Rational analysis alone (as in much postmodernist and poststructuralist critique) appears to lack the emotive potency/component to effectively affect the 'grip' those assumptions, or the dominant psychological complexes supporting them, reflexively maintain on consciousness—and thereby one's re-presentational experience of identity and reality.

Psyche-logical Distress as Epistemic Con-Fusion, Psychotherapy as Epistemological Differentiation

Psychopathology is a term used to indicate distressed and aberrant conditions of mental and emotional status. Mental illness is another term employed to represent such conditions of non-normative or dysfunctional behavior. But distinctions between mental health and illness, normal and abnormal, functional and dysfunctional psychological status are most inconsistently defined. In the larger respect, these are dependent upon the specific values of a given society. In the more specific regard, such standards are context dependent within any set of social structures. Behavior that is appropriate in one context (i.e. a party or private bedroom) can be judged radically inappropriate, even criminal, in another context (a court room or public street). Thus determining whether a given persons behavior manifests a status of mental illness or pathological psychic 'functioning' is no simple matter. In addition to such contextual criteria, psychological diagnosis in reductive modernist medical practice requires differentiating literally hundreds of categories of particularized identifications of psychopathology. Diagnosis and treatment of emotional and cognitive 'disorders' under such a mechanistic, reductive model of psyche-logical perspective (medical psychiatry) demonstrates a primacy for micro-epistemic methods of analysis and therapeutic response.

In more recent decades a contrasting approach to psychical distress has developed under a 'holistic' perspective that tends to conceive mental functioning as a complex continuity rather than a hierarchical mechanism of differentiated parts that can be 'separately adjusted.' This perspective often posits mental states as intrinsically related to somatic factors and even to contextual aspects of the environment beyond the individual's mind and body. Holistic style diagnoses and therapies thus tend more to account for interactions and changes in a complex of mind/body/environmental factors. In a very general sense, such

psychological approaches are more macro-epistemic in methods of understanding conditions of consciousness and personality.

The more reductive, micro epistemic approach typified by medical psychiatry is perhaps the most dependent upon social norms for its standards of ‘mental health’ or sanity—given that contemporary society is so systematically structured and mechanistically ‘minded.’ Aberration or dysfunction in such a context of socialized identification is more likely to be assessed as ‘disruption of normatively efficient functioning’ that necessarily ‘needs’ to be ‘corrected.’ A more holistically complex view might be a bit more likely to conceive that such aberration could be ‘healthy’ as a way of compensating for some reductive emphasis thought and feeling resulting from personality formation or social conformity. It is proposed here that a meta epistemic approach the logic of psyche and its distresses or disorders could be conceived as one that is even less concerned with socialized standards and the preferences of personality formation.

A psyche-ology derived from meta epistemic methodology might regard mental and emotional distress, or even socially aberrant behavior, as related to unacknowledged conflicts between epistemic modalities. A ‘normally ordered’ personality tends to conform its ways of knowing, understanding, and behaving to the general standards of its socially structured collective context. Mental and emotional distress, or socially aberrant behavior, could be regarded as a potential consequence of confusing knowing and experience derived from reductive versus non-reductive epistemic methods. Intuitive knowing taken as rational explanation can lead a person into much confusion about what is ‘reasonable’ in thought, belief, or conduct. Psychotherapies that focus upon rational discussion of feelings, thoughts, and impulses in relation to some social standard of reality or ‘reality principle’ can thus be viewed as confronting possible epistemological confusions. Psychological theories and therapies that engage ‘socially unreal’ or improper aspects of mental life and overt conduct as valid yet perhaps miss-placed in social contexts go further in acknowledging the significance of non-reductive or symbolic psychic life. This approach, more typical of depth and archetypal psychologies, can find meaning and purpose in what reductive methods regard as ‘mere dysfunction.’ They can affirm the psychical importance of thought, feeling, and behavior that transgresses socialized boundaries of identity, reality, and truth as essential aspects of knowing self, other, and world inclusively.

Yet by differentiating valid, if socially discriminated, modes of knowing and understanding these logics of psyche can enable some reflective discretion about what modes ‘belong’ where. In this view, distressed psychic states and aberrant behavior might be ‘healthy’ but need be tended in some context outside of normative social life. The contrast and tensions of psychic life are thusly granted a significant validity despite their social impropriety.

One could say that the radically complex status of inconclusive inter-subjectivity is thereby acknowledged as ‘the really real mind’ but that it also must necessarily be subordinated by egoic function

most of the time to the 'hierarchically socialized persona-mind.' 'Sanity' thusly becomes designated as a discretionary self-consciousness capable of mediating conformity to particular standards of a contextually designated diversity of conduct. To be 'socially sane' one must know how to behave when and where. To be 'psyche-logically sane' one must be able give expression to emotions, feelings and thoughts that transgress ordinary identifications. It would seem appropriate to describe such a differentiated social->psychical self-consciousness as a meta-epistemological practice.

Re-Orientating Cultural Values and Social Structures to Facilitate Inclusive Knowing

Conceiving Cultural Values Capable of Promoting Social Structure that Relativizes Itself to Anti-Structural Totality

In reference to Campbell's concept about how human culture both 'comes out of Nature' and is subject to it, a purpose for societal structurings of identity, reality, and understanding is to mediate between what it structures and what it cannot structure in experience and phenomenal reality. A comparison can be made here between how a society in general both imposes its structure upon experience and phenomenon, and how scientific thought does so. Technological science depends upon the reliable assertion of certain 'laws of nature' and testable hypotheses. However, to investigate the character of phenomenon that those established structurings prove incapable of explaining, a certain acceptance of 'not knowing' is required. What is 'as yet unstructured' about material phenomenon often can only be investigated from an inconclusive attitude of un-knowing. Culture and society have an even more complicated task in so far as these must provide a way of 'living with and in relation to' inexplicable aspects experience, psychic life, and irreducible complexity of even material phenomenon—living, that is, with and even as "anti-structure" or the un-structurable.

Cultural values and social structurings that attend to this challenge must both definitively structure identity, reality, and understanding yet also (at least on occasion), overtly acknowledge the limitations of those structurings. It is that 'submission' to the irreducibly complex dynamism of totality that has been termed here a relativization of habitual, ordinary identification to a 'more than ordinary context.' Cultural values and societal structures that overtly undertake acknowledging their subordination to Nature and totality must face it in several contexts. In the individual or personal context, the egoic sense of self is confronted with acknowledging its limitations in re-presenting the 'larger self' of a personal psyche. In the interpersonal social context, persons are confronted with subordination of their experience, thought, and feelings to the standards of society. In respect to the society->Nature dyad, the totality of social structures are confronted with a 'larger field' that they both 'stand outside of' in asserting definitions of it, yet are also a subset of. That meta-context for society must concern itself with the relations of structure-<

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>anti-structure, temporality and atemporality, one-ness and many-ness. Socio-cultural efforts to address relation between these categories in archaic and traditional settings tend to take the forms of spirituality, mythology, and religion. In more modernist settings these issues are addressed through philosophical and scientific modalities.

All of these modes of mediating the culture/society < >Nature/cosmos dyad are concerned with posing some meta-epistemological perspective that can 'account for' the reductive < >non-reductive dialectic of epistemic methods and experience. In the contexting of cultural values asserting primacy to individualized persons and pluralistic, egalitarian social order, yet another layer of significance is added to the general significance of that epistemic contrast. If individuality is to be promoted, then a well differentiated or individuated status of character and epistemic capacities would seem a primary concern of social structures. Thus those structurings would seem to have to overtly acknowledge how they limit the latitude of individual sense abilities and intelligences. That is, those structurings would at some point have to overtly demonstrate the reductive effects of these definitions on individualized development and expression. Similarly, an overt promotion of epistemic diversity, or meta-epistemic perspective, would appear important if a basis for pluralistic society is to be supported. Social structuring that did not emphasize a meta-epistemic relativization of both reductive and non-reductive method or purpose to the irreducible dynamics of one-ness and many-ness in totality would not be effective in relativizing the 'egoic functions of collective identities' within a pluralistic society to the limitations of their competitive or superior self-assertions. Concern with religious tolerance in secular civil societies is an illustration of this issue. Similarly, the contrasts between 'knowledge domains' in science are in essence mediated by the maintenance of distinct disciplines of study and academic departments in universities. In such a manner a more pluralistic context for epistemic method is maintained.

However, the relativization of both personal and collectively social identifications to the radical complexity of some inconclusive totality suggests a submission of the authority of society itself to define identity and understanding. How can a relationship between the known and the un-knowable, the structured/structurable and "anti-structure" be facilitated from within a society derived from primary cultural values asserting the literalistic, quantifiable, positivized basis for identity and reality?

Considering a Socio-Logical Culture that Might Promote a Dialectical Eros of Reductive < >Non-Reductive Epistemic Consciousness

Examples of archaic pre-Western and non-Western societies can be cited that appear, in their incorporations of mythical dynamism and ritual inductions, to have been structured such that they overtly functioned to relativize inherently reductive social identifications to a more inclusive status of some radically diverse totality. There is precedence then for societies having cultural orientations that impose

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some form of meta-epistemic reflection upon their own habituated reductivities. However, those were cultures that tended to imbue aspects of ordinarily structured social identifications with mythically dynamic, overt re-presentations of validly 'un-real reality.' Some relational eros between reductive and non-reductive epistemic methods was implicit in their sociological, spiritual, or religious practices. The contemporary 'globalization' of rationalistically reductive, positivistically quantitative, literalistically secular, mechanistically systematic society presents the most radically reductive model of socialized identity consciousness historically conceivable. How, in such a contemporary environment, could a society be structured so as to counter this all-pervasive emphasis upon positivism and reductive identification? Such a society would have to be radically self-reflective and tolerant of uncertainty in reductive terms even as it promotes, in its ordinarily valid structuring of identity and reality, a primacy of reductive identification. That contrast would seem to require a potent regard for more inclusive identification that somehow 'stood outside' the purview of social structuring. The Romantic movement of the nineteenth century can be regarded as attempting such an ancillary cultural reference, but its idealization of 'the arts' appears to have remained ineffectual at relativizing modernist reductivity. Conceiving how this dialectic might be more effectively established seems to demand a concept of how socio-cultural dynamics can be overtly self-reflective about such contrasts.

A distinction is thus offered here between what the terms culture and society might be regarded as re-presenting in collective human associations. Dictionary definitions for these terms exhibit considerable overlap. But a differentiation can be discerned that places society as a subset of the context culture. Culture is given, among others, the definition of "the act of developing the social, moral, and intellectual faculties through education," and "a style of social and artistic expression peculiar to a society or class (Am. Heritage Dict. '85, 348)." The term culture is thusly identified as somehow directing the formation of society. Definitions for the term society include, "a group of humans broadly distinguished from other groups by mutual interest, participation in characteristic relationships, shared institutions," and "the institutions and culture of a distinct self-perpetuating group," as well as "medium (Am. Heritage Dict. '85, 1160)." The modern word culture derives from the Latin *cultivare* meaning to cultivate, whereas society derives from the Latin *societas* for fellowship. Thus culture can be considered as the 'medium' in which the particular structures of a given society, with its institutions and habituated patterns of 'fellowship,' 'take form.' Cultural values thus suggest the 'style' in which social structures and institutions are expected to 'take form' or develop. Thus whatever the habituated formations and patterns of social behavior that evolve can be compared to those cultural values or style for how well the former represent the latter. In general, it is offered here that cultural values are often more complex and inclusive than are societal structures and practices. Society, as the foreground structuring of cultural style or values, thus often appears as more reductive in its identifications than the background cultural references. An example is how the emphasis upon human equality and liberty in American cultural values is rather

imperfectly expressed in the actual structuring of social class status in the actuality of American society. There is an element of conflict or tension inherent in the relations of cultural values and social structuring. In archaic cultural contexts, there are values and beliefs associated with a cosmological or spiritual realm, mythically re-presented, that supersede the concerns and hierarchies of socialize reality and identity. In modernist secular, technologized societies, there is much less of this 'other worldly' reference by which to 'humble' the predominance of ordinarily socialized identifications. Yet even the secular government of the United States of America seeks validation by a 'higher power' in its constituting documents that invoke the assistance of 'god.'

Thus any society that would promote the relativization of the habitually reductive structurings of its socialized identifications would have to have reference to background cultural values that provide a 'medium' in which to 'cultivate' such a re-ordering of epistemic methods and practices. Any 'dialectical eros of reduction and non-reduction' will have to be, in essence, 'forced' upon the reflexive reductions of social structuring by some attitude in which the very structures of society are 'cultivated.' There an existing example of such an inherently self reflective contrast associated with rationality and reason. One might assert that Western style societies derive from a cultural 'medium' in which rationality is intrinsically favored. But as preceding analysis has shown, a primacy attached to rational analysis does not inherently dictate one for rational-ism as a necessarily self-consistent, non-contradictory imposition on all knowledge and explanation. Curiously, the application of the rule of law in Western style societies demonstrates this contrast of values rather well. Reasoning or rationality is a primary focus in determining appropriate formulations and applications of law. Decisions arrived at in court are often influenced by referring to preceding determinations in like cases. However, as if in respect for the radically complex possibilities of individual motive and mitigating circumstances, each case is (theoretically, at least), tried 'on its own merits.' These societies are structured to accept quite divergent or inconsistent verdicts even in very similar cases if these are arrived at through the 'due process' of rational analysis. Perhaps a similar attitude could be 'cultivated' in regard to the radically complex character of epistemic criteria and its reductive and non-reductive 'realities.'

Re-Formalizing Initiatory Culture and Its Anti-Structural Social Functions as Logically Illogical Social Practice

Bringing a value for some dialectical eros of epistemic methodology into a prominent position in cultural values and social structurings is, in a sense, impossible in so far as the agency making the effort is reflexively reductive. That is to say, direct, systematic, positivistic attempts to 'manufacture meta-epistemic reflection' seem doomed to failure since the 'objective' of such an effort is 'subjectively reductive.' Rather than 'rationalize one's way out of reductivity' it might seem wiser to 'attempt

metamorphosis.’ Thus some turn toward ritualizing experience of the ‘identity of non-identity and identity’ would seem more appropriate. Enactive gestures such as artistic creation already exist in contemporary society, but these lack contexting as metamorphic initiation of the sense of self, other, and world into an unfamiliar/more-than-ordinary/radically complex status. Experiential transits from ‘I’ to ‘Not-I’ and ‘Not-not-I’ do occur, but again are de-valued or invalidated by reflexively reductive attitudes. Humans inherently have or experience the range of epistemic methods and criteria but socio-cultural contexting decides how these are to be valued and acknowledged.

If the preceding analysis of the role of the ‘un-real real’ in knowing can be validated as reasonably logical, then there is a basis for asserting the social logic for the illogical practice of ‘epistemic initiation into the reality of un-reality.’ Such a practice does not ‘have to be explained’ in reductive fashion if there is a cultural attitude that affirms it is reductively illogical but psycho-philosophically necessary. What is then “anti-structural” to reductively dominant social structuring might then be allowed a affectively “liminal” rather than ineffectually “liminoid” status.

On Being More than Good or Bad, This or That: Irreducible Diversity, Mythical Ethics, and The Maturation of Egalitarian Society

If oppositional modes of identification tend to generate reductive one-nesses of self, other, and world that obscure the phenomenal complexity of such ‘fields of psycho-somatic activity,’ then these can be considered psychologically incomplete or immature. Good > < Bad, Right > < Wrong, This > < That differentiations are obviously useful but inevitably limit the elucidation of relationally complex knowing and understanding. That limitation becomes particularly significant when socialized standards of truth come to assert the relative equality of persons as individuals in egalitarian association. The notion of complex identity posed by the concept of poly-centric psyche prompts something of a crisis for ethical morality based upon the singular one-ness of personhood. Indeed, this notion of the many-ness of personal identity is in essence heretical to the orthodoxy of personal one-ness as ‘a social member.’ One could posit then that there is an ethics of responsible conduct as a singular person in relation to other singular person, but also a mythical ethics of responsible conduct as a pluralistic psyche among other pluralistic psyches. The former would be more concerned with differentiation a status of good or bad, fair or unfair conduct. The latter ethicality would be more concerned with a sense of self-complexity, focused on promoting a fullness of perception and expression of that complexity. The ethics of personal one-ness seem then to be more about definitive actions whereas the ethics of poly-centric many-ness are about manifesting a mythical dynamism in knowing self, others, and world that respects and expresses their irreducible diversity. Thusly posed, there is an ethical perspective that is not concerned with singularly oppositional status or identity but appropriately constellated poly-centric identity and status.

Psycho-philosophical Maturity in a Context of Polycentric Psyche.

Those who attempt to be both a one and a many, as “I”, “Not-I,” and “Not-not-I,” must thus seek a complexity of “individuated” maturity that is essentially ‘inconceivable’ in the available discourse of socialized reality. Such a ‘matured’ sense-of-self/other/world would be characteristically reflective upon its own shifting constellatory composition (and that of others) from a variety of ‘internal’ psychic perspectives concurrently. In a sense such an ‘identity’ would be a ‘contingent’ one relative to whatever arrangement of psychic factors are dominant a given moment. But that ‘present composition of identity’ as ‘this moment’s Dionysian Personae,’ though contexted by reflective relation to ‘historical’ ones of preceding experience, would appear, from the psychological and philosophical implications considered in this study, to be the ‘most mature’ one possible. Only as ‘one’ ‘dismembered’ and ‘re-membered variously’ can a sense of the “*totus homo*,” or ‘total being’ be attended and ‘acted from with/in’ variously. But, according to the references cited above, such a diverse composition of selfhood is not some status one develops—rather it is the inherent status of psycho-dynamic consciousness that one comes to be aware of consciously ‘as an I.’ That diversity is not a consequence of psyche-logical maturity. Rather, that maturity is a consequence of non-ordinary experience and reflective analysis by egoic functions upon the phenomenal activity of one’s, and others’, selves.

Egalitarian Ethics and Psyche-logical Maturity

The emphasis placed upon the importance and liberty of individuals as a basis for socio-cultural values radically alters the way a collective presents ‘an identity.’ In hierarchically stratified society, persons understand their identity in relation to their social and economic rank. Under the rule of egalitarian society, the person becomes an individual whose identity becomes more ‘of their own making’ and exists in a more equivalent relation to the identity of other individual persons. In the specific socio-cultural structures of contemporary Westernized democratic contexts, the very basis of the collective, of society’s power to dictate a unitary identity, is derived from the importance of the individuality of the persons who comprise it. The one-ness of the social many-ness is thus dependent upon its complex diversity as an irreducible many-ness composed of differentiated individuals.

It is not surprising then that such a socio-cultural milieu has generated the poly-centric perspectives of ‘depth’-psychological theory. The complexity of the identity of the social collective is mirrored in this psychological re-presentation of a poly-centric personal psyche. This “impossible subject-ivity,” which can develop an appropriately complex egoic sense of self only by some process of “individuation,” necessarily becomes ‘an entity’ that is too complex to be identified as simply good or bad, this or that. Consequently, the socially structured rules for defining and enforcing egalitarian behavior between

persons must also become more complex. The society as a collective is confronted with identifying its diversity and thus ‘individuating.’ The development of meticulous sensitivity in applying the “rule of law” to determining the specific motives and premeditated intentions of those accused of crimes, along with the notion of innocence by reason of insanity, represent such a maturation of socio-cultural attitudes in regard to the diversity and complexity of individual persons. In this contexting, “justice for all” no longer can mean the same punishment for every person for the same crime because crimes are regarded as committed by different persons for different motives under differing circumstances. None the less, in the terms of legal processes, an either > < or verdict of guilty or not guilty is required—though there is some ‘middle ground’ represented by the “hung jury” and a finding of “mistrial.”

It is in the broader context of socially structured behavior and identification that the notion of irreducibly complex individuality poses perhaps the greatest conundrum for standards of ethical behavior. Prior to the institutionalization of the rule of law, an abstractly moral judgment of good versus evil conduct could be applied to determine compliance with egalitarian standards. With the advent of the rule of law and its theoretically equal application to all citizens, two spheres of social conduct appear—the legally binding and that of social propriety. Legal statutes and precedents posit relatively definitive standards of guilt and punishment. But in a context of trial by human opinion, whether that of a judge or jury, the ultimate decision of guilt and punishment are likely to be influenced by the standards of social propriety rather than “the letter of the law.” It is not surprising then that trial attorneys often focus their efforts on appealing to the ethical morality of juries rather than a rational analysis of evidence.

Ethical Culture and the Problem of Pluralistic Psychology’s ‘Mythical’ Moral Ambiguity

The two different orientations for ethical behavior proposed can be associated with the previously identified contrasting pair of logo-centric rationalism and the mytho-logic of radically complex totality. The latter pair were presented as a potentially concurrent mytho-logos or complementarity. Conceiving of such a concurrency of these ethical perspectives is perhaps even more challenging. The basis of the conundrum bears reiterating: How can a society founded upon notions of personal ethics incorporate individual plurality? A culture whose “normative structures” exist to protect the individual from oppression and abuse depends upon the notion of ‘personal responsibility’ and attendant accountability before the law to enforce its ethical concerns. A psychology of polycentric psyche threatens that concept of ‘individual responsibility.’

Exclusivist notions of right versus wrong, good versus bad, innocent versus guilty, and real versus un-real are similarly oppositional modes for ‘structuring’ discrimination. The inclusive modes of non-hierarchical, pluralistic psychology assert a differently structured basis for valuation of the elements of behavior and motive discriminated in the individual. Just as myth is often regarded as indulging in, if not

,
'glorifying,' rapacious and unethical conduct (particularly of those outrageous gods and goddesses, but also of more human heroes and heroines), 'depth' psychology asserts inherent value to expression of feelings, motives, and even actions that are socially unacceptable and legally prohibited. Similarly to the ways archaic cultures tended to periodically breach their social taboos in enactments of ritual "liminality," 'depth' psychology in essence encourages the eruptions and expression of repressed aspects of psyche readily classed as socially improper, rationally incoherent, emotionally dangerous—even as "wild" or 'uncivilized.' To 'know Thyself' from this psyche-logical perspective is to know the variousness of one's being beyond the bounds of social propriety. That need not imply 'literal enactment' so much as symbolic expression, so as to know the dynamical quality of 'being radically various.' Yet such knowing is only possible in some context of 'non-identification' with habitually socializes sense of self—a status that includes the suspension of ordinary moral and ethical judgment. One might call this the 'moral ambiguity of mythical totality.' Such perspective on psyche and individuality could be viewed as posing an 'ethical' concern for the 'individuals' of the individual, much as ethical culture is concerned with the individuals of the collective society.

These threatening aspects of 'depth' psychological or 'mythical' psychology's insights about the many-ness of identity in contrast to the one-nesses of practical positivism and ethical social morality need not be perceived as 'oppositional' to them, however. If presented 'oppositionally,' as a 'negative' to a 'positive,' then these insights are reduced a singular status that collapses their basis for validity. Rather, if their inclusivist mode of identification is respected, they can even 'include' positivistic and ethical concerns. These insights need not 'negate' the validity of 'real' versus 'un-real' or 'fair' versus 'un-fair' distinctions, though they do position such discriminations in a more complex contexting. Thus they provide a basis for challenging reductively literalistic and simplistically moralistic culture to enhance efforts at knowing reality and living ethically. Persons who do not 'know' the variousness, of self variously can hardly be held fully 'responsible' for the 'actions' of their totality.

If the consequences of repression of psychic plurality or pluralistic knowing are the repression and conscious denial of significant 'realities' of psychic life which then can find expression only in 'unconscious acting out,' somatic or mental illness, and attribution of one's unethical impulses to other individuals—then ethical social responsibility is clearly related to ethical psychological responsibility and its mythical expression. The effects of repression of psychic plurality are characterized by Jung's term "the shadow." In this notion, what is repressed or denied by, or 'invisible' to, dominant identity becomes part of a 'shadow self' whose motives and actions remain a 'mystery' to consciously acknowledged identity. Thus the argument to be made in favor of 'depth' or 'mythical' psychological practice in the context of an ethical culture is that there is little chance of 'effectively responsible' individual conduct in the absence of 'knowing Thyself variously.' The 'moral ambiguity' of 'mythical expression' is actually intrinsic to 'knowing realistically' and thus developing the capacity to discriminate 'justly.' It is essential to an

effective mediation between the realms of social structure and the “anti-structural” dynamism of totality, the “tame” and the “wild” that can enable some experiential status of “*totus homus*.”

Practical Social Moves in the Real World of Un-Real Reality

If a consciously aware relationship with the dynamical nature of ‘totalistic reality’ is accessible through ‘enacting’ and ‘rigorously thinking’ the ‘un-real real,’ and such an awareness might re-arrange the ‘fragmentation’ of a ‘post’-modern identity, what can be done to foster that awareness by those who only seem to know how to ‘do’ ‘positivistically?’ What ‘practical efforts’ can be made that do not reassert positivistic assumptions about the reductive literality of ‘the real’ and thus ‘the valid?’ How can ‘depth’ psychology’s notion of “psychological life” and scientific notions of “relativity” and “chaos-complexity” be demonstrated as valid criteria for identification? The varied perspectives explored in this study provide some orientation to this dilemma of attempting to ‘act unnaturally’ in regards to how one’s ‘nature’ is habitually and socially defined.

Cultural Promises, Social Realities, and Psyche-logical Mediation of Discrepancies between Expectations and Unattainable Standards

There is an important distinction to be made between what a Culture poses as a status of competent and adequate socialized identity and what existing social structures actually enable persons to attain. The concern here is that some societies present standards of accomplished personhood and societal function that are quite practically accessible given the social structures. But there are other societies that appear to offer or promise more than they are able or ‘intend’ to facilitate the attainment of. Practically unattainable cultural ideals or values can be regarded as a directive impulse for social order and structure. The cultural value for democracy and social equality is such an ideal. But a socially proposed ideal is rather different. A social standard is one that ‘identifies’ attainment of membership in the ‘social order’ and the affirmation of self worth thereby conferred. In fixed hierarchical societies, a person’s identity affirmation is relative to being an adequate member of their assigned sub-group. A ‘member’ of the “working class” in 18th century England did not have to worry about attaining the attributes of an aristocrat to have social value conferred upon him or her. But if a society asserts social accomplishment in terms commercialize standards of beauty or a particular level of economic wealth and commodity consumption that are inaccessible to many, then many persons are likely to experience an inherent failure to attain socialized identity affirmation.

Neither Back nor Forward but Logically and Erotically in/through the Reductive Present

One initial impulse in seeking a more pluralistic status is to look ‘elsewhere’ for practical examples of ‘how’ to relativize habitual identities to inclusive reality. That might mean to turn ‘backward’ or ‘leap

forward.’ One could turn in this sense turn ‘back’ toward the psycho-mythological ‘practices of ‘pre-modern’ cultures and mimic pagan religions or meditate on Buddhist sutras. Or, one can attempt to ‘escape’ modernist context by way of a transcendental, utopian imagination of a ‘purer’ or ‘truer’ being of harmonious equality. But both such ‘moves’ tend to evade the potentially initiatory context of the contemporary ‘identity crisis’ of ‘post’-modernity and the ‘possibilities’ it generates for ‘facing’ the ‘impossible subject’ of polycentric psyche. That is not to say that historical archaic culture cannot be instructive. Rather, the point is to note that archaic culture had a different context for its efforts at relativizing habitual identity to a larger field of reality. Thus, it is not ‘practical’ or ‘practicable’ to turn backwards or leap forwards in any attempt to be more attentive to and present with the plurality of being in the present moment. Eliade’s determination about archaic cultural attitudes toward participation in a totality wider than that of ‘ordinary life’ seems particularly provocative in ‘our time’ of the notion of linear ‘clock time.’ “To cure the work of Time it is necessary to “go back” and find the “beginning of the World” (Eliade, Myth and Reality 88).

‘Titanic’ modernism’s efforts to ‘domesticate’ the entire universe to the ‘control’ of literalistic objectivity has ‘positivized’ time as a regularized linear progression. Thus the “beginning of the world” can only be an ‘historical’ one which is essentially no different from ‘this one.’ There is an assumption that the same ‘laws of materialism’ always apply, everywhere at all ‘times.’ Thus a ‘beginning’ that is not like the present is utterly ‘inaccessible’ in a ‘backward’ orientation. Thereby, the notion of enacting a ‘move’ that will intensify and pluralize ‘presence’ Here and Now by *being both* ‘in and out of time,’ thus both precipitating and participating in ‘the beginning,’ seems absurd.

One wonders whether the day will come when this desire to transcend one’s own time—personal, historical time—and be submerged in a “strange” time, whether ecstatic or imaginary, will be completely rooted out. As long as it persists, we can say that modern man preserves at least some residues of “mythological behavior.” (Eliade, Myth and Reality 192)

Those “residues of mythological behavior” are being obliterated by the Titanic vision of living *only* in linear time ‘where’ appetites and impulses might be expected to be (hope-fully) satisfied’ in the ever impending ‘better’ future.’ ‘Moving forward’ is thus ever seductive to such mentality. To ‘move’ ‘backward’ or ‘forward’ is to intensify such modality. Yet it is in such a cultural mentality, more obsessed with the satiation of appetites and future enhancements of satisfaction, that the notion of Einsteinian ‘space-time’ and relativity were ‘divined’ as maps to an ‘other world.’ Thus there is another ‘direction’ into which contemporary identity can ‘move.’ That ‘movement’ of consciousness figured in the ‘scientific mapping’ of Einstein, Bohr, Bohm, and others is also given ‘form’ in the ‘thought forms’ of psychological theory and practice engaging the ‘mythical dynamism’ of ‘depth’ and ‘inwardness’ to

contrast the reductive linearity of “normative structural status”—a status that tends to ‘look only outward’:

It is a vision of life in which there is no inwardness, in which people are activated only by impulses that come seemingly out of nowhere, expressed through a superficial mimesis. I consider it the task of those who do not want to be drawn into the collective Titanism of today to try to become aware of it, to think about it constantly, and, most difficult of all, to reflect on it and learn from it. (Lopez-Pedraza 11)

“To think about it constantly,” to “learn from it” by ‘descending’ into that “nowhere’ from which its impulses ‘arise’ is to regard it ‘impersonally’ and thus ‘go into exile,’ to become an ‘alien’ intelligence, a ‘stranger in a strange land,’ an ‘outcast’ from Its collective context of personalistic validation who has ‘one foot in another world.’ Such a ‘view’ is akin to that of the fence-straddling Hagazussa.

Such a positioning enables an unusually attentive focus, a ‘bearing witness’ by an interested ‘outsider’ capable of differentiating the reductions, of elucidating the repressed and compressed complexities and “complexes.” Doing so with the ‘compassionate’ perspective of ‘pluralistic being’ precipitates relationship with the Titanic by dark and dangerous eros figures lurking on thresholds, ‘maddening’ agents of Dionysian dismemberment. This ‘move’ is neither ‘back’ or ‘away from’ the chaotically reductive moment but rather an ‘entering into’ its manifestations reflectively, logically, variously and perhaps most significantly, ‘creatively. Just as a ‘move’ into ‘logical’ awareness of the present context cannot be one ‘back’ or ‘forward,’ neither can it be ‘socially acceptable.’

The poet, the artist, the sleuth—whoever sharpens our perception, tends to be antisocial; rarely “well-adjusted,” he cannot go along with the currents and trends. A strange bond often exists among anti-social types in their power to see environments as they really are. (McLuhan, Understanding Media 88)

To resist Titanic reduction generates a mentality that ‘betrays’ the metaphysical assumptions of modernity by ‘expressing’ the ‘unacknowledged’ or ‘unconscious’ limits or ‘bounds’ of modernist reality framing and identifications.

A traitor or a heretic is one who transgresses categories. It is no accident that such a person is called a “snake in the grass,” that heretics in the Middle Ages were referred to as “vermin,” or that those animals that push the boundaries of our reality (our body boundaries) are termed “creepy” and make us “edgy.” (Berman 79-80)

To ‘transgress’ the barriers of singular identifications is to cast the “I” of modernity into a Hell of non-linear associations, to suffer the ‘sin’ of ‘identifying’ with ‘the divine.’ It is to ‘suffer’ the investment of the notion of self, of ‘one self,’ in the ‘truly’ complex relational or erotic field of totality and its chaotic ‘orderings.’ The contemporary context of ‘totality’ involves Titanic reductivity *and* Titanic

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fragmentation. To 'know' and 'experience' it is to be in relationship with it and by 'seeing through' its reductions to engage its inherent plurality. An experience of inclusive reality will have to include an intimate relationship with present particularity. The 'mass-produced' 'things' of contemporary life are not just the 'things' they are habitually taken as but fantastically complicated compositions of materials and activities originating in, and thus 'relating,' vastly diverse people and places. Toasters and cars and pencils are metaphoric entities and metamorphic flows of form in the non-local multidimensionality of 'post'-modern life. Commercialized popular culture derives its psychic energy or force from utilizing 'mythical dynamism' to impart 'spirit' to the 'objectified' representations of longing for experience of metamorphosis, of transubstantiation. But to become aware of this dynamic, to enter into the 'flow' behind the 'form' of it, one must 'go inside of it,' and thus 'into' one's selves. Egoic function must seek a 'position' 'between' the objectifications to 'feel' their 'flowing,' their archetypality: the *how* of 'coming into being' and the particularity of its variousness. To evade this encounter with psyche in everyday things is to attempt a transcendence of the complexity of actuality.

As with the Babylonian Tiamat and other 'monsters of chaos' representing the "anti-structural" natural realm, the 'dragon' of modernity as Titanic rationalistic reduction with its fragmenting terrors *is* a 'mythical beast.' But 'It' is not one to be 'slain' by imposing more reductive humanistic order/structure. 'Attacking' it with more oppositionalism, as much postmodernist thought seems to attempt, intensifies its fragmentary effects. Reductive criticism of reductivity does not 'enable' a 'position' outside/beside its mentality. Attempting to dismiss it by indulging in emotional irrationality, as in Romanticism, fails to 'dismember' its restriction of 'reality.' Rather, its tyranny over identity can be 'un-done' only by a 'logical' understanding of and relationship with its covert 'mythical dynamism,' thereby giving 'thought form' and 'image' to the "shadow" side of positivistic reduction—namely, its 'Dionysian personae' of fragmentation. Plurality of identity and identification 'always already' exist. 'Many-ness' and 'oneness' are inseparable, like 'spirit' and 'matter.' Conscious awareness and engagement of such 'unity in difference' are what vary.

Thus, practically speaking, the 'virtually impossible' descent into individual fragmentation and plurality activated by dis-identification with individual persona can be 'assisted' by the individual consciously becoming an agent of pluralistic knowing on behalf of the collective or cultural context. And that effort to become an agent of the collective's self-knowing can be further supported in a communal or collective attendance to cultural context. By attending to Titanism in the surrounding context of other persons and society a relational field might be generated that could assist individual efforts at dis-identifying egoic-function from "persona." By 'traitorously' exposing the complexities and pluralities concealed with/in the Titanic, as Dionysus does to Pentheus in The Bacchae, one can bring It into some relation with It's 'interior.' Though, 'of course,' that process will be 'brutal' to identities composed through Titanic reduction.

Thus the 'original' 'beginning,' the 'time of creation of manifold existence' by 'divine powers,' which can be to be 're-turned' to in contemporary context is neither 'back there' nor 'up above' or 'out beyond.' It is 'here' in erotic submission to and "sublation" of the brutally literalistic present by way of a 'logical conversation' with its fantastically 'un-real real' expressions. Both the individual personal and the collective personas—since these are inextricably connected—must be subjected to an 'erotic deconstruction' that is potentially both painful and 'liberating'—though not by way of transcending.

For Eros's realm extends, as Jung says, from the "endless spaces of the heavens to the dark abysses of hell." This means that the connections Eros brings will also bring something of the characteristics of boundless heavens and the pits of hell. Relationship brought by Eros will include the agonies of hell, the never-ending pushing of the Sisyphean rock up the mountain, the never-healing wounds, to the bliss and ecstasy of union with the divine. Moments and eternities of each. Unless the ego is willing to go through all this, to submit to the pain as well as the pleasure, then true relationship will not be possible. The ego, in trying to avoid pain by avoiding or aborting suffering of the burdens of relationship, will become empty, unrelated, always hungry, always unfilled, always in search, but never finding.

An Eros relationship means that one is able to tell the other person the reality of one's experience over its full range and to tell it in a *personal* way. [. . .] It is telling the truth of one's thoughts, feelings, emotions, sensations, intuitions. It is keeping nothing back behind facades. It is not bargaining. (Lockhart, Words as Eggs 127)

"Telling the truth of one's thought, feeling, emotions, sensations, intuitions" requires 'knowing' them and 'knowing' them means having a sense-of-self not limited by the boundaries of habitual identity, singularly egoic identifications, and social propriety. But that requires coming to 'know' them, to differentiate those boundaries, by giving them 'voice' and listening to what gets expressed. It also implies knowing one's selves for the 'non-positivized,' pluralistic 'being' one exists as/in. All of that requires a 'fall of egoic unity' into the 'hell' of Dionysian various-ness.

The *descensus ad inferos* is crucial for soul, whether ego likes it or not. It is *via crucis*, a "way of ego crucifixion," a sacrifice of ego's perspectives, its opinions, historical literalisms and fundamentalisms. Such crucifixion is crucial in order that a person may have a way to imagine his or her history, for such experiences bring with them a "treasure house" and a "womb" full of imagination. The descent into whatever hells becomes an initiation in life, a "baptism" by burning and drowning in life (fire and water), a confrontation with "dragons" and "serpents" and other animality, an experience of "rumbling belly" and "gnashing teeth" of "swinging doors" and "clashing rocks," of "warring" and a "shaking of the foundations." Hell gives underworldly (deep) imagination to our histories. It provides our "is" with "as," telling us what life is like, offering ways to imagine the here and now, as well as how to go on. (Miller, Hells and Holy Ghosts 97)

Once again we are reminded of the essential 'function' of the images of the 'un-real real' in knowing 'the real,' of the essential experience of metamorphosis and metamorphic status in 'becoming one's selves.' 'Depth' psychology has re-configured the essential 'descent into the interior,' in/to the pluralistic psyche that brings awareness into relation with totality, *as logic*. Images and tales of its

mythical dynamism abound in Titanic culture *as literalized facts* that can be de-literalized or given pluralistic identity by an erotic engagement of metaphoric sensibility and metamorphic enactment.

There can be no going back and there is no way 'out' by 'going forward. To 'hold out that hope' is a betrayal of the logic of psyche and cruel to both individual and the collective.

Structuring The Anti-Structural Dionysian Initiation of the Notion of Identity

Given the preceding considerations about epistemic diversity within reductively rational mentality and ethically literalistic society the conundrum of relativizing reductive to non-reductive understanding is historically exceptional. To 're-institute' a socio-cultural practice of relativizing ordinarily reductive identification and positivized reality to a more radically complex sensing of totality through non-reductive epistemic experience does not appear feasible through recapitulation of the initiatory practices of archaic or premodern cultures. Yet relativization of persona to self-complexity and social reality to inclusive totality do not appear viable through 'purely rational' endeavor. How then to relate the model of Dionysian personae to 'after-modernist' initiation into conscious mediation of real, un-real, and un-real real status? How to engage a psycho-somatic knowing of the variousness of knowing, knowledge, and the knower?

The Problem of Dionysian Initiation of the 'Notion' of Identity

If the 'task' of 'proceeding without transcending' appears to be to practice erotic relation with the plurality of self/other/world then *how* is a person to engage the 'relativity' of 'space-time,' in the variously fragmentary Here and Now *as* the 'place of creation' and the 'time of origins?' Principle to such a re-orientation is cultivating a means of initiating egoic function into some sense of 'Dionysian personae,' to 'culture' its manifestations as 'cultural practice.' Two 'practical' problems for engaging such an 'initiation' of identification into a more psyche-logical reality are of preeminent concern. Firstly, the example of archaic ritual culture illustrates some 'necessity' of a relational community of 'ordinary life' from which the initiand is 'alienated' and back into which the 'reborn' can be welcomed as a more psychically complex identity. As noted above, such a context can most likely only be constituted in contemporary context by a group recognition of individual alienation or sense of 'exile' *from* Titanic culture. Thus the community/collective/village capable of such 'initiation' would be 'identified' by a mutuality of 'dissociation' from normatively fragmentary society. In traditional cultures such initiations are conducted by those already 'initiated' into 'totalistic participation' or inclusive eros who thereby share such experience as a basis of their mutuality. Emulating that context in contemporary conditions is genuinely 'problematic.' It is not simply a 'choice to be made.'

It is worth noting here some isomorphism between the archaic community of those who have experienced initiatory alienation from “normative social structure” by way of ritualized inclusive knowing and a group of contemporary individuals who experience normative culture to be itself appropriately alienating. While the former are ‘moved away from’ a genuinely consistent basis of normative identification in a traditional culture by initiation, the latter associate a “liminal” status to their already “liminoid” cultural experience. This view again suggests that ‘post’-modernity is psyche-logically a ‘spontaneous’ initiation by way of the compulsive cultural productions of ‘un-real real’ expressions, as referenced by such notions as the simulacra, modern art, virtual reality, indeterminacy, and space-time relativity. In this sensing, the ‘task’ becomes how to engage the existent “anti-structural liminality” of what collective assumptions ‘mistake’ as a consistent basis of ‘ordinarily practical’ “social structures.” One can readily argue, as postmodernists do, that contemporary world culture is more “anti-structural” in its dynamics than “normatively structured.” But, as this study has asserted, that condition may be a ‘natural’ consequence of excessive emphasis of “directed egoic thinking” on ‘fragmentary ordering’ in linear causalities.

The second critical concern in addressing initiation into ‘Dionysian personae’ is ‘how’ to ‘think’ in a way appropriate to inducing such ‘initiation’ of identification into plurality. To affect ‘abandonment’ of any ‘real’ notions of identity, like denials of ‘truth,’ posits absolutist, reductive, and thus positivistic disavowals that, if they do ‘summon the god,’ will likely only do so ‘un-consciously.’ “To think that I am not going to think in terms of the principle of identity is still to think in terms of the principle of identity” (Hopper, Way of Transfiguration 245).

For “the principle of identity” to have any validity it must, again like that of ‘truth,’ be de-positivized. To make this move is to move into Dionysian dynamism, to thrust one’s sense-of-self into the ‘wilderness,’ into the ruthless presence of an ‘Artemesian logos’ or archetypality.

To be sure, when the ego is displaced from its appointed perch of presumptive command, I am confronted by the abyss; but, as Rilke says, “the very abyss is full of the darkness of God, and where one experiences it, let him climb down and howl in it (that is more necessary than to cross over it).” (Hopper 246)

This ‘way’ there can only be ‘death’ for the ‘ordinary identity’—and *no* ‘rebirth’ as such. If one thusly ‘incends’ rather than attempts to ‘transcend,’ then whatever ‘new life’ thereby comes to be will not be like the old life. Or, more ‘realistically speaking,’ since ‘the old life’ does not simply ‘cease’ after egoic differentiation occurs but rather is ‘relativized’ to a larger contexting of self/other/world, the ‘new life’ *co-exists* with the ‘old life’ enabling an eros of relationship between them. If one can deliberately thrust oneself into the presence of ‘divine negativity’ where the ‘personal’ is likely to be intrinsically altered by impersonal agencies then perhaps there is yet some context in which that initiatory trauma can be ‘participated’ rather than ‘acted out’ in ‘unconscious’ Titanic ‘transcendentalism.’ Certainly it is

possible to manifest different modes of being and consciousness in a schizoid state, such as exemplified by Stevenson's "bipolar" Dr. Jekyll > Mr. Hyde. Such is the effect of oppositionalism as "personality disorder" of cultural identity. Variousness *will* be expressed. Whether it is consciously inter-relational is another matter.

Thus there is at least the choice of clinging to positivism, if only nihilistically, or thrusting one's egoic function of consciousness into the maddening dialectic of "logical negativity." Here one considers the necessity of Giegerich's "absolute determination." And yet, even with 'egoic-function' having been so 'initiated,' psyche is so various, so complex, that positivized personas will surely persist and re-form amid any 'newly' or more 'dialectically' configured identifications of self/other/world. The "I" must 'go down' again and again to 'enact' this 'ontogeny of self' through dis-identification with positivity, in order to begin to 'realize' that it only exists in/as such a non-positivistic "reality"—as the "impossible subject" of 'post'-modernity. 'Depth' psychological notions are the 'spiritual' or 'religious' guides for such Dionysian initiations of identity and its conceptualizations in Titanic time. To 'reactively' 'attack' and 'blame' the Apollonian 'movement of measurement' is not a dialectical response to identity's alienation and fragmentation. Rather, the status of 'alienation from the world,' from plurality of self, demands a further alienation—*from identification with/as Titanic singularities*. There can be no 'single move' of trans-formation to a 'purer' status, but rather only a submission to various metaphorical beings' in the pluralistic status of metamorphic becoming. Of course, this notion is 'nonsense.' But it has been shown to be 'complexly logical.'

A true transformation, a real being affected, thus cannot be emotional. It cannot refer merely to one's states or "attributes." It implies the change of oneself in one's "substance" or identity, or the revolution of the logic of oneself (and of course, since the *logic* is indivisible, also the logic of the world and life). (Giegerich, Soul's Logical Life 255)

And "one's "substance" or identity" is neither singular nor literal thus its 'logic' must not be 'positive' but 'negative'—in literalistic 'terms'—an un-real real!

And this is what the Dionysian experience of dismemberment is about. One's entire being (*totus homo*) must be dissolved and reconstituted by Truth from within or assimilated to it. This Dionysian experience is the way in which Truth can come home from its exile "out there" [. . .]. Actaion has moved into the wilderness, the topos of negativity, so what he assimilates to is also Truth as negativity. (Giegerich, Soul's Logical Life 256)

"Actaion has moved into the wilderness, the topos of negativity" as a figure *of* such a movement. But 'he' is not a figuration of a 'literal' person, while 'we' moderns, however 'post' the time of 'modernity,' continue to 'exist' as 'individual persons' so defined. Contemporary status of being might be 'post'-modern, but the prevailing status of identification remains modernist. (Again, this 'confusion'

,
suggests initiatory “liminality.”) This situation is not unlike a prevailing Ptolemaic identity of an earth-centered universe in a culture having ‘proved’ a Copernican ‘reality.’ *How* are such as ‘we’ (the ‘post’-modern moderns) to act in some accord with these notions of psychic plurality and its ‘truths?’ How to “assimilate to Truth as negativity?” Initiation of ‘identity as mode of identification’ from modernist positivism into the ‘consciousness’ of a ‘post’-modernist ‘Dionysian personae’ would seem an alchemical process that requires both certain capacities of logic and metamorphic imagination as well as a ‘container’ or ‘alembic vessel’ to ‘hold’ the traumatic processes of ‘putrefaction’ in “liminal space.” Such implies the debunked efficacies of archaic “magic” and “ritual” and with/in a collective social effort. ‘Dionysian initiation of identity’ is thus caught in a ‘non-where’ between a ‘positivistic rock’ of literalistic reality and a ‘hard place’ of ‘impossible context.’ Thus, to be ‘honestly practical’ about such an effort is to ‘begin’ with its ‘impossibility’ and then attempt to enact the ‘impossible initiation’ ‘logically.’

Somehow culture and its social structures must ‘institute’ their known relativization to what is ‘larger’ or ‘beyond’ their structuring—and thereby provide the context for the Dionysian initiation of the Notion of identity. It is easy, with all this conceptual analysis, to forget that such a reorientation has been associated with some experiential or somaticized manifestation of metamorphic dynamism.

Two Practical Conundrums for Initiating a Body/Mind Dialectic: Somaticized Metaphoric Sensibility and Thinking Logical Negativity.

In ‘practical’ terms, what then *can* ‘logically be done,’ here, in this Titanically singular and nihilistically fragmented ‘now?’ If oppositional distinctions of mind and body are ‘psychologically invalid,’ then effort to ‘invest’ one’s self into the ‘wilderness,’ to be ‘taken in’ by “absolute negation,” cannot be approached as a ‘purely mental’ abstract or ‘out of body’ ‘enactment.’ Yet if that opposition is also ‘literally’ or empirically invalid, any somatic or emotional experience of ‘totality’ is also ‘insufficient’ to deconstruct positivistic identity. The notions of the ‘reality of psyche’ and the ‘psychical nature of reality’ indicate that bodily experience as well as logic must be ‘re-experienced’ by assimilation to the “topos of negativity”—and that ‘from within.’ The singular positivizing of embodiment (“I” am this one body), requires being ‘deconstructed’ as much as the reductive logic of literalizing “thought forms” for there to be a ‘real’ but non-positivized dialectic of mind<>body as spirit<>matter or flow<>form of archetypality and its expressions. Thus, ‘practicing’ the ‘feeling’ of metaphoric status and metamorphic plurality as well as the ‘thinking’ of their “logical negativity” appears essential. Such a ‘practice’ might be termed ‘learning to do thinglessly,’ since ‘being’ and ‘doing’ are found to enact ‘thinglessness’ as much as ‘thingness.’ Thus ‘embodiment’ of ‘un-reality’ is involved in ‘knowing inclusively.’

Although it is not often stated directly or even understood, the attempt to restore body cognition to the center of human consciousness is a central feature of most heretical movements

in the history of the Christian West. Much of the argument of heresy vs. orthodoxy revolves around belief in God vs. the actual *experience* of God; something that can only be brought about by somatic practices, ascetic or otherwise. Gnosis is not about belief, but about tangible proof of the existence of “larger forces,” [. . .]. (Berman 138)

Such ‘experiences’ of an ‘un-real real’ then offer a ‘seemingly positive’ phenomenon for reflective thought to invest itself in, thus “sublating” the seemingly positivized ‘experience’ into “logical negativity.” But again, these moves are much more readily considered (Apollonically viewed from afar) than ‘invested’ in “Dionysiacly.”

In the context of Titanic literalism, the only aspect of life in which most individuals have at least some openness to validating metaphoric sensibility *and* metamorphic experience is childhood.

The body ego is the earliest form of self-experience. It operates in terms of the magical stratum of the psyche, on a level of symbiotic field identity with what later we divide into a within and without. This ego operates in magical all-oneness in which what we call a part or partial event, contains, mobilizes and affects the whole. [. . .]

By connecting with body activity, then, we link our awareness with the activated magical dimension of the unconscious psyche. That means we mobilize and channel primitive and undifferentiated (potentially obsessive) affect energy into form. Simultaneously, conscious awareness expands. What we have come to call an altered state of consciousness ensues whenever emotionally charged imagery connects with bodily experience or activity. This “magically” altered state of consciousness can bring forth changes on the biological and psychological level which could not be accomplished by mere willing or reflecting. (Whitmont 242)

This “body ego” is the basis of capacity to experience psycho-somatic participation in a non-objectified totality. The capacity to ‘de-positivize’ thereby must derive some way from metamorphic somatic identity or experience. Yet increasingly the early years of childhood development, when such experience is most accessible, are under a Titanic assault of objectifying education—pressuring children to read and write and ‘master’ abstract mathematics at ever earlier ages learning to take symbols and signs as things. Such programmatic emphasis on reductivist “though forms” imposes upon them the metaphysical ‘message’ of those linearizing ‘mediums.’ The child is thus pressured to abandon its ‘metaphorically playful’ mentality in a way that reminds of the Titans tearing apart the ‘Dionysian infant’ before it can ‘develop.’ Perhaps this is the “shadow” force driving conscious ‘hysteria’ about ‘child abuse,’ expressing a subliminal awareness of how the social collective is ‘terrorizing’ the Dionysian diversity of childhood. This contemporary ‘assault’ on the metamorphic capacity and metaphoric sensibilities of participatory plurality is not some exemplary story in myth but a literal cultural imperative—a ‘necessary condition’ of reductive modernism asserting its hegemony over ‘reality.’ Some individuals obviously ‘survive’ it by becoming ‘shape-shifters’ that ‘pretend’ to ‘obey the rules’ of positivism, as figured in tales of the transformative tactics of the young Dionysus. But in the absence of a

similarly potent cultural emphasis on the value of metaphoric sensibility and metamorphic capacity these ‘ways of knowing’ remain culturally “liminoid,” marginal and inferior to the literalistically ‘real.’

Here again is a suggestion of an ‘alternative’ or ‘additional’ morality to that of ‘personal ethical morality.’ In contrast and complementarity, there is an ‘ethical’ attitude toward the pluralistic Self to be assumed that values a ‘democracy’ of psychic elements and energies, in which it is ‘right’ to attend and enhance the variousness of their ‘archetypal representation’—to think positivistically and morally heretical thoughts. One could paraphrase this attitude’s relation to personalistic and social ethics as ‘no psychic repression without conscious representation.’ It can also be considered a ‘psychical multi-culturalism.’

Thus any psyche-ology of the “*totus homos*,” the ‘whole human,’ implies an ‘obligation to psyche’ to assert its notions on behalf of defending, validating, and enhancing the ‘development’ of metaphoric sensibility and metamorphic enactment in childhood. Without adequate ‘experience’ of the Dionysian play of identification, and the range of terror and ecstasy which attend it, prior to the necessary ‘assault’ of pragmatic literalism once focused around the age of seven or eight years (the “age of reason”), the child will likely have difficulty growing into an adult who can even consider a notion such as “logical negativity.” In the absence of an ‘adequate initiation’ of body-centered egoic-identity into the reality of metaphoric being and metamorphic becoming there is likely to be minimal basis for the ‘Dionysian initiation’ of totalistic identity into a ‘logically’ pluralistic persona or ‘personae.’ Only a ‘depth’ psychological perspective seems capable of asserting the intrinsic value of ‘protecting’ and intensifying this childhood ‘phase’ of development. (Recall that Dionysus as a figuring of this ‘struggle’ has the capacities of an ‘actual’ ‘God’ to enable his survival as a Dionysian entity.)

A need for metaphoric sensibility that could enhance capacity for “thinking logical negativity” prompts concern about cultural life and ritualization. The inherent metaphorical play and metamorphic enactments of childhood, judging from the examples of archaic cultures, appear to be precursors to deliberate enactment of such psycho-somatic processes in adulthood. Such gestures appear to be ‘consciously’ undertaken for the very purpose of de-positivizing habitual gesturing, for de-literalizing reflexive activity (still expressed in impulses to create ‘art’). Ritualization has become a ‘popular topic.’ But it is often approached as empirically practical activity for the purposes of the positivized egoic identity—for ‘healing’ the pains of personalized identity rather than enacting submission of that identity to the impersonal, pluralistic, “anti-structural” agencies of self/other/world. The Dionysian is thusly often approached as ‘compensation’ for the reductions and repressions of habitual identity, whether in the context of ‘therapy’ or as ‘harmless play’ and tension releasing fun—or even as personalistic ‘appetite indulgence!’ Its wildness is thereby assimilated to the reflexive ‘wants’ of egoic personality.

Again, the ‘positivistic’ experiences of ‘mythical dynamism’ in ritual enactment (as also in the figurations of myth) are a basis, a *prima materia*, for the alchemical process of *thinking* them as

‘intellectual forms’ or ‘organs of reality’—by which one might so *in-vest* one’s ‘self’ into the ‘wilderness’ so as to ‘know’ *presence* as “logical negativity.” Thusly ‘valued’ these cannot be enacted as compensation for the psychical limitations of ordinary identity.

In all honesty, however, to consider facilitating these ‘activities’ of somaticizing metamorphic embodiment (and its “sublation” through thinking “logical negativity” to access “absolute archetypal truth”) is another ‘impossibility’ for contemporary ‘uninitiated’ adults. Positivized adult selfhood can, however, consciously acknowledged its incapacity and turn that awareness to how children might be better enabled. Such effort is likely to be a matter of assisting other, younger individuals to become able to ‘do’ *as the facilitators are not*. so able. Admission of ‘defeat’ in attempting to consistently ‘do/be’ thusly is likely a criteria for appropriately assisting others. Here the ‘figure’ of the ‘wounded healer’ is apt. One needs to ‘limp one’s own limp’ if one is to convey an honest sense of self-knowing to others. Thus those seeking to act ‘as dead to ego’ are likely to be guiding others by ‘maps’ that the guide can ‘read’ but not necessarily ‘follow.’ Such is what even Jung did—no small accomplishment nor unimportant cause toward which to devote one’s resistance against reductive habit.

Taking Psychological Response-ability for Ritual Culture

At issue here is a reorientation of socio-cultural attitudes toward ‘validating’ the actualities of metamorphic enactment, such as ritualizing and other ‘trans-morphic activity’ that promotes metaphoric sensibility. Such a shift would involve generating socially structured contexts for non-egoic agency to express the ‘Not-I’ and thus conscious participation in/as some ‘Not-Not-I.’ Social structure so composed would be in overt contradiction to the already structured reinforcements of a singular egoic identity of contemporary individualism in personalistic culture. To be psyche-logically effective, overtly conscious societal intentions would need to take ‘psychological responsibility’ for emphasizing the validity of both contexts for identity—that of one-ness and that of many-ness. So long as inductions of many-ness and the ‘un-real real’ are hierarchically assimilated to the dominance of one-ness and ordinary identity consciousness, the latter is not relativized to the dynamic character of radical complexity. As Turner notes, contemporary societies maintain a center > < margin relationship of the socially structured and the “anti-structural” field of totality such that the latter is ‘merely’ “liminoid” or secondarily peripheral to socialized reality. Ritual culture tends pose the contrast as more mutually significant, with the non-socially structured realm having a “liminal” status relative to the ordinary reality. That relationship enables the periodic inversion of the references, moving the “liminal” to the position of central importance. This context for ‘ritual’ enactment is explicitly differentiated from ‘ceremonial performances’ that serve to establish and confirm societal hierarchies and the reality of ordinarily structured identity consciousness. The ‘problem’ here is the contrast of ‘psychological reality’ with ordinarily realistic representation of human behavior. Representations of that behavior, be these in ‘art’ or

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'science,' that do not 'violate' habitual standards of what is 'realistic' cannot, according to the reasoning of this study, *adequately re-present or participate in* the dynamical character of an inclusive psychical reality because the latter is covertly subsumed in the positivistic assumptions of ordinary consciousness.

The 'hyper-realism' of much contemporary entertainment is thus inadequate to overt expression of the Not-I of radical complexity. Such pseudo-realism can be seen as an attempt to stretch ordinarily realistic standards to 'include' the dynamical reality of psyche and thus assimilate it to ordinary reality. Thus, for the most part such expressive style appears employed in tactics of the persona-identified egoic function of cultural Titanism to claim the "anti-structural" forces of psyche for its own egoic purposes—to "inflate" its sense of self with the Not-I energies of non-ordinary metamorphic consciousness. This intention is testified to by the typical idolization of the 'heroically egoic protagonist.' A more affectively effective relativization of identity to radically complex sense of self, other, and world tends to humble the heroically singular sense of identity. A Herculean persona is dynamically anti-thetical to a Dionysian personae. To temper such Titanic personalism and its tyranny over both 'the rest of the self' and the world, the egoic function requires being 'led' (perhaps tricked or even 'driven'), into pluralistic identity and inclusive knowing. Such is a principle function of ritual culture. To know/gnow self/other/world, people need to engage in metamorphic enactments of a sort that they will inherently resist from a personalistic perspective—because their 'person' (as habitually), will likely be significantly altered (not to mention the world as they know it). They must 'experience' and reflectively engage 'unknown' and 'unknowable' aspects of self/other/world if overt experience and awareness of the concurrencies of epistemological method is to be manifested.

In spite of the theoretical notions in anthropology, aesthetic theory, science and epistemology brought together in this study, none of these disciplines of thought seem capable of a radical critique of positivistic identification from 'outside' of it. They can and do variously delineate dynamical differences between oppositional dualism and more totalistic 'orderings.' Aspects of 'depth' psychology's 'logic of psyche' do seem to provide a basis for deconstructing oppositionalism by way of its own "self-sublation." If this assessment is accurate, then any response/able re-orientation of the role and value of the 'un-real real' and its ritualistic enactment in Titanically literalistic culture is best pursued in relation to concepts of poly-centric psyche.

The importance of such a 'move' cannot be understated if a more radically complex, thus psychologically meaningful experience of individual and collective human life is to become overtly accessible to conscious identity that that enabled by the supremacy of positivistic identification and instrumental pragmatism. A pluralistic status of meaning in living depends on a 'developmental process of mythical dynamism' such as induced by successive 'rites of passage.'

The psyche expects rites of passage that deepen the imagination, open the spiritual eyes,

and expand emotional capacities. The inner life expects to be led out, to move from physical growth to sexual activity and learning of love, from naiveté to psychological savvy, from innocence to knowledge of life and death. When the expected rites of passage don't occur, anything that makes a break from childhood and opens other ways of seeing and feeling can become a substitute. Anything that contains fire, that tears at life and stirs the shadows, becomes a substitute rite of passage. (Meade 190)

The extremity of the collective traumas of late modernity testify to awesome and enormously destructive forces continually shattering Enlightenment Humanism's attempts to impose order on psychic life in ethical and rationalistic terms. The virtual disappearance of initiatory ritual and its relativizing effects on oppositionally singular egoic identity has contributed to the creation of a "sibling society united principally by agreement to protect each other's 'self-indulgent' (Titanic) consumptive appetites (Bly, Sibling Society). Although historically unparalleled material benefits have been provided to those at the hierarchical peak of technological societies, anxiety and depression appear rampant among individuals who are the most 'successful' in these terms (the primary consumers of anti-anxiety and anti-depressant medications are upper-middle class Americans). Comfort, appetite-obsessing 'mass consumption,' personal safety, political and economic 'liberty,' evidently do not eliminate the intrinsic trauma of psychic life and pluralistic being. Persistent neurosis and depressing indicate that positivistic social structure and instrumental control of environment do not calm the Dionysian dis-ease of the many in the one. Such 'persistent dissatisfaction' in the midst of 'positivistic success' might well be the 'agency' which 'reflects' the 'mask' concealing the complex archetypal dynamism that is the source of life's vitality.

As we said before, initiation lies at the core of any genuine human life. And this is true for two reasons. The first is that any genuine human life implies profound crises, ordeals, suffering, loss and reconquest of self, "death and resurrection." The second is that, whatever degree of fulfillment it may have brought him, at a certain moment every man sees his life as a failure. This vision does not arise from a moral judgment made on his past, but from an obscure feeling that he has missed his vocation; that he has betrayed the best that was in him. In such moments of total crisis, only one hope seems to offer any issue—the hope of beginning life over again. This means, in short, that the man undergoing such a crisis dreams of new, regenerated life, fully realized and significant. This is something other and far more than the obscure desire of every human soul to renew itself periodically, as the cosmos is renewed. The hope and dream of these moments of total crisis are to obtain a definitive and total *renovatio*, a renewal capable of transmuting life. Such a renewal is the result of every genuine religious conversion.(Eliade, Rites and Symbols of Initiation 135)

The "new and regenerated life, fully realized and significant," a "total *renovatio*, a renewal capable of transmuting life" is hardly accessible within the habitual identity of Titanic positivism and its futuristic drive toward literalistic satisfactions. The recent history of alternating waves of chaotic mass-destruction (world wars, genocide, environmental degradations), and ethically based but economically driven order shows indication of a need for generating a 'self-realization' rather than more egoic satisfaction. Some

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persistent “shadow” aspect of psyche seems to be seeking, in these very eruptions of unintended disaster, a deliberate reflection on its obsessive pursuit of control over self/other/world. That is to say, psyche as a totality seems to be pushing positivistic egoic identification to enantiadromic extremes to force a conscious reflection upon its reflexive dominance. Yet increasingly, ‘authority’ as a relationship with a ‘totalistic’ intelligence or ‘wisdom’ of life evolved in successive bouts of ‘heroic defeat’ is discredited. The ‘wise’ that are lauded by contemporary social standards are those who ‘keep on winning,’ who make greater profit rather than stimulate more complex knowing of self, other, and world. Such are not the individuals suited to facilitate reflective initiation into the many-ness of one-ness.

In many tribal cultures, it was said that if the boys were not initiated into manhood, if they were not shaped by the skills and love of elders, then they would destroy the culture. If the fires that innately burn inside youths are not intentionally and lovingly added to the hearth of community, they will burn down the structures of culture, just to feel the warmth. Each generation is a fire of individual and collective heat that only learns its purpose by burning. No proliferation of laws, no adjustment of the curriculum of early education, no private, hopeful prayer is going to remove the threats that modern society will be destroyed by its own youth. But the most certain signals to light the fires of destruction are sent when the old people of a group lose their memories, consume like youths, and neglect the rites of grieving and burial. (Meade 19)

“The fires that innately burn inside youths” were, for a phase of modernity, “added” to the ‘fires’ of singular nationalistic identities and their violent competitions in hegemonic wars and industrial rivalry. Subsequently, those energies have been directed more toward the promise of consumer culture’s promise to satisfy emotional appetites by positivistic consumption. Those who remain ‘economically underprivileged’ under the social culture of consumerism might be expected to continue to respond more with anti-social violence to such psychic reduction—yet the promise of appetite satiation seems to quell most resistance even in the ‘underclass.’ Thus while both the more and less privileged seem religiously devoted to the pursuit of materialistic satisfaction of psychic longing, those of ‘means’ and ‘opportunity’ appear to lead the way in ‘burning the culture down’ with their aggressive pursuits of heroic consumption, and individualistic power. ‘Success’ in that endeavor seems to exacerbate some psychic longing, causing a redoubling of the effort to achieve a sense of completeness by positivistic means. Such hyper-competitive/consumptive social conduct can be associated with the destructiveness of uninitiated adolescent identity struggling to assert a viable unitary sense of self—whether by hyper-competitive social propriety or anti-social behavior.

Thus the ‘uninitiated youth’ most likely to burn down their culture might well be the majority of Western or Westernized individuals of modernity who have not ‘matured’ by having egoic-identity relativized to some ‘sense’ of ‘impersonal totality’ and collective diversity. Individualistic social structure has increased personal liberties, but there remains a tremendous longing, a need, to ‘burn brightly’—as

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‘something other than a socialized ego,’ as an ‘identity identified with’ some sacred reality. Trauma generally is despised by contemporary society yet exerts a rather obsessive fascination in news and entertainment. It is as if the grasping at security and control is countered by some longing for de-structuring disaster that might ‘open’ lives to some more ‘inspiring’ (if identity-deconstructing) forces. But even when persons are cast into such disruptions of ordinary status there is no psycho-social context in which to value the ‘beatings’ of personalistic egoic-identity resulting from naïve egoic wants and psychic projectivity of repressed self-aspects upon others. People are not assisted in knowing and understanding *by way of* non-ordinary breaks personal and social continuity.

The individual life is “made” in those initiatory moments when the individual sees both ways into their own soul. The validity of that vision can only be verified by return to community. A man cannot look back accurately enough or forward long enough if he is standing alone and isolated; there is just too much confusion, illusion, and disillusionment to be able to face it alone. Unless enough men can gather together and hold the genuine threads of their lives so that the pattern of community and of elders can be seen, even temporarily, there’s no promise of healing waters ahead. (Meade 19)

The “moments when the individual sees both ways into their own soul” can be posed as moments of ‘Dionysian vision.’ It is a seeing by and through a many-ness of one-ness, a perspective that is both here and there. But such ‘seeing’ constitutes dissolution of the habitual identity, a maturation of self-perspective—‘one’ extra-ordinarily difficult to sustain by individuals in a competitive, literalistic, non-erotically relational social environment. Religions in a culture of literalistic belief appear resistant to genuinely metaphoric sensibility and metamorphic enactment, as are other ‘institutions’ and ‘disciplines’ of thought ‘identified’ with oppositional method and linear logic (including most contemporary psychology with its quantitative methodology and preferred reductive interpretation of such activity). Yet the principle notions of ‘depth’ psychology that ‘logically’ suggesting a genuine validity to such inclusive or ‘participatory consciousness’ and thus a ‘truthfulness’ to life that is not reductive derive from within that culture of oppositional method. The Western method of analytical rationalism itself has produced this perspective. It can thereby be regarded as intrinsic rather than as a ‘cultural import’ which could not represent an ‘inherent maturation’ for Westernized mentality. There *is* a basis to re-invigorate psychic life in Western culture *with its own sensibilities*. And there is evidence of increasing impulse to do so.

Whatever the reason, the past two decades have witnessed a resurgence of interest in the construction of rites of passage. The aim of inventing or constructing rites is bold, some might say arrogant. But without constant reinvention, we court disorientation. Without rites that engage our imaginations, communities, and bodies, we lose touch with the rhythms of the human life course, just as we become temporally disoriented without seasonal and commemorative rites that recreate our connections to the natural world and the course of human history. (Grimes 3)

‘Invented rites that engage our imaginations, communities, and bodies’ will not be ‘repetitions’ of ‘what once literally happened’ in the investigations of historical anthropology. Rather, if these present manifestations of what happens variously and concurrently ‘here and now’ then they can reorient persons to psychic complexity within contemporary context. But if such enactments are ‘mere’ imitations of the sequential patterns of a mechanistic nature then dominant identity consciousness will not be relativized. An expression of overt ‘mythical dynamism’ is still required to evade ‘positivistic assumptions’ and generate ‘sublatable’ experience of the reality of the ‘un-real real.’ It is in this sense that “reinventing ritual” (in a non-ceremonial manner) will be a most radical and thus ‘dangerous’ effort. It is not only the social personas of educational, scientific, and social ‘institutions’ that will resist.

Reimagining ritual can be threatening to religious institutions, since, conventionally understood, imagination is about the made up, whereas religion is supposed to be about the given. Although I treat ritual traditions with respect, I challenge them—sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly—by setting an imagined ritual alongside an actual rite. By reimagining, I dance into the abyss that comfortably separates the spiritual from the social-scientific, the personal from the scholarly, and the narrative from the analytical. (Grimes 6)

It is in and of that “abyss that comfortably separates the spiritual from the social-scientific” that some gnosis of “logical negativity” might be engaged. ‘Investing our selves absolutely’ in such a gapping gap necessarily prompts anxiety about potential dis-ease resulting from shifts in assumptions about ‘how things actually are.’ But it appears that ‘deepening’ a sense of meaning in life requires trauma. Mythical and religious narratives typically associate gaining greater awareness of the more-than-social order of reality with traumatic transformations. Ritual culture has historically acknowledged this ‘fact of life.’ choosing to value and ‘inflict’ discomfort (even what would be termed ‘injury’ by contemporary standards), deliberately—but in ‘service’ to a totality of identity ‘beyond’ the singularly personal, for the sake of a sense of ‘truth’ or ‘meaning’ that encompasses and relativizes personalistic impulses and concerns to both the collective society and a mythically dynamic cosmos.

Although it may sound contradictory to say so, reinventing initiation requires not only the evocation of wonder but also the willingness of leaders to disenchant initiates [. . .]. To be effective, reinvented initiations must be able simultaneously to evoke wonder and to provoke disenchantment. (Grimes 136-37)

The most essential ‘trauma’ of ritualistic initiation might be the ‘deflation’ of singular egoic identity, its specific ‘humiliation,’ partly by a leveling of ordinary social status and partly through intense exposure to notions of ‘greater powers’ than the human that demand ‘impersonal purposes’ of the individual in life. In one sphere of the ‘impersonal,’ initiation conditions the individual to participation in the social collective as a member in the many-ness of its one-ness. In a larger totality, it conditions the individual to ‘life in/of the cosmos.’ ‘Depth’ psychological notions offer terms for the ‘powers’ and their

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purposes in both these realms (social and super-social), that are not literalistic or reductive. It can 'guide' the "reinvention of ritual" through the 'temptations' of Titanic impulses. But even those terms are likely to become positivized by ordinarily reductive attitudes unless they are engaged in a constant "self-sublation" of psychology as a mechanistic science, salvific agency, or positive truth. Even 'depth' psychological perspective can be applied reductively if it is not posed as the 'threshold guardian' of "absolute negation" and thereby regarded as a dangerous, disreputable eros figure bound to bestir the extremities of being. Engaged thusly, its affective efficacy will be noted if it provokes the terror or wrath of "normative structural" identities--be those personal or institutional. Such reactivity appears appropriate to engendering the potentiality of the Dionysian initiation of the notion of identity with its experience of many-ness in one-ness.

Approaching Childhood Development, Education, and Maturation with Respect for the Reductive <> Non-Reductive Dialectic of Consciousness and Understanding

If a mutually relativizing, self-reflective complementarity of reductive and non-reductive epistemic method is inherent to the most broadly complex functioning of human consciousness in a ‘complete individual’ (*totus homos*), as well as somehow integral to the “logic of survival” for the ‘inhumanly human’ species *homo sapiens sapiens* (*sapiens*), then that complementarity would seem crucial to developing self-fulfilling selves and citizens. Knowing by way of the ‘un-real real’ then is essential to developing complexly individualized or individuated persons, and thereby, to enabling the diversified pluralism of egalitarian society. In terms of title of this work, manifesting the many in the one is a status ‘attainable’ through development of a complex diversification of modes of knowing and understanding that ‘takes form’ or is ‘embodied’ in an overtly irreducible expression of diversity of self, other, and world. This study comes to its indeterminate end, then, with some suggestions about orienting social attitudes and educative efforts toward enhancing that interminable dialectic of epistemic modes and their irreducible statuses of identification throughout the life process.

To write of the possibility of ‘doing’ the impossible –attempting Dionysian initiation from and by positivistic reductive attitudes—implies some practical means. Such ‘taking action’ in spite of a socially structured logical impossibility requires some schemata for development of the dialectic between reductive and non-reductive knowing. Thus an attempt is made here at identifying aspects of the life course in which the interplay of elements of ‘inclusive’ and ‘exclusive’ epistemologies appear to emerge so that they might be more mutually developed.

An Overview of Psycho-Epistemic Self Development in Succeeding Life Stages

Broad, general concerns for epistemic modalities in the development of relations between self and self, other, and world are considered here in reference to some supposed ‘stages of psycho-logical development.’ Concerns about psycho-somatic childhood and adolescent experience and development are outlined here in four general stages of ‘immaturity’ and three of adult maturity. The distinctions of these stages are not assumed to be literalistically exact or final. Rather, it is assumed that to some degree they ‘accumulate’ rather than simply succeed each other as organizing concerns for psychological function—such that an adult continues to be influenced by concerns of childhood and adolescent stages. Considerable variation among individuals in onset of these concerns, as well as the degree and timing of ‘regression to’ preceding ones is also assumed. Thus a child might be engaged by more adult considerations and an adult

experience a form of regression to those of childhood. Perhaps most importantly, an assumption of the radically variable role of environmental factors in influencing development of sense of self, other, and world is the very basis for offering these speculative stages. If development of epistemic modalities were not readily influenced by physical, emotional, and social factors of environmental context, then there would be no point in considering how that development might be directed toward a more complex, overt complementarity.

In overview, the course of development being suggested here reflects concepts about the initial status of identity in the consciousness of human infants as being undifferentiated from ‘external’ environmental components. Self and world, in this perspective, are encountered and experienced in a unitary continuum of self/mother/other/world. The continuity of such undifferentiated identity status is then considered to encounter initial differentiations between self and other as a consequence of physical and emotional experiences—particularly those that frustrate the infant’s appetites or comfort. Distress and trauma thus are seen as playing an immediate and crucial role in the development of differentiated identity status—in the ‘knowing of difference.’

It is suggested here that this initial context of ‘continuity consciousness’ in infancy is succeeded by two stages of childhood differentiation emphasizing a non-reflective self< >other awareness, then one of adolescent differentiation emphasizing a more radically competitive self-conscious or self-reflective self< >other awareness. Beyond that stage sense of self, other, and world can develop the capacity of ‘maturing’ into an adult status of complimentary diversification of identity and contextual self< >other relations. This general course can be characterized as the development of egoic functioning through various engagements with reductive and non-reductive modes of identification commencing in the infant’s relational eros of psycho-somatic symbiosis, proceeding through increasingly reductive stages of socio-erotic or socially-structured relational context of mutuality and collective identity into adulthood, and concluding in the individual confrontation with personal death. ‘Along the way,’ egoic functioning has various ‘opportunities’ to ‘put itself in service to’ both reductive and non-reductive modes of knowing. But in order to become thusly diversified, considerable impetus from both non-egoic aspects of personal psyche and the more ‘external’ ones of society appear to be required. These proposed stages do not assume any predetermined course toward, nor ultimate development of, a diversified status of complex psycho-philosophical adult relations of self with self, other, and world. Rather, they merely present an attempt to outline the possibility of developing such a status and how enhancement of ‘knowing by way of the un-real real’ might promote it.

Infancy: Initially Inclusive Embodiment of Psyche

In so far as infant consciousness manifests an undifferentiated status of identity in which egoic function has not yet developed a sense of self in contrast to others and world, or its own body, its psyche

might be described as ‘fully embodied.’ Thus there would appear to be no differentiated aspects of consciousness capable of performing abstract or objectified identifications. Consciousness seems to present itself as an undifferentiated subjective field in which the body is psychical and the psyche is body. Such status could also be posed as immersion in the ‘Not-Not-I’ condition in so far as everything seems to appear as self but there is as yet no ‘I’ to differentiate from ‘other.’ Perhaps it is fair to say then that such status is ‘fully participatory’ in that it experiences a continuity of self< >other< >world—differentiations only possible for a later status of psychical development. Physiological development might well be posed as another essential aspect of the capacity to differentiate thusly since it enables the child to interact with both its environment and its own body my way of material manipulation linked to sensory stimuli. Developing physiological capacities of sight, movement, and vocalization greatly expand the possibilities for differentiating interaction with the environment, thus increasing stimuli to the re-presentational capacities of the psyche or mind. At some point in the first year or two of life this increasingly intimate ‘exploration of self, other, and world’ appears to induce self< >other awareness and a reflective consciousness of difference. An example of this transition is when a child is presented with its reflection and ‘discovers’ that the image is ‘of it’ but ‘not it.’ This stage could then be considered to extend from birth to the attainment of initial self-identification as ‘an I’ and that is expressible through some competency in symbolic re-presentation, most obviously communicative language skills.

The evident ‘unitary beginning’ of psycho-somatic identity in this ‘stage of development’ lacks a basis for reflective abstraction but expresses inherent impetus toward development of such capacity. Infants and toddlers that suffer traumatic degrees of neglect, abuse, or illness that frustrate or inhibit a relatively ‘comfortable immersion’ in this status are often said to manifest developmental delays or incapacities in later life stages. It can be supposed then that some minimal level of immersion in this status is important to further stages of psychical as well as physiological development of inherent capacities of consciousness.

Early Childhood: Emerging Relational Diversity Differentiations through Emphasis on Symbolic Dynamics in Metamorphic Play

The status of childhood is here associated with a shift from the psycho-somatic continuity of the infant psyche or consciousness to a more self-generated schemata of differentiation that supports the formation of a self-aware ‘I’ of egoic discretion. Such ‘a sense of self’ would seem to depend upon a capacity to differentiate between ‘fields of agency.’ Thus self< >other< >world continuity comes, as it were, into more self-conscious awareness. If increasing awareness of difference and capacity to express it as symbolic psychical re-presentation are assumed to be impelled by enhanced egoic function, then the

emerging configuration of a distinctive sense of self appears to be central to epistemological development. An impetus toward egoic differentiation 'energizes' epistemic development.

In relation to the notion of a reductive <> non-reductive contrast in ways of knowing, it is proposed here that early childhood consciousness manifests those modes in a relatively dialectical manner. Direct manipulation of the child's own self and its 'external' environment through both physical means and psychical symbolizations (things of thought, words, images), would appear to involve both reductive and non-reductive identifications. It is thus suggested that there is a crucial phase of development in which reality is consistently and non-reflectively engaged as both definitively positivistic and also psychically symbolic. This activity is typically referenced by the term play. The dictionary definitions of this word take up an exceptionally extensive portion of a page with ten or more categories of denotations. There is a recurrent theme of performance, enactment, participation, pretense, gaming, movement, improvisation, informality, manipulation, and imagination in these definitions. Play is often posed as the opposite of intentionally productive activity or work. Play then is evidently an activity of mind and body that are not primarily directed toward practical manipulations or conclusions. Play is also most typically associated with childhood behavior in general. Playing is what children 'do' with themselves, in the world. This 'psycho-somatic play of childhood consciousness' is readily characterized as metaphorical and metamorphically dynamic. It enables transformative reconfigurations of self, other, and world as well as the concurrent validity of reductively irreconcilable statuses. One might further characterize this attitude as one of unfettered indulgence in the creative 'play' of the "imaginal body" that is both the 'body of psyche' and the 'psyche of body' in which the 'literal body' can be experienced as psycho-morphic. This stage can be figured as the interactivity of 'I <> Not-Not-I' identifications.

It can further be observed that the play of childhood appears less configured or constricted by established context or 'rules' than does play associated with adult persons. Older children, adolescents, and adults tend more to 'play games' rather than 'just play.' It is suggested thereby that play which is pervasive and relatively unstructured by socialized rules is a critical component of early childhood development in which egoic function is allowed to freely intermingle reductive and non-reductive epistemic methods of knowing and understanding in a non-hierarchical concurrency. The phrase 'playing make believe' seems indicative of such a psycho-somatic engagement with the 'making of reality' through a rather 'serious' generation of 'un-real reality.'

Later Childhood: Gradual Objectification in a Pre-adolescent Shift Toward Analytical Manipulation and Socialized Reality

At some point during childhood an increasing emphasis appears to be placed by egoic function upon more literalistic definitions of identity and reality. Consistently positivistic, oppositional, and

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objectified definitions of self, other, and world appear to gain importance. While the characteristic activity of play persists, it gradually becomes more overtly contrasted to more reductive identity consciousness. One might say it becomes more of an inter-play between discrete entities. Obviously adult social pressure asserts some influence on this transition by reinforcing or even compelling this emphasis. But for some span of time mythical dynamism and practical literalism appear to coexist in a rather non-hierarchical dualism. Egoic identification appears then to be able to shift back and forth between these criteria for knowing and experience without inducing a sense of self-contradiction. Eventually the generation of a concurrently reductive and non-reductive experience as some ‘un-real real’ status tends to diminish and play comes to be identified more as overt un-reality, fantasy, entertainment, or ‘mere imagination.’

In this shift egoic identification appears to become more abstracted from experience and phenomenon, perhaps more competitively prone to impose its identifications on those of others. It is thus more effectively poised to practice objective reduction and reflective analytical manipulation of both symbolic re-presentations (words, images, concepts) as well as material objects. Increased competitive autonomy of egoic self-assertion thus seems to associate with this increased capacity for reductive objectification and re-presentational definition. Commensurate with that development, however, there appears to be a greater susceptibility to socially structured definitions and explanations of objective status. As the impetus for egoic function to control and effectively manipulate self, other, and world through reductive epistemics increases, contrast and confrontation of egoic assertions with socially structured identifications also increases. Psychical re-presentation is thus no longer so much contexted as play but rather comes to be judged against socialized ideals or standards for real, proper, right, and true status. Any characteristic autonomy of individual psychic re-presentation thus comes under increasing pressure to conform to collective standards. Uniqueness or originality of individual sense abilities and intelligence are thus at increasing risk of repression as childhood development proceeds toward an adolescent stage. It is assumed that such pressure on identification of self, other, and world is a primary influence on the configuration of personal persona. This phase can then be figured as an interplay between emphasis upon ‘I’ > < ‘Not-I’ competition and ‘I’ < > ‘Not-Not-I’ co-relation in identity consciousness—or as (‘I’ > < ‘Not-I’) < > (‘I’ < > ‘Not-Not-I’).

This ‘sketch’ of what seems a crucial shift in childhood from more metaphoric and metamorphic consciousness to more reductive and objective identification leading is deliberately general to avoid asserting any definitive developmental process. But if the proposed shift is accepted, then some basis for a fundamental succession of emphasis in development of epistemic modalities can be asserted. Physiological brain studies indicate that neurological pathways are profusely generated during childhood and those that are utilized in establishing specific cognitive activities of association or differentiation repetitively are most likely to endure. Those that are not repetitively reinforced tend to be literally

‘discarded.’ It would thus seem important that adequate emphasis be given to psycho-somatic engagement of both reductive and non-reductive modalities during childhood if a physiological basis in brain function for inclusive knowing is to be readily available in later life stages. Egoic function that developed under a predominance of either modality would seem to be both psychically and physiologically diminished in the breadth of its epistemic capacities.

Overall, the developmental course indicted here can be thought of as extending from initial egoic differentiation of a sense of self, other, and world that becomes communicable through symbolic psychic re-presentation, to the ‘acquisition’ of competency in objective rational abstraction. The earlier aspects of this span could be characterized in relation to Freud’s ‘polymorphous perverseness’ and might be thought of as ‘naïve Dionysian development’ engaged through the metamorphic enactment of play in which identity is readily reconfigured and pluralized without egoic preoccupations about projecting a ‘self-consistent’ and socially structured persona posture. The latter aspects of this span could then be characterized as a much more overt distinction in modes of identification between the real and the un-real, the actual and the imaginal or fantastic. To the degree that the ‘literally actual,’ realistic, or socially proper statuses are granted hierarchical dominance, this phase of development would appear to be concluding. Commencement of that shift might be referenced in the often traditionally designated “age of reason’ around seven or eight years of age, tending to culminate under the pressures of hormonal changes inducing adolescence and its psycho-social effects.

Adolescent Individuation: Confrontation with a Competitive Diversity of Potential Identifications and Social Reductions

A transit from a relatively dualistic mutuality of mythically dynamic identification and more objectified literalization in childhood toward predominance of a socialized version of the latter tends to coincide with the radical biological transformations of adolescence. Under such an increasingly reductive, pragmatized emphasis, the continuity of self < > other < > world tends to become more fragmented and oppositional. What might be most underappreciated about these shifts is that increasing personal and social pressures to rely primarily on reductive identifications of reality status exert a narrowing of the valid range of epistemic method *at the same time as* both body and mind (physical, intellectual and emotional capacities) are undergoing dramatic transformation. Adolescents undergo physiological and psychological changes at a rate and to a degree that seems unsurpassed except perhaps during embryonic development. At the very period of development that egoic function is ‘moving’ from concern with the ‘experimental/experiential play’ of childhood toward asserting some autonomously self-determined adult status, it is confronted with potent impulses to both definitively differentiate its selfhood *and* to seek conformation of that selfhood through social acceptance. That double struggle takes place ‘in’ intra-

psychic and inter-psychic (social) contexts that are radically more complex than in childhood. Egoic function is in essence 'torn' between self-definition and collective definition. Subsequently the metamorphic play of childhood becomes a more competitive effort to definitively and hierarchically define self versus "Self" and versus others, or 'my group identity' versus that of other groups ('cliques').

A remarkable conflict between determining an individuated self-identity appropriate to personal character of sense abilities and intelligence, and seeking affirmation of self-worth by way of social conformity thus characterizes adolescence as an intrinsic and essential 'double' identity crisis. The individual must ask, 'who am I to me?' as well as, 'who or what am I to them?' Adolescent rebellion against, or rejections of, childhood identity emersion in family and socio-cultural contexts suggests the need to 'break free' of what 'feels like' reductive definitions of the emerging autonomy of egoic function (self identification). The stereotypical image of the contentious adolescent exhibiting defiance, disdain, and resistance to 'all things childlike or adult' re-presents the intensity of this developmental phase of character, persona, and autonomy. What is often 'forgotten' by adult observing such expressions of that inherently traumatic 'inner drama,' is that is relatively unconscious—egoic function is not yet sophisticated enough to 'reflect upon it's self-expressions.' Furthermore, it is suddenly seeking to 'make its claim' on identifying self, other, and world without having either much life experience or complex education of its intellectual capacities. Thus it is in a sense 'acting out' autonomy with little sense of what the more intrinsic character of the 'deeper self' it is charged to re-present (both to self and others). Adolescents, in other words, insist on 'knowing what they want' (or more often perhaps, what they do not want) even though they have not yet had sufficient experience and development to be likely to 'know' their selves well enough to 'know what is appropriate to their individuality.' Once again, it seems important to emphasize the significance of this life course stage because it is when egoic function comes under the pressures of an exponential increase in literalistic, oppositional definitions.

How individuals contend with these essential 'identity crises' of adolescence might well depend in part on how diversified their engagement with epistemic modalities has been in childhood development. Those emerging from a childhood context in which the meaningfulness of identifications involves validated symbolic or inclusive as well as objectively literal, mechanistically manipulative qualities, then they would appear to be 'better prepared' to 'endure' the adolescent 'metamorphosis.' Both exclusive and inclusive modes of knowing can readily be posed as intrinsic to attempts to 'objectify' autonomous selfhood. Yet, unlike the more concurrent validity of these modes in childhood, the adolescent context can be seen as pitting the impulse for reductively definitive identifications of self, others, and world that might provide a potent sense of 'self control' and/or one of social affirmation, over and against a need to deploy more metaphoric and metamorphic modes of knowing and understanding for the sake of 'making psyche-logical sense' of this radical transformation of self, and thus of relation to self other, and world.

What *is* a person in such flux, under such pressures of ‘becoming?’ What can it mean to ‘grow up’ to an egoic function impelled to assert autonomy without any experience of such status? How is one to understand that becoming? From this perspective it does not seem ‘unreasonable’ that adolescents often reflexively ‘identify with’ defiance and ‘non-involvement’ on one side, or ‘compulsive conformity to’ and performance of socialized expectations on another. Some appear to cling to a such consistent self-identifications or socialized contexts of association during this upheaval. Others appear to experiment radically as they shift from one imago or persona posture, one social group identity, to another. Some doggedly attach sense of self to the most ordinarily reductive of socialized identifications and others adopt fantastically deviant, improper, and impractical identifications. Yet all such identifications can be asserted with stunningly reductive and literalistic certainty ‘in the moment,’ regardless of how often and radically they are changed.. Some appear to abhor any hint of socialized alienation and others embrace it rather religiously. Yet individuals on either side of this divide over conformity to norms of social structure can appear to have little practical discretion at times, often taking extraordinarily naïve physical and social risks in their behavior (driving fast, committing crimes, drug use, sexual experimentation, etc.).

Intellectual and emotional development during this life phase can occur in radically different ways among individuals , often seeming sporadic and inconsistent, rapid or sluggish. Brain studies indicate there is a physiological basis for such swings, digressions, and regressions. Taken all together these characteristics of adolescent development indicate a genuinely ‘fantastic’ psychical ‘drama’ impelling egoic identifications to either ‘act out’ unconsciously and rebelliously or conform reflexively—sometimes both at once as in the act of conforming to some non-conformist, anti-social standard or group (“Goths,” Hippies,” or even joining the army). Adolescent status is thus in one sense ‘fleeing’ childhood status while reiterating its ‘metamorphic play’ as it ‘rushes toward’ an autonomous adult status. yet also resisting the conformist determinations of such status. The energy of such youth is thereby somehow alien to both childhood and adulthood, ‘rushing forward’ and ‘leaping backward’ in a developmental con/fusion and competition of reductive and non-reductive impulses. The concerns of identity consciousness in adolescence can thus be figured as ‘I’><’Not-I’ competition in conflict with ‘I’<>’Not I’ relation while seeking to express emerging self-complexity in ‘I’<>’Not-Not-I’ experience. There is acute impetus toward reduction of self and other to opposites, of self and other to identity, and non-reduction of self<>other<>world interplay in/as the “imaginal body.” The autonomous creative enthusiasm of psychic or psyche-logical life erupts just as the pragmatic reductions of ‘real life’ in society and under the limitations of practical concerns ‘descends’ upon it.

The metamorphic<>literalistic or reductive<>non-reductive ‘play’ of childhood does not cease in adolescence but becomes in a sense much more earnest—the stakes are high for psyche as identity of self, other, and world will be ‘ultimately’ defined by impending egoic rigidification in persona acceptance of socialized standards. Thus the ‘play’ of the adolescent psyche’s grappling with epistemic modes of

knowing and understanding is a far more 'serious' one than that of childhood. A veritable maelstrom of turmoil can be assumed to be 'taking place' under even the most calm exteriors of adolescent personalities—a fact testified to in the often utterly unexpected occurrence of teenage suicide. The 'un-real reality' of adolescence then, in the extremity of its potentially overt expressions and life-defining conclusions, is indeed a literally dangerous period of development. That most teenagers appear to survive it without overt distress or 'pathological expressions' does not, however, necessarily indicate that no 'serious repression' of their individual character, sense abilities, and intelligences has occurred. The 'heroic' efforts of egoic function to present a unified, confident, competent, and socially acceptable persona are known for 'covering up' or repressing the most extreme of psychological distress and confusions about identity and the nature of experience that conflict with socialized definitions and identifications. That egoic repression tends to be so effective that the distress remains relatively 'unknown' to or unacknowledged by the conscious sense of self testifies to the resilience of egoic function in asserting an 'appearance' of unified self-identification.

Egoic function is in a sense forced to make more definitive identifications in this contexting. If that epistemic emphasis is not to come to dominate identity consciousness then some overt engagement with 'un-real real' status would seem important to avert imposition of a repressively reductive persona formation. Naivete on the part of adult perspective about the psyche-logical reality of adolescence suggests a failure of having consciously confronted the adolescent drama of epistemic 'play' in one's own egoic struggle with the necessarily reductive 'facts of life.'

Early Adulthood: Initial Egoic Confusions of Persona and Self-complexity, Socialized Structure and Anti-Structural Totality

Adolescent confrontation with the seeming divergence of psychological reality, or knowing by way of the un-real real, and the practical reality of life in society, might be posed as culminating, (to varying degrees), in some acceptance of 'adult status.' The social reductions about personal identity and collective life as an adult citizen and self-reliant economic entity then become more or less dominant in determining a person's priorities. Egoic function then appears to shift somewhat from concern with 'inventing' or 'discovering' who and how to 'be one's self' in the world toward 'being a self defined in established societal roles.' Life thereby takes on a more reflexively consistent persona-directed character or consolidated persona posture. Openness, exploring or experimenting as one who is uncertain about the identity of self, other, or world thereby diminishes. Adolescent doubt, defiance, and experimentation lose impetus in this shift because persona identity asserts selfhood and reality more explicitly in terms of socialized structure rather than personal experience or in reference to the concepts of "anti-structural" totality suggested by adolescent 'fantasy.' That is not to assert that all adolescents experiment radically

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or experience radical diversity but rather to indicate an overall tendency in the move toward adulthood that is 'away from' 'fluidity' and toward 'fixity' of identity. Adult epistemological tendencies tend to be more pragmatically reductive and functionally materialistic due to both social conformity and practical necessity. Self < > other < > world continuity become more reductively identified and thus rather mechanistically experienced. One could pose this status as more one of systematized self > < other > < society relations that also gives a sense of independent continuity (self < > other < > society).

This status can also be regarded as a con-fusion of selfhood with persona postures that is in part impelled by the intensity of youthful 'sense of self' continuing after adolescence. Once a sense of "I" develops around specific references to appearance, behavior, appetites, and social contexts that energy seems to thrust persons 'forward' in life in a manner that does not promote reflective self-analysis. Thus there is typically some period of relatively undifferentiated persona/selfhood confusion. Such a status allows people to think and act with considerable confidence and minimal self-doubt. This status can be figured as a more simple opposition of 'I' > < 'Not-I' dynamic of identification.

Mid-Life: Experience's Reflective Potential for Retrospective Differentiation of Egoic Function from Persona, Societal Assumptions from Inclusive Experience

A subsequent generalized phase or identity status can be associated with the concept of mid-life, and its 'mid-life crises' of identity. After fifteen to twenty years of adult status considerable experience accumulates with attempting to 'be one's self' under the reductions of both personal persona postures and the external definitions of social structures. Some persons appear to respond to that experience, confronted by waning youthfulness and impending age, with considerable anxiety. In more antic expressions, people can attempt to 'return to youth' by wearing, buying, or doing what gives the impression of youthful enthusiasm and confidence. Other people experience shock and depression in response to realizing how their adult lives have been defined and determined in ways that they now discover their own self-complexity does not genuinely 'identify with.' In another sense, people can become aware of how differently they experience their own selfhood, as well as the character of truth and reality, than their persona attitudes and society have presented these. It would seem that some considerable amount of life needs to be lived or experienced before such reflection upon selfhood, reality, and truth becomes feasible.

Once egoic function becomes experientially alienated from persona postures and social reductions, the 'I' of identity is more able to diversify its representations of identity and reality. Life, it can be assumed, inevitably generates numerous experiences of an inclusive epistemological character. But an effectively socialized persona attitude seems typically capable of repressing or redefining such experiences. By 'mid-life,' however, experience and the development of analytical reflection can dislodge

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the dominance of those attitudes. Subsequently a much greater potential for complex relations of 'I' < >'Not-I' and Self < > Society < > World can emerge. Again, the assertion here is not that all persons undergo such a consciously reflective shift in identification during 'mid-life.' Rather, there appears to be a considerable occurrence of such a shift among people in general that suggests some intrinsic impetus for a further differentiation of developmental phasing in the life course. One could term this a second stage of maturational development. For those who undergo this shift they would seem to be less likely to naively accept either their habitual definitions of their own self and reality, or those of society. With such an attitude a person is better able to mediate between habitual identifications on the one side and experience or analytical reflection on the other. Such a person can more readily 'be in/of the socialized world' and yet think and act with greater autonomy than those who are not so aware of being so 'defined and thus confined.'

Life Conclusion: Culmination of Life Stages in Old Age and a Potential Release From Both Egoic Expectations and Socio-Structural Reductions

As the life course approaches its conclusion in the confrontation with mortality, yet another developmental shift in the maturation of psycho-epistemic attitudes appears feasible. Old age, or perhaps overt confrontation with debility and impending death at any age, appears to confront consciousness with the ultimate limitations of its embodiment. Within that contexting, egoic function is presented with a potential realization about the superfluousness of its maintaining habituated persona reductions as well as those of socialized standards for identity, reality, and truth. Persons in such a relation to life and society might more readily allow their consciousness to 'take whatever form' it is impelled toward. Expression, though, feeling, meaning making are all potentially less inhibited than under the normative status of adult identity. Egoic function then might become less reflexively obedient to the imperatives of habituated expectations and social proprieties. Both present and previous life experience might then be allowed to emerge in awareness through a less reductive, more inclusive epistemic mode. The example of people who, facing death by disease or old age, declare that they feel more 'alive' or more 'a part of the world' than ever before illustrates this shift. As Pedrazza notes, old age with its diminishment of egoic sense of control and certainty, might well be regarded as an inherently Dionysian status because it enables a play of identification that is no longer so tightly defined by socialized reality. Such a status of egoic relation to self and world might then be figured as emphasizing a 'I' < >'Not-Not-I' identity consciousness.

Educating Selfhood as the Complex Tending of Psychological Development and Epistemic Capacities through these Life Course Stages

The ‘many-ness of one-ness’ or diversity of self, other, and world are posed as being variously encountered in the life stages or phases of development suggested above. In this view, an evolving selfhood or sense of self becomes the primary psychological context for experiencing and becoming reflectively conscious about those diversities. Yet awareness of self-complexity appears to develop in relation to awareness of the complexity of others and the world that then ‘mirror’ one’s own radical complexity ‘back.’ Development of complex identification thus becomes associated with diversifying psychological and epistemological modes of experience and knowing. Which of those modes and capacities are most appropriate to emphasize, and how, would then appear to be somewhat relative to the general tendencies for self< >other< >world orientation in each life stage.

In a general respect, this development concerns the articulation and interactivity of competence in reductive as well as non-reductive modes of knowing and understanding. In a more specific regard, such psycho-epistemic development can be viewed in relation to the differentiations of egoic function in relation to self, other, and world. In order for egoic function to develop a diversified sense of self appropriate to re-presenting radically complex identity, it would seem to have to fully invest itself in the differing contexts of life course stages. Thus there arise concerns about both supporting the self-assertive tendencies of egoic identification as well as at times radically challenging its reductions and oppositions. To be able to re-present the unfolding diversities of an individuating self in relation to those of a world known through both reductive and non-reductive modalities egoic function would have to become multi-functional or poly-centric in deploying sensibilities and intelligences. It would need to develop confidence and competence in making definitive identifications as well as in relativizing those to more inclusive, radically complex statuses. It would need to be able to ‘see its operations’ from the perspective of its own self-complexity and from that of socialized standards for identity, reality, and truth. The ‘education of complex selfhood’ thus would involve both affirmations and deconstructions of egoic assertions, relative to the relational contextings of self< >self, self< >society, and self< >cosmos (or radically complex totality)—as positioned in different life stages. In terms of the ‘cosmological’ relationship, egoic function is confronted with learning to relativize both its personal as well as the socialized reductions to the totalistic field of irreducible complexity through non-reductive epistemic methods.

Some brief suggestions of how the diversification of psychological capacities, epistemic method, and egoic function might appropriately be emphasized in those stages follows.

Stimulating Inclusive Embodiment in Infancy

Attending to the initial encounters of psyche ‘as embodiment’ in life course stage of infancy appears as predominantly somatic or sensorial task. Constant physiological care is obviously a necessity for infant survival. But how that care is provided and the attitudes and actions of parents leading up to the onset of childhood status with the emergence of linguistic competency is regarded as having critical effects of psychical development. If the development of consciousness is regarded as stimulated by interactive relations with self, other, and world then providing diverse and non-threatening engagements for the infant seems essential. Varied activity, and a dialectic of ‘mutual mirroring’ between infant and adult behaviors, in the context of somatically affirmed emotional affinities, are thus seen as the elements of ‘educating the embodiment of psychical infancy.’

Elaborating the Interplay of Childhood Metamorphic Play and Pragmatic Objectification

In general, childhood development can be viewed as the articulation of ways of knowing difference within a context of experientially based participatory consciousness. Supporting and facilitating that diversification of sense abilities and intelligences for knowing, and thus knowledge creation, thereby are concerned with how to enhance differentiation without imposing ultimate reductions that might dissociate the psycho->somatic interplay of participatory experience. Differentiation of modes of knowing then can ‘take place’ within a sensed field of continuity of self->other->world (or self->society->totality). This view need not be understood as imposing an aversion to practical, objective learning or understanding. Rather, it suggests a value for providing such stimulus ‘in relation to’ more overtly metamorphic experience and metaphorical activities of symbolic understanding.

Such an approach would promote a relatively ‘even handed’ educational emphasis upon thinking and doing that emphasize both reductive literalization and non-reductive symbolization. Learning of language illustrates the inherent interplay of these modalities as it is both an access to definitionally reductive identification and metaphorical re-presentation of the symbolized experience of inclusive knowing—of the logics of one-ness and of many-ness. However, language learning can be presented with an emphasis on either of these ‘polarities.’ It would seem appropriate then to take care in emphasizing both aspects of language usage so that the symbolization of mythical dynamism is not repressed in an over-emphasis upon mechanistic objectification. This move would require careful development of deductive and analytical capacities without emphasizing them as superior or antithetical to metaphoric sensing or metamorphic experiencing. To do so requires confidence that childhood intelligence is quite capable of ‘operating’ in more than one ‘epistemological methodology’ for determining ‘reality’—a naïve but essential concurrency of real and ‘un-real real.’

Another dyad can be offered to illustrate attending to the diversification of modes of knowing. Language as a written or literary formulation of consciousness can readily be regarded as emphasizing different cognitive functions and sense abilities than it does as an oral phenomenon. As noted by McLuhan, these are different “outerings” of human psychical, and even somatic, capacities. The literary form of language expressed as reading and writing is more objectified and overtly systematic. Similarly, numbers and mathematics engaged in relation to the manipulation of tangible objects versus as written signs and programmatic formulations has different epistemic qualities. It would then appear important to provide extensive stimulus in and engagement with both literary and oral modalities, both somatically tangible and theoretically abstract context for mathematics.

It seems important then to emphasize the sensorially experiential aspects of oral culture, metaphoric expression and metamorphic enactment at least as equally as literary and analytical scientific abstraction, particularly in the earlier aspects of childhood differentiative development. In the latter aspects of this life stage, as concern with more pragmatic objectification seems to emerge, an epistemic emphasis upon analytical abstraction seems more appropriate. Yet that emphasis could be contextualized by the perspective that it is also a ‘way of knowing radical complexity’ rather than only a way of knowing reductive simplicity. If the reductive method of rational analysis and theoretical interpretation were thusly introduced, without exclusive or reflexive association to reductive purposes, then perhaps subsequent struggles with the contrasts of the real and unreal, the objectively practical and psycho-symbolically actual, would not be so antithetical. What is being suggested here is, in Gieggerich’s terms, beginning in later childhood to develop a capacity to “think logical negativity.” In the terms of this study, one could state this capacity as the ability to ‘think’ (know) even abstractly reductive, positivistic knowing as psycho-logical knowing that is not ultimately ‘of things’ but of how they ‘thing’—by way of non-positivized characterization of their dynamical ‘thinging’ or becoming. Theoretical explanations of ‘objective reality’ thus can be engaged as ‘of the real’ that is not simply positivized. Thinking thusly retains some of the ‘mystery’ of more overtly mythical expression and experience.

Perhaps the most difficult consideration about how to engage a mutuality of reductive and non-reductive epistemic development in childhood arises in relation to moral or ethical concerns. Issues of right and proper behavior are obviously important concerns for the development of ‘well socialized behavior.’ Differing societies assert differently structured rules and roles for morality. But these are intrinsically reductive. Thus if they are given an absolute status of primacy over any thought or behavior that might contradict them, the metamorphic play of childhood consciousness is at risk for epistemic repression. In contemporary Western societies, this issue is complicated by the association of morality with the ethics of egalitarian and rationalistic cultural values. Subsequently, the presentation or teaching of morality not only asserts reductive definition of right and wrong identity, thought, and behavior, it is conveyed in rationalistic terms. Children are thus continuously admonished not only to ‘behave properly’

but about how proper behavior is reasonable, rational behavior. Thus to be 'socially proper' one is urged to be 'analytically reasonable' about fairness and equity. Such emphasis can be regarded as intrusive upon the way complex development of childhood consciousness is being presented in this writing. Ethics and morality have an important place in childhood development, both as socialization of behavior and psychological impetus for egoic differentiation. However, if conduct and expression are not allowed, and accepted, which violate and contradict ethical rules and roles, the developing sense of self, other, and world might not be able to experience the diversity of expression necessary to both reductive and non-reductive understanding.

Complementing the Antagonisms of Adolescent Dissociative Relation with Self, Society, and Totality

Anthropological study of archaic culture and society indicate that great emphasis tended to be placed on adult attention to the transitions from childhood to adolescent status. In general it appears that these initiatory attendings to the psychological, somatic, and social changes of this life stage often emphasized both reductive and non-reductive knowings of self, society, and cosmos (totality). In contrast to more modernist Westernized attitudes, the more archaic ones often express an emphasis upon the traumatic turmoil of adolescent consciousness. It appears as if these cultural perspectives found a value in overtly emphasizing the dissociative effects of egoic confrontation with both personal and social assertions of self identification during radical physiological, emotional, and intellectual development. It might well be worthwhile then to consider how consciously complimenting those antagonisms might better serve maturation than repressing or ignoring them.

Anthropologists note that at least in some cultures age of initiates is quite flexible, being subjectively determined by attentive elders evaluating the 'developmental' status of children between about 12 and 14 years of age. One might propose that the culmination of this phase represents the 'appropriate' period for confrontation of developing singularity of egoic identification with some rather 'terrifying' 'other world' of complex meaning and 'creative forces' as the individual commences physical and social maturation. In contemporary educational culture, it seems that this role or function is hardly engaged at all, except perhaps in the form of a more theoretical and abstract scientific indoctrination. Induction to life as a maturing sexual entity is dealt with almost exclusively in this literalistic biological manner or on an ethical basis, rather than as a context for developing relations with polycentric psyche. An example of a more 'inclusivist' orientation of identity consciousness at this stage of life would be introduction to Jungian notions of contra-sexual intra-psychic aspects of Anima and Animus.

Adolescence, with its onset of hormonal stimulus, avowed 'identity crises,' and efforts to assert often contrasting individual and collective identities in the process of configuring an 'adult' "persona," presents the opportunity to induce the initial conscious or reflective relativization of egoic function to polycentric psyche. It is, in mythological sense, the opportunity for 'second birth' or 'spiritual birth.' That

means that as a developmental stage of psycho-somatic life process, consciousness is intrinsically 'thrown open' but confrontation with both the limitless and limited contexting of 'immaterial psyche' embodied in mortal materiality. Since this is the period of life when long-standing persona 'structures' become entrenched in adult identity as an 'accommodation' of individual character with "social structures." This context of the confrontation of individualistic personality and socially participatory identity seem appropriate for confronting the still uncertain yet impulsive urge to establish singular sense-of-self with an after modernist initiation of 'identity consciousness' as epistemological methodology. Such an initiation would confront one with McLuhan's "language of forms" and Giegerich's "logic of totality," etcetera. This can be posed as the 'post'-modern version of archaic culture's exposing the newly forming and reflexively positivistic sense-of-self/other/world in adolescence with the 'creational powers' of 'super-natural' reality—or the "implicate flowing" in/as "explicate form." As noted, archaic adolescent initiations tend to involve 'dis-illusionment' of egoic expectations that enable a more reflective and complex maturation of adult mentality. One could also characterize this initiatory effort as inducing logic and experiential context for learning to 'think about thinking,' or to 'think psyche-logically.' Engagement with expressions of 'mythical dynamism' and somaticized shifts of 'self-consciousness' would be essential to 'validating' such a 'dis-illusionment' of the personalistic attitude that could simultaneously be 'inspiring' to the 'rest of the self' subject to such intense repressions and "projectivity" during adolescence. Anthropologists have noted elders in archaic societies assertions that if youths are not initiated before late adolescence then it is too late to effect personal perspectives.

Since mythical dynamism in contemporary society is expressed mostly in the commercialized media entertainments and advertisements it is those positivized forms to which adolescent mentality is most psychically responsive. These 'objectifications' of the 'un-real reality' of inclusive knowing are thus 'ripe' for 'archetypal engagement' in a context of respectful initiatory 'deconstruction.' All aspects of popular culture—electronic media, television, advertisements, movies, consumer products, music—provide the *pirma materia* for such an 'initiation into conscious relation with dynamical reality' and epistemological complexity. These are the 'thought forms' of myth in contemporary culture that can become "organs of reality" if "sublated" into their dynamical status, their 'thingless thinging'—their 'indeterminately meaningful references.' But that 'de-positivization' will necessarily be disillusioning for appetite-identified adolescent egoic identities seeking confident sense of self in relation to positivistic culture. Yet that very disappointment with the seeming substance of commercialized cultural reality can enable egoic-function to put more focus on the complexities of the individual self< >Self eros and its elucidation one's radically totalistic character. As noted, the issue of sexuality for adolescents also provides a 'mythically charged' positivized context suitable for engaging various epistemological methodologies and somaticized experience of the variousness of self and other knowing.

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These notions are not meant to suggest literal or exclusive categories of cognitive capacities, developmental stages or chronological phases of development. An appropriately complex consideration of these issues would require an interdisciplinary association of cross-cultural anthropological, sociological, and psychological studies of development of cognitive, social, and expressive characteristics of children. But it is asserted here that any attempt to act ‘response-ably’ in regard to development of mytho-logos concurrency requires addressing these concerns in parenting, socializing, and educating youth.

Facilitating Adult Mediation of Self-Directed Diversity within Socially Structured Reductive Identifications

Adulthood might be understood as a status that is not only socially designated and defined but also an on-going interplay of self-asserted autonomy within persona and socially structured reductions of identity, reality, and truth. Those forms of schooling referred to as “higher education” and associated with college or university study suggest this phase of development. A young person transitions from a more uniform schooling typically of adolescence to one that emphasizes diversified disciplinary, and thus epistemological, contexts for differentiating statuses. The term “liberal arts” identifies that model of early adult schooling. Yet even as persons are exposed to a wider diversity of ‘fields of study’ they are also encouraged to ‘choose their major,’ the academic field or practical application where they will place their emphasis for learning and possibly for participating economically in social structure. Adult life as a both an independent yet socially defined and responsible entity is thus pre-figured by this model for the ‘final’ stages of formalized schooling. University constitutes a socially contexted venue for any on-going efforts at self-directed identity development that can emphasize both reflective analytical autonomy and the proper ways to successful social conformity.

Thus universities, like other social structures, can facilitate or retard the further development of autonomous self-generation of identity status and epistemological diversification. Such enhancement can be emphasized for either or both the more reductive and more non-reductive, exclusive and inclusive modes of knowing. Contexts for cultural, social, and economic interaction can all place emphasis on one side or the other of this duality. On rare occasion, such contexts can actually promote a meta-epistemic engagement with the concurrence of reductive and non-reductive modes of knowing. In general, a society that does not structurally induce such reflection upon the reductive emphasis of its identifications, thereby enabling relativization of them to a larger, more radically complex totality (of self, cosmos, Nature), serves to repress rather than facilitate both the on-going development of the diversification of selfhood and that of pluralistic, egalitarian social relations. When there is no ‘officially’ recognized, thus validated, context for encountering and experiencing an ultimately irreducible interplay of self < > self,

society < > cosmos then reductively socialized identity or pragmatism remains reflexively and hierarchically superior to any more-than-socialized totality.

Regarding the life course as manifesting somewhat differentiated contextings for meta-epistemic relativizations of reductive identity to irreducible statuses of complexity indicates a need for social structures to attend not only to the more obvious ‘metamorphoses’ of childhood and adolescence, but to subtleties of adult development as well. Attainment of some adult status of self reflection upon autonomous selfhood within socialize structure provides a perspective for assisting in diversifying the evolving sense of self, other, and world in the young. In the context of pluralistic, egalitarian cultural values it would seem that adults have a socialized responsibility to foster such differentiation of sense abilities and intelligences in youth. But older adults would appear to potentially attain a perspective enabling them to assist younger adults in the further maturation of that diversification. The ‘passage’ into ‘mid-life’ and ‘old age’ can be seen as psyche-logically significant as those into adolescence and early adulthood. Each such shift suggests a potential context for initiatory attendance to the ‘maturation of human consciousness’ within the literalized context of aging, experience, and mortality.

In summary review, then, childhood is here regarded as an emersion in the ambi-valence of reductive < > non-reductive epistemic modes. Adolescence is presented as a confrontation with the competition between these modes. Early adulthood is characterized as something of an emersion in the literalization of life experience, a practical con-fusion of reductive and non-reductive. Mid-life contexting then comes about after accumulated experience (various egoic ‘victories’ and ‘defeats’), enabling a more autonomous, individuated reflection upon the confinements of both personal persona and social conformity. Such a perspective would appear to contribute to a more self-conscious awareness of ‘when and where’ reductive and non-reductive modes are ‘operating.’ Late life maturity then is characterized as a potential context for emersion in the concurrencies of these modalities—a sort of reflective return to the metamorphic psyche of childhood. In terms of the modernist/postmodernist “search for meaning” these stages can be approached as different contextings for how that search is generally ‘developed’ and how persons in one life course stage or phase can readily contribute to facilitating that of persons in other phases by offering a contrasting reflection. The one-ness of that searching can be approached variously, and is inherently varied if these archetypal categories of epistemic orientation are at all accurate.

The Example of Gender and Sexual Orientation as Archetypal Categories for Education and Initiation

Socialized identity of necessity poses definitive categories for ‘sorting’ persons. Though many of these are narrowly contextual in their preeminence (doctor, mother, president, artist), some play a more fundamental role in defining identity. How societies respond to epistemic development and education of

sense abilities and intelligences is greatly influenced by its most broad categories of identification. Gender is perhaps the most inherent and pervasively socialized such distinction. For the vast majority of humans, sexual identity is anatomically and physiologically ‘a fact.’ It is often assumed then by social standards that all persons are either male or female. Thus such a status for identification could be considered to be virtually universal, a sort meta-archetypal category similar to that of ‘being human.’ There are some similarly archetypal characteristics to the life course stages of male and female humans that appear to have some rather consistent developmental influences. The onset of puberty and menses is the most overt example. However, regardless of how obvious differences tend to be between ‘the sexes’ and how reflexively societies assert an oppositional relationship between them, there is always more diversity and complexity that such opposition can ‘account for.’

Thus there might well be significant differences between the factors of emotional and intellectual development of males and females *in general* worthy of consideration in how they are socialized and educated. But there are also going to be significant diversities of individual character with those categories, and even individuals who simply do not or cannot conform to either. This diversity is evident in as the anatomical condition of hermaphroditism, as well as biochemical variations of sexual hormone production that influence appearance and behavior. It is also evident in the psycho-logical expression of “gender identity.” Archaic societies have been cited in anthropology whose socialized identity categories overtly acknowledge more than ‘two sexes’ (such as the Hindu “har . . .). Contemporary modernist societies, in accord with pluralistic cultural values, are now ‘officially’ re-cognizing more than one socially accepted status of sexual orientation or “gender identity” as well.

Such diversity within and between such a fundamental or archetypal category of socialized identity as male and female illustrates the pervasiveness of the conundrum of ‘the many in the one.’ This context for the inherent struggles between socially identified status and the actualities of both physiological and psychical life is offered as a reference for how intrinsic and genuinely human the struggle between reduction and non-reduciton, exclusion and inclusion are. As such, it is meant to emphasize the radical implications pluralistic, egalitarian cultural values have for socialized relativization of habituated identities to a more radically complex totalilty.

Knowing, Knowledge, and Education under Instrumentalist Social Values

Contemporary discussion about education often centers around its con-figuration as learning technical, linearly logical, economically ‘useful,’ abstract procedures and mental skills—the instrumental skills of the ‘cult of measurement’ and mechanistic selfhood. ‘Knowledge’ has come to be regarded almost exclusively as that which can be ‘tested’—as a ‘measurable’ ‘quantity.’ A person’s capacity for

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‘success’ in life is thus implied as something ‘measurable.’ If one fails to ‘succeed’ one has ‘failed to measure-up.’ The social value of persons is increasingly associated with the economic ‘value’ of the knowledge or functional skills they can ‘apply effectively.’ Knowing in this form of knowledge-as-information or skill has thus become positivized not only as ‘the things of knowing’ (so readily confused with that which these symbolically re-present), but also as a commodity that can be acquired and possessed. Learning thus comes to resemble a process of production in which the commodity of knowledge, or skilled persons, are systematically ‘manufactured.’ In comparison, knowing-as-wisdom that is not ‘instrumentally useful’ has become increasingly ‘quaint’ and esoterically regarded. It seems worth considering that such a reductive contexting for knowing as knowledge is not so much evidence of ‘progress’ for the Enlightenment Project as of ‘modernist mentality’ frantically attempting to assert itself ‘against’ some enormous shift in collective psyche long brewing as some inherent postmodernist element. The impulse to turn education into a ‘consumer driven market’ suggests an extreme, perhaps desperate assertion of materialistic positivism. Obviously “persona,” be it personal or societal, will ‘go to great extremes’ to attempt to maintain its dominance over conscious identity. Though it exerts its influence over the young with tremendous energy, they are also those yet least indoctrinated and thus perhaps most likely to resist. Certainly the succeeding historical waves in modernity of adolescent generational disenchantment with formalized schooling and ‘adult’ culture suggest some mismatch of educational methods and contemporary psychic context. McLuhan famously noted that “electronic culture” appeared to be exacerbating a discrepancy between mechanistic models of knowledge and the knowing of young persons.

The young today live mythically and in depth. But they encounter instruction in situations organized by means of classified information—subjects are unrelated, they are visually conceived in terms of a blueprint. Many of our institutions suppress all the natural direct experience of youth, who respond with untaught delight to the poetry and the beauty of the new technological environment, the environment of popular culture. It could be their door to all past achievement if studied as an active (and not necessarily benign) force.

The student finds no means of involvement for himself and cannot discover how the educational scheme relates to his mythic world of electronically processed data and experience that his clear and direct responses report. [. . .]

Education must shift from instruction, from imposing stencils, to discovery—to probing and exploration and to the recognition of the language of forms. (McLuhan. Understanding Media 100)

“Recognition of the language of forms,” of the ‘content’ of the archetypality of ‘modes’ of thinking and configuring, or ‘identifying’ de-positivizes epistemological assumptions. It constitutes a radical dis-identification with much of modernism’s mechanistic reductivity. McLuhan’s analysis concludes that the ‘electrical age’ uses media of communication that have ‘mythic dynamism’ in the ways these modes ‘collapse’ the old identifications of space and time with ‘instantaneous transmission.’ In this way it

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seems Titanism has confounded itself on the creations of its own technological extremity. The mechanistic logic of technological culture has manifested 'mediums' of expression that 'surpass' that mechanistic logic or mentality in the complexity of their dynamic associations. The Dionysian play of childhood mentality can still readily 'associate' with/in that dynamism, 'identifying with' its eruptions in 'popular' culture as 'entertainment.' But that capacity is not provided an education that enables it to give giving such an experience an "intellectual form" expressed in some commensurable sophistication of concurrent or recursive logic. Experience of the mythical dynamism of evoked by 'electronic culture' is not amenable to expression in the available intellectual discourse.

Actual epistemological cognitive processes are thus caught in a classic "double bind" whereby much of what they inherently seek to know in/as experience is invalid according to the epistemological methods and criteria for valid reality according to the 'systematized knowledge' of schooling which positivizes knowing and literalizes reality. One simply cannot thusly know one's selves, others, and the worlds *as they variously are*.

The very circumstance that the concept of "double bind" was a product of deduction, the resolution of a *reductio ad absurdum* in conventional epistemology, indicated that the new epistemology must be supported by extension into many other fields. [. . .] The behaviorists and the idealists had both created vast imaginary domains of explanation. On one side were the edifices of intellect where the *implicit* had been elegantly unfolded from the "self-evident" premises and postulates to build such great tautologies as arithmetic and Euclidean geometry. But none of these could ever serve as the explanatory frame for learning and adaptation because conventional logic could never admit the oscillations and contradictions of recursive systems. (Bateson, A Sacred Unity 186-87)

The dominant form of epistemology or 'system of knowing' remains tautologically 'positivist' and equationally linear in its devotion to tautological self-consistency. It relies upon constant reductive reference to 'positivized truths' either as 'ideals' or as self-referring deductive formulations as if these were mathematical certainties. Thus concepts are validated by consistency with other concepts much as words are defined by other words. But as Bateson notes, that epistemic mode is incapable of representing the polyvalent and recursive dynamical complexity of such phenomena as human learning and adaptation to unfamiliar contexts. In such situations contradictory conditions and statuses that appear contradictory to reductively linear perspective are inherent and accommodation of these is obstructed by demanding self-consistency. The tension of contrasting validities poses a "double bind" for the attitude insisting upon self-consistency. When attempts are made to 'act mythically' the "double bind" of being in/of a 'recursive system' while intellectually operating 'from' the logic of a reductive linear epistemology tends to be psycho-somatically traumatic. Youth are inherently exposed to such a conflict when the 'mythical dynamism' of adolescence is confronted with societal insistence upon self-consistent validity. The responses of youth to such a "double bind" can include repressions of awareness, reactive

defiance, deviant experimentation, and emotional depression. In the absence of attention to this epistemic contrast, whatever ‘subject’ is taught in seeking to ‘educate,’ whatever the conceptual complexity addressed, a socialized reflexive tendency tends to ‘teach the message’ of the dominant epistemological method or ‘medium’—a medium whose ‘epistemic message’ does not reflect the dynamism of either “complex systems” or human experience in/as the radically complex, non-self-consistent concurrencies of perceptual, cognitive, and emotional life.

[. . .] current educational processes are a “*rip off*,” from the point of view of the student. [. . .] While much that universities teach is new and up-to-date, the presupposition or premises of thought upon which all our teaching is based are ancient and, I assert, *obsolete*.

I refer to such notions as:

- a. The Cartesian dualism separating “mind” from “matter.”
- b. The strange psychicalism of the metaphors which we use to describe and explain mental phenomenon— “power,” “tension,” “energy,” “social forces,” etc.
- c. Our anti-aesthetic assumption, borrowed from the emphasis which Bacon, Locke, and Newton long ago gave to the physical sciences, viz. that all phenomena (including the mental) can and shall be studied and *evaluated* in quantitative terms.

The view of the world—the latent and partly *unconscious* epistemology—which such ideas together generate is out of date [. . .]. (Bateson, Mind and Nature 235)

Even when attempts are made to emphasize the metaphoric and metamorphic activity of childhood identity consciousness (and thus some basis for mytho-logos complexity), there persists an ‘unconscious’ tendency to do so ‘in service’ to the instrumental purposes and hierarchical ordering of dominant socialized structure.

[. . .] school systems, even religiously sponsored ones, are largely ignorant of the power of ritual, except the ceremonial sort used at assemblies or employed to establish hierarchies and maintain order. Instead of elevating learning to the level of ritual celebration, schools use ceremonies as tools for social control or reduce them to the level of empty play.

Younger children are less worried than adults about the distinctions among play, ritual, work, and drama. But unless adults go beyond instructing children about ritual to teaching them ritually, children’s mastery of ritual skills will atrophy. The trouble is that even if kids do master the language of ritual, there are few places in which to “speak” it. So it is essential that we create “sanctuaries,” safe “nests,” where ritualized play and ritual experiment are possible. (Grimes, Deeply into the Bone 133)

To act in accordance with the theoretical insights of the pluralistic logic of psyche will require finding ways to advocate for serious emphasis on metamorphic experience and ritualizing *for the sake of* the non-positivistic experience these enactments generate, for the expression of ‘the rest of the self’ (besides the habitually singular egoic-identity), that is thusly enabled. Yet to satisfy the inherently instrumental concerns of dominant social values, a ‘case’ must inevitably be made for the value of such experience to an individual’s (measurable) ‘success’ in life.

Subsequent to emphasizing metaphoric sensibility and metamorphic experience in childhood, adolescent 'education' would be the context to develop 'logical' reflection on such experience—an intellectual articulation of knowing mytho-dynamically. For archaic cultures, the typical trauma of adolescent identity formation appears to have been the appropriate developmental 'moment' for initiation of 'ordinary identity' into a larger field of reference (i.e. the inclusively cosmic or sacred). Thus it also is likely to be the most effective time for 'post'-moderns to confront egoic function with notions of psychic plurality and configure a Dionysian initiation of persona into 'personae.' Again, those who have not had such an experience may not be capable of fully appreciating it, but if an attempt to facilitate it is not made by such uninitiated adults, society will have failed to 'act' upon the psycho-logical insights and reality of reality illustrated in the dialectical relation of modernist < > 'post'-modernist insights about many-ness and one-ness.

Restoring Emphasis on Emotive Epistemology to the Education of Selfhood and its Rational Capacities

Any inclusive approach to childhood development and education of complex self awareness would have to grant considerable emphasis to the role of emotion and feeling in the diversified deployment of the rational intellect. Such emphasis tends to be denigrated by a reflexively mechanistic or instrumental perspective on the value and function of the intellect, however. As noted, Damasio's neurological research has indicated the importance of emotion and feeling to rational thought. It is useful to remember that emotion and feeling are not automatically registered in self-conscious awareness—that is to say, they can be readily repressed and are often difficult to observe in others as well as in one's self.

I have proposed that the term *feeling* should be reserved for the private, mental experience of an emotion, while the term *emotion* should be used to designate the collection of responses, many of which are publicly observable. In practical terms, this means you cannot observe a feeling in someone else although you can observe a feeling in yourself when, as a conscious being, you perceive your own emotional states. Likewise no one can observe your own feelings, but some aspects of the emotions that give rise to your feelings will be patently observable to others. Moreover, for the sake of my argument, the basic mechanisms underlying emotion do not require consciousness, even if they eventually use it: you can initiate the cascade of processes that lead to an emotional display without being conscious of the inducer of the emotion let along the intermediate steps leading to it (Damasio 42).

If feelings are definitively 'private' or not overtly evident in the behavior of others, then a sensitivity to the feeling of others would seem to derive only from developing a sensitivity to feeling in one's own selfhood. And if one can be emotionally expressive without necessarily registering the phenomenon in one's self-conscious awareness (as feeling) then one might well require observational

response or feedback from others to better learn to derive conscious feelings from one's emotional life as epistemic modality. The point here is that the significance and meaningfulness of emotional phenomenon and its presence as feeling *in relation to rationality* is not automatic or intrinsic to 'merely being human.' Rather, it seems human to have to develop the capacities to bring these (epistemic) aspects of consciousness into complex interrelation. Little of educational intention or schooling appears to place this concern foremost in its considerations.

Of Personal and Collective Practices for Manifesting the Many in the One with/in Titanic Society's Mythical Reductionism

The conundrum of how to depositivize knowing and knowledge from within a religiously positivistic mentality of identity consciousness poses two broad concerns. From one perspective there is the possibility of *not doing*—of learning to resist certain tendencies in habituated perception, cognition, and expression that intrinsically privilege and enforce the dominance of positivistic reality. From another perspective there are the possibilities of *doing differently*—of consciously developing modes of perception, cognition, and expression that promote a more concurrently complex contexting of valid reality.

Both these approaches can be manifested in an effort to resist reduction analyzing it for how it depends upon literalizing 'un-real real' psychic re-presentation's metaphorical symbolism to assert its supposed definitive, literalistic, mechanized reality and truth. By deconstructing positivistic literalism for its inherent, if covert, dependence on the 'un-reality' of metaphorical consciousness, it can be revealed as covert myth that asserts its influence over social attitudes and personal persona more by way of psychic symbolism than pragmatic functionalism. Practicing such analytical reflection upon personal and social habits of identification

A General Contemporary Practice of Inclusive, Non-reductive Knowing and Expression Directed towards Relativization of Predominant Reduction

In regards to its view on contemporary development of epistemic diversity for knowing one-ness and many-ness in the presently 'postmodern modern moment,' this study is obviously pessimistic about there being any effective 'resistance' to the pervasive predominance of reductive identity consciousness. In general, any 'systematic attempt' to reorder the prevailing emphasis upon systematic reduction, despite the 'postmodern symptoms' of radically complex analytical differentiations (Bohm's "fragmentation" of continuity), appear to be reiterations of the very impetus toward 'making singular order.' It might be then, that the way to 'promote epistemic diversity' is to 'go with the flow' of Titanic reductionism. That is to say, not to 'fight' it rather to emphasize awareness of its intrinsically psychical, symbolic, metaphoric,

even mytho-logical character. Such an endeavor could be phrased as ‘the practice of revealing that the emperor of reduction has no clothes.’ Such practice can be conceived as having two general aspects.

In one regard, a structurally socialized bias for reductive epistemics or exclusive, positivized knowing can be deconstructed as deriving from an arbitrarily imposed set of criteria for real > <unreal, true > <false binary oppositions. Such hierarchical bases for positivism is then ‘visible’ as psychical imagination—a knowing that is not of things but psychic metaphorical re-presentation. In another regard, its expressions can be interpreted as being mythically dynamic metamorphoses of states of being and becoming whose persuasive effects are just as or even more psychologically affectual that literalistically effective. That ‘revelation’ involves demonstrating the ‘unconscious’ or subliminal influence seemingly literal, objectively reductive identifications have upon both personal and collective motives. People are, within a certain necessity, *persuaded* about accepting definitive statuses of the real and true. Their motives then become reflexively habituated to those definitions, producing behaviors that are ‘acted out’ with little or no reflection upon whether they are motivated by symbolic associations rather than ‘objective facts.’ Thus arises the very human need for relativizing simplistic habitual reductions to a more radically complex dynamical experience and understanding of ‘totality.’ Reductive epistemics are also ‘mythically dynamic’ in that these too ‘make a version of reality’ that derives from metaphorical re-presentations of being and metamorphic portrayals of becoming. Making that epistemic ‘slight of psychical hands’ more overtly conscious thus becomes a ‘turning of analytical reduction back upon itself.’ Reduction is inevitably dependent upon non-reduction for its assertions. The logic of one-ness cannot ‘reasonably operate’ in the absence of the ‘logic of many-ness.’ And yet conscious awareness of that relationship is essentially heretical in a society structured around the ‘religion of reductive objectification’ and positivistic quantification.

Reflecting Upon the Mythical Dynamism of Systematic Society and Commercialized Popular Cultural Expression

The practice of such revealing of reduction’s denial of non-reduction can be readily engaged with the dominant aspects of contemporary life. Much ‘cultural producton’ can be identified, in the terms of this study, as ‘assimilational entertainment’ that operates to draw mythical energy into the service of socialized reductions without relativizing the predominance of their structure to any “anti-structural” status (movies, magazines, television, music, sports, religion). But a disciplined deconstructive analysis of those expression can readily reveal how that diversion of non-reductive knowing occurs in portraying the ‘un-real real’ as either ‘mere fantasy’ or ‘hyper reality.’ That most overt expression of ‘un-real real’ re-presentation occurs ‘in service to’ reductively commercialized purposes (i.e., ‘to make profit’) is itself a potent factor in ‘litreralizing’ any potential relativization of socialized reductions to some “anti-structural”

status. Attempting to 'be conscious' of such an intrinsic resistance to non-reductive knowing within a society dominated by is thus a radical act.

Applications of scientific method and technological expression are similarly appropriate phenomenon for a practice of non-reductive knowing and relativization of habituated reductions. Firstly there is the issue of how even scientific thought derives from psychical re-presentation and understanding by way of 'un-real real' status in its theoretical abstractions. Secondly there is the question of whether the inherently hypothetical assumptions of scientific method are acknowledged in explanations of phenomenon (being and becoming) such method is deployed to substantiate. Holding scientific explanations to the methodological criteria of classical scientific method readily relativizes reductive purposes to the more limited reductive assumptions of analytical methodology. In so far as the reductive differentiation of scientific method is applied to reductive, idealistic purpose, it is reflexively inadequate to facilitate radically complex knowing. In so far as it is applied to amplifying insight into radical complexity by way of its intrinsically exponential differentiations, it can enhance a basis for appreciation of radical complexity. Technological expression are akin to the more 'artistic' ones in that these overtly figure what McLuhan termed the "outering" of psychical capacities of human consciousness.

Thus seeking to know the meaningfulness of these expressions as psycho-symbolic manifestations brings their 'reality' into a more inclusive, mytho-logical contexting. Practicing such reflective analysis can 'bring to awareness' the mythically dynamical character of even 'scientifically structured society.'

Coda: Prelude to a Meta-epistemic Logos

In lieu of conclusion, the preceding efforts at positing an archetypal concept of the reductive and non-reductive epistemic aspects of knowing are offered as a pro-vocation to analysts specializing in all disciplinary fields of study. Each disciplinary specialization or knowledge domain can be regarded as presenting a particular archetypal configuration of 'ways of knowing.' And each can be parsed for how and where it uses more and less reductive modes to assert identity status or causal explanations. The intent of the associations made here among disciplinary contexts is not to assert that their particularized 'knowledges' or 'languages' are ultimately commensurable. Rather, the impulse is to initiate a non-reductive concept of how their irreducible diversities can be engaged in some more meta-epistemological *logos* that engenders mythically dynamic sense abilities capable of 'palpably' experiencing the logical form of radically complex totality.

Perhaps the most appropriate summary is, "it's all in how you look at it." There is always a choice between reductive and non-reductive, exclusive and inclusive epistemics. But only if one is both aware of

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and adept in deploying them. And that awareness does not 'come naturally' since to differentiate knowing thusly is intrinsically 'painful' to habituated identity consciousness.

**What an immense rip
In my life and in all things,
In order to be with my entire self,
In everything;
In order to never cease being,
with my entire self, in everything.**
— Juan Ramon Jimenez

Fear habits more than enemies.
--St. Issac of Nineveh